Alabama Attorney General Opinion 1979-0169

OF-Fla OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LEE L. HALE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL CHARLES A. GRADDICK ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF ALABAMA APR 26 DRS ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING 64 NORTH UNION STREET MONTGOMERY. ALABAMA 36130 WILLIAM M. BEKURS. JR. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT WALTER S. TURNER CHIEF ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL JANIE NOBLES ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT Honorable Fred Dykes, Jr. Tax Collector Pike County Troy, Alabama 36081 12051 832-5640 HERBERT I. BURSON. JR. B. FRANK LOEB PHILIP C. DAVIS RON BOWDEN JOHN J. BRECKENRIDGE WILLIAM L. THOMPSON Assistant Attorneys General Revenue Department Tax Collectors - Tax Assessors - Supernumeraries A supernumerary tax collector would continue to receive monthly compensation in the event the supernumerary temporarily fills a vacancy in office. Dear Mr. Dykes: Your letter of March 26, 1979, requesting an opinion from the Attorney General has been referred to my desk for reply. Basically your request was as follows: "Would a supernumerary tax collector or assessor continue to receive his monthly compensation as directed in Code of Alabama 1975, §40-6-3 in the event he is called on to temporarily fill a vacancy in office?" As stated in your request, the appropriate statute regarding compensation for supernumerary officials is codified at Code of Alabama 1975, §40-6-3, Cumulative Supplement, which provides in part: "Every such supernumerary official shall serve for life and receive from the county governing body, in equal monthly installments on the first of each month, an annual salary of 65 percent of the average compensation he re- ceived for the past four years as an official charged with the assessing and collecting of ad valorem taxes, the said salary shall not be less than $6,500 per annum nor more than $11,250 per annum; provided, however, that all persons presently serving as supernumerary officials under -2- "the provisions of this chapter on April 27, 1977, shall receive an annual salary of $6,500, said sum to be paid in the same manner as heretofore provided in this chapter." The statute governing the assumption of duties by a supernumerary official in the event there is a vacancy of office is codified at Code of Alabama 1975, §40-6-2, which provides in part: "And, if a vacancy shall occur in the office in the county in which the supernumerary tax collector, tax assessor, license commissioner or other elected official charged with the assessment and/or collection of any ad valorem taxes holds his commission, he shall immediately assume and exercise all of the duties, power and authority of such official in said county until a successor is ap- pointed by the Governor of the State of Alabama." Since the language in the above-quoted statutes is clear and causes no doubt as to its meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are to give effect to the Legislature's intent as expressed in the statute. Locke v. Wheat, 350 So.2d 451; Akers v. State Ex rel Witcher, 283 Ala. 248, 215 So.2d 578. See Generally: Alabama Digest, Statutes, §181. Where the words of a statute are plain there is no room for construction and if the language is clear it is conclusive. Hodgson v. Mauldin, 344 F.Supp. 302, affirmed Brennan v. Mauldin, 478 F.2d 702, rehearing denied 480 F.2d 924; Alabama Industrial Bank v. State Ex rel Avinger, 286 Ala. 59, 237 So.2d 108; See Generally: Alabama Digest, Statutes, §188. Since the language used in this statute and the intention of the Legislature on this point is quite clear, the fundamental rule of con- struction is that the intention of the Legislature must be given its effect and force as is expressed in the language of the statute. Davis v. State, 16 Ala.App. 397, 78 So. 313; Cheek v. Odom, 20 Ala.App. 31, 100 So. 782; Starlite Lanes Inc. v. State, 283 Ala. 48, 214 So.2d 324. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute will be construed to mean exactly what it says. State v. Robinson Land and Lumber Company of Alabama, 262 Ala. 146, 77 So.2d 641; Henry v. McCormick Brothers Motor Car Co., 232 Ala. 196, 167 So. 256; White v. City of Decatur, 25 Ala.App. 272, 144 So. 872, cert. den. 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873, 86 A.L.R. 914. Where the language is plain it should be considered to mean exactly what it says and rules of statutory construction need not be resorted to when the language is plain and unambiguous. Holloway v. State, 262 Ala. 437, 79 So.2d 40; Steber v. State, 26 Ala.App. 148, 155 So. 706, cert. den. 229 Ala. 88, 155 So. 708. Since the language in §40-6-3, supra, is quite clear that every supernumerary official serves for life and receives a fixed salary on the first of each month, and since there is no provision that such compensation should be either increased or decreased while temporarily filling a vacancy of office, it is my opinion that the supernumerary official would continue to receive his salary regardless of whether or not he is called on to perform the prescribed duties of that office. In other words, if the supernumerary official was called upon to fulfill the duties of the tax collector while a vacancy of office existed, the supernumerary official would continue to receive his supernumerary salary, and would not be entitled to any further compensation. 0 a ' -3- I hope I have fully answered the question contained in your letter, and if I can be of any further service to you in this matter, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, CHARLES A. GRADDICK Attorney General By- JOHN J. BRECKENRIDGE Assistant Attorney General