No. 06-101
California Attorney General Opinion No. 06-101
Cite as Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 06-101
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
BILL LOCKYER
Attorney General
:
OPINION
:
No. 06-101
:
of
:
:
April 25, 2006
BILL LOCKYER
:
Attorney General
:
:
GREGORY L. GONOT
:
Deputy Attorney General
:
:
THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. PLESCIA, MEMBER OF THE STATE
ASSEMBLY, has requested an opinion on the following questions:
With respect to two affiliated limited partnerships, one of which has entered
into a series of contracts with a hospital district to provide an ambulatory surgery center and
the other leases land to the surgery center, and the district is the general partner in both
partnerships and a limited partner in the surgery center partnership, and the individual
retirement account of a newly elected district director’s spouse holds a limited partnership
interest in both affiliated partnerships,
1. May the hospital district enter into additional contracts with the affiliated
partnerships, or renew existing ones, where (1) the limited partnership interests held in the
spouse’s individual retirement account represent less than 3 percent of the affiliated
partnership interests, (2) the total distributions and other income from the affiliated
partnerships do not exceed 5 percent of the total annual income of the director and her
spouse, and (3) the district, as the general partner in both affiliated partnerships, determines
the amount of cash distributed by the partnerships?
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2. May the interests in the affiliated partnerships held in the individual
retirement account be transferred to a third party pursuant to procedures specified in the
partnership agreements which allow the district, as a limited partner in the surgery center
partnership, to exercise a right of first refusal to purchase affiliated partnership interests?
3. May the trustee of the individual retirement account exercise a “put option”
right as provided in the partnership agreements which requires the district, as the general
partner in both affiliated partnerships, to purchase partnership interests at fair market value?
CONCLUSIONS
With respect to two affiliated limited partnerships, one of which has entered
into a series of contracts with a hospital district to provide an ambulatory surgery center and
the other leases land to the surgery center, and the district is the general partner in both
affiliated partnerships and a limited partner in the surgery center partnership, and the
individual retirement account of a newly elected district director’s spouse holds a limited
partnership interest in both affiliated partnerships,
1. The hospital district may not enter into additional contracts with the
affiliated partnerships, or renew existing ones, where (1) the limited partnership interests
held in the spouse’s individual retirement account represent less than 3 percent of the
affiliated partnership interests, (2) the total distributions and other income from the affiliated
partnerships do not exceed 5 percent of the total annual income of the district director and
her spouse, and (3) the district, as the general partner in both affiliated partnerships,
determines the amount of cash distributed by the partnerships.
2. The interests in the affiliated partnerships held in the individual retirement
account may be transferred to a third party pursuant to procedures specified in the
partnership agreements which allow the district, as a limited partner in the surgery center
partnership, to exercise a right of first refusal to purchase affiliated partnership interests,
provided that the district does not exercise its right to purchase.
3. The trustee of the individual retirement account may not exercise a “put
option” right as provided in the partnership agreements which requires the district, as the
general partner in both affiliated partnerships, to purchase partnership interests at fair market
value.
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ANALYSIS
We are informed that a hospital district1 has contractual agreements with two
affiliated limited partnerships. One partnership (“Surgery Center Partnership”) provides the
district with an ambulatory surgery center. The second partnership (“Land Leasing
Partnership”) leases land to the Surgery Center Partnership. The district is the general
partner in both partnerships and is a limited partner in the Surgery Center Partnership.
We are further informed that the spouse of a newly elected district director has
an individual retirement account (“IRA”)2 that holds a limited partnership interest in both
affiliated partnerships. These interests represent less than 3 percent of the affiliated
partnerships interests, whether they are considered separately or in combination, and the total
distributions and other income from the affiliated partnerships do not exceed 5 percent of the
total annual income of the district director and her spouse.
We are asked three questions concerning the foregoing contractual
arrangements. The questions involve the possible applicability of Government Code section
10903 in light of the partnership interests held in the IRA by the spouse of the newly elected
district director. Section 1090 provides in part:
“Members of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and
city officers or employees shall not be financially interested in any contract
made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of which they
are members.”
Before addressing the questions individually, we note that a director of a
hospital district is covered by section 1090’s prohibition. (See Eldridge v. Sierra View Local
1 Hospital districts and health care districts are governed by The Local Health Care District Law
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 32000-32492). They have the power to execute leases of property located both within
and outside their territories, as well as to establish, maintain, and operate health care facilities. (Health & Saf.
Code, § 32121, subds. (c), (j); see 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 92, fn.1 (2004)).
2 An IRA is a tax-advantaged trust or custodial account set up for the exclusive benefit of the owner
or his or her beneficiaries. The IRA must have a trustee or custodian, but the owner may direct the trustee or
custodian to invest the funds in particular assets. (See U.S. Dept. Treasury, Pub. 590 (2005).) For purposes
of this opinion, we may assume that any proposed transfer of an interest by the IRA trustee will be in
compliance with all applicable federal rules and regulations.
3 All section references hereafter are to the Government Code.
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Hospital District (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 311, 320; 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 93;
75 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 20, 23 (1992).)4 The statute is concerned with financial interests, other
than certain remote or minimal interests, that prevent public officials from exercising
absolute loyalty and undivided allegiance in furthering the best interests of their agencies.
(See Stigall v. City of Taft (1962) 58 Cal.2d 565, 569; People v. Honig (1996) 48
Cal.App.4th 289, 333.) Section 1090 is intended “not only to strike at actual impropriety,
but also to strike at the appearance of impropriety.” (City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey (1980)
103 Cal.App.3d 191, 197.) If a public official is a member of a board that executes the
contract in question, he or she is conclusively presumed to be involved in the making of the
contract. (Thomson v. Call (1985) 38 Cal.3d 633, 645, 649.) When section 1090 is
applicable to one member of the governing body of a public entity, the prohibition cannot
be avoided by having the interested board member abstain; the entire governing body is
precluded from entering into the contract. (Thomson v. Call, supra, at pp. 647-649; Stigall
v. City of Taft, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 569; City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey, supra, 103
Cal.App.3d at p. 197; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 138, 139 (2003); 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 45, 48
(1987).) A contract that violates section 1090 is void. (Thomson v. Call, supra, 38 Cal.3d
at p. 646.) The prohibition applies regardless of whether the terms of the contract are fair
and equitable to all parties. (Id. at pp. 646-649.)
Prohibited “financial interests” extend to expectations of economic benefit
(People v. Honig, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 315); “a financial interest within the meaning
of section 1090 may be direct or indirect and includes the contingent possibility of monetary
or proprietary benefits.” (Id. at p. 325; see People v. Gnass (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1271,
1298-1301; People v. Vallerga (1977) 67 Cal App.3d 847, 865; People v. Darby (1952) 114
Cal.App.2nd 412, 433, fn. 4.) The fact that the officer’s interest “might be small or indirect
is immaterial so long as it is such as deprives the [district] of his overriding fidelity to it and
places him in the compromising situation where, in the exercise of his official judgment or
discretion, he may be influenced by personal considerations rather than the public good.”
(Terry v. Bender (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 198, 207-208.)
Here, the district director would have a financial interest in the contracts
between the district and the affiliated partnerships as the result of her spouse’s IRA
investments in the partnerships. A contract favorable to the affiliated partnerships would
enhance their value. (See Fraser-Yamor Agency, Inc. v. County of Del Norte (1977) 68
Cal.App.3d 201, 214-215 [county supervisor has partnership interest in insurance agency;
agency’s contracts with county contribute to its financial success, which in turn enhances
4 Section 1090 is inapplicable to hospital district directors under certain conditions set forth in Health
and Safety Code Section 32111. These conditions are not relevant to the present inquiry. (See 87
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra at p. 93, fn. 3.)
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value of supervisor’s interest in agency]; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 141 [contract
between city council and council member’s law firm to perform pro bono work for city could
bring indirect economic gain to law firm through publicity from successful litigations,
thereby enhancing value of council member’s interest in the firm].)
Even though the IRA is held in the name of the spouse alone, the director has
a personal financial interest in the IRA, as it may inure to her direct benefit as a designated
beneficiary or otherwise contribute to her support. (See Thorpe v. Long Beach Community
College (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 655, 659; Reece v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. Appeals Bd. (1976)
64 Cal.App.3d 675, 683; Nielsen v. Richards (1925) 75 Cal.App. 680, 685-687). It has long
been held that the financial interest of one spouse will be attributed to both spouses for
purposes of section 1090. (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 34, 36 (2002); 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 169,
171-172 (1998); 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 230, 237 (1995); 69 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 102, 106
(1986).)
The district director in question would not only have a financial interest in the
district’s contracts with the affiliated partnerships, she would also be called upon to approve
any changes to those contracts as a member of the district’s board of directors. When the
contracts at issue were first “made,” no prohibited financial interests were present since she
was not yet serving on the board. However, after the election, and in the absence of a
statutory exception, section 1090 would prohibit the board from entering into any new
contracts with the affiliated partnerships. The renegotiation or amendment of an existing
contract between the partnerships and the district would constitute the “making” of a contract
prohibited by section 1090. (See City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 196-197; 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 176, 177, fn. 2 (2002); 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 274, 278
(1998).).
Finally, we note that the renewal of a contract–even when the renewal involves
no renegotiation and when every term of the agreement remains unchanged–constitutes the
making of a contract for purposes of section 1090. (See 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 134, 137-138
(1998).) Of course, if the district director’s spouse may first terminate his IRA’s holdings
in the affiliated partnerships, the district could then execute new contracts with the
partnerships. (See 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 187, 191-192 (2003).)
1. “Remote Interests” and “Noninterests”
The first question asks whether the district may enter into additional contracts
with the affiliated partnerships, or renew existing ones, where (1) the interests held in the
IRA of the district director’s spouse represent less than 3 percent of the affiliated
partnerships interests, whether the partnerships are considered separately or in combination,
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(2) the total distributions and other income from the partnerships do not exceed 5 percent of
the total annual income of the district director and her spouse, and (3) the district, as the
general partner in the affiliated partnerships, determines the amount of cash distributed by
the partnerships. Does the presence of these three factors allow the prohibition of section
1090 to be avoided? We conclude that they do not.
The Legislature has excluded certain financial interests from the prohibition
of section 1090. Denominated as “remote interests” (§ 1091) and “noninterests” (§ 1091.5),
these exceptions apply in specific circumstances. If a “remote interest” is present, as defined
in section 1091, the contract may be made if the officer (1) discloses his or her financial
interest in the contract to the public agency, (2) such interest is noted in the entity’s official
records, and (3) the officer abstains from any participation in the making of the contract.
(See 88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 106, 108 (2005); 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 23, 25-26 (2004);
83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 246, 248 (2000); 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at pp. 235-237;
65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 305, 307 (1982).) If a “noninterest” is present, as defined in section
1091.5, the contract may be made without the officer’s abstention, and generally a
noninterest does not require disclosure. (City of Vernon v. Central Basin Mun. Water Dist.
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 508, 514-515; 84 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 158, 159-160 (2001);
83 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 247.)
The only remote interest or noninterest exception that merits discussion is the
noninterest exception of subdivision (a)(1) of section 1091.5, which states:
“An officer or employee shall not be deemed to be interested in a
contract if his or her interest is any of the following:
“(1) The ownership of less than 3 percent of the shares of a corporation
for profit, provided that the total annual income to him or her from dividends,
including the value of stock dividends, from the corporation does not exceed
5 percent of his or her total annual income, and any other payments made to
him or her by the corporation do not exceed 5 percent of his or her total annual
income.”
The district director’s financial interest fits within the percentage restrictions of section
1091.5, subdivision (a)(1), but the interest is in limited partnerships, not in shares of a
corporation. May it nonetheless qualify as an exception to section 1090’s prohibition?
In analyzing the scope of section 1091.5, we follow well established rules of
statutory interpretation. “The words of the statute are the starting point.” (Lungren v.
Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735.) “ ‘If the language is clear and unambiguous there
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is no need for construction . . . .’ ” (Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 977.) “[A]
statute ‘. . . is to be interpreted by the language in which it is written, and courts are no
more at liberty to add provisions to what is therein declared in definite language than they
are to disregard any of its express provisions.’ [Citation].” (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior
Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1097.) Moreover, statutory exceptions to conflict-of-interest
laws are to be strictly construed. (Thorpe v. Long Beach Community College Dist., supra,
83 Cal.App.4th at pp. 663-664; 88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 122, 128 (2005).)
The Legislature has carved out a specific exception to the prohibition of section
1090 for “[t]he ownership of less than 3 percent of the shares of a corporation for profit,”
where such ownership also meets certain requirements as to “income. . .from dividends,
including the value of stock dividends, from the corporation. . . .” (§ 1091.5, subd.(a)(1),
italics added.) No other type of business entity is mentioned in this exception. The doctrine
of statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius provides that “ ‘the
expression of certain things in a statute necessarily involves the exclusion of other things not
expressed. . . .[Citation.]” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Co. (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1379, 1391, fn. 13.) We reject the suggestion that an interest that has some of the
characteristics of one of the noninterests specified in section 1091.5 is legally cognizable an
as additional exception to section 1090. In particular, a financial interest that may be
quantitatively similar to one of the specified noninterests may not be qualitatively similar.
Here, we note that the district director not only has interests in the two
affiliated partnerships through her spouse’s IRA investments, she also would be exercising
influence over the partnerships through the district’s role as general partner in both
partnerships. She would therefore participate in determining the amount of cash to be
distributed by the partnerships. Recipients of cash distributions by these entities include her
spouse’s IRA. In these circumstances, her financial interest cannot be considered the
equivalent to that of a minor shareholder in a corporation; rather, it is more characteristic of
a corporate officer.
We conclude in answer to the first question that the hospital district may not
enter into additional contracts with the affiliated partnerships, or renew existing ones, where
the limited partnership interests held in the spouse’s IRA represent less than 3 percent of the
affiliated partnership interests, (2) the total distributions and other income from the affiliated
partnerships do not exceed 5 percent of the total annual income of the board member and
spouse, and (3) the district as the general partner in the affiliated partnerships, determines
the amount of cash distributed by the partnerships.5
5 A “rule of necessity” allows execution of a contract in narrowly defined circumstances. (See
Eldridge v. Sierra View Local Hospital Dist., supra, 224 Cal.App. at p. 321; 88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra,
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2. Transfer of Partnership Interests
The second question asks whether the interests in the affiliated partnerships
held in the IRA may be transferred to a third party pursuant to procedures specified in the
partnership agreements, where the district, as a limited partner in the Surgery Center
Partnership, may exercise a right of first refusal to purchase affiliated partnership interests.
We conclude that as long as the hospital district is not the one making the purchase, such a
transfer would avoid the application of section 1090.
In ordinary circumstances, an official with a proscribed financial interest,
whether a partnership interest or some other type of financial interest, may terminate the
interest and thereby avoid section 1090’s proscription. (81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at
p.138; see City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 197 [city
concessionaire had choice between remaining on the city council or continuing her
ownership of business concession causing the conflict].) Here, the spouse of the district
director could normally direct his IRA trustee to sell his interests in the affiliated
partnerships. However, under the partnership agreements, the district would have a right of
first refusal. The district director would have a financial interest in the board’s decision to
buy her spouse’s partnership interests. If the district were to exercise its option and enter
into a contract with the trustee of the IRA, the board would be involved in the making of a
contract in which one of its members would have a prohibited financial interest.
However, if the hospital district were to decline to exercise its right of first
refusal, it would not be a party to the sales agreement. That contract would be between the
spouse’s IRA trustee and a third party. It would be anomalous to conclude that in declining
its option to enter into a contract prohibited by section 1090, the board of directors would
be “making” another prohibited contract to which it was not a party.
We note that under a separate statutory scheme, the Political Reform Act of
1974 (§§ 81000-91014; “Act”), the district director may have a disqualifying conflict of
interest that would prevent her from participating in the board’s decision not to exercise its
right of first refusal. The Act generally prohibits public officials from participating in
“governmental decisions” in which they have a financial interest. (See § 87100; 88
Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 32, 33-34 (2005); 78 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 362, 368-374 (1995).) Section
87103 states: “A public official has a financial interest in a decision within the meaning of
Section 87100 if it is reasonably foreseeable that the decision will have a material financial
at pp. 110-112; 80 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 335, 338-339 (1997); 65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 310.) The
application of this rule is beyond the scope of this opinion. (See 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p.174, fn.
3.)
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effect, distinguishable from its effect on the public generally, on the official, a member of
his or her immediate family. . . .” As relevant here, the act of decision making includes
voting on a matter or obligating one’s agency to a course of action on an issue. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 2, § 18702.1, subd. (a)(1),(3).) A determination not to act in either of those ways
is also “making a decision” under the Act. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18702.1, subd. (a)(5).)
A financial effect includes increasing or decreasing the personal expenses, income, assets,
or liabilities of the official or members of the official’s immediate family. (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 2, § 18703.5.) The effect must be at least $250 in a 12-month period in order to be
considered “material.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 18705.5.) When a disqualifying conflict of
interest exists, the Act requires that the disqualified official abstain from participating in
every aspect of the decision-making process. (§§ 87100, 87105; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2,
§§ 18700, 18702.1; see Hamilton v. Town of Los Gatos (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1050, 1058
1059; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.142, 143 (2003).)
Accordingly, in answer to the second question, we conclude that the interests
in the affiliated partnerships held in the IRA may be transferred to a third party pursuant to
procedures specified in the partnership agreements which allow the district, as a limited
partner in the surgery center partnership, to exercise a right of first refusal to purchase
affiliated partnership interests, provided that the district does not exercise its right to
purchase.
3. Exercise of “Put Option” Right
The third question asks whether the trustee of the IRA may exercise a “put
option” right6 as provided in the partnership agreements which requires the district, as the
general partner in both affiliated partnerships, to purchase partnership interests at fair market
value. As we have demonstrated, the district director has a financial interest in her spouse’s
IRA holdings. Any purchase of those holdings by the district, whether at fair market value
or otherwise, would be a contract subject to the prohibition of section 1090. (See People ex
rel. State of California v. Drinkhouse (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 931, 934-935).
The fact that the put option right is part of pre-existing partnership agreements
does not prevent the prohibition of section 1090 from being applied. Here, we would have
a new contract requiring the district to agree to an amount representing fair market value.
(Cf. 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 137 [city and partnership cannot contract where
general partner sits on city council although pre-existing agreement allows an arbitrator to
decide new rental rate or fees].) Even the selection of an appraiser would be a negotiable
6 A “put option” right in this context is “the right to require another to buy.” (Black’s Law Dict. (8th
ed. 1999) p. 1128, col. 1.)
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aspect of the process leading to the contract’s execution. The separate buy-out contract
between the spouse’s IRA trustee and the district would be a violation of section 1090.
Accordingly, in answer to the third question, we conclude that the trustee of
the IRA may not exercise a “put option” right as provided in the partnership agreements
which requires the district, as the general partner in both affiliated limited partnerships, to
purchase partnership interests at fair market value.
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