Can the Mayor vote in a City Council meeting under any circumstances? If there is not a more specific statute than 14-43-501; 14-43-402; 14-43-403; 14-43-404, which prohibits the mayor from voting, then he or she can vote. That provision says that the mayor shall have a vote when it is needed to p

STATE OF ARKANSAS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JUSTICE BUILDING, LITTLE ROCK 72201 STEVE CLARK July 31, 1985 (501) 371-2007 ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85-174 Honorable John W. Parkerson State Representative 520 Ouachita Avenue Hot Springs, Arkansas 71901 Dear Representative: You have requested an opinion from our office on the following questions: 1. Does the Mayor of a city of the first class have the right to vote in a City Council meeting on passage of an emergency clause to an ordinance? 2. Does a Mayor of a city of the first class have the right to vote in a City Council meeting under any cirucmstances? In response to your first question Ark, Const., Amend. 7 provides, inter alia, that "if upon a yea and nay vote two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, or two-thirds of all the members elected to city or town councils, shall vote upon separate roll call in favor of the measure going into immediate operation, such emergency measures shall become effective without delay.” (Emphasis added) The Hot Springs City Attorney has correctly pointed out that in construing similar language contained in Amendment 7 the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that an ordinance repealing an initiated ordinance could not be passed by the mayor's vote, because he is not an elected member of the city council. Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. 524, 669 S.W. 2d 471 (1984). Given the clear and unequivocal Language of Amendment 7 in reference to emergency measures, we find the Thompson decision controlling and thus, the answer to your first question is "no". In response to your ‘second question, Ark. Stat. Ann. §19-1010 (Supp. 1983) provides, inter alia, that the mayor "shall have a vote when the mayor's vote is needed to pass any ordinance, by-law, resolution, order or motion." This ig a provision of general applicability to mayors of cities of the first class as ex-officio members of the city council. However, it is well settled that in statutory construction, where specific expressions conflict with general_expressions, the greater effect is given to the more specific expression. .g. Thomas v. Hasely, 277 Ark. 353-600 Sat od 797 (1982). Thus, nowithstanding §19-1010, the references to a “majority of the Alderman" in Ark. Stat. Ann. §19-2402 (1980) for municipal appropriations, and to a "majority . . . of members elected to the Council" in Ark. Stat. Ann. §19-2403 (1980) for entering into contracts precludes the mayor from voting to pass these measures. 1 a Honorable John W. Parkerson July 31, 1985 Page 2 _ ee ee an Accordingly, although §19-1010 gives the mayor a vote when needed to pass any o ordinance, etc., this statute does not apply where a more specific provision, such as the aforementioned statutes. has’ been enacted by the Legislature. O£ course, in the absence of a more specific provision, the mayor retains the power. en atl e-foregeing—opitifon, which I hereby approve, was prepared by Chief Deputy Attorney General Rodney Parham. SC:RP:1m