No. 79-819
California Attorney General Opinion No. 79-819
Cite as Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-819
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79-819
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN
Attorney General
_________________________
OPINION
of
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN
Attorney General
Rodney Lilyquist, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
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No. 79-819
November 14, 1979
SUBJECT: CHARTER CITY COUNCIL PROCEEDINGS—In a charter city that has
adopted Roberts’ Rules of Order to govern city council proceedings pursuant to charter
authority, a motion carries where two council members vote affirmatively and the two other
members abstain, with the fifth seat vacant.
The Honorable Curtis R. Tucker, Assemblyman, 50th District, has requested an
opinion on the following question:
In a charter city that has adopted Roberts’ Rules of Order to govern city council
proceedings pursuant to charter authority, does a motion carry where two council members
vote affirmatively and the other two members abstain, with the fifth seat vacant?
CONCLUSION
In a charter city that has adopted Roberts’ Rules of Order to govern city council
proceedings pursuant to charter authority, a motion carries where two council members
vote affirmatively and the two other members abstain, with the fifth seat vacant.
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ANALYSIS
We are informed that at a recent meeting of the city council of a chartered city, two
members voted affirmatively on a motion and two members abstained, with the fifth seat
vacant. The city’s charter provides that the council may establish rules and regulations for
the conduct of its proceedings, and the municipal code requires that the meetings be
conducted according to Roberts’ Rules of Order unless the members of the council agree
otherwise. We are asked whether the motion carried, assuming that the abstentions were
not caused by conflicts of interest and Roberts’ Rules of Order were in effect. We conclude
that the motion carried.
To reach our conclusion we must consider several distinct issues. In particular, we
must examine the often quoted principle that in the absence of controlling law, a “majority”
of a “quorum” is empowered to act for a legislative body. (See FTC v. Flotill Products
(1967) 389 U.S. 179, 183; People v. Harrington (1883) 63 Cal. 257, 259–260; Ursino v.
Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal. App. 3d 611, 620; Martin v. Ballinger (1938) 25 Cal. App.
2d 435, 437; 61 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 243, 252 (1978); 60 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 76, 78
(1977); 58 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 706, 706 (1975); 55 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 26,27 (1975).)
A.
Municipal Affairs of a Charter City
The California Constitution provides for ‘home rule” by chartered cities as follows:
“It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in
respect to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations
provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be
subject to general laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution
shall supersede any existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs
shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.” (Cal. Const. art. XI § 5,
subd. (a).)
The establishment of rules regarding the conduct of city council business would
come within the “home rule” provision as a “municipal affair.” (In re Pfabler (1906) 150
Cal. 71, 82; Morton v. Broderick (1897) 118 Cal. 474, 487; see also Fisher v. Board of
Police Commissioners (1965) 236 Cal. App. 2d 298, 300–301.) Thus, while general law
cities are governed, for example, by Government Code section 368101 concerning the
1 Government Code section 36810 provides:
“A majority of the council constitutes a quorum for transaction of business. Less
than a majority may adjourn from time to time, and compel attendance of absent
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transaction of business by a city council (see Kennedy v. City of Ukiah (1977) 69 Cal. App.
3d 545, 551), chartered cities may adopt their own charter provisions governing the
procedures to be followed in city council proceedings.
Here, we are requested to take note that the city in question has a charter allowing
the council to establish its own rules and regulations for the conduct of its business, and
the council has done so by adopting Roberts’ Rules of Order to govern the transaction of
its business. Accordingly, we will look to Roberts’ Rules of Order in determining the issues
presented.
B.
Quorum Requirement
Without the presence of a “quorum,” a deliberative body cannot transact business
other than to (1) fix the time to which to adjourn, (2) adjourn, (3) recess, or (4) take
measures to obtain a quorum. (Roberts’ Rules of Order (Rev. 1970) § 37, p. 295; cf. 61
Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 243, 252 (1978).)
A quorum is the minimum number of members who must be present at a meeting
for business to be legally transacted. (Roberts’, supra, § 3, p. 16; cf. Mason’s legislative
Manual (1975) § 503, p. 340; Sturgis Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure (2d ed.
1966) p. 113.) A quorum refers to the number of members present, not to the number of
members actually voting on a particular question; however, the quorum members must be
entitled to vote.2 (Roberts’, supra, § 39, p. 293; cf. Mason’s, supra, § 502, pp. 338–339;
Sturgis, supra, p. 114.)
A quorum consists of a majority (more than half) of the existing membership of the
body. (Roberts’, supra, §§ 3, 39, pp. 17, 294; cf. Mason’s, supra, § 500, p. 336; Sturgis,
supra, p. 113.) The existing membership may be less than the fixed membership of the
body if one or more seats are vacant. (Roberts’, supra, § 43, p. 342; cf. Mason’s, supra,
§ 501, p. 337; Nesbirt v. Bolz (1939)13 Cal. 2d 677, 680; 49 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 30, 32–
33 (1967).)
members in the manner and under the penalties prescribed by ordinance.”
2 A member who is not entitled to vote because of a conflict of interest, for example, is not
counted for purposes of establishing a quorum on a particular question. (Roberts’, supra, § 39, p.
293; cf. Mason’s, supra, § 502, pp. 338–339; Sturgis. supra, p. 114.) Special rules are applicable
where a quorum cannot be formed due to conflicts of interest. (See Dry Creek Valley Assn. Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors (1977) 67 Cal. App. 3d 839, 846 fn. 1; 61 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 243, 253–
255 (1978).) We do not have those circumstances here, and we will limit our discussion
accordingly.
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In the question presented, the existing membership of the city council numbered
four, a majority of which would be three. Since four council members were present and
entitled to vote, regardless of the number of votes actually cast, a quorum was present for
the transaction of business.
C.
Majority Vote Requirement
Having determined that a vote could be taken with regard to the motion presented,
we next consider whether the motion carried where two members voted affirmatively and
two abstained.
The basic parliamentary rule is that where a quorum is present, the direct approval
of more than half of those members actually voting for or against the measure becomes the
act or choice of the body. (Roberts’, supra §§ 1, 43, pp. 3, 339; cf. Mason’s, supra, §§ 503,
510, 516, pp. 342, 348–350, 363; Sturgis, supra, p. 133.)
Only those votes that are for or against the measure are counted; blank votes and
members who abstain are not counted in determining the outcome. (Roberts’, supra, § 43,
pp. 339, 343; cf. Mason’s, supra, §§ 410, 515, 517, pp. 348–349, 360, 364.) Those members
who wish to remain neutral thus acquiesce in the action taken by the majority of those who
vote affirmatively or negatively.3 (Roberts’, supra, § 43, p. 342; cf. Mason’s, supra, § 516,
p. 363; Sturgis, supra, p. 134; Dry Creek Valley Assn. Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, supra,
67 Cal. App. 3d 839. 843.)
In the question presented, there were two affirmative votes and two abstentions with
regard to the motion. Following Roberts’ Rules of Order, we conclude that the motion was
adopted.
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3 In case of a tie among those who vote, for or against the measure, the motion is not adopted
sod the situation remains unchanged. (Roberts’, supra, § 43, p. 343; cf. Mason’s, supra, § 513,
pp. 355–356.)