Alabama Attorney General Opinion 1979-0076

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 1 9-00076) 5aid CHARLES A. GRADDICK ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF ALABAMA LEE L. HALE DEPUTY ATTORNEY ADMINISTRATIVE BUILDING 44 NORTH UNION MONTGOMERY. 31130 AREA (SOU. 134-SISO WILLIAM M. . JR EXECUTIVE ASSI • S. TURNER CHIEF ASSISTANT ATTORNEY JANIE NOBLES ADMINISTRATIVE ASSI February 9, 1979 Honorable Pauline Cumbie Chairman, Houston County Board of Registrars Houston County Courthouse Dothan, Alabama 36301 Dear Mrs. Cumbie: Compensation for Registrars This office is in receipt of your letter of August 3, 1978, wherein you requested an opinion concerning the following question: "I hereby request an Attorney General's opinion as to whether or not Sections 34 and 35, of House Bill 426 (Regular Session 1978) which became law on April 12, 1978, repeal House Bill 722 (Regular Session 1973) which became law on August 10, 1973." The answer to your question is as follows: House Bill 722 is a local act further regulating the compensation of the members of the Houston County Board of Registrars. It provides that those members shall receive Ten Dollars ($10.00) per day to be paid by the state and Ten Dollars ($10.00) per day by Houston County, to be dispensed on the order of the Judge of Probate. Section 34, House Bill 426, expressly repeals certain named statutes. Code of Alabama 1975, §17-4-43 is specifically listed and therefore repealed. That provision formally pro- vided for compensation from the state for members of the Honorable Pauline Cumbie February 9, 1979 Page Two several Boards of Registrars. That section has been replaced by Section 9 of House Bill 426 which provides that members of the several Boards of Registrars are to be compensated Twenty Dollars ($20.00) a day. Section 35 of House Bill 426 is a general repealer and states that all other laws or parts of laws which conflict with House Bill 426 are repealed. Section 34 of House Bill 426 does not specifically mention or list, and therefore repeal, House Bill 722. If that bill is to be repealed, it must be done by Section 35 of House Bill 426. The portion of House Bill 722 dealing with the provision concerning compensation from the state of Ten Dollars ($10.00) a day to members of the Houston County Board of Registrars would be repealed by Section 35 of House Bill 426. This is so because that particular subject matter is expressly pro- vided for in Section 9 of House Bill 426. Consequently, House Bill 722, as it pertains to this subject, would be in conflict with House Bill 426. However, this is not the case with that portion of House Bill 722 dealing with compensation from the county to the members of the Houston County Board of Registrars. Payments on the county level are in no way covered by House Bill 426 and therefore that portion of House Bill 722 dealing with that subject does not conflict with 426. If this portion of 722 were to be repealed by House Bill 426, it would be by implication only, a circumstance not favored by our courts. This-conclusion is well amplified by the case law from our appellate courts. It has long been the law in this state that repeal by implication is not favored, Fletcher v. Tusca- loosa Federal Savings & Loan Association, 294 Ala. 173, 314 So. 2d 51 (1975); Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 165 So. 89 (1935) and that a general law, such as House Bill 426, will not repeal a local law, such as House Bill 722, by implication. Davis v. Browder, supra. This is true even if` thelocal law was a general law in form and passed as such. The courts have said that only when the two statutes in question are so repugnant to each other that it must be pre- sumed that the Legislature intended that the latter should 4 Honorable Pauline Cumbie February 9, 1979 Page Three repeal the former will a repeal by implication be found to exist, and where there is a reasonable field of operation by just construction for both statutes, both will be given effect. Bates v. The State; 240 Ala. 609, 200 So. 779 (1941). The only way a subsequent statute can repeal a prior one is for the repugnance between the two statutes to be so glaring and irreconcilable that the two statutes could not stand together. Bates v. State, supra. In this case we do not have a repugnancy that is glaring or irreconcilable. We have a case where a construction can be given to both statutes so that there is a field of opera- tion for both. House Bill 426's field of operation can be for compensation on the state level while the operation of House Bill 722 can be for the compensation on the county level. With this construction, the two statutes are clearly not repugnant but in harmony. Both statutes should be so construed and given effect. I would be remiss in closing this opinion without men- tioning an important reason for the rule that general laws will not repeal local laws by implication. This is true be- cause the Legislature is usually presumed to have only general cases in view when passing a general law and not particular cases which have already otherwise been provided for by a local or special act. See Hawkins v. City of Birmingham, 239 Ala. 185, 194 So. 533 (1940). In closing, I again reiterate that the portion of House Bill 722 which deals with compensation to the Houston County Board of Registrars from the state is repealed by House Bill 426 but that the provision of House Bill 722 dealing with the county compensation to, members of the Houston County Board of Registrars is not repealed and is to be given effect. I trust that this satisfactorily answers your question. If not, do not hesitate to let me know. Very truly yours, CHARLES A. GRADDICK Attorney General By- 01.47( WILLIAM T. STEP NS Assistant Attorney General WTS:bb