R.C.S.A. § 46a-54-46a
Default for failure to answer
Cite as Conn. Agencies Regs. § 46a-54-46a
(a) The executive director may enter an order of default against a respondent who, after
notice, fails to answer a complaint in accordance with section 46a-83(a) of the Connecticut
General Statutes or within such extension of time as may have been granted under section
46a-54-45a of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies.
(b) A commission attorney, the Attorney General, a manager or investigator or a complainant
may request that the executive director enter an order of default. Requests to enter
default shall be mailed to the executive director along with copies to the complainant
or the commission and the respondent. Service upon the respondent shall be made by
certified mail, return receipt requested, or other mail service that confirms receipt.
The stamped "Receipt for Certified Mail" or other mail service's confirming receipt
shall be prima facie proof of the date of mailing.
(c) After fifteen (15) days from the mailing of the "Request to Enter Default," the executive
director may issue an order of default or deny the request, provided that no default
shall enter if the respondent has answered the complaint under oath in accordance
with the Connecticut General Statutes and section 46a-54-43a of the Regulations of
Connecticut State Agencies.
(d) If the respondent files a written objection specifically stating the reasons for its
objection not later than fifteen (15) days after the mailing of the "Request to Enter
Default," the executive director shall consider the reasons set forth in the objection.
If an objection is filed, the executive director shall allow the commission counsel,
Attorney General or complainant requesting the default order to respond fully to the
objection.
(e) Upon the entry of an order of default, the complaint and case file shall be transferred
to the office of public hearings to conduct a hearing in damages, pursuant to Article
III.
(f) Prior to the commencement of a hearing in damages, the executive director may, for
good cause shown, vacate an order of default.