1993-013
Transfer of the PERB's power to grant waivers
Cite as Alaska Op. Att'y Gen. No. 1993-013
April 6, 1993
J.P. "Pat" Wellington
Chairman, Public Employees
Retirement Board
2802 Wesleyan
Anchorage, AK 99508
Re: Transfer of the PERB's power to
grant waivers of the deadline for
claiming occupational disability
benefits; our file no. 663-93-0334
Dear Chairman Wellington:
At the last meeting of the Public Employees' Retirement
Board (PERB), it was proposed that the board transfer its powers
under AS 39.35.410(f) (to waive the deadlines for filing for
applications for occupational disability benefits) to the
administrator of the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS),
reserving
a
right
to
hear
appeals
in
cases
where
the
administrator denies a request.
You asked for an opinion as to
whether the board could legally do this. We believe that it can,
in light of the reserved power to review a denial by the
administrator.
As you are aware, under AS 39.35.410(f) a person
applying for occupational disability benefits under the PERS must
apply "within six months after the date of the accident, if
disability is attributable to an accident, within six months
after the date the disability begins if the disability is caused
by an occupational disease, or within 30 days of terminating
employment, whichever is later."
In addition, the subsection
requires the employee, if the disability is attributable to an
accident, to file a notice of the accident with the administrator
within 30 days of the date that the accident occurred.
The
subsection states, "If the employee is unable to meet a filing
requirement of this subsection, it may be waived by the Public
Employees' Retirement Board for cause."
This board has been presented over the years with a
large number of cases in which an employee has sought a waiver
under AS 39.35.410(f). In many of these cases the administrator
has not opposed the request, either because the good cause for
the employee's failure to meet a deadline was obvious, or because
the deadline was only missed by a short period of time.
There
J.P. "Pat" Wellington, Chairman
April 6, 1993
Our file 663-93-0334
Page 2
seems to be general agreement that it is a waste of everyone's
time to require the board to hear these cases. Therefore it was
proposed
that
the
waiver
power
be
transferred
to
the
administrator, with the board retaining the right to entertain
appeals of denials of waivers by the administrator.
The only case law in Alaska on the question of transfer
of power by an administrative agency seems to be Kaiser v.
Sundberg, 734 P.2d 64, 69-70 (Alaska 1987).
The case, while
upholding one agency's delegation of its statutory powers to
another agency, is not directly on point because it relied on a
statute that specifically required the adoption of regulations to
facilitate such delegations, when feasible.
Here there is no
such statute. However, Kaiser indicates that the Alaska courts
will follow the general rules on administrative subdelegations.
We believe that those general rules allow the proposed transfer
of this board's waiver power to the administrator, because, as
discussed below, there is not a true delegation of that power,
given this board's retention of ultimate control.
The law of administrative subdelegation is discussed in
1 Kenneth. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise •• 3:16 - 3:18 (2d
ed. 1978).
Most significant to the proposed transfer at issue
here, Professor Davis concludes that when an agency's governing
body retains the power to decide whether or not to set aside an
agency
officer's
determination,
"the
power
has
not
been
subdelegated." Id., • 3:17 at 220.
In support of his statement, Professor Davis cites
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Exchange Security Bank,
529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), and Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Duval Jewelry Co., 357 U.S. 1 (1958).
In the former case a
statute allowed a person served with an EEOC subpoena to petition
the EEOC to revoke the subpoena, and required the EEOC to revoke
it under certain circumstances.
The EEOC issued a regulation
requiring its Director of Compliance to make a determination upon
a petition to revoke, which determination "shall be reviewed by
the Commission and unless the Commission decides otherwise shall
become final 3 days thereafter." Id. at 1218. Acting under this
regulation, the Director of Compliance denied Exchange Security
Bank's petition to revoke the subpoena served on it, and the EEOC
did not disturb that denial.
The bank then challenged the
process.
However, the Fifth Circuit, relying on Duval Jewelry,
found that there was no delegation because the commission
retained the ultimate power of decision on the petition to
revoke.
Duval Jewelry involved an NLRB subpoena and a federal
statute incorporated into the laws enforced by the EEOC. As with
the EEOC, the NLRB issued regulations requiring a regional
J.P. "Pat" Wellington, Chairman
April 6, 1993
Our file 663-93-0334
Page 3
director or a hearing officer to pass upon a petition to revoke a
subpoena and allowing for a discretionary appeal to the board.
While the court, unlike Professor Davis, found that this
constituted a delegation, 357 U.S. at 7, it concluded that the
delegation was permissible, since the ultimate power rested with
the board.
The
proposed
transfer
here
is
essentially
indistinguishable from Exchange Security Bank and Duval Jewelry.
Indeed, this transfer appears less extensive than the transfer
upheld in Duval Jewelry. There the NLRB's practice was to deny a
discretionary appeal if it believed no substantial question was
raised in the appeal. 357 U.S. at 6. By contrast, an untimely
applicant for occupational disability benefits under the PERS
would have an absolute right to appeal the administrator's denial
of a waiver to this board, regardless of how weak the applicant's
claim for a waiver might be.
Thus we are confident that our
proposed transfer, if challenged (and it is difficult to imagine
who would challenge such a transfer), would be sustained by the
courts.
Please feel free to contact us if we can be of further
assistance on this matter.
Very truly yours,
CHARLES E. COLE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
By:
John B. Gaguine
Assistant Attorney General
cc: PERB members
Robert Johnson, PERB counsel
Robert Stalnaker