No. 06-02
Whether a School District’s Investment Earnings on its Bond Redemption Fund can be Paid to the Districts General Fund
Cite as Colo. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 06-02
J o h n W . Su t h e r s
Attorney General
Cynthia H. Coffman
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Allison H. Eid
Solicitor General
STATE OF COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF LAW
Office of the Attorney General
State Services Building
1525 Shernian Street - Mh Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone (303) 866-4500
FORMAL
No. 06-02
OPINION
AG Alpha No. TR TR AGBBS
Of
March 13, 2006
JOHN W. SUTHERS
Attorney General
This opinion is issued at the request of Deputy State Treasurer Benson M. Stein. The
Deputy Treasurer’s letter asks a question regarding the disposition of investment interest earned
on moneys in school districts’ bond redemption funds.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Question: Does Colorado law permit a school district to contract with a financial
institution so that investment interest earned on moneys in the district’s bond redemption fund
(“BRF”) are paid to the district’s general fund, thus making such investment earnings available
for general fund purposes, instead o f being used solely for BRF purposes?
Answer: No. Investment interest earned on BRF moneys must be used solely for BRF
purposes. A school district may not contract to have such investment earnings credited to its
general fund.
BACKGROUND
The Deputy State Treasurer asks whether § 22-42-119(1), C.R.S. (2005), requires that not
only the BRF taxes themselves, but also all investment earnings on a school district’s BRF
moneys be used “only for payment of interest upon and for the redemption of such bonds.’’ The
statute reads in material part as follows:
Bond fund - payment and redemption. (1) [Taxes to fund voter-
approved school bonds] shall be collected in the same manner as
other school district taxes and when collected shall be placed by
the county treasurer in the bond redemption fund o f said school
district. The moneys in said fund shall be used only for
payment of interest upon and for the redemption of such bonds
. . . ; but the board of education of said school district may
withdraw, or ... may instruct the third-party custodian
administering the bond redemption fund ... to withdraw, any
or all of such moneys credited to said fund which are
temporarily not needed to satisfy the obligations of bonded
indebtedness, for the purpose of depositing or investing such
moneys in the manner prescribed by law.
§ 22-42-119(1), C.R.S. (2005) (emphasis added). The investment earnings at issue here fall
within the last clause of the subsection quoted above - that is, the investment of BRF moneys
that “are temporarily not needed” to satisfy bonded indebtedness.
DISCUSSION
Subsection 22-42-119(1) contains no explicit language concerning the disposition of
investment earnings derived from BRF moneys. However, the school financing statutes, when
read as a whole, compel the conclusion that investment interest earnings must be paid to and
used solely for BRF purposes. This conclusion is also supported by the common law rule of
“interest follows principal,” by the Colorado constitutional provision on public indebtedness, and
by voters’ expectations when voting on a bond issue.
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A. SCHOOL FINANCE STATUTES
First. § 22-42-119(1) must be read in the context of title 22 as a whole. As the Colorado
Supreme Court has stated:
Our primary task in construing statutes that are part o f an overall
statutory scheme is to give effect to the intent of the General
Assembly. When the General Assembly adopts a comprehensive
regulatory program, the legislation should be construed as a whole,
giving effect to all of its parts in the context of the entire scheme.
Statutes related to the same subject matter are construed in p a ri
materia, in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible
effect to all of their parts.
Left H and Ditch Co. v. H ill, 933 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo. 1997) (citations omitted). See also K rieg v.
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 686 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. 1984) (goal is to “arrive at a
construction that harmonizes a particular provision with the statutory whole”); Petition o fS .O .,
795 P.2d 254, 258 (Colo. 1990) (courts must choose construction of statute which “best
effectuates the purposes of the legislative scheme”). Reading § 22-42-119(1) in the context of
title 22 as a whole leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended that investment earnings
on BRF moneys should be credited back to the BRF and used for BRF purposes.
The General Assembly has enacted numerous provisions in title 22 to govern school
finance. A number of those provisions demonstrate a legislative preference to preserve all
moneys associated with the BRF inviolate, and to use such moneys only for payment of principal
and interest on bonded indebtedness. Beginning with §22-42-119(1) itself, the statutory
language and the entire statutory scheme indicate careful delineation and separation between a
district’s general fund and other district funds, particularly the BRF.1 See, e.g., § 22-45-103 (for
accounting purposes, school district moneys are divided into seven separate funds with specific
1 This is also consistent with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).
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requirements for each; general fund includes all district revenues except, inter a lia, revenues
attributable to BRF).
Another provision of § 22-45-103 also affirms that the legislature was establishing a self-
contained scheme for the BRF, and that it intended that all moneys associated with the BRF
inhere to the benefit of the BRF, rather than being used for alternate purposes. Excess moneys in
the BRF “shall be used to reduce the levy for the bond redemption fund in future years or to pay
any then existing obligations of the district payable from the bond redemption fund at a date
earlier than they become due.” § 22-45-103(1 )(b)(IV), C.R.S. (2005). See also B oard o f County
Comm"rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 710 (Colo. 1996) (school accounting and reporting
statute establishes funds for various purposes; expenditures from each fund limited to its
specified purpose; BRF revenues may be used only for “obtaining or using real property or
equipment for school buildings, sites, or structures”).
Next, § 22-42- 102(2)(a) authorizes districts to contract bonded indebtedness for certain
delineated purposes. None of these purposes includes augmentation of the general fund. While
§ 22-42- 102(2)(b) provides that the specified purposes “shall be broadly construed,” it would be
unreasonable to stretch such purposes to include augmenting a district’s general fund. The
general fund is used for normal operating expenses, as opposed to the special one-time purposes
related to the district’s physical plant specified in § 22-42- 102(2)(a). Thus, § 22-42-102(2)(a)
does not contemplate that a district can incur bonded indebtedness for general fund purposes,
which would be the practical result if investment earnings on BRF moneys were credited to the
general fund. To the contrary, borrowing for general fund purposes is limited to short-term debt
to be repaid within six months of the close of the fiscal year. § 22-40-107, C.R.S. (2005). See
also Abts v. Board o f Educ., 622 P.2d 518 (Colo. 1980).
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In sum, various statutes that are a part of the school finance law demonstrate that the
General Assembly intended that BRF moneys be circumscribed and kept apart from general fund
moneys and purposes.
B. THE COMMON LAW
Additionally, the common law2 supports the conclusion that interest earned on BRF
moneys must be used solely for BRF purposes. As a general rule, all investment earnings should
be credited to the principal from which they arise. The U.S. Supreme Court discussed the
English common law doctrine that “interest follows principal” in Phillips v. W ashington Legal
Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998). As the Supreme Court in that case concluded,
The rule that “interest follows principal” has been established
under English common law since at least the mid-1700's . . . .
[Ijnterest shall follow the principal, as the shadow the body.
524 U.S. at 165 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). See also Fabulous Pharmacies,
Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 162 (1980) (same).
This common law doctrine has also been widely applied in the area of public funds. See,
e.g., Queen v. M oore, 340 S.E.2d 838, 841 (W. Va. 1986) (with regard to student activities fees,
in absence o f lawful separation, interest presumed to be an accretion to the fund earning it); State
v. D ickherber, 576 S.W.2d 532, 537 (Mo. 1979) (general principle that interest on public funds
designated for specific purpose follows those funds, in absence o f unequivocal legislative
expression otherwise). See also State v. M ontoya, 575 P.2d 605 (N.M. 1978) (interest accrued
on bonds for one project may not be diverted to another related bond project).
2 Pursuant to § 2-4-211, C.R.S. (2005), English common law is “the rule of decision and shall be
considered as of full force” in Colorado unless it is “repealed by legislative authority.”
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Application of this doctrine to the question presented leads to the conclusion that, just as
the principal contained in the BRF is by legislative mandate devoted solely to payment of
bonded indebtedness, the interest earned on that principal is to be similarly circumscribed.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON PUBLIC INDEBTEDNESS
Moreover, article XI of the Colorado Constitution, entitled “Public Indebtedness,’’
suggests that not only is the public debt of political subdivisions, including school districts, to be
strictly controlled, but that repayment o f such debt is a priority. In particular, section 6(1)
provides in material part as follows:
No political subdivision o f the state shall contract any general
obligation debt by loan in any form . . . except by adoption of a
legislative measure which shall be irrepealable until the
indebtedness therein provided for shall have been fully paid or
discharged, specifying the purposes to which the funds to be raised
shall be applied and providing for the levy of a tax which together
with such other revenue, assets, or funds as may be pledged shall
be su fficient to pay the interest and principal of such debt. . . .
COLO. CONST, art. XI, § 6(1). Using interest earned in BRF accounts for BRF purposes is
consistent with article XFs mandate to use interest to fully pay and discharge debt.
D. VOTER EXPECTATIONS
Finally, reference must also be made to the intent of the voters in approving the bond
measure in question. The ballot question presented to voters states only that the investment
earnings are not to be counted for TABOR purposes; it nowhere indicates that such earnings will
be credited to the district’s general fund.
In Busse v. City o f G olden, 73 P.3d 660 (Colo. 2003), the Colorado Supreme Court dealt
with a case concerning the utilization of voter-approved m unicipal bond moneys. The court held
that while the city could validly make “expenditures incidental to [the voter-approved] purpose,”
it could not use bond moneys in a way that would “materially depart from the [voter-approved]
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purpose of a bond measured’ 73 P.3d at 665-66. This reasoning is equally applicable here, and
reinforces the conclusion that not only the BRF moneys themselves, but all investment earnings
thereon must be devoted to the voter-approved purpose. When voters approve a bond issuance,
as those questions are customarily formulated,3 the electorate would expect that all moneys
associated with the BRF will be used to pay bonded indebtedness, rather than being utilized for
general fund purposes.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, investment interest earned on BRF moneys must be used
solely for BRF purposes. Therefore, a district may not contract to have such investment earnings
credited to its general fund.
Issued this 13lh day o f March, 2006.
ag*aeam
VA>J , -..
W. SUTHERS
rado Attorney General
J Similar to the typical ballot language at issue here, the municipal bond measure in Busse
specified that the investment earnings on the bond proceeds could be spent without regard to
constitutional (TABOR) limitations and those of any other law. 73 P.3d at 661 n. 1.
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