Cable Vision, Inc.

412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Cable Vision, Inc. and Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO. Cases -CA-14440 and -CA-14721 May 8, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND TRUESDALE On December 27, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Claude R. Wolfe issued the attached Deci- sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed exceptions and a reply brief to Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified. 2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Cable Vision, Inc., Lewiston, Maine, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(d) and re- letter present paragraph 2(d) and succeeding para- graphs accordingly: "(d) Offer to all unfair labor practice strikers who struck on or after May 1, 1978, and who make unconditional application to return to work imme- diate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 The General Counsel has excepted to the Administrative Law Judge's failure to provide for the reinstatement of all unfair labor practice strikers. As the record does not indicate unequivocally that all such strik- ers were permitted to return to work after the strike ended, we shall amend the recommended Order and notice to so provide. While Chair- man Fanning and Member Jenkins recognize that the rule allowing an employer 5 days to reinstate strikers is current Board law, they nonethe- less adhere to their position stated in Drug Package Company, Inc., 228 NLRB 108, 119 (1977). See Genova Express Lines. Inc. and Genova Trans- port, Inc,, 245 NRLB No. 28 (1979) 249 NLRB No. 62 if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equiv- alent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, dismissing any replacements if necessary. Further, if the Respondent does not reinstate the striking employees within 5 days from the date of uncondi- tional application, make them whole for any loss of earnings they may suffer as a result of Respond- ent's refusal, from the date of application, less any net earnings during the period of refusal. Backpay is to be computed in the manner prescribed by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclu- sive representative of all employees in the ap- propriate unit described below, by negotiating in bad faith with no intention to enter into a final agreement with the Union. WE WILL NOT ask employees to abandon the Union, or promise them benefits for so doing. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate em- ployees about their union sympathies or de- sires or those of other employees. Wt WILL NOT solicit or promise to remedy employees' grievances. WE SWILL NOT falsely blame the Union for our failure to grant wage increases. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of Local 2327, Internation- al Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL- CIO, or any other labor organization, by dis- charging or in any other manner discriminat- ing against any of our employees with regard to their tenure of employment or other term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL, upon request, bargain collectively with Local 2327, International Brotherhood of CABLE VISION, INC. 413 Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclu- sive representative of all employees in the ap- propriate unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed contract. The appro- priate bargaining unit is: All technicians and installers employed by the Employer at its 720 Sabatus Street, Lewiston, Maine, location, but excluding programmers, office clerical employees, pro- fessional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL offer Donald Jandreau immediate and full reinstatement to his former job, or substantially equivalent employment if that job no longer exists, without prejudice to his se- niority or other rights and privileges previous- ly enjoyed by him, and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of our unlawful termination of him, with interest computed thereon. WE WILL offer, upon their unconditional ap- plication, to reinstate unfair labor practice strikers who struck on or after May 1, 1978, to their former jobs, or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, dis- missing any replacements, if necessary, and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings they may suffer as a result of our re- fusal, if any, to reinstate them within 5 days after application. CABLE VISION, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE CLAUDE R. WOLFE, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding was heard before me at Auburn and Lewis- ton, Maine, on February 26, 27, and 28, and March 1, 2, 19, 20, 21, and 22, 1979, pursuant to charges filed by Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,' on May 2, June 14, July 18, and August 29, 1978, and complaint issued September 6, 1978, and amended at hearing. The complaint alleges violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, consisting of various acts of interference, restraint, and coercion, discriminato- ry job assignment and constructive discharge of Donald Jandreau, and unlawful unilateral action and bad-faith bargaining by the Respondent, Cable Vision, Inc. It is further alleged that Respondent's illegal acts caused an unfair labor practice strike. I The name of the Charging Party is amended to reflect its affiliation with the AFI -CO. Respondent denies the commission of unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record, 2 the demeanor of the wit- nesses as they testified, and due consideration of the able post-trial briefs filed, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCI.USIONS 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is a Maine corporation with its principal office and place of business at Lewiston, Maine, where it is engaged in the sale and installation of cable television service. Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business, causes large quantities of raw materials used by it in the installation of cable television services to be pur- chased and transported in interstate commerce from and through various States of the United States other than the State of Maine. Respondent's gross annual volume of business is in excess of $500,000. Annually, Respondent purchases goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the State of Maine. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 3 A. Introduction On January 17, 1977, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative 4 of Re- spondent's employees in the following unit: All technicians and installers employed by the Em- ployer at its 720 Sabatus Street, Lewiston, Maine lo- cation, but excluding programmers, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and su- pervisors as defined in the Act. Thereafter, Respondent and the Union had 22 negotia- tion meetings between February 23, 1977, and April 27, 1978. 5 The first 12 meetings occurred more than 6 2 Errors in the transcript have been noted and corrected. 3 The facts set forth herein are based on a composite of the credited aspects of the testimony of all witnesses, the exhibits, and careful consid- eration of the logical consistency and inherent probability of the facts found. Although I may not, in the course of this Decision, advert to all of the record testimony or documentary evidence, it has been carefully weighed and considered and to the extent that testimony or other evi- dence not mentioned herein might appear to contradict the findings of fact, that evidence has not been disregarded but has been rejected as in- credible, lacking in probative worth, surplusage, or irrelevant. 4 Respondent's formal denial that the Union still enjoys this status is unsupported by any evidence, and the presumption flowing from the cer- tification stands unrebutted ' February 23, April 13 and 27, May 18, June 16 and 30, July 14 and 28. August II and 25. September 27, Ocotber 14, November 2, 17, and 30, and December 28. 1977, and then on January 12 and 25, February 16 and 23, March 23, and April 27, 1978 CABLE VISION, INC 413 414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD months prior to the filing of the first charge in this case6 and may therefore only be considered as background evi- dence shedding light on events within the statutory 6- month period which are alleged as violations. Unit employees went on strike from approximately May I to June 23, 1978. B. Interference, Restraint, and Coercion I. Statement by Walter Radvon 7 In January or February 1978, Radvon told unit em- ployee Richard Vallee, at Respondent's office, that Re- spondent's employees were all unhappy but the Monta- chusetts employees had no union and were happy. Radvon continued that if Respondent's employees dropped the Union there would be changes. Vallee asked what changes would occur and would the employees get more money. Radvon answered that he could make no promises and could not tell Vallee if employees were going to get a raise. Radvon also commented that he had belonged to a union, all it wanted was money, and it was no good. Montachusetts Cable is, like Respondent, a sub- sidiary of AR Telecommunications, Inc. Radvon's comparison of the unhappiness of Respond- ent's employees with the happy state of Montachusetts employees who had no union clearly conveyed the thought that the cited unhappiness was in some way at- tributable to the Union. His following prediction of changes if the Union were dropped implied benefits would flow to Respondent's employees in exchange for eschewing union representation and that employees would therefore be happier. This implied promise condi- tioned on abandoning the Union is a patent violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Radvon's subsequent state- ment that he could promise nothing is a self-serving con- struct after the promise had already been made, and does not obliterate or ameliorate the unfair labor practice al- ready committed. Moreover, his additional comment that another union had been no good served to emphasize that a union was not a source of satisfaction for employ- ees, that they would be better off without one, and that his promise of benefits deserved careful consideration. 2. Statements by Ronald Hammaker, director of operations (a) In January 1978,8 Hammaker rode with employee Lucien Mailhot on his service route. Hammaker asked Mailhot how the work was going and if he had any com- ments or complaints. Mailhot9 opined that the work was going smoothly, which was the substance of Hammaker's inquiry, and then volunteered that he thought negotia- tions were going slowly. Hammaker changed the subject. After some further general conversation, Hammaker asked Mailhot why the employees had voted for the a May 2. 1978. 7 Radvon did not testify. I am persuaded by a careful examination of the pleadings, both written and oral, that the supervisory and agency status of Radvon have been fairly admitted. I further note that his com- ments parallel those made by Director of Operations Hammaker. s Hammaker says January 13, 1978. a Mailhot was the more believable witness, and I credit him over Ham- maker where the two conflict. Union. Mailhot pointed to poor employee-management communications and dissatisfaction with company meth- ods. Hammaker noted that management had been changed and things would have improved, but it was going to take some time now that there was a union. Hammaker asked if Mailhot had further comments, and Mailhot mentioned complaints about uniforms that the prior manager had laughed at. Hammaker asked what his problem was in view of new uniforms and new supervi- sion. Mailhot complained of the $2.75 weekly uniform fee. Hammaker said it would have to be negotiated with the Union and, in response to a further inquiry regarding the possibility of a future wage raise, that he did not be- lieve Mailhot would be getting a raise because the pres- ence of the Union required retention of the status quo. Hammaker asked what employees hoped to accomplish with the Union and what had it gotten them thus far. Mailhot told him the employees were not going to give up, and he was assured that he would not get fired if he dropped the Union. He questioned this and was reas- sured by Hammaker, who noted a former union activist at Montachusetts' ° was still working. Hammaker then asked what he thought the Union would get him and stated Mailhot would get nothing Respondent did not want to give. Mailhot asserted employees were going to "hang in there" until the matter was resolved. This ended the conversation. I conclude that Hammaker did, as the complaint al- leges, (1) solicit grievances from Mailhot and made an implied promise to remedy them if the Union were aban- doned; and (2) solicited him to abandon the Union. Both were violations of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. I also find that Hammaker violated Section 8(a)(1) by (1) unlawfully interrogating Mailhot with regard to his and other em- ployees' motives for voting for the Union and continuing to support it; and (2) placing the onus on the Union for the improbability of a future wage increase. KDEN Broadcasting Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of North American Broadcasting Company, Inc., 225 NLRB 25, 26 (1976). l L (b) Employee Ralph Caron credibly testified that Hammaker and Richard Vallee met him on the job in Janaury 1978. "They asked him if he had any problems, and Caron mentioned there had been no raise in Octo- ber. 2 Hammaker responded that he could not do any- thing about it because there would be "outside influ- ences. "'3 Caron asked Hammaker, who was wearing a company uniform, how he liked it. Hammaker said he liked it, and commented that Montachusetts employees did not pay for uniforms as Respondent's employees did. After Caron and Vallee corrected the problem for which Caron's assistance had been requested by Vallee, iO It appears that there is now no union at Montachusetts. x These latter two violations, although not specifically alleged, were closely related to complaint allegations regarding the Hammaker-Mailhot conversation, were an integral part of that conversation, and were fully litigated. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Incorporated, 244 NLRB No. 162, fn. 3 (1979); Ackerman Manufacturing Company, 241 NLRB No. 106, sl. op., pp. 2-3 (1979). 12 Respondent gave annual merit increases through November 1, 1976, but has not since granted any. Its action in withholding these raises was unilateral. t I construe this as a reference to the Union. CABLE VISION, INC. 415 the three stopped for coffee. Hammaker gave Vallee his phone number and invited him to call him on any prob- lems, other than things relating to the Union, that Vallee might have.1 4 The General Counsel contends that, by asking Caron if he had any problems, and by telling Vallee to call him if he had any problems on matters other than union-related matters, Hammaker solicited grievances. It is not clear whether it was Hammaker or Vallee, or both, who asked Caron if he had any problems. Standing alone, the word "problems" is somewhat ambiguous. In the circumstances, it is just as likely, if not more so, that the inquiry was directed at "problems" of the same nature encountered by Vallee requiring Caron's help, rather than other problems with wages, hours, or work- ing conditions which Hammaker might remedy. Similar- ly, the invitation to Vallee to call him may very well have referred to problems met with in performing the job. The General Counsel has adduced evidence perhaps warranting suspicion, but has not shown that the suspi- cion is well-founded. Accordingly, I conclude that the General Counsel's specific allegations with regard to this incident should be dismissed. However, I conclude, for substantially the same reasons given by the Board in Ack- erman, supra, that the credible testimony of Caron re- quired a finding that Hammaker violated Section 8(a)(l) by placing the onus for the absence of a raise Respond- ent had unilaterally withheld on the Union, and by com- paring the free uniform benefit at Montachusetts, known by employees to be nonunion, with the uniform fee paid by employees and insisted on by Respondent during the concurrent negotiations. The latter comparison was, in my view, designed to emphasize that Respondent was more favorably disposed to the absence of a union and granted better benefits where that situation pertained and was an implied promise that Respondent would do better for its employees without a union. (c) On January 6, 1978, Hammaker accompanied em- ployee Donald Jandreau on his route. After some small talk they discussed a new system that had been built in Lisbon, Maine, by employees of Respondent and Monta- chusetts. Jandreau volunteered that the Montachusetts men were not experienced because everyone there who had been union activists had been fired. Hammaker re- sponded that this was not true, pointing out that the most active union adherent at Montachusetts was still there after 5 years and nothing had happened to him when the Union was dropped.' 5 In my view, the General Counsel draws a long bow indeed in contending that Hammaker's statement implied- ly solicited Jandreau to abandon the Union. Hammaker's statement was nothing more than a reply to speculation which he considered not to be true, and I find nothing in it violative of the Act, nor am I impressed with the argu- ment that because Hammaker only accompanied employ- " Vallee did not testify on this series of events, nor did Hammaker who merely generally denied the allegations pertaining thereto. ' The facts set forth are derived from a composite of the credible por- tions of the testimony of the two participants and my observation of the witnesses as they testified. There are no significant differences between the testimony of Hammaker and Jandreau except for Jandreau's failure to report that he raised the issue of union activists being fired. I find that he did and credit Hammaker on this point. ees on rare occasions, at times the General Counsel deems significant, he had always to be doing it for pur- poses of inducing abandonment of the Union. 3. The matter of Jandreau Donald Jandreau was a leading union activist during the organizing period, union observer at the Board elec- tion preceding union certification, chief union steward, the employee representative at all negotiation meetings but one, and actively picketed Respondent throughout the 1978 strike. Throughout his employment for Respondent, Jandreau was a self-employed musician performing on occasional week nights, as well as Friday and Saturday nights. In addition to this paid work, Jandreau rehearsed one or two nights a week. On occasion his music earnings matched or exceeded his earnings from Respondent. The information that Jandreau performed in dinner clubs ap- peared in the November-December 1977 issue of the company newspaper. It is therefore obvious Respondent knew of Jandreau's outside employment long prior to the job assignment and separation which are in issue. More- over, Jim Palmer, admitted by Hammaker to be a super- visor, attended performances by Jandreau before the strike, and Hammaker concedes that Jandreau mentioned to him at one time he was a musician. Jandreau was an installer throughout his employment with Respondent and was told by Cloutier, Hammaker's predecessor at Cable Vision, when he was hired that so long as he remained an installer he would not have to perform standby work. Jandreau was never assigned to standby work until the time in issue before me. Jandreau was assigned to standby work when he re- turned from strike. On June 27, 1978, he told Hammaker that his name was mistakenly on the standby list. Ham- maker replied there was no mistake and, to Jandreau's comment that he had no training, said Jandreau needed no training since the nature of the business had changed. Jandreau protested that he would not be able to work standby due to his outside commitments, and that he un- derstood he did not have to work standby so long as he was an installer. Hammaker told him there was no reason why he should not work standby. At that point, Jan- dreau said he would contact his union representative. Hammaker then told him to have his representative, Nadeau, contact Respondent's attorney, Kirle, if Nadeau had a problem. Neither Nadeau nor Jandreau raised the problem with Kirle. Hammaker also told Jandreau that he could swap with other employees whenever he was not able to do the work. Although Jandreau first claimed he replied that this would be a problem because he needed every weekend as well as rehearsal time during the week, he conceded on cross-examination that he did not tell Hammaker about his rehearsals and engagement schedules. I credit Hammaker that Jandreau did not spe- cifically say that he had music commitments during the week and weekends, and find that Jandreau only said that he had outside commitments. I further find, howev- er, that it may be reasonably inferred that Hammaker, aware as he was of Jandreau's employment as a musi- cian, understood the outside commitments to be related to that employment and was therefore put on notice by CABLE VISION, INC. 415 . . 416 I)ECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Jandreau that the assignment conflicted with his musical schedule. On June 28, Jandreau told Hammaker that he did not think he would be able to work standby. Hammaker re- fused to take him off the standby list, stating there was nothing he could do and had to leave it as it was, and repeated that Jandreau could swap with other employees if he needed to do something else. It is common practice for employees of Respondent, who serve on standby on a rotating basis, to trade duty with each other. Jandreau concedes that he did in fact trade his July 4 to July 7 standby duty with another employee. On June 30, Jandreau told Hammaker that he was ter- minating his employment I week from that date and was giving his notice. Hammaker expressed regret and com- plimented Jandreau of his work for Respondent. Considerable evidence was adduced with regard to Jandreau's ability to perform standby work. It is plain to me that Jandreau's abilities had little to do with his deci- sion to sever his employment relationship with Respond- ent. He left because the hours of the standby work inter- fered with his other occupation as a musician, but his lack of training and experience are factors to be consid- ered in ascertaining Hammaker's motive. Jandreau was the first employee assigned to standby without prior training, and there is no showing as to why it was necessary, if it was, to so assign him. I am satisfied from an examination of the considerable evi- dence on the matter that Jandreau was neither trained nor experienced in handling many problems commonly encountered on standby. Respondent's contention that various changes in the equipment and the system made standby work easier to perform will not bear close scru- tiny. The changes referred to occurred several months before the strike, and Respondent never thereafter as- signed anyone not previously trained to handle standby until Jandreau was listed. I further note that a technician was assigned to standby throughout the strike. Ham- maker never really explained why he selected Jandreau for standby, and his statement to Jandreau that he could do nothing about the standby assignment is unbelievable. It is clear that he assigned the men and made the list, and, as the highest official of Respondent at the facility, certainly had the authority to change what he himself had wrought. Summing up, Jandreau was the most conspicuous union adherent on and off the picket line, and Respond- ent was well aware of his activities and identification with the Union. Respondent also knew Jandreau did out- side work as a musician, and refused to consider his truthful claim that he had been promised by Respondent he would not have to work standby. Hammaker incredi- bly told him that he could not change what he had con- structed. There is no showing that it was necessary to put Jandreau on standby. He did not have the training all others on standby had. Added to all this, the timing of the assignment immediately on return from strike strong- ly suggests a retaliatory motive, and the statements of Hammaker to Caron and Mailhot, detailed above, reflect hostility to the Union. Thus, present are outstanding union activity, knowledge of that activity by Respond- ent, union animus, very suspicious timing, unacceptable justification for not changing the assignment, a sparsity of good cause shown for it, and a departure from past practice in making standby assignments. I am not persuaded that the aim of the unlawfully mo- tivated assignment was to put Jandreau in the position of having to choose between his job at Respondent and his outside employment as a musician, with the reasonable expectancy by Respondent that Jandreau's choice might very well be to leave Respondent's employment, a de- sired end from Respondent's point of view. It might be argued that Jandreau could have elected to abandon his musical work while on standby, and thereby avoided separation. In the circumstances, this was not a reason- able alternative because he sometimes made more at that work than from Respondent, and Respondent had ceased granting annual merit increases and had consistently re- sisted wage increases and other improvements to benefits at negotiation meetings attended by Jandreau. I conclude that it was reasonably predictable that placing Jandreau on standby was likely to cause him to quit, and that Re- spondent believed this when it placed him on standby and was confirmed in this belief by his subsequent pro- tests which it refused. Any argument that the opportuni- ty to swap standby with others alleviated the oppressive nature of the assignment is rejected because it preserves that Jandreau would invariably be able to do so when on standby. This is pure speculation not worthy of consider- ation. For all the above reasons I find that the assignment of Jandreau to standby violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and that Respondent violated the same sections of the Act by constructively discharging Donald Jan- dreau. The allegation that the assignment of Jandreau to standby duty is an unlawful unilateral change in working conditions without having bargained to impasse, and therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, is without merit because the Board has held that a unilateral change limited to one employee absent a similar change in policy with respect to its employees in general does not affect "terms and conditions of employment" within the mean- ing of Section 8(d) of the Act. Mike O'Connor Chevrolet- Buick-GMC Co., Inc., 209 NLRB 701, 704 (1974); Brown & Connolly. Inc., 237 NLRB 250 (1978). C. The Bargaining Respondent's attorney, Julius Kirle, and the Union's assistant business manager, George Nadeau, were the chief negotiators for the parties throughout the meetings, except for the last one when the Union's attorney was present. Kirle was assisted by Hammaker, and Nadeau by Jandreau. The sole witness testifying at any length about the content of negotiations was George Nadeau, although some information relating thereto was adduced from Hammaker and Jandreau. Accordingly, the following ac- count of some of the more significant events in the course of the various meetings is largely derived from the credible portions of Nadeau's testimony. CABLE VISION, INC. 417 1. Meeting 1, February 23, 1977 Kirle and Nadeau agreed to schedule future bargaining sessions after the first of March 1977; they also agreed that problems developing during bargaining would be brought to the table for resolution. Kirle agreed to rec- ognition of the Union for the certified unit, and asserted that he and Hammaker had full authority to negotiate subject to ratification by the Company's board of direc- tors. Kirle received the Union's first contract proposal package and promised to review it for discussion at the next meeting. In response to a union inquiry, Kirle said he had no counterproposals prepared, and agreed to pro- vide information on the existing pension, health and wel- fare plan so the Union could complete its proposal there- on. The Union's proposal had 24 articles entitled: "Recog- nition," "Duration of Agreement," "Management Rights," "Non-Discrimination," "No Strike," "Grievance and Arbitration," "Union Business," "Union Security," "Hours of Work-Overtime," "Holidays," "Call-Outs- Standby," "Tower Work," "Inclement Weather," "Ab- sence From Duty," "Leave of Absence," "Vacations,' "Safety," "Tools," "Seniority-Layoff," "Pension-Health and Welfare," "Wage Progression-Promotions," "Ex- pense and Travel Time," "Part-Time Employees," and "Separability," together with clauses on agreement, in- troduction, and scope. 2. Meeting 2, April 13, 1977 Kirle orally gave information on employee/employer contributions to the health and pension plan. After dis- cussion of the pension and insurance plans, the Union re- quested additional data. The Company agreed to supply it. Kirle said he would study and consider the Union's proposals. There was exploratory discussion on various articles, with agreement to label the union-security pro- posal as "check-off." Nadeau requested concluding the day with a complete explanation of the Union's package. Kirle responded that was not necessary and they would discuss it at the next meeting. 3. Meeting 3, April 27, 1977 The Company did not bring the insurance plan data but it was not necessary to the conduct of the meeting. The Union's proposals article 13-leave of absence through article 19-senority layoffs were discussed. Kirle made a noncommittal statement of intent to review, as he did throughout negotiations when presented with pro- posals. There were off-the-record discussions regarding the parties' respective positions. None of the Union's ar- ticles was flatly rejected. The Company made clear its position on no wage progression. The Union stated an intent to submit an article on uniforms during negotia- tions, and rejected company utilization of employee-paid vending service. 4. Meeting 4. May 18, 1977 Union proposals article 21-wages to article 24-sep- arability were discussed. Respondent furnished health, welfare and pension literature like that made available to all employees. As of this meeting the Company had sup- plied all the information the Union had requested. The Union wanted to skip the wage issue until the Company agreed to include the programmer position. Kirle cor- rectly protested that the programmer included in the Union's wage proposal was not in the certified bargain- ing unit. The parties agreed to defer wage discussions until the Company could verify the accuracy of the in- formation submitted in the Union's proposal. Prior to the next meeting, the Union mailed an amend- ed proposal on article 18-tools and a complete proposal on article 20-pension. 5. Meeting 5, June 16, 1977 Respondent submitted its first written proposals and provided information on a new installer, Boutot. At this meeting, Kirle stated that the Company would have to caucus if the Union accepted its initial proposals. The parties discussed Respondent's proposals, which Kirle stated were open for bargaining and not offered as "take it or leave it" terms. Some of the main clauses were sum- marized as requested by the Union and the parties took positions on article 9-grievances. The Union insisted on the inclusion of an arbitration clause. Respondent wanted to exclude a "no strike clause" as inappropriate because it did not agree to an arbitration clause. Either at this meeting or a subsequent one, the Company agreed to change the designated union grievance agent from Inter- national representative to the business manager, and to extend the grievance filing period from 2 to 4 days. Kirle refused to agree to more frequent meetings. Nadeau also asked Kirle if he would accept union counterproposals by mail so the parties would be in a position to accept or reject terms at the next meeting. Kirle refused to accept mailed proposals, insisting that proposals be submitted at the table. 6. Meeting 6, June 30, 1977 At the opening of the meeting, Kirle rejected all union articles which had not been already effectively rejected by Respondent's written proposals submitted on June 16, 1977. The Company's draft proposal contained articles sub- stantially different from the Union's proposal on such matters as workweek, overtime, wages, vacation, insur- ance, and seniority. Unlike the union draft, Respondent's proposal included a waiver article, but did not include separability; expense and travel time; pension; unpaid leave of absence; callout-standby; toner work; tools; union business; or checkoff provisions. Respondent's grievance proposals omitted arbitration. The overtime proposal did not provide for Sundays or holidays, and the workweek article expressly retained the right to re- quire overtime, make final determination of hours per day or week, and to completely or partially shut down. In addition to a broad management-rights clause,' I The proposed management-rights clause art VII--management. read Except only as herein clearly and explicitly limited by the express and specific terms of this Agreement, all rights, powers, and authori- Conlinued CABLE VISION, INC. 417 418 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD which was never thereafter varied, Respondent proposed a shop-rule clause requiring employees to abide by all shop rules and regulations that it promulgated. Respond- ent's right to exercise discretionary controls was sought in its wage article regarding the institution, revision, and discontinuation of job classifications, merit increases, and promotions. This wage proposal offered no wage in- crease and was subject to grievance only for wage re- duction for new or revised jobs. Additional discretionary control was retained in the pension plan, vacation article, seniority (layoff), grievance,S and subcontracting't arti- cles. Respondent's waiver proposal required a complete waiver of bargaining on all matters not specifically cov- ered in the contract, whether then known or not. The Union accepted Respondent's proposals on recog- nition, agreement clause, employment opportunities, and safety and health. The remaining company proposals were rejected in whole or part. 7. Meeting 7, July 14, 1977 The Union submitted its second set of proposals re- garding workweek, overtime, and paid holidays. The Union verbally offered to agree to overtime pay for part- timers on conditions that new part-timers receive time pro rata. The Company submitted its retirement plan. There were no substantive agreements reached at this meeting. The parties did agree to review the status of the contract terms as to agreement and rejection, stating dif- ferences involved. 8. Meeting 8, July 28, 1977 The Union submitted second proposals on grievance and arbitration, seniority, subcontracting, and vacations. No agreement was reached on those proposals. Respond- ent's retirement proposals was rejected by the Union. The parties reviewed Respondent's first proposal pack- age. After this review Kirle stated that the Company was now in a better position to start negotiations. An- other review was made at this meeting with discussions focused upon the Union's first proposal. ties of the Company in the Management of the business and its em- ployees, including (but not limited to) the right to determine the methods and means by which its operations are to be carried on, to direct the work force and to conduct its operations in a safe and efective manner shall be retained by the Company. " Art. Vll--shop rules, read: The employees will abide by all shop rules and regulations pro- mulgated by the Company. 'x These articles read: A grievance as used in this Agreement is limited to a complaint which involves the interpretation or application of a specific provl- sion of this Agreement. However, no matter reserved by this Agree- ment to the discretion of Management or which is excluded from the grievance procedure of this Agreement or involves a right which is retained by the Company under Article of this Agreement shall be the subject of a grievance as herein defined. '9 Art. XV-subcontracting, read: Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the right to subcontract work shall be retained by the Company and shall not be subject to the grievance provisions of this Agreement. 9. Meeting 9, August 11, 1977 The Union submitted a second retirement proposal, which the Company agreed to review and consider. There was further discussion of the union proposals sub- mitted at the prior meeting. The issues involved were not resolved, and the Company rejected grievance and arbitration, vacations, holidays, workweek, subcontract- ing, and seniority proposals of the Union. The parties then discussed their differences on premium pay for Sun- days and holidays in the overtime proposal; Respondent neither accepted nor rejected, but agreed to look into it. The Union maintained that Respondent's management- rights clause was ambiguous and dovetailed with the shop-rules article. Nadeau agreed to review and consider company brochures on employee stock options and the Christmas bonus plan for that year. A review of the day's discussion ended this meeting. 10. Meeting 10, August 25, 1977 Respondent submitted its first proposals on discharge and travel expenses, and its sceond proposals on work- week, overtime, paid holidays, shop rules, grievance, and complete agreement. The Union's response was to reject all in whole as in part except "complete agreement," which was accepted since it reflected the union-request- ed wording "mutually agreed upon." The paid holidays, article VI, reflected no additional terms in comparison to the last prior company proposal on this subject. Re- spondent's grievance article was accepted in principle by the Union since there were additions of union-requested wording and an increase of 2 days for cooling-off period, but rejected because there was no arbitration clause in- cluded. The other proposals reflected some changes but none which were substantial, e.g., the phrase "not incon- sistent with the terms of this agreement" was added to Respondent's shop-rule proposal. Kirle rejected Nadeau's request to meet longer and schedule meetings at shorter intervals. I. Meeting 11, September 27, 1977 After bargaining on the per diem rate for travel ex- pense, the Union accepted Respondent's proposal on that topic. No agreement was reached on arbitration, which kept the parties apart on the discharge and grievance ar- ticles. Nadeau told Kirle, "we're getting closer and we could agree with this article if the Company would agree to arbitration." Extensive discussion of the vacation arti- cle constituted the remainder of the meeting. The parties did agree to continue negotiation of the vacation article since an impasse had not yet been reached. Except on the issue of pro rata for part-time, union acceptance of company concessions made to meet previous objections resulted in subsequent agreement to the company vaca- tion, article XI. CABLE VISION, INC, 419 12. Meeting 12, October 14, 1977 There were no agreements reached at this meeting, al- though there was general discussion on several topics.20 Kirle requested the Union to outline its priorities which were, in order of importance to them, wages, se- niority, hours of work, overtime, grievance and arbitra- tion, callouts, standby, paid absence, tower work, sub- contracting, vacations, holidays, expenses, and uniforms. Later, the retirement/pension term was included. The Union offered to withdraw the remaining issues it considered secondary, if Respondent would submit fur- ther proposals on the priority items. 13. Meeting 13, November 2, 1977 The Union considered and rejected Respondent's 1977-78 holiday schedule, claiming it contradicted the holiday proposals submitted during negotiations. The re- maining topics of discussion at this meeting are unclear, but it does not appear there was agreement to any terms. Subsequent to this meeting Nadeau telephoned Kirle to inform him of the Union's approval of the 1977-78 holiday schedule. 14. Meeting 14, November 14, 1977 Kirle read a statement that the Company would no longer participate in negotiations unless the employees discontinued a work slowdown.21 Nadeau denied knowl- edge and promised to investigate. The meeting then ended, and Nadeau expressed his intention to request the participation of a Federal mediator. Prior to the resumption of negotiations Nadeau sent Respondent a telegram advising that its employees had been informed of the consequences of a work slowdown, even though no such conduct had been verified. The telegram also included a request for more frequent and longer negotiating sessions. 15. Meeting 15, November 30, 1877 Apparently there was some discussion at this meeting about vacations. The parties agreed on tower work and inclement weather provisions. The Union submitted addi- tional counterproposals and the parties discussed callout pay and other matters. At the close, Nadeau expressed his concern at the length of the meeting and asked Kirle to come next time better prepared to put in a free day. Nadeau suggested meeting twice a week; Kirle objected on the basis of prior commitments. 16. Meeting 16, December 28, 1977 Respondent submitted seniority, workweek, and sub- contracting proposals which were identical to its earlier proposals. Kirle said the Company was not making any change in its first proposals on seniority and workweek, and was resubmitting them in response to the Union's proposals. Nadeau protested the subcontracting proposal was duplicative and that Kirle was showing no change 20 Nadeau testified that although discussion of items had been held in reserve there was never an outright refusal by either party to discuss any item. 21 There is no probative evidence or any slowdown. of position. Respondent gave Nadeau information con- cerning the recent wage increase of employee Boutot at the end of his probationary period. Respondent restated its position on union priority issues, callout pay, holidays, and wages, with no change. The Union submitted an- other wage proposal. Kirle refused to give the Union in- formation on financial ability. Kirle took the position that no obligation to furnish information existed because the Company did not claim inability to pay. At this meeting, or a subsequent one, Nadeau again expressed a desire for longer meetings at shorter intervals. He stated that the parties could easily resolve articles on which there were minor differences. Kirle responded that he did not look upon them as minor differences. 17. Meeting 17, January 12, 1978 The parties reached no agreements at this meeting, other than an agreement by Kirle to reconsider Respond- ent's position on present practice with regard to its "standby" proposal. 18. Meeting 18, January 25, 1978 Respondent presented revised proposals on workweek employment hours, standby pay, and holidays. No agree- ment was reached on them. The parties restated their po- sitions on various proposals, with no significant change. As to wages, Respondent took the position that any form of guaranteed wages was unnecessary, and that it was the Respondent's right to determine when or if wage raises were granted. Kirle asserted that Respondent's wage structure was fair and contained no inequities. Nadeau requested continued negotiations on a wage package, and stated that he would definitely withdraw all proposals on secondary issues and focus on priority matters. He further stated that he wished Kirle would reply to the latter issues. 19. Meeting 19, February 16, 1978 Respondent submitted proposals on jury duty, sick leave, paid holidays, grievances, seniority, vacations, and death in the family. The Union submitted proposals on paid holidays, seniority, vacations, standby pay, and overtime. Respondent's jury-duty offer was agreed to. As to holidays, Respondent's proposal reflected a signifi- cant change in eligibility period with which the Union agreed. The only change in its grievance proposal was correction of an editing oversight. Respondent changed its seniority proposal to reflect 5, rather than 3, days within which to return to work on recall. Changes in Respondent's vacation proposal were significant, but this article was completely agreed on except for part-time pay. There appears to have been no other significant changes of position by the parties. The Union withdrew all its proposals on issues it con- sidered secondary. Kirle gave Respondent's position on each item on the Union's priority list, and stated that any proposals not agreed on were rejected; all union propos- als rejected were still rejected unless they had later been accepted; and all outstanding company proposals which had been rejected in whole or part by the Union reflect- ed Respondent's position. CABLE VISION, INC. 419 420 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Nadeau gave reasons that it was Respondent's fault no agreement had been reached and requested further meet- ings. Kirle cited the Union as equally contributing to the status of negotiations and questioned the necessity of more meetings. Kirle did, however, agree to meet again and negotiate further with the Union. This meeting closed with off-record discussions of the remaining arti- cles. 20. Meeting 20, February 23, 1978 Negotiations at this meeting are best characterized as review of past bargaining, written and verbal counter- proposing without significant change, and off-the-record discussions. Both parties essentially maintained firm posi- tions with respect to their most recent proposals offered. 21. Meeting 21, March 23, 1978 A Federal mediator was present. Nadeau made a state- ment of what he considered the issues. Respondent did not question this. There was some joint discussion of wages, seniority, subcontracting, grievances and arbitration, and work- week. The parties maintained their fixed positions and no agreements were reached. 22. Meeting 22, April 27, 1978 A Federal mediator was present. There was discussion of various existing proposals with neither party budging. The Union's counsel insisted on wage improvements as a condition of contract. There have been no further meet- ings. With respect to the length and frequency of meetings Hammaker concedes that Nadeau asked for longer and more frequent meetings four or five times, and that al- though Nadeau had stated that meeting for over 4 hours was not desirable he had also pointed out that the parties had to meet more often than once every 14 days. Nadeau also told Respondent in February 1978, according to Hammaker, that he wanted to negotiate further to make progress and would meet 7 days a week, 24 hours a day to do so . With the exception of the meetings of April 13, 1977, and February 23, 1978, the meetings were held at intervals ranging from 2 weeks to a month, with 14 days the most common interval. The duration of the meetings varied from about an hour and a half to almost 5 hours. Of the five meetings 4 hours or more in length, four were within the 6-month period preceding the filing of the charge. It appears that only four meetings started on time. Although some of the late starting was due to weather or union contribution, most of this delay was at- tributable to late arrival by Respondent. The Union did not make any serious protests on the delay, but focused its continuing complaint on the length and frequency of the meetings. I am persuaded that the pattern of bargaining was set by Respondent from the outset. A comparison of the bar- gaining on and after November 2, 1977, with that which went on before reveals a continuation of this pattern without any significant variation until negotiations col- lapsed. A total of 22 meetings over a 14-month period, or the 10 over 6 months that were held during the period en- compassed by the charge, can hardly be characterized as diligent bargaining. That this pattern was primarily due to Respondent's approach to the bargaining is made ap- parent by Nadeau's repeated requests for longer and more frequent meetings, which Respondent ignored. Moreover, Kirle's stock reply to union proposals-that Respondent neither accepted nor rejected and would review, study, or consider them and then get back to the Union-later suggests either uncertainty as to Respond- ent's position, which is very unlikely in view of Re- spondent's fixed posture on most significant issues or an inclination to string out bargaining to the limit in an at- tempt to avoid or delay agreement, which I find to be the most probable. That planned delay was part of Re- spondent's bargaining strategy is further demonstrated by Respondent's failure to provide any written proposals until the fifth meeting 3-1/2 months after receiving the Union's proposals; Kirle's comment, perhaps joking but indicative of Respondent's modus operandi, that Respond- ent would have to caucus if these proposals were accept- ed by the Union; failure to provide complete data on Re- spondent's health, pension and welfare plan until 3 months after the initial request therefor; Respondent's repetitious requests for review of union proposals either plain on their face or previously discussed; the refusal to accept counterproposals by mail to expedite the bargain- ing; the resubmission of prior proposals with insubstantial or no change; and Respondent's refusal to negotiate on November 14, 1977, for the asserted reason of an em- ployee slowdown, the existence of which rests only on Respondent's ipse dixit and has not been shown to have in fact happened or even to have been threatened. Further confirmation that Respondent was merely marking time at the meetings is supplied by Kirle's com- ment in the July 28, 1977, meeting, after another review by the parties of their respective positions, that the Re- spondent was now in a better position to start negotia- tions. This was more than 6 months after the first meet- ing and followed seven prior meetings. Respondent specifically did not rely on any inability to pay additional wages or other monetary benefits, but made no concessions of any significance. 22 To the con- trary, it entered negotiations with the fixed intent of giving nothing in wages in addition to its existing sched- ule. The evidence is quite clear that Respondent never varied its position on wages nor was at any time during negotiations seriously prepared to consider alternatives to that position. Respondent's fixed and inflexible posture on maintaining the staus quo on wages, as well as man- agement rights, arbitration, and other matters detailed in the meetings above, suggests an attitude contrary to the duty to bargain in good faith. In addition to the foregoing, Respondent's proposed management-rights clause; shop-rule clause; reserved controls over job classifications, merit increases, promo- tions, pension, vacations, seniority, and subcontracting coupled with its proposed limitation of grievances on 22 Respondent agrees in its post-trial brief that it made no concession on issues of economic value to employees, except for a I-hour concession on call-in pay. CABLE VISION, INC. 421 wages to wage reductions on new or revised jobs; the limitation of grievances in general to interpretation or application of specific contract provisions with specific exclusion from the grievance procedure of all matters re- served to the discretion of management and any other rights retained by Respondent under the contract; con- tinuous opposition to arbitration; and its proposed waiver clause completely forbidding bargaining on anything not covered specifically in the contract, whether known during negotiations or not, would effectively preclude the Union from exercising its statutory bargaining rights for the term of the contract. Respondent could not have reasonably expected the Union to accept this mixture of restrictions, and I conclude it was proffered and insisted upon with full knowledge it would not be agreed to by the Union. The general tenor of Respondent's position is that it may, with impunity, take firm positions on mandatory subjects of bargaining and insist on them, without making any concessions, to impasse. This, maintains Re- spondent, is permissible hard bargaining and this is what it did. The problem with Respondent's position is that, while it embraces the provision of the Act noting that the bargaining obligation does not require agreement to proposals or the making of concessions, it simultaneously seeks to use it as a tool to totally defeat collective bar- gaining and thereby thwart the purposes of the very Act Respondent relies on. The principles controlling the disposition of the refus- al-to-bargain allegation in this case have been succinctly summarized in N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., Inc.,23 an oft-cited case, as follows: The obligation of the employer to bargain in good faith does not require the yielding of positions fairly maintained. It does not permit the Board, under the guise of finding of bad faith, to require the employer to contract in a way the Board might deem proper. Nor may the Board ". . . directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements . . " for the Act does not "regulate the substantive terms governing wages, hours and working conditions which are incorporat- ed in an agreement." N.L.R.B. v. American National Ins. Co., 1952, 343 U.S. 395, 402, 404 (1952), affg. American National Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1951). On the other hand while the employer is assured these valuable rights, he may not use them as a cloak. In approaching it from this vantage, one must recognize as well that bad faith is prohibited though done with sophistication and finesse. Consequently, to sit at a bargaining table, or to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and there, could be the very means by which to conceal a purposeful strat- egy to make bargaining futile or fail. Hence, we have said in more colorful language it takes more than mere "surface bargaining," or "shadow boxing to a draw," or "giving the Union a runaround while purporting to be meeting with the Union for pur- 23 275 F.2d 229 (5th Cir 1960) pose of collective bargaining." [275 F.2d at 231- 232.1 The Respondent's conduct in bargaining meetings viewed in conjunction with Respondent's accompanying violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) previously herein found, which reveal an effort to undermine the Union's position as collective-bargaining representative, required a finding that Respondent's bargaining conduct on and after November 2, 1977, was intended to frustrate agree- ment and was not good-faith bargaining as required by the statute. In the language of the court Respondent was "giving the Union a runaround while purporting to be meeting with the Union for purpose of collective bar- gaining." Accordingly, I find that Respondent did not, on and after November 2, 1977, bargain in good faith with the Union, and did therefore violate Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. The Nature of the Strike The conduct of the bargaining was reported to the union members by Nadeau on March 6, 1978, and April 30, 1978. Nadeau also advised the members that an unfair labor practice charge was being filed at the April 30 meeting and asked them if they wanted to strike. They did, unanimously. The picket signs used during the strike noted there was an unfair labor practice charge and bar- gaining in bad faith. It is obvious that Respondent's bar- gaining conduct, which I have found unlawful, caused the strike. The strike was therefore an unfair labor prac- tice strike. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions based thereon, and upon the entire record, I make the following: CONCI.USIONS OF LAW 1. Cable Vision, Inc., is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Cable Vision, Inc., con- stitute a unit appropriate for collective bargaining: All technicians and installers employed by the Re- spondent at its 720 Sabatus Street, Lewiston, Maine location, but excluding programmers, office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and su- pervisors as defined in the Act. 4. At all times since January 17, 1977, and continuing to date, the Union has been the certified exclusive repre- sentative of all the employees within said appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By engaging in bargaining with the Union in bad faith with no intention of entering into any final binding collective-bargainng agreement, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. By soliciting employees to abandon the Union, and by promising them benefits for so doing, Respondent in- CABLE VISION, INC. 421 422 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD terfered with, restrained, and coerced them in exercise of their Section 7 rights and violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 7. By interrogating employees about their union sym- pathies and desires and those of others, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 8. By soliciting grievances from employees and prom- ising to remedy them at a time it was legally obligated to bargain with the Union on wages, hours, and working conditions, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 9. By making statements to employees placing the onus on the Union for Respondent's failure to grant wage in- creases, Respondent interfered with, restrained, and co- erced employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 1(). l3 assigning Donald Jandreau to standby duty and thcrchy causing his termination, both for the purpose of discouraging union activity, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. 11. The strike engaged in by Respondent's employees from May I to June 23, 1978, was an unfair labor prac- tice strike. THE RI-MvRI)Y In order to remedy the unfair labor practices found hrein my recommended Order will require Respondent to cease and desist from further violations and post an appropriate notice to employees. I shall further order that Respondent bargain collec- tively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive rep- resentative of the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understand- ing in a signed agreement. In order to ensure that the employees will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by law, I shall order that the initial period of certification will begin on the date that Re- spondent commences to bargain in good faith with the Union. See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 817; Burnett Construction Company, 149 NLRB 1419, 1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965). I shall also order Respondent to offer Donald Jan- dreau unconditional reinstatement to his former job or substantially equivalent employment if that job no longer exists, and make him whole for all wages lost by him as a result of his unlawful termination, such backpay and in- terest thereon to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950); and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 24 The General Counsel seeks additional remedies requir- ing Respondent to bargain within 15 days of the Board's Order; bargain a minimum of 15 hours a week; make written progress reports to the Regional Director and the Union at 15-day intervals; and pay the employee ne- gotiator for earnings lost while attending bargaining ses- sions. I do not believe these extraordinary remedies are 24 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Healing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). warranted by the facts of this case. Moreover, I con- clude that a broad cease-and-desist order is not warrant- ed.25 Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 2 6 The Respondent, Cable Vision, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain with Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit described above, by negotiating in bad faith with no intention of entering into a collective-bargaining agreement. (b) Soliciting its employees to abandon the Union, and promising benefits for so doing. (c) Interrogating employees concerning their and other employees' union sympathies and desires. (d) Soliciting and promising to remedy employee grievances. (e) Falsely blaming the Union for Respondent's failure to grant wage increases. (f) Discouraging union activity or membership in the Union by discriminatorily assigning or causing the termi- nation of its employees, or otherwise discriminating in any manner with respect to their tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment. (g) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain in good faith with the above-named Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. (b) Offer Donald Jandreau immediate and full rein- statement to his former job or substantially equivalent employment if that job no longer exists, without preju- dice to any seniority and other rights or privileges previ- ously enjoyed by him. (c) Make Donald Jandreau whole for any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of his unlawful dis- charge and refusal of reinstatement. Said backpay shall be computed in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other rec- ords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. 24 Brownsboro Hills Nursing Home, Inc., 244 NLRB No. 47, fn.3 (1979). 6In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. CABLE VISION, INC. 423 (e) Post at its Lewiston, Maine, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 2 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being duly signed by Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including 27 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 1, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the initial period of certi- fication of Local 2327, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, will begin on the date that Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with said Union. -