Can person under l8 be charged with contributing to the delinquency of anoth er person under l8. 5-27-220 9-27-367 No.

STATE OF ARKANSAS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL JUSTICE BUILDING, LITTLE ROCK 72201 STEVE CLARK (501) 371-2007 ATTORNEY GENERAL March 19, 1985 OPINION NO. 85-93 Mr. Ray Scott, Director Arkansas Department of Human Services Donaghey Building - Suite 1300 Seventh and Main Streets ' Little Rock, Arkansas 72201 Dear Mr. Scott: This letter is written in response to your opinion request in which you posed the question of whether under Ark. Stat. Ann. §45-445 (Repl. 1977) a person under eighteen (18) years old can be guilty of contributing to the delinquency of another person under eighteen (18) years old? Stated differently, the question is whether a minor can contribute to another minor's delinquency. By the plain wording of §45-445, a minor cannot be convicted of contributing to the delinquency of another minor. The statute first uses the words "any person" to define a potential defendant under the act. Reading the words in their popular and well known sense, as they must be read, Henderson v. Russell, 267 Ark. 140, 143, 589 S.W.2d 565 (1979), one would conclude that the provision encompassed minors. This conclusion changes later, however, when it is seen that the statute authorizes the issuance of a bench warrant for violation of the act only for an adult. The © provision provides for adjudication and punishment by the juvenile court and by its definition of minor impliedly defines adult as anyone eighteen (18) years old or older. If the juvenile court is to enforce this section, it must necessarily have the power to issue a bench warrant for violation, Hence, who the juvenile court can issue a bench warrant for is who can be guilty of this crime, and that person is an adult, defined as a person eighteen (18) years old or older. As was stated in Scott. v. Greene, 229 Ark. 1043, 1048, 321 S.W.2d 262 (1959), quoting 50 Am. Jur. 371, Statutes, — §376, ". . #« where there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control." The short answer to your question is no. The foregoing opinion, which I hereby approve, was prepared by Assistant Attorney General Thecdore Holder. ely,/ UAL bb Attor ey General SC: TH:eac