Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc.

LIBBIE REHABILITATION CENTIER, INC. 817 Libbie Convalescent Center a/k/a Libbie Rehabilita- tion Center, Inc. and Retail Clerks Union, Local 157 a/w United Food & Commercial Workers International Union. Case 5-CA- 11282 August 27, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND TRUESDALE On May 30, 1980, Administrative Law Judge James L. Rose issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. 1 AMENDED REMEDY Substitute the following for the first paragraph of "The Remedy" section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision: "Having concluded that the Respondent with- drew recognition in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and that it recognize and upon request bargain with the Union and take other affirmative action deemed appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act, including continued recognition of and bargaining with the Union as statutory representa- tive." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Libbie Conva- lescent Center a/k/a Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I In the section entitled "The Remedy" of the attached Decision, the Administrative Law Judge recommended that the Union's certification year begin again ith he Respondent's compliance ith the Order However, in ie r of he fact that there was no finding of bad-faith bar- gaining. and absent any unusual circumslances, se find the extension to be inappropriate and shall amend the remedy accordingly Glenna Pav- ics. Inc., 234 NLRB 1309, fn 4 (1978) See also Pennco. Inc., 250 NLRB No 93 (1980) 251 NLRB No. 116 DECISION SIAT'I M N OF tHIHE CASE JANIMS L. ROS, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard before me at Richmond, Virginia, on March 10 and 11, 1980, upon the General Counsel's com- plaint which alleged that the Respondent has engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151, et seq., by: (a) refusing to execute a collective-bargaining agreement with the Charging Party; and (b) withdrawing recogni- tion of the Charging Party as the bargaining representa- tive of a unit of its employees. The Respondent generally denied that it has commit- ted any unfair labor practices and affirmatively contends that it never reached an agreement with the Charging Party concerning all the terms and conditions of the col- lective-bargaining contract which they were negotiating. The Respondent further contends that it was privileged to withdraw recognition because it doubted that the Charging Party continued to represent a majority of its employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. Upon the record as a whole, including my observation of the witnesses, and the briefs and arguments of counsel, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS o0 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. JURISDICTION The Respondent is a Virginia corporation engaged in the operation of a nursing home at Richmond, Virginia. During the 12 months immediately preceding the issu- ance of the complaint herein, the Respondent received gross revenues in excess of $100,000 from this operation and it purchased and received in interstate commerce products valued in excess of $2,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth of Virginia. The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 157 a/w United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (herein the Union or the Charging Party), is admitted to be, and I find is, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Facts Following a petition for certification in Case 5-RC- 10417, an election was held on July 7, 1978, among the Respondent's employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.' The tally of ballots shows that, of approximately ' The appropriate bargaining unit ithin the meaning of Sec 9(b) of the Act is All full-time and regular part-time nurses aides. food service employ- ees, recreational therapy assistant, cook. medication nurse. mainte- Continued 818 DECISI()NS OF NATIONA I.A()KOR REL ATIONS BOARI) 86 eligible voters. 74 cast ballots in favor of the Union and 2 voted for an intervenor; there were 5 votes cast against either participating labor organization and there were 2 challenged ballots. Thus, including challenges, the Union received "Yes" votes from 74 of the 83 em- ployees voting. The Union was certified as the employ- ees' bargaining representative on July 21, 1978. Following certification, the parties began negotiating the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement. Several meetings were held beginning August 10, 1978, and many terms were resolved. There was, however, dispute on wages, dues, checkoff, and holiday pay; and on Feb- ruary 8, 1979, the Respondent submitted to the Union its "final offer." The Union apparently had some kind of meeting to consider this proposal and on February 14 rejected it."2 By letter of March 8, the Respondent notified the Union that, since the parties had been at impasse for some time, the Respondent intended to implement its final offer. There was apparently no response to this an- nouncement nor were there any subsequent meetings until July 5. On April 24, the employees commenced an economic strike with, initially, about half of the bargaining unit staying off work. Thereafter, some of the strikers re- turned to work and the Company commenced hiring permanent replacements. By July 30, according to re- cords of the Company, there were 62 members of the bargaining unit who had not gone on strike, 11 had re- turned, and 64 employees were hired after the strike began. While these 64 were designated permanent replace- ments, from the testimony of company witnesses, t is clear that the composition of the bargaining unit in- creased substantially during the course of the strike be- cause of changed manning requirements. For instance, according to Frank R. Giannotti, the Respondent's chair- man of the board of directors and chief executive officer, at the time of the strike there were approximately 90 em- ployees in the bargaining unit while as of July 30 there were 137. Thus many of these 64 would be considered new hires as opposed to permanent replacements for strikers. The July 5 meeting was at the office of a Federal me- diator. The parties are in general agreement that at the beginning of this meeting, the unresolved issues were a union demand for an additional 30 cents per hour over nance employees, housekeeping employees employed by the Em- ployer at its Libbie Avenue, Richmond, Virginia facility, but exclud- ing all office clerical employees. charge nurses, bookkeepers, activity director, housekeeping supervisors, maintenance supervisor, director of nursing, assistant director of nursing, dietary supers isors and foiod service supervisors, guards and all other supervisors as defined i the Act. 2 Walter R Lewis, the Union's president and chief executive officer, testified, somewhat ambiguously, concerning the Union's ratificationl process. He testified that no contract could be accepted without it being ratified by the membership but he also stated that the ratification ote could not take place until after the Company had executed the proposed agreement. The February 8 offer by the Company was never sigined by either company or union officials, thus the meeting at which the Febru- ary 8 offer was rejected was not a "ratificalion" vote withinl the meaning of Lewis' testimony even though, presumably, the membership could have voted to accept the Company's proposal the 3-year term of the contract, an agreement that the Company would checkoff dues of union members, and the Union wanted one additional holiday. A fourth issue, concerning prepayment of vacation pay, the Company readily agreed to because, according to company wit- nesses, it was their impression that such was already the policy. The Company rejected the Union's demand for an ad- ditional 30 cents in wages, checkoff, or an additional holiday. During the course of this meeting, the Union re- duced its economic demand to 5 cents per hour per year over the 3-year term of the contract plus checkoff and an additional holiday. Again the Company rejected the Union's demand and the meeting broke off with the un- derstanding that no further meetings would be set until one party or the other believed movement would be pos- sible. In such case, that party was to contact the Federal mediator, who would arrange a meeting After the July 5 meeting broke up, according to Lewis, he and John Gourlay, an International representa- tive who had been present during the course of the nego- tiations, agreed that they would capitulate and accept the Company's offer of February 8. The only evidence of this, however, is Lewis' uncorroborated testimony. The principal factual issue in this matter is whether this deter- mination was ever communicated to the Company. Lewis claiming he did so at a meeting on July 25 and, by implication, before. In any event, within 2 weeks, as the Company was be- ginning to increase its staffing requirements, Christine Purdue, one of the company attorneys, contacted Lewis to determine whether the Union wanted the Company to hire strikers or "off the street." Though unclear from the record, Purdue and Lewis apparently talked on July 19; then on July 20 Lewis called and talked to Paul Thomp- son, the Company's chief spokesman and principal attor- ney in this matter.:' According to Thompson, Lewis still asked for some method by which the Union could col- lect dues and did not withdraw the demand for an addi- tional 5 cents per hour per year or an additional holiday. Thompson and Lewis also discussed reinstatement of the strikers. At Thompson's request, Lewis sent him a list of the strikers to be reinstated. Subsequently Lewis and Purdue had a phone conversation concerning the imme- diate reinstatement of some strikers. Pursuant to this, sometime during the week of July 23 six were offered re- instatement. In the meantime, a meeting had been arranged for July 25. There is some indication from Lewis' testimony that the meeting had been originally set for July 17 and again for July 20. In any event, the meeting was held on July 25 in the presence of a new Federal mediator. Thus, ac- cording to the testimony of Thompson, the initial part of the meeting was devoted to appraising the mediator of the outstanding issues: 5 cents per hour per year, check- off, and an additional holiday. The parties did in fact dis- cuss these issues, with the Company staying firm in its denial. : Ihonipson (and his associate Purdue) withdrew as counsel for the Respoldenlt when it became apparent that this nmalter would go to hear- illg anrd hen r v,ould he required ds wit lesses LIBBIE REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. 819 The Union also produced a "strike settlement agree- ment" and there was discussion concerning how the strikers would be reinstated and over what time period, the Union having previously sent to the Company a doc- ument (above referred to) which outlined the Union's demand: Everyone on the Strike Line goes back: (a) On their regular shift (b) At their regular position (c) Same Assignment (d) If the replacements inside are making more than the Company's final offer to the Union for any position the strikers would go to that higher pay rate also. Health insurance was cancelled, Company must pick it up. (With no waiting period.) There was a total of 53 employees going out on strike but in trying to work with the Company as they suggested at our last meeting on replacing the strikers when jobs became available, the list of 28 employees names listed below would go back imme- diately and the difference of 23 could be replaced back in their jobs when and if the jobs became open; (there follows the list of 28 names). The Company declined to discharge individuals who had been hired as strike replacements. However, there was discussion concerning the two openings then exist- ing. The Union suggested that the three members of the employee bargaining committee be given immediate rein- statement. According to company witnesses, inasmuch as the strikers were being reinstated on a strict seniority basis and since the members of the bargaining committee were junior to some of the employees who were continu- ing to strike, to agree to this demand by the Union might be an unlawful preference. The company negotiators caucused, following which the attorneys met with the union representative and me- diator stating that they wished to recess the meeting in order to check out the question of whether or not they could give "super-seniority" to the bargaining commit- tee. They suggested meeting again on August 6. The Union contended that was too far in the future and it was agreed that the parties would meet on August 1. Lewis testified that during the course of this meeting Thompson stated, "I guess we got a contract, right" and Lewis stated, "As soon as you sign it." Thompson spe- cifically denied that he made any such statement. Simi- larly, the other witnesses called by the Respondent, Giannotti and Purdue, denied hearing any statement con- cerning whether an agreement had been reached. There was no corroboration of Lewis' testimony. Lewis did not sign the Company's proposal nor did he ask the Compa- ny's attorney or chief executive office to sign it. Lewis testified that later that day he had a meeting among employees but, as indicated above, they could not ratify the proposal because it was not signed. Therefore he did not withdraw the pickets. By letter on July 30, Giannotti informed Lewis that the Company was withdrawing recognition and, by im- plication, according to the testimony of Thompson, also the contract offer of February 8. In his letter Giannotti stated the Company doubted the Union continued to rep- resent a majority because, along with "a number of other considerations," the Union asked to have the strikers re- instated and the replacements discharged. Giannotti testified that the other factors which led him to believe the Union no longer represented a majority of employees in the unit were: the Union had asked for "super-seniority" status for the bargaining committee em- ployees in reinstatement; during the week following the July 25 meeting a number of employees told him that they were "for the Company" and against the Union; he saw the number of pickets had diminished; and he had been advised by supervisors and administration employ- ees that unit employees had told him they were opposed to the Union and to paying dues. Lewis answered Giannotti by letter on August I in which he stated, in pertinent part, "Therefore, we were assuming that you were to present us with the order that a special recall list of employees would be recalled due to the fact that the union accepted your final offer." B. Analysis and Concluding Findings As indicated above, the two principal issues in this matter are: (a) Whether the Union accepted the Company's Feb- ruary 8 contract proposal at any time before it was with- drawn. (b) Whether under the facts here the Company was privileged to withdraw recognition from the Union. I conclude that the parties never reached a meeting of the minds concerning the terms of the collective-bargain- ing agreement, nor did the Union accept the Company's proposal. But I also conclude that the Respondent un- lawfully, and in violation of its obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, withdrew recognition. I. The contract The General Counsel's allegation that the parties reached a meeting of the minds on July 25 is dependent solely on the testimony of Walter Lewis. His testimony is not corroborated by documentary evidence or other- wise. Conversely, all the Respondent's witnesses, credi- bly I believe, disputed Lewis' assertions on this issue. Further, Lewis' claim is not credulous or consistent with the total facts or his other testimony. There is no question that the parties were apart as of July 5 on the issues of wages, checkoff, and holiday pay. There is also no question that, following the July 5 meet- ing, the Union came to realize that it was in a losing po- sition with regard to the strike and that something would have to be done. Thus, Lewis undertook to have the strikers reinstated and to reach final agreement on a con- tract. Nevertheless, he continued to want something over and above the Company's proposal of February 8. So testified Thompson, undenied by Lewis. To believe Lewis' testimony, the Union came to the July 25 meeting for the purpose of executing a contract to which he announced agreement, yet he did not sign it or ask any company representative to do so. Such seems 820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD improbable. More probable is that the parties continued to negotiate on July 25. Thus Thompson testified, unden- ied by Lewis, that the first part of the meeting was de- voted to advising the new mediator concerning the histo- ry of negotiations, including the issues which separated them at that time: wages, checkoff, and holiday pay. Nor did Lewis dispute Thompson's testimony that, following this recitation, the parties then embarked upon a discus- sion of reinstatement of the strikers; and this was the matter under discussion throughout the remainder of the meeting. Nor did Lewis testify that he told any of the striking employees, following adjournment of the July 25 meet- ing, that he had agreed to a contract nor did any of the striking employees to whom he talked testify that he told them the Company and the Union had reached an agree- ment. Thus, Lewis' testimony that Thompson said, "I guess we have a contract, right'?" is not believable. It simply is not consistent with the total factual situation. And Lewis' testimony that he started the meeting with the comment, "Paul, you know that we are here to sign a contract today," certainly is not an unambiguous accept- ance of the Company's proposal, particularly when fol- lowed by demands on substantive issues. While I found Lewis to be generally credible, on this specific item his demeanor was negative whereas I was impressed with the candor and positive demeanor of the company witnesses, all of whom testified that at no time during the July 25 meeting did Lewis state that the Union agreed to the Company's February 8 proposal or give any indication that the Union would capitulate on the outstanding issues. Indeed, Lewis testified that when the company repre- sentatives left to caucus (over the striker reinstatement matter) the mediator and union representatives "were hatching over different ways we could get the Union dues deducted." Such suggests that the Union had not given up on some form of union security-had not ac- cepted the Company's refusal in this issue. Had the Union really accepted the Company's proposal, discus- sion of this and the other outstanding issues would have been mooted. Nor do i believe credible Lewis' conten- tion that he accepted the Company's proposal and then asked the Company to give in on the outstanding issues. Rather, I believe that at the July 25 meeting when the issues of wages, checkoff, and holiday pay were again brought up, these were critical items that were still under discussion. While the Company's proposal was "still on the table" and the Union could have accepted it, I do not believe that the Union did so on July 25, or at any time until after the offer had been withdrawn. While Giannotti's letter of July 30 does not specifically state that the Company was withdrawing its February 8 proposal, certainly by implication it did so. Withdrawing recognition of the Union is certainly tantamont to with- drawing the proposal. I therefore conclude that the Company did not refuse to execute a collective-bargaining contract agreed to be- tween the parties and did not in this manner breach its obligations under Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 2. The withdrawal of recognition It is well settled that during the year following certifi- cation a bargaining representative enjoys an almost unre- buttable presumption that it continues to represent a ma- jority of employees in the unit. Following expiration of the "certification year" the representative continues to be presumed to represent a majority of employees in the unit, however, the presumption becomes rebuttable. The employer can rebut the presumption by: Showing that the union has in fact lost its majority status, or "that it had sufficient objective bases for reasonably doubting the union's continuing majority status at the time it with- drew recognition." Pennco, Inc., 242 NLRB 467 (1979). But in either case, the employer has a burden of proving its assertions by preponderance of the credible evidence. Further, it is well settled that new employees are pre- sumed to support the union in the same ratio as those they replace; and, this is true even where the new em- ployees are hired during a strike and to replace strikers. That is, the mere fact that an employee crosses a picket line to accept employment (or does not go on strike or strikes and then returns to work) does not establish factu- ally or by implication that such an employee rejects the union as his or her collective-bargaining representative. Windham Community Memorial Hospital and Hatch Hos- pital Corporation, 230 NLRB 1070 (1977), enfd. 577 F.2d 805 (2d Cir. 1978). The court specifically accepted the Board's conclusion that strike replacements (and those who did not go on strike or who returned from striking) cannot be presumed to have repudiated the union as their bargaining agent. Said the court, "This is especially true in employment which is so closely involved with health and safety; many nurses consider strikes completely im- proper." Thus the Board and the court recognize that there may be many reasons, other than rejecting the union as the bargain representative, why employees, particularly in the health care industry, would choose not to strike in the first instance, would abandon a strike, or would accept employment at a facility where employees were engaged in a strike. In the election of July 7, 1978, the Union received ap- proximately 90 percent of the vote. The evidence is in- sufficient that this substantial mandate was reduced to less than half, that replacements did not, as presumed, support the Union in the same ratio as those voting. In addition to the fact of nonstrikers, the Respondent's evidence that the Union had lost its majority status was the testimony of Giannotti and other representatives of management to the effect that a number of employees, particularly returning strikers, had indicated a dissatisfac- tion with the Union. This testimony, however, even taken in the light favorable to the Respondent, does not show a sufficient number of dissidents to nullify the Union's strong majority. Further, Giannotti's testimony about events during the week following the July 25 meeting, including "feed- back" that employees did not want the Union, is simply too vague to overcome the Union's presumed majority status. LIBBIE REtiABIIITAlION CENTER, INC 821 It might be noted that there was some testimony con- cerning alleged threats by striking employees to non- strikers and other alleged misconduct by some striking employees. While such events might affect an individ- ual's entitlement to reemployment, such is not at issue in this case. Even if these events happened as testified to by the Respondent's witnesses, such were not of sufficient magnitude to affect the Union's status as the bargaining representative, nor is there any indication that the Union was responsible for these alleged acts. From the total record then I conclude that Giannotti did not in fact have sufficient objective evidence to con- clude that the Union no longer represented a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit when, on July 30, 1979, he withdrew recognition. Absent actual evidence that the Union no longer represented a majority of these employees or such objective considerations, the Union's status as a majority representative of these employees is presumed to continue and I find did. Accordingly, when the Respondent withdrew recognition just 7 days follow- ing the end of the "certification year," it did so in viola- tion of Section X(a)(5) of the Act. IV. tiHI I :CTS OF1 IHI UNFAIR I AHOR PRACIICES UPON COMMI RCE: The unfair labor practices found, occurring in connec- tion with the Respondent's operations set forth above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com- merce and the free flow of commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. v. THE REMEDI)Y Having concluded that the Respondent withdrew rec- ognition in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom, and, to recognize and upon request to bargain with the Union and take other affirmative action deemed appropriate to effectuate the policies of the Act. I shall also recommend that the Union's certification year begin again with the Respondent's compliance with the recommended Order herein. Upon the foregoing fiidings of fact, conclusions of law, the entire record in this matter, and pursuant to the pro- visions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the fol- lowing recommended: ORDER 4 The Respondent, Libbie Convalescent Center a/k/a Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Richmond, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain with Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 157 a/w United Food & Commercial Workers ' In the evenl no exceptions are filed as prosvided h Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations f he National L.ahor Relations Board, he find- ings, conclumsi, aid recolmmended order herein shall, as pro,,ided in Sec 102 48 of he Rules and Regulaions, he adopted h he Board aid hecome its findings., conclusionls, and ()rder. aid all objectlions thereto shall he deemed waised fior all purposces International Union, as the majority representative of its employees in the unit found appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining as set forth above. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action deemed ap- propriate to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Recognize and bargain with Retail Clerks Interna- tional Union, Local No. 157 a/w United Food & Com- mercial Workers International Union, as the representa- tive of a majority of its employees in a unit found appro- priate for purposes of collective bargaining under Sec- tion 9(b) of the Act as defined above, and execute any collective-bargaining agreement reached between the parties. (b) Post at the Respondent's facility at Richmond, Vir- ginia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." ' Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being duly signed by the Re- spondent's representatives, shall be posted by it immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by the Re- spondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicu- ous places, including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in wvrit- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. In the ent iha I thi ()rder is enforced b5 a Judgment of a TiUnited Stales Court of Appeal,. ithe %kord, in the notice reading "'ostled ', Order of he Natilonal labor Rlallolls HBoard" shall "Potled P'ursua:nt o ia Judgmen l of th e iliteld Stl;tc, C lurl or Appeals E:ifiorcing an ()rder of the Natirial .ahor Relallons Board" APPENDIX NoTicE- To EMPl.OYliES POSTH I) BY ORDI)ER OF THE NATIONAI LABOR R I.ATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties were given the op- portunity to participate, call, to examine and to cross-ex- amine witnesses, it has been found by the National Labor Relations Board that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. We have been ordered to stop such activity, to post this notice, and to comply with its terms. WE wn.l. NOT refuse to bargain with Retail Clerks Union, Local No. 157 a/w United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, as the representative of a majority of our employees in the following described collective-bargaining unit: All full-time and regular part-time nurses aides, food service employees, recreational therapy as- sistant, cook, medications nurse, maintenance em- ployees, housekeeping employees employed by the Employer at its Libbie Avenue, Richmond, Virginia facility, but excluding all office clerical 822 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees, charge nurses, bookkeepers, activity director, housekeeping supervisors, maintenace supervisor, director of nursing, assistant director of nursing, dietary supervisors and food service supervisors, guards and all other supervisors as defined in the Act. WE Wll.l NOT in any like or related manner in- terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. WF. WILl., upon request, recognize and bargain with the above-named labor organization as the ma- jority representative of our employees in the above- described collective-bargaining unit and we will reduce to writing and execute any contract agreed to with the Union. LIBBIE CONVALESCENT CENTER A/K/A LIBBIE REHABILITATION CENTER, INC. ---