4 Op. O.L.C. 64
Authority of the Secretary of the Treasury Under the New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978
Authority of the Secretary of the Treasury Under the
New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978
T he authority o f the Secretary o f the T reasury to issue guarantees under the N ew York
C ity L oan G uarantee A ct o f 1978, P.L. No. 95-339 and P.L. N o. 95-415, was not
affected by a rider in the Senate appropriation bill, H.R. 7631, under § 101(a)(3) o f the
C ontinuing A ppropriations Resolution, P.L. No. 96-369, 94 Stat. 1351.
Section 101(a)(3) o f the C ontinuing A ppropriations Resolution w as intended to distinguish
betw een m atters considered by both the Senate and the H ouse o f R epresentatives in
their appropriations bills, for w hich the m ore restrictive o f the tw o provisions on an
agency's authority is to govern, and m atters considered by only one H ouse in its
appropriations bill, for w hich the authority and conditions of FY 1980 appropriations
are to govern.
T he restriction on the Secretary o f the T reasury’s authority to issue guarantees under the
N ew York C ity Loan G uarantee A ct o f 1978 is found only in the Senate version o f the
appropriations bill pertaining to the N ew York C ity Loan G uarantee program and had
not been considered by the H ouse o f R epresentatives; therefore, the Senate rider did
not operate (under § 101(a)(3) o f the C ontinuing A ppropriations Resolution) to restrict
the S ecretary’s authority to issue N ew Y ork C ity loan guarantees.
T he A ttorney G eneral does not have the authority to issue opinions on questions arising
out o f a business transaction betw een a private person and the governm ent w hen the
private person has insisted on receiving an A ttorney G eneral opinion for his benefit and
the requesting departm ent head has no real concern about the question.
T he A ttorney G eneral will issue opinions related to business transactions betw een the
governm ent and private persons only w hen the transaction raises a substantial and
genuine issue o f law arising in the adm inistration o f a D epartm ent.
October 2, 1980
T h e S e c r e t a r y o f t h e T r e a s u r y
M y D
e a r M r . S e c r e t a r y ; Y o u have asked my opinion whether a
rider contained in the Senate-passed version of H.R. 7631, concerning
administrative funds for the New York City Loan Guarantee program,
affects your authority to issue guarantees pursuant to the New York
City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. Nos. 95-339 and 95-415.
For reasons elaborated below, I conclude that the rider in question has
not taken effect, and therefore does not restrict your authority under
the Guarantee Act.
In pertinent part, H.R. 7631, as passed by the Senate, provided:
For necessary administrative expenses as authorized by
the New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978 (Public
Law 95-415), $922,000: Provided, That none o f these funds
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may be used to administer programs to issue loan guarantees
to New York City for the purpose o f permitting the Munici-
pal Assistance Corporation to use the proceeds o f its borrow-
ings in fiscal years 1981 and 1982 to meet the City's financ-
ing needs after fiscal year 1982.
The italicized language is the rider, which was a committee amend-
ment. 126 Cong. Rec. S 12,589 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980). There is no
provision similar to the rider in the House-passed version of the bill.
As fiscal year 1980 drew to a close, there was no opportunity for the
normal conference procedure to resolve differences between the bills,
and Congress found it necessary to provide continuing appropriations
through H.J. Res. 610 for a number of agencies having pending appro-
priations. For agencies whose appropriations had passed both Houses,
the Resolution provides as follows, in § 101(a)(3):
Whenever the amount which would be made available
or the authority which would be granted under an Act
listed in this subsection as passed by the House as of
October 1, 1980, is different from that which would be
available or granted under such Act as passed by the
Senate as of October 1, 1980, the pertinent project or
activity shall be continued under the lesser amount or the
more restrictive authority: Provided, That where an item is
included in only one version of an Act as passed by both
Houses as of October 1, 1980, the pertinent project or
activity shall be continued under the appropriation, fund,
or authority granted by the one House, but at a rate for
operations not exceeding the current rate or the rate per-
mitted by the action of the one House, whichever is
lower, and under the authority and conditions provided in
applicable appropriation Acts for the fiscal year 1980.
The apparent purpose of § 101(a)(3) is to distinguish between matters
considered by both Houses, for which the more restrictive of the two
provisions is to govern, and matters considered by only one House, for
which “authority and conditions” are to revert to those found in fiscal
year 1980 appropriations.
Because the rider is found only in the Senate version of the underly-
ing 1981 appropriations bill, and the issue of restricting the mode of
administering New York City loan guarantees was not taken up in the
House, § 101(a)(3) of H.J. Res. 610 specifies that the rider falls within
the proviso as an “item included in only one version of an A ct.”
Therefore, it is superseded by the “authority and conditions” found in
applicable 1980 appropriations.
65
This reading of the resolution is confirmed by the following explana-
tion provided by the Managers in the Conference Committee Report on
H.J. Res. 610:
The Committee of Conference agrees that, for the pur-
poses of this resolution in interpreting the language con-
tained in Section 101(a)(3) concerning restrictive authority
included in only one version of an Act as passed by the
House and Senate, the restrictive authority, as it applies to
the proviso concerning the New York City Loan Guaran-
tee Program, contained in the 1981 HUD Independent
Agency Appropriation Act, must have been carried in the
applicable Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 1980, before
it is operative in Fiscal Year 1981.
The rider was “included in only one version of an A ct” within the
meaning of the proviso to § 101(a)(3), and was therefore, by the terms
of the proviso, superseded by the applicable appropriation act for fiscal
year 1980, which contains no such limitation. I therefore conclude that
the rider has not taken effect, and does not restrict your authority in
administering the Guarantee Act.*
Sincerely,
B e n j a m i n R. C i v i l e t t i
•As you know, Attorney General Elliot Richardson adopted the formal policy on October 1, 1973,
o f not issuing opinions regarding the validity of guarantees or other obligations issued by federal
agencies unless the opinion request raises a genuine issue of law. Successive Attorneys General,
including myself, have adhered to this policy. In addition, Attorneys General have opined that they do
not have the authority to issue opinions when it is apparent that the request has been made, not
because the requestor has any real concern about his authority, but because private persons, who
engage in transactions with the United States, have insisted upon such an opinion for their benefit. 39
Op. A tt'y Gen. II, 17-19 (1937); 20 Op. A tt’y Gen. 463, 464 (1892). Because your request raises a
genuine issue of law, I believe that an A ttorney G eneral’s opinion on the narrow issue presented is
appropriate. I am also persuaded that this is a legal issue over which you have a serious concern and,
for that reason, I believe 1 have the authority to issue this opinion. I am troubled, however, by the
insistence of private lawyers involved in the New York guarantee transaction on receiving an
A ttorney General opinion addressing this question. I ask you to inform private persons who transact
business with your department that the A ttorney General will not issue opinions solely because they
feel it is important to protect them or guide them in their transactions, and that opinions related to
business transactions with the government will be issued only when the transaction raises a substantial
and genuine issue of law arising in the administration of a department.
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