No. 80-116
California Attorney General Opinion No. 80-116
Cite as Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-116
_________________________
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN
Attorney General
:
OPINION
:
No. 80-116
:
of
:
December 9, 1980
:
GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN
:
Attorney General
:
:
Jack R. Winkler
:
Assistant Attorney General
:
:
SUBJECT: WORTHLESS CHECK—A district attorney may not properly state to
the maker of a dishonored check that he will institute criminal prosecution for issuing a
worthless check if the maker does not pay to the district attorney’s office the full amount
of the check to reimburse the holder.
The Honorable William D. Curtis, District Attorney, Monterey County, has
requested an opinion on a question we have phrased as follows:
As part of a proposed worthless check program, may a district attorney properly
state to the maker of a dishonored check that he will institute criminal prosecution for
issuing the worthless check if the maker does not pay to the district attorney’s office the
full amount of the check to reimburse the holder?
CONCLUSION
A district attorney may not properly state to the maker of a worthless check that he
will institute criminal prosecution for issuing a worthless check if the maker does not pay
the full amount of the check to the district attorney to reimburse the holder of the check.
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ANALYSIS
A proposed worthless check program has been described in the opinion request as
follows: The person holding a worthless check issued by a local maker delivers it to the
district attorney and fills out the report set forth in appendix A. Sheriff’s records are
checked to determine if there is an outstanding arrest warrant for the maker. If no warrant
is found the form letter set forth in appendix B is sent to the maker. If the money is received,
it is sent to the complainant and the district attorney’s file is closed. If there is no response
for ten days, the citation set forth in appendix C is sent to the rpaker. If payment for the
check is received, it is forwarded to the complainant and the district attorney’s file is closed.
If there is no response from the citation for ten days, a criminal complaint is filed. The
question presented relates to the propriety of statements made in appendices B and C.
Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 476a provides:
“Any person who for himself or as the agent or representative of
another or as an officer of a corporation, willfully, with intent to defraud,
makes or draws or utters or delivers any check, or draft or order upon any
bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, for the payment of
money, knowing at the time of such making, drawing, uttering or delivering
that the maker or drawer or the corporation has not sufficient funds in, or
credit with said bank or depositary, or person, or firm, or corporation, for the
payment of such check, draft or order and all other checks, drafts or orders
upon such funds then outstanding, in full upon its presentation, although no
express representation is made with reference thereto, is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state
prison.”
The district attorney is the public prosecutor. (Gov. Code, § 26500.) The district
attorney’s duty as public prosecutor includes instituting “proceedings before magistrates
for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably suspected of public offenses when he
has information that such offenses have been committed.” (Gov. Code, § 26501.) The
statute requires that the district attorney make the decision to prosecute based on
“information that such offenses have been committed.” The prosecutor is free to obtain that
information by any lawful means.
In People v. Municipal Court (1972) 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, the court described the
authority of the district attorney to Initiate criminal prosecutions in the following terms.
“The prosecution of a case by the district attorney involves an exercise of executive
power.” (Id., at p. 203, citing Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 127.) “Both
cases [Esteybar, supra, and People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 891 recognized that the charging
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process is a matter committed to the discretion of the district attorney, a part of the
executive branch of government.” (Id., at p. 204.) “As concerns the enforcement of the
criminal law the office of district attorney is charged with grave responsibilities to the
public. These responsibilities demand integrity, zeal and conscientious effort in the
administration of justice under the criminal law. . . . Nothing could be more demoralizing
to that effort or to efficient administration of the criminal law in our system of justice than
requiring a district attorney’s office to dissipate its effort on personal grievance, fanciful
charges and idle prosecution.” (Id., at p. 205, citing Taltaferro v. Loche, 152 Cal. App. 2d
752, 755–756.) “Thus the theme which runs throughout the criminal procedure in this state
is that all persons should be protected from having to defend against frivolous prosecutions
and that one major safeguard against such prosecutions is the function of the district
attorney in screening criminal cases prior to instituting a prosecution.” (Id., at pp. 205–
206.) “Due process of law requires that criminal prosecutions be instituted through the
regular processes of law. These regular processes include the requirement that the
institution of any criminal proceeding be authorized and approved by the district attorney.”
(Id., at p. 206.) “The district attorney’s function is quasi-judicial in nature [citing Pearson
v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 277, 286], and as we have already stated, he is vested with
discretionary power in determining whether to prosecute in any particular case. An
unbroken line of cases in California has recognized this discretion and its insulation from
control by the courts through the writ of mandamus. [Citing Board of Supervisors v.
Simpson, 36 Cal. 2d 671 and People v. Vatelli, 15 Cal. App. 3d 54, 58, 59.]” (Id., at p. 207.)
“Except for the situation where the district attorney is himself charged with a crime, his
failure to act, even if improperly or corruptly motivated, is not a matter for the courts. In
the final analysis, the district attorney, like a judge, is answerable to the electorate for the
manner in which he conducts his office.” (Id., at p. 208.)
The proposed worthless check program includes elements extraneous to the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion and the prosecution of criminal cases. A principal object of the
program is restitution to the victim holding the worthless check. The public prosecutor
represents all of the people of the state in their sovereign capacity and does not represent
the victim of the crime any more than he represents the defendant. (Flemming v. Hance
(1908) 153 Cal. 162, 167; People v. Bail (1914) 25 Cal. App. 342, 358.) The public
prosecutor has no duty to obtain restitution for the victims of crime. His duty is to
determine whether to institute criminal charges in the courts and to prosecute those charges
on behalf of the people. The fact of restitution may be considered in determining whether
criminal charges should be instituted but the public prosecutor has no obligation to make
that fact occur. Restitution is not a defense to the commission of a crime. (People v. Wynn
(1944) 44 Cal. App. 2d 723, 729.)
The Uniform Crime Charging Standards prepared and published by the California
District Attorneys Association in 1974 refer to restitution. Standard III, A, 1, c (at p. 43)
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states:
c. Victim requests no prosecution
“It would be proper to decline to charge because the victim does not
wish the prosecutor to file criminal charges and the case involves the
following crimes or situations:
“1) In assault or battery cases where the victim has suffered little or
no injury and where the accused’s conduct is not likely to be repeated;
“2) In crimes against property, not involving violence, where no major
loss was suffered and where the accused’s conduct is not likely to be
repeated. The fact of restitution may be considered in applying this Standard.
“Commentary
“Crimes are prosecuted on behalf of all citizens of the state not on
behalf of particular individuals. The victim is not a party to a criminal
prosecution. He is not the prosecutor’s client. (See People v. Municipal
Court, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 207 [19721.) Crimes are committed primarily
against society and only secondarily against individual members of society.
There are rare situations, set forth here, in which the secondary interest of the
individual outweighs the primary interest of society. This primary interest is
outweighed because none of the four purposes of a criminal sentence are
particularly applicable while non-prosecution would serve Interests like
family harmony, good employment relations, the promotion of individual
friendships, and the personal privacy of the victim. . . .”
Standard III, A. 2, a (at p. 47) states:
“a. Restitution
“It would be improper to decline to charge simply because the accused
made or tendered restitution to the victim.
“Commentary
“The mere fact of restitution should -not justify declining to charge.
If it did, the accused would in effect be buying his way out of prosecution at
no additional cost. He would have no incentive for not committing a crime.
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On the other hand, the fact of restitution in conjunction with legitimate
factors like the victim’s request not to prosecute or the existence of a de
minimus situation might justify a decision not to prosecute.”
A consideration of the proposed worthless check program in the light of the duties
of the public prosecutor reveals a fundamental legal flaw in the program. Both the letter
set forth in appendix B and the citation set forth in appendix C conveys to the maker of the
check a threat to charge him with a crime if he does not pay the amount of the check to the
district attorney for restitution. Obtaining restitution by means of such a threat would be
improper under the rationale of People v. Beggs (1918) 178 Cal. 79.
We do not mean to suggest that a public prosecutor may not contact the maker of a
worthless check and indicate his intention to initiate a prosecution under Penal Code
section 476a. Such indications may take letter form or even a citation to show cause why
the maker should not be prosecuted.1 Such a communication advises the maker that
prosecution is being considered and provides: him with an opportunity to present any facts
which might indicate no crime was committed or indicate a defense to the charge. This
would be entirely consistent with the public prosecutor’s duty to investigate the charges to
acquire the information necessary to determine whether criminal proceedings should be
instituted.
The problem in the documents set forth in appendices B and C is that the threat to
prosecute is coupled with a demand for restitution. That restitution rather than information
is the principal object of these threats to prosecute is made clear by the statements that,
“You may settle this matter” and “I will return your check to you” if you send a money
order or cashier’s check payable to the district attorney.
Another problem we see in the proposed worthless check program is the apparent
substitution of a clerical procedure for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the public
prosecutor. As the proposed program has been explained, the filing of criminal charges
will depend on whether restitution is made or not, rather than upon any weighing of
appropriate factors by the public prosecutor or his deputy. We have serious doubts that
such a substitution of a criterion based solely on the fact of restitution for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion on a case-by-case basis will produce the kind of screening that
due process requires. (See People v. Municipal Court, supra, 27 Cal. App. 3d at p. 206.)
1 This statement should not he read as an approval of the wording of either appendix H or
appendix C. We do not address the propriety of the use of the caption or such words as “complaint
has been filed,” ‘ordered to appear” or other language which might he interpreted to mean that
court proceedings had already been commenced.
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Finally, the routing of the money paid as restitution under the proposed worthless
check program would not comply with Government Code sections 26503 and 26504 which
provide:
“§ 26503.
“The district attorney shall deliver receipts for money or property
received in his official capacity and file duplicates with the county treasurer.”
“§ 26504.
“On the first Monday of each month, or at more frequent intervals as
may be directed by the board of supervisors, the district attorney shall
account for all money received by him in his official capacity and pay it over
to the treasurer upon a deposit permit issued by the auditor.”
It seems clear that any restitution received by the district attorney under the program
would be money received in his official capacity and thus must be paid to the county
treasurer for appropriate disbursement rather than be paid directly to the holder of the
worthless check. We conclude that the district attorney may not properly state to the maker
of the worthless check that he will institute criminal prosecution for issuing worthless
check if the maker does not pay the full amount of the check to the district attorney to
reimburse the holder.2
2 We are also asked whether a district attorney max collect a fee to pay for the costs of the
worthless check program either by way of an additional amount to be paid by the maker of the
worthless check or by way of a deduction from the amount of restitution received before it is paid
to the holder of the worthless check Since we has e concluded that a district attorney is not
authorized to obtain restitution for worthless checks in the manner contemplated by the proposed
worthless check program, the second question is moot.
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APPENDIX A
REPORT OF RECEIPT OF FRAUDULENT CHECK
I. Person making report
Business name:
Business or other address
Address where check accepted:
What steps have you, as the victim, taken to contact the suspect and/or recover your
loss?
Date: __________ How contacted?
Where?
Results
By whom?
How many times?
II. Person who accepted check:
Address: _______________________________________ Phone:
Can you identify the check issuer?
Was the issuer known to you? Yes ____ No ___ How?
What was the check used for? (i.e., merchandise, payment on account, services,
etc.)
Did you see the suspect write or endorse the check? Yes
No
What initial or mark did you place on the check at the time accepted?
III. Name of person who issued check:
Address:
Driver’s License # _____________ State __________ Other I.D. _______________
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Check number _______ Date check was accepted:
Amount: $
Was the check postdated or was a request to hold made by suspect? Yes
No
Date: _________________________
Signature of person making report
NOTE: If the person who issued the check reimburses you directly, please notify this
office immediately.
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APPENDIX B
[Letterhead of District Attorney’s Office]
RE: Your Check No. _________________ Amount $
Dear Sir or Madam:
Your check, listed above, has been referred to this office for criminal prosecution.
Normally, this would mean that a complaint would be filed with the Municipal Court and
a warrant issued for your arrest. It is the policy of this office, however, to allow the accused
an opportunity to explain a situation such as this as there may well have been a banking
error or some other unavoidable circumstance. You are requested therefore to contact me
within five (5) days from the date of this letter in order that we may discuss this problem.
If you would prefer to handle this matter with the utmost simplicity, you should forward a
money order or cashier’s check in the amount stated above, to this department, made
payable to the
County District Attorney. Upon receipt, I will return your
check to you.
Very truly yours,
District Attorney Investigator
cc: To merchant or other person
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APPENDIX C
OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
COUNTY OF
, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
The People of the State of California,
Plaintiff
vs.
Defendant
CITATION-CRIMINAL
A complaint has been filed with
, District Attorney of the County of
, State of California, alleging that the above defendant on
in County
of
, State of California, did willfully and unlawfully write a check in the
amount of $
in violation of Section 476a of the California Penal Code.
You are hereby ordered to appear at the
County District Attorney’s
Office,
, California, to answer this charge on
, 1980,
at
M.
Failure to appear will result in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
You may settle this matter by sending to this office a money order or cashier’s check
made payable to the
County District Attorney for the full amount of this
check.
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
By:
D.A. Investigator
cc: Merchant or other person.
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