249 NLRB 608
Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hospital
608
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hospital and Office
and
Professional
Employees
International
Union, Local No. 56, AFL-CIO. Cases 28-CA-
5142, 5190, and 28-RC-3582
May 19, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND TRUSEDALE
On January 31, 1980, Administrative Law Judge
James M. Kennedy issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief, and cross-excep-
tions and a supporting brief. The General Counsel
filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find-
ings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, 3
as
modified herein.4
' Respondent and the General Counsel have excepted to certain credi-
bility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge It is the Board's
established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolu-
tions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of
the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect,
Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F2d
362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing his findings.
Among the credibility findings so affirmed is the Administrative Law
Judge's crediting of King, rather than Borth, in the King-Borth ex-
change, This credibility resolution results in the Administrative Law
Judge's finding that a statement to the effect that union supporters would
lose their jobs if the Union lost the election is not attributable to Re-
spondent and, thus, is not a violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Since we
agree that the credited testimony fails to establish a violation, we see no
need to pass on the Administrative Law Judge's further finding that even
if the discredited version of Borth were accepted there would have been
no violation.
2 The Administrative Law Judge inadvertently failed to translate, to
his Conclusions of Law, the full impact of his specific finding that Re-
spondent impliedly threatened to close the Hospital in the event the
Union won the election. Said Conclusions shall be modified accordingly
by inserting in paragraph 3, following the phrase "loss of their jobs," the
phrase "through the closing of the Hospital" The recommended Order
and notice shall also be modified accordingly.
s For the reasons cited in his separate opinions in Beasley Energy. Inc.,
d/b/a Peaker Run Coal Company, Ohio Division #1, 228 NLRB 93 (1977),
and Hambre Hombre Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Panchito's, 228 NLRB 136
(1977), Chairman Fanning would make the bargaining order prospective
as there is no evidence that the Union demanded and Respondent refused
bargaining even though, as of November 25, 1978, such a demand could
have been made.
4 In addition to the modification noted in the Order, infra, which con-
forms the language of the Order and the notice, the Administrative Law
Judge's proposed notice to employees shall be modified by deleting in
full the fifth unnumbered paragraph
249 NLRB No. 90
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hospital, Cotton-
wood, Arizona, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a):
"(a) Restraining or coercing employees with
regard to the exercise of their Section 7 rights by
threatening them with loss of employment through
the closing of the Hospital in the event they select
a union to represent them for collective-bargaining
purposes."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held
on December 19, 1978, in Case 28-RC-3582 be set
aside, and that the petition therein be, and it hereby
is, dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that we
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered us to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all such
activities.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce our em-
ployees with regard to their Section 7 rights
by threatening them with loss of employment
through the closing of our Hospital in the
event they select a union to represent them for
the purpose of collective bargaining.
WE WILL NOT grant our employees wage in-
creases in order to induce them to reject
Office and Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local No. 56, AFL-CIO, or any
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
609
other labor organization whom they select as
their collective-bargaining representative, but
without prejudice to any wage increases or
other economic betterments heretofore grant-
ed.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
WE WILL immediately recognize and bar-
gain in good faith with Office and Professional
Employees International Union, Local No. 56,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of our employees in the bar-
gaining unit described below. Such recognition
and bargaining shall be retroactive to Decem-
ber 14, 1978. If we reach an understanding, we
will reduce such agreement to writing and will
sign and honor it. The bargaining unit is:
All employees employed at our Cottonwood,
Arizona,
Hospital excluding doctors,
regis-
tered nurses, other professional employees, se-
curity guards and supervisors within the mean-
ing of the Act.
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE
MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge: This
case was heard before me at Cottonwood, Arizona, on
July 10-13, 1979, pursuant to an amended consolidated
complaint issued by the Regional Director of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board for Region 28 on February 16,
1979. Earlier, on January 25, 1979, the Regional Director
ordered consolidated with the original complaint certain
issues arising from a representation election in Case 28-
RC-3582. The amended consolidated complaint, based
upon charges filed on December 8, 1978,1 and January
15, 1979, by Office and Professional Employees Interna-
tional Union, Local No. 56, AFL-CIO (herein called the
Union), alleges that Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hos-
pital (herein called Respondent or the Hospital) has en-
gaged in certain violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended; at the hearing
the complaint was further amended to also allege a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
The Union's representation petition was filed on No-
vember 28 and sought a representation election among
all of Respondent's nonprofessional employees. An elec-
tion was held on December 19, pursuant to a Stipulation
for Certification Upon Consent Election. Objections to
conduct affecting the outcome of the election were filed
by the Union on December 27.
' All dates herein refer to 1978 unless otherwise indicated
Issues
Whether or not Respondent prior to the election vio-
lated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by threatening, on three
occasions, employees with loss of their jobs (either di-
rectly or by threatening to close its Hospital) and by the
disparate application of a no-distribution rule. If any or
all of those violations are proven, I must decide whether
a bargaining order is the appropriate remedy, particular-
ly taking into account a postelection wage increase
which is separately alleged to violate the Act.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate,
to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex-
amine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Briefs,
which have been carefully considered, were filed on
behalf of both the General Counsel and Respondent.
Upon the entire record of the case, and from my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS
Respondent admits it is an Arizona corporation operat-
ing a nonprofit health care institution in Cottonwood,
Arizona, and further admits that its annual gross volume
of business exceeds $250,000 and that during the same
period it purchased goods and materials valued in excess
of $5,000 which originated from sources outside Arizona.
Accordingly, it admits, and I find, that it is a health care
institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act
and that it is engaged in commerce and in an industry
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
IlI. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Participants
Respondent is a general hospital located in Cotton-
wood, Arizona. It services the entire Verde Valley,
which has a population of approximately 40,000 people.
Most of the people it serves live in Yavapai County, al-
though one community, Sedona, is located in Coconino
County. Aside from a cement plant located in nearby
Clarkdale, Respondent is the largest employer in the
Verde Valley. It is the only hospital between Prescott
and Flagstaff.
Until the fall of 1978 Respondent's administrator was
Roland Wilpitz. For health reasons Wilpitz was unable
to continue his duties that fall and Respondent's board of
directors sought a successor. In mid-December the board
selected Reid Wood. During the hiatus between Wilpitz
and Wood the Hospital's assistant administrator, Richard
Shanks, served as the acting administrator, assuming
those duties on October 15 and relinquishing them to
Wood during a transition period between December 15
610
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and January 15. Shanks has now resumed his duties as
assistant administrator.
Other officials of Respondent who are involved in this
matter are Mike King, then the comptroller and now the
director of finance; Dr. Robert H. Jochim, chief of staff
and member of the board of directors; Dr. Joel E.
Futral, cardiologist; Minnie Hostetter, nursing supervi-
sor; and Don Smart, chief physical therapist.
In approximately September, ward clerk Judy Porter,
on a trip to Phoenix, sought the assistance of the Union,
obtaining authorization cards from a union vice presi-
dent. The Union's chief executive officer, Secretary-
Treasurer Margie Wick, with the assistance of Porter
and some others, obtained a mailing list of Respondent's
nonprofessional employees and about October I mailed a
letter and return-mail authorization envelope to all em-
ployees on the list. Shortly thereafter ward clerk Frances
Borth also became involved in the drive. The Union's In-
ternational representative, Richard Holober, arrived in
Cottonwood on December 5, 2 weeks before the elec-
tion.
Also in December, as the election drew near, about 18
employees, including some authorization slip signers,
formed a committee opposing union representation. They
distributed a two-page flyer stating their views. There is
no contention that Respondent sponsored that committee
or utilized it as its own counterorganizational
tool.
Where pertinent, testimony of members of that commit-
tee shall be noted.
B. The October 19 Conversation Between Smart and
Figy
On October 19, after the Union's organizing campaign
was underway and after it had become a general topic
for conversation among hospital employees, physical
therapist Robin Figy had a conversation with her super-
visor, Don Smart, physical therapy department head.
She testified that Smart told her that he had worked in a
unionized hospital in Douglas, Arizona, which had been
unable to pay the contract wages, had gone bankrupt,
and had been taken over by Cochise County. She said
Smart told her, "It could probably happen here."
In her pretrial affidavit she stated Smart had previous-
ly worked in a hospital in Michigan or Ohio and de-
scribed the conversation as having been in reference to
one of those States. Before me she explained she was
then confused because she thought Douglas was in
Michigan or Ohio. Later, in an interview with one of
Respondent's attorneys in Smart's presence, she admitted
she said that Smart had told her regarding the topic of
bankruptcy that "maybe it could, maybe it couldn't
occur here." She later testified that she now believes
Smart said, "[M]aybe it could happen here." In October,
when the conversation occurred, Figy was a new arrival
to Arizona, having lived there for only 3 months.
Smart testified that, although he had once worked in a
Michigan hospital, immediately before being hired by
Respondent he had worked at Cochise County Hospital
in Douglas, Arizona. He said that in his October conver-
sation with Figy regarding that hospital he told her that
the Retail Clerks Union had won a hotly contested elec-
tion by a small margin and that shortly thereafter he had
come to work for Respondent. He said he told her that,
after he left, it had gone bankrupt and had been taken
over by the county. He said he also told her that at the
time it had gone bankrupt no union contract had yet
been negotiated and the union's presence had nothing to
do with that hospital's financial circumstances. He also
said Figy asked him whether such a thing could happen
at Respondent and he replied, "There is no way of
knowing, it could or it could not." Furthermore, Smart
admits having told other employees the same thing
during coffeebreaks and the like. The General Counsel
has not alleged his other conversations as violations.
I was not impressed with Figy's ability to report accu-
rately what Smart said. As a new arrival to the State she
may well have been confused about the location of
Douglas which, standing alone, might not be enough to
warrant discrediting her. Yet, she first testified that
Smart tied bankruptcy to unionization at Douglas and
then said he told her "it could probably happen here."
On two other occasions, one pretrial and one on cross-
examination, she said Smart told her "maybe" bankrupt-
cy could happen here and "maybe it couldn't." While
even these testimonial differences are not particularly
significant, together they cause me to view her testimony
carefully.
When compared to Smart, who testified in greater
detail with both logic and clarity, I am compelled to
credit him over her. His reference to the election and the
noncontract status of the union at that hospital and his
perception that the financial circumstances there had
nothing to do with the union there is a detail which
would unlikely be said if he were trying to coerce Figy.
I conclude that Figy's testimony is not as reliable as
Smart's and that the threat, as alleged, did not occur.
C. The December 5 Pizza Hut Threat
In the evening of December 5 the International's orga-
nizer, Richard Holober, conducted a meeting of employ-
ees at the Cottonwood Pizza Hut Restaurant. Approxi-
mately 25 employees were present and that group had
pulled 4 or 5 tables together for their discussion. In addi-
tion, other patrons of the restaurant sat nearby. It ap-
pears to be a typical pizza parlor, attendant with the
noise and hurly-burly associated with such businesses.
The meeting began about 7:30. At approximately 9:30, as
the union business ended, Respondent's comptroller,
Mike King, entered the restaurant ostensibly to purchase
a takeout pizza. Larry Aksentowitz, a respiratory thera-
pist attending the meeting, saw him and waved him over.
Other employees who testified about King's presence
were Albert Krug, Dennis Franco, and Frances Borth.
Holober also testified about the meeting.
It appears that King, whose original intention was
simply to order a pizza, have a beer while he was wait-
ing, and leave, decided to stay. He recognized it as a
union meeting and as such told Aksentowitz he should
not stay. However, Aksentowitz and some of the others
urged him to stay as the meeting was over. King did so.
Holober testified that after King arrived, when he
learned who King was, he suggested King leave because
his presence created the risk that he would be accused of
unfair labor practices. King denies that. After sociability
----
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
611
took over, Holober reports King needled him occasional-
ly by suggesting that the Union's only purpose in orga-
nizing the Hospital was to obtain a collective-bargaining
contract with a dues-checkoff clause in it. King admits
doing so.
Later, according to Frances Borth, she was sitting
with King at the same table, separated by employee Ro-
berta Hubbard. Borth said King leaned back in his chair,
tapped her on the shoulder, and talking behind Hubbard
said he was going to "pull management" on Borth and
told her she really should not "do this" but should give
(acting administrator) Shanks a chance, saying Shanks
was a "great guy" and he had done some good things for
the Hospital. She testified further that "he also said that
all employees that were connected with the organization
of the union, would lose our job because the union
would fail to get in." Borth said she responded by telling
him she did not want to talk to him any more but also
told him she was involved with the Union or she would
not have been at the meeting. Borth did not repeat
King's statement to anybody at that time but said that
later that evening she reported it to Holober, Hubbard,
and fellow employee Wanda Sue Baird.
King testified that upon arriving at the meeting at ap-
proximately
9:15
he
socialized
with
Aksentowitz,
Franco, and Krug and continued to do so on and off
throughout his stay. Contrary to Holober and Borth,
King says he did not move around and that Hubbard
never sat next to him that night. He does recall that, at
one point, from across the table Borth asserted some-
thing to the effect that "everyone that was involved with
the organization, the union activities, probably would be
fired if the union did not get in." He said that he replied
the Hospital was so short of help that he did not think
there would be any action taken one way or the other
whether the Union got in or not.
Borth, on cross-examination, testified that she recalled
the conversation well because King's use of the phrase
"pull management" was unusual. Even so, despite that
unique phraseology she failed to so quote him in her pre-
trial affidavit. Hubbard, called as a witness to authenti-
cate her authorization card, was not asked whether she
overheard this conversation though from Borth's testi-
mony it appears that she and King were speaking direct-
ly in her ears.
Frankly, I am skeptical of Borth's version here, par-
ticularly as Hubbard did no: testify about the topic (per-
haps she was engaged in another conversation
and
simply did not hear it). Even so, Borth's version was that
King, rather than coercing people to vote against union
representation, seemed to be favoring it (that conclusion
is somewhat tempered by Borth's additional statement
that King told her she should not be involved with the
Union). Indeed, King's version, although he attributes it
to Borth, was similar in import-that people would be
fired if they did not vote for the Union.
The question, however, boils down to the issue of who
made the statement. In observing Borth I noted that she
was an assertive individual; she also omitted from her af-
fidavit the remark King made which allegedly prompted
her recollection. In observing King I noted that he can-
didly admitted needling Holober and he seems to have
testified openly. I also note, as discussed infra, that Re-
spondent was somewhat short-handed and was having
difficulty filling some medically related jobs. Thus King's
claim that he answered by saying he did not think Re-
spondent would take any action one way or the other is
a more probable version.
In the circumstances, King's entire version seems the
more probable. I find, therefore, that it was Borth, not
King, who made the remark and she likely adopted it as
his. In any event the remark as reported by both 2
tended to "coerce" employees to vote in favor of union
representation-i.e., employees would lose their jobs if
the Union failed to become the representative. Since the
remark seems to have favored union representation, it
would be anomalous to find a violation where the Union
was the beneficiary of the remark rather than a victim. I
regard the allegation here as unproven and so find.
D. The Doctors' Meeting of December 14
On December 14 a series of four employee meetings
was held by Respondent's management. Approximately
50 employees attended the 4 meetings, 15 at the first 3
and approximately 5 at the last. Testimony was taken
only with respect to the first three. The meetings were
conducted by two of Respondent's staff physicians, its
chief of staff, Dr. Robert Jochim, and Dr. Joel Futral, a
cardiologist who serves as the director of Respondent's
cardiac care unit and its cardiac diagnostic laboratory.
Also in attendance at each of the meetings was Acting
Administrator Richard Shanks. Each meeting began with
the explanation that the physicians were there to discuss
the medical staffs view regarding the possible unioniza-
tion of the Hospital. Although the physicians took care
to preface their remarks by saying the views expressed
were theirs, rather than the Hospital's, Shanks' presence,
together with Jochim's membership on the board of di-
rectors, demonstrates that their view was the same as the
hospital administration's. Indeed, their agency status is
admitted.
Each meeting will be taken separately.
Meeting No. 1
The first meeting began at approximately 7:30 a.m. It
was conducted principally by Futral, as Jochim was late,
having been in surgery that morning. Futral testified he
told the employees he was there to express his opinion
about what might happen to "patient care" if a union
came into the Hospital. Futral had never worked in a
unionized hospital himself, though he claimed familiarity
through colleagues with Cook County (Illinois) Hospital,
whose employees are union represented. He had, howev-
er, worked at a Veterans Administration hospital. He as-
serted, during the meeting, that union hospitals had re-
strictive job assignment rules similar to those he had seen
at the VA hospital. He told the employees that the VA
hospitals, as a result of those rules, delivered inferior pa-
tient care; so did Cook County Hospital, and employees
could assume that Respondent would suffer the same
fate. The thrust of his message was that unionization of
2 Neither Borth nor King heard each other's testimony.
612
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Hospital would have a "detrimental effect" on pa-
tient care.
Futral said that, after Jochim arrived, Robin Figy and
others complained that large amounts of money were
being spent on constructing a new wing while the Hospi-
tal was understaffed and employees were underpaid.
Jochim said a question was also raised about how the
Hospital could afford to buy expensive new equipment,
such as the nuclear medicine apparatus, while not also
paying its employees better. He replied that the medical
staff was concerned with understaffing and underpay-
ment as well, but it looked as if the new equipment
would pay for itself. He denies that the topic of closing
the Hospital was discussed.
Six employees testified about that meeting. Figy re-
called Futral said that, in the event the Hospital was
unionized, patient care would fall. She remembers him
saying the Hospital could not afford union wages and
would close if the Union became the employees' repre-
sentative. Howard Engel recalled Futral saying that if
the Union got into the Hospital it would have to close
because wages would undoubtedly be increased and the
Hospital could not afford to pay union wages. Engel re-
called, without specifically remembering the details, that
bankruptcy was also discussed. Chalee Byrne testified
that Futral gave a speech from an "unprepared text"
saying a unionized hospital "would not prosper" and
would probably close because people would not want to
go to a unionized hospital. She recalled Futral was refer-
ring to hospitals in general, not to Respondent specifical-
ly. She also said both she and Figy asked how Futral
could expect to obtain people to run the new equipment,
but he replied that the machines would pay for them-
selves. When Jochim arrived he said he could guarantee
that, if the employees gave management a try, things
would be better. Futral's also said that he was there to
talk only about patient care, not about wages. She does
not remember the subject of bankruptcy being mentioned
and does not recall any discussion about the Hospital's
ability to meet union demands.
Steve Bentley recalled Futral's referring to material he
had read and observations he had made about other
unionized hospitals. Bently remembers Futral referring to
the allegedly detrimental effects unionization would have
on patient care. He also said there was no discussion re-
garding the Hospital's closing if the Union came in.
However, he remembers Futral's saying "In my opinion,
what I have seen in the past, whenever a union came
into a health care institution, because of the demands, it
eventually went bankrupt." He admitted that when the
subject of bankruptcy was raised the possibility that the
Hospital might close crossed his mind. He also remem-
bered Futral's saying that a hospital "back East" had
gone bankrupt and had closed.
Becky Lewis testified that Futral mentioned a Chicago
hospital which had become unionized. She remembers
him saying the quality of patient care dropped at that in-
stitution when it was unionized and young physicians no
longer wished to do residencies there. He also likened a
unionized hospital to those operated by the Veterans Ad-
ministration, saying that job descriptions in those systems
made the delivery of medical care more difficult. She re-
members an employee asking about the expensive fur-
nishings and the money being spent on the new wing and
asking why that money could not be used for higher
pay. She remembers Futral replying that the question
was not germane to the doctors' view. She denies there
was any discussion of closing the Hospital.
Cecil Shull, a housekeeper, testified Futral explained
that the Hospital was everyone's source of income, that
the expenses of operating a hospital are high-not all
money is profit. She recalls Futral further observed that
everyone's livelihood depended on the Hospital's profit-
ability. He observed that some hospitals "had gone
broke" due to union activity and patients might not wish
to come to a unionized hospital because they would be
afraid of strikes and lack of proper care. She remembers
him saying "a unionized hospital would not be prosper-
ous and might have to close down and we would all lose
our jobs."
Meeting No. 2
Futral testified that during this meeting Borth "took
over," saying she doubted things would get better be-
cause doctors did not want to put patients on her station.
He recalled he and Jochim agreed that the old adminis-
tration had been difficult to work with but that Jochim
said to give the new administrator a chance. He remem-
bered utilizing his VA hospital example. Jochim remem-
bered saying he could not promise any wage increases
but employees should give the new administrator a
chance. He also recalled a discussion regarding the ex-
pensive furniture and the money being spent on the new
wing. Both physicians said that the topic of closing the
Hospital was not discussed by them at all, although
Joann Dillion remarked at the end of the meeting that, if
employees failed to work, such a situation would close
any business.
Borth testified she had taken notes of the meeting but
had lost them. She recalled Futral's saying he had
worked in a union hospital and that patient care there
was not good. She remembers Jochim responding to a
question by saying he did not think the Hospital had suf-
ficient money to meet the union demands and that Futral
said the Hospital might have to close if the Union came
in. She denies Dillion mentioned anything about closing
the Hospital. Borth also remembers replying to Futral's
remark that the Hospital had insufficient moneys to meet
the union demands by referring to the money being spent
to build the new wing.
Rosemary Beecher is a registered nurse. Although not
in this bargaining unit, she is a member of the unit
sought by the Arizona Nurses Association in a contem-
poraneous proceeding. She attended the second meeting
and recalls Futral ended the meeting by saying some-
thing to the effect that "the Hospital did not have to bar-
gain with the union and . . . [and] even if they did . . .
we probably wouldn't and couldn't meet their demands
and we would have to close the Hospital down." At the
time Beecher gave her testimony she was hospitalized in
Respondent's facility and her testimony was taken in the
hospital conference room.
Dillion testified that the only time closing the Hospital
was discussed was at the end of the meeting when she, in
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
613
a response to something Beecher had said, hotly re-
marked, "Job security is when you're the very best you
can be and you do the very best job you can. Otherwise,
if you don't, you can close down [even] a hospital. Even
the doctors won't have patients if they don't give quality
care." Her testimony was corroborated by Jean Eaklor-
Hood. Dillion is also certain that there was no remark to
the effect that hospitals which go union go bankrupt or
the Hospital might have to close if the Union came in.
Meeting No. 3
At this meeting Futral said very little; Jochim carried
the principal burden. Jochim remembers Judy Porter's
asking if a prounion doctor could be present and he re-
plied that he had no objection but there was not enough
time to get one. He denied there was any reference to
closing the Hospital or employees's losing their positions,
saying that the third meeting was essentially a repeat of
the second. Futral recalled that the atmosphere was
"hostile and prounion" and that Porter asked most of the
questions. He remembers an employee asking him if he
had had any experience at a union hospital and that he
replied he had none, but then repeated his VA hospital
example. He denies anyone said there was a possibility
that Respondent would close if the Union became the
employees' representative.
Al Krug remembers Jochim's asking employees to give
the new administrator, Wood, a chance. He also remem-
bers remarks made by each doctor, which Krug said
were not connected for they were separated by a signifi-
cant amount of time. The first was an apparently rhetori-
cal question by Jochim: "What if the Hospital was
unable to meet the demands placed on it by the labor
union?" Later, Futral said either, "What if the Hospital
had to shut down?" or "The Hospital might have to be
shut down." Sally McNabb remembers Jochim's refer-
ring to declining patient care and asking employees to
give Wood a chance. She remembers his saying that
other hospitals had had to close because of the advent of
a union, but also remembers he was not specifically re-
ferring to Respondent. Sandra Brindley recalled Jochim
merely said he did not think the Union would be good
for the Hospital and most of the the conversation was
between Jochim and Porter. She said no one discussed
the question whether the Hospital would close.
Dennis Franco, who attended the meeting, testified he
had blotted the meeting out of his head. Judy Porter,
who is alleged to have taken over the meeting, was not
questioned about it at all.
In evaluating the relative crediblity of the doctors and
the various employees I observe that five employees
(Becky Lewis, Bentley, Dillion, Eaklor-Hood, and Brind-
ley), who testified to the effect that no threats of closing
were made were all members of the antiunion committee.
Indeed, two of them, Eaklor-Hood and Brindley, auth-
ored the committee's flyer. It should also be observed
that Brindley, a cardiovascular technician who works
closely with Futral and Becky Lewis, is a medical rec-
ords typist who does some typing for Futral. In analyz-
ing their testimony I shall assume that they have an an-
tiunion bias. Two employees (Krug and Byrne) who tes-
tified that Futral and Jochim made threats were members
of the Union's original organizing committee and signed
a public statement in favor of union representation. 3
Others who testified with seeming fervor for the Union
were Figy and Borth. Likewise, I shall assume that these
people have a prounion bias.
Only a few employees seemed to be without visible
bias. These were Engel, Shull, Beecher, and McNabb.
That is not to say that they are not affected by bias, only
that it was not as visible.
It can be seen, fairly readily, that the reports of what
transpired during the meeting vary depending on the
point of view each witness had toward unionization. The
apparently unbiased witnesses are not consistent either.
Nonetheless, it seems to me that in balancing the various
testimony and weighing the probabilities, tempered by
my view of the witnesses' abilities to accurately recall,
the General Counsel has proven that during the meetings
the physicians made an implied threat to close the Hospi-
tal in the event that the Union won the election. In
reaching this conclusion I recognize that there is little
likelihood that the Hospital would actually have closed
no matter what the circumstances. Respondent
is a
modern hospital having a virtual monopoly on health
care delivery in the Verde Valley and has recently
begun building a $9 million expansion, referred to as the
new wing. It has invested further in expensive medical
technology designed to keep patients in the valley rather
than having them seek treatment in larger communities
which are less accessible. Thus, in the abstract it is un-
likely that against such a background a threat to close
would be made seriously. Nonetheless, the specter was
raised, probably in the context that hospitals suffer from
unionization in a way more acute than ordinary business-
es.
Thus it appears that the physicians' assertions that
unionized hospitals failed to deliver the same quality
medical care as nonunion hospitals, coupled with their
observation that Respondent was the source of livelihood
for all concerned, was designed to express the message
that unionization carried the terrible risk of financial fail-
ure. That specter was followed by a discussion of finan-
cial possibilities, including bankruptcy or simply the fail-
ure to maintain a reasonable level of business. Those two
things can be translated easily to an implication of finan-
cial collapse (the possibility of a reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act notwithstanding) or something less, both
of which would result in at least partial, if not total, loss
of employment. Even Bentley, an employee who op-
posed union representation, said that, after Futral dis-
cussed bankruptcy as an eventuality, the possibility of
the Hospital's closing crossed his mind. Certainly his re-
action is typical of most lay people when discussing
bankruptcy. I do not, however, believe that the threat
was as blatant as Figy reported. She said that Futral
flatly stated that the Hospital could not afford to pay the
union wages and would have to close if the Union got
in. Closer to the mark is Byrne's version to the effect
that a unionized hospital would not prosper and would
probably close because patients would not go to a union-
' Porter also signed the public statement.
-.
614
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ized hospital. Shull's testimony is very close to that and
essentially corroborates Byrne.
Engel corroborates Figy but both versions seem too
unsophisticated to be exactly accurate. No doubt their
testimony accurately sums up the physicians' message,
but their accounts are exaggerated. Becky Lewis is
simply discredited on the basis that she is too close to
Futral and her denial that Futral ever mentioned the
Hospital's closing is improbable.
With respect to the second and third meetings, princi-
pally run by Jochim, the message was the same. In the
second meeting there is the testimonial split between
Borth and Beecher on the one hand and Dillion and
Eaklor-Hood on the other. The latter two flatly state
that neither physician said the Hospital would close and
the only time the subject was discussed was when Dil-
lion, in an angry response to Beecher, remarked that any
business would close if employees failed to do their jobs.
No doubt Dillion did make that remark as a parting shot,
but that does not negate the version reported by Beecher
and Borth. Beecher's testimony is particularly credible as
she had no interest in the outcome of this particular elec-
tion. She recalled Futral's saying the Hospital was not
obligated to bargain with the Union and even if the obli-
gation were imposed it could not meet the Union's de-
mands and would probably close. She concedes those
were not the exact words used by Futral but Borth testi-
fied generally consistently. She recalled Futral's observ-
ing that the Hospital might close if the Union came in
and Jochim's saying he did not think the Hospital had
sufficient moneys to meet union demands. The versions
of Dillion and Eaklor-Hood are also consistent with my
finding, for I doubt Futral or Jochim ever flatly said that
Respondent would close. Their threat to close was
couched in hypothetical or comparative phraseology.
That being the case, it is likely that these witnesses did
not view the statement as a threat to close and answered
questions consistent with that view.
Similarly, in the third meeting McNabb recalled one of
the two physicians saying other hospitals had to close
because of unionization, but he did not specifically say
Respondent would close. Krug recalled Jochim's hypo-
thetically asking what would happen if Respondent were
unable to meet the union demands and Futral's later
asking what would happen if the Hospital had to shut
down or that the Hospital might have to shut down.
Brindley's testimony denying that there was any discus-
sion of closure is rejected.
The sum of the above conversations simply is that
Futral and Jochim, while carefully attempting to avoid
straightforward threats to close the Hospital, nonetheless
subtly, through the use of analogy and hypothesis, fa-
shioned the specter of financial illness in the event of
unionization and implied that the illness would eventual-
ly be measured in terms of the employees' jobs. I con-
clude that such a "prediction," absent any objective facts
to support it, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See
Jimmy-Richard Co. Inc., 210 NLRB 802, 804-805 (1974),
enfd. 527 F.2d 803, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
E. The Alleged Incident Involving Hostetter and
Porter
Ward clerk Judy Porter testified that, a few days
before the December 19 election, she and Nursing Super-
visor Minnie Hostetter had a conversation at the nurses'
station. Porter testified Hostetter had some medically re-
lated papers with her and handed them to her together
with the remark, "Here, I read you-all's material, you
read mine." Porter said Hostetter gave her a copy of the
flyer issued by the antiunion employee group known as
Employees for Individual Rights. Hostetter said nothing
further to her and Porter could not remember if the flyer
was on the top of the medical material or mixed with it.
She was unable to recall the shift or who else was on
duty that day. She further testified that although Hostet-
ter is from Texas she normally did not speak with a
Texas accent, but on this occasion did so, apparently for
emphasis.
Hostetter, who has recently retired and is no longer
employed by Respondent, denied the incident in its en-
tirety. When she was shown the flyer she said she had
never seen it until that moment and on cross-examination
stated Respondent's lawyer had not even shown it to her
prior to her taking the witness stand. She did, however,
say whenever management issued campaign propaganda
to the employees she, apparently like other supervisory
staff members, distributed that material to rank-and-file
employees as instructed.
The General Counsel has alleged that Hostetter's dis-
tribution of the antiunion committee's literature during
working hours and in a working area violated Section
8(a)(l) of the Act, although the theory is not clear. First,
although it is true that Respondent maintains a rule pro-
hibiting employees from distributing literature "for any
purpose" during working time or in working areas, Hos-
tetter was not an employee, but a supervisor and not sub-
ject to the rule. Second, it is doubtful that mere distribu-
tion of a statement having an antiunion sentiment unac-
companied by interference, restraint, or coercion violates
the Act. Third, Hostetter's denial appeared credible to
me. She had no ax to grind, no longer being employed
by Respondent. Moreover, the case cited by the General
Counsel, Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 NLRB 611 (1964), is
distinguishable. To begin with, the rule in question there
was promulgated as a discriminatory response to the
union organizing drive; that did not occur here. Second,
that rule applied to anyone and was not limited to em-
ployees. Third, the supervisory issue was not addressed
by the Board; and, fourth, it occurred in a context of
massive unfair labor practices on other fronts. Accord-
ingly, the case is not applicable here. In all the circum-
stances, therefore, I conclude that the General Counsel
has failed to sustain its burden of proof with respect to
this allegation.
F. The Postelection Wage Increase
The election was conducted on December 19 and on
December 27 the Union filed timely objections. Five
days later, on January 1, 1979, the Federal Minimum
Wage Law required an hourly increase of 25 cents to all
those who were at the then minimum wage. Most of Re-
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
615
spondent's employees, of course, were paid rates higher
than that called for by the Federal Minimum Wage Law,
but some were not. A year previously, on January 1,
1978, when a similar increase was mandated, Respondent
granted the increase only to those employees who were
then at the statutory minimum. That "practice," if it can
be termed such, was not followed in January 1979. At
that time all rank-and-file employees were given a 25-
cent across-the-board increase, not just those who were
at the minimum wage.
On January 5 Respondent issued a memo (G.C. Exh.
58) to all employees which contained the following state-
ments:
On January 1, 1979, the minimum wage per hour
was raised from $2.65 to $2.90.
Because we are legally able to do so, your man-
agement is happy to take the opportunity to extend
this twenty-five cent per hour increase to all em-
ployees on the hourly payroll. The increase will
appear on your next paychecks deliverable January
12.
Unfortunately, the union is prolonging certifica-
tion of the recent election. The uncertainty generat-
ed by these actions precludes any possible further
specific adjustments at this time.
As can be seen the third paragraph blamed the Union for
prolonging the election process and for creating an "un-
certainty" which barred any further wage adjustments.
The last remark seems particularly unjustified in light
of certain material generated by Respondent toward the
end of its 1977-78 and the beginning of its 1978-79 fiscal
years. The fiscal year had ended on June 30, 1978. Ten
days before, on June 20, at an administrative staff meet-
ing Administrator Wilpitz granted a 6-percent across-the-
board wage adjustment with an additional 2-1/2 percent
available for merit increase. The minutes of that meeting
state: "There will be no other raises in the hospital until
July 1979; however [merit] evaluation will still take
place." Similarly, on that date a department head meet-
ing was conducted by Wilpitz in which he informed the
department heads of the decision to implement the in-
crease. He reiterated, according to those minutes, that
"there would be no further salary increases for the re-
mainder of the fiscal year 1978-79." On July 7 Wilpitz
issued a memo to employees explaining the across-the-
board wage increase. The memo stated, "We have
chosen to give the entire amount available during this
fiscal year at this time rather than require employees to
wait until their normal evaluation date." Thus the memo
implies that Respondent had reached its budgetary limit
regarding wage increases for the entire 1978-79 fiscal
year.
Respondent observes that it had been faced for some
time with two separate but related personnel problems.
These were an inability to recruit qualified hospital em-
ployees and an unfair pay system which had resulted in
wage compression. The General Counsel does not dis-
pute that Respondent was faced with these problems.
Indeed, as early as October 1977 it had begun taking
steps to rectify them. Respondent is a member of the Ar-
izona Hospital Association and specially hired that orga-
nization to study wage and salary data and to make rec-
ommendations to correct the deficiencies. By February
1978 most of the data had been collected and a report
followed on March 1. However, Wilpitz did not follow
many of the AHA's recommendations. At some point
during the year Wilpitz became ill; he later relinquished
his post as administrator. When Shanks became the
acting
administrator
the AHA
representative,
Tom
Grimes, apprised him of the situation and of Wilpitz' in-
action on the recommendations. Although Grimes had
responsibility for the earlier study, Respondent also
sought his counsel (through the AHA) in dealing with
the two union organizing drives which began that fall.
Respondent argues that the January 1979 25-cent grant
to those employees whom Respondent was not mandated
to give a raise was merely a partial attempt to follow the
AHA's wage recommendations and had at least the bene-
ficial legitimate business purpose of not further compress-
ing wages and might have assisted recruitment as well.
I might be persuaded by that argument if Respondent
had not in its January 5, 1979, memo blamed the Union
for the loss of certain additional salary increases in view
of the fact that such increases had not even been budget-
ed. In that circumstance I must conclude Respondent
was attempting to reward its employees for having re-
jected the Union and was also seeking an advantage in
the event a second election was ordered. The Board has
held both motivations to be unlawful. 4
G. The Bargaining Unit and the Union's Majority
Status
Respondent has admitted that the appropriate unit in-
volved herein is:
All employees employed by Respondent at its hos-
pital in Cottonwood, Arizona, excluding doctors,
registered nurses and other professional employees,
security guards and supervisors within the meaning
of the Act.
The parties are in agreement for the most part with re-
spect to the members of that unit except that Respondent
alleges that two individuals,
Katherine Schamp and
James Randall, should be included. The General Counsel
and the Union oppose their inclusion. In addition, Re-
spondent raises questions regarding the validity of the
designation of agency to the Union by four individuals.
These are Judy Tourville nee Butler, Darlene Geiser,
Roma Hamrick, and Vivian Derosia.
The complaint alleges that the Union had obtained ma-
jority status as of November 25 and maintained that
status until shortly before the election of December 19 at
which time the majority was destroyed by Respondent's
unfair labor practices. Before discussing the question of
4 The reward cases include Eagle Material Handling of New Jersey. 224
NLRB 1529 (1976), 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977) Westminster Communlrt
Hospital. Inc., 221 NLRB 185 (1975). The advantage cases are Ielsenthal
Plastics, Inc n/k/a Grede Plastics, a Division of Grede Foundries. Inc., 224
NLRB 1312 (1976);
Centralia Container Corporation,
195 NRB 65()
(1972)
See also Raleyvs, Inc. 236 NLRB 971 (1978), enfd suh noma Retail
Clerks Local 588, Retail Cerk
International 4socsiaton,. 41-t.--C10. 587
F.2d 984 (9th Cir 1979).
616
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the validity of the challenged agency designations, I shall
first deal with the issue of whether or not Schamp and
Randall should properly be included in the unit.
Katherine Schamp:
Respondent
contends
Schamp
should be included as she is an office clerical whose
duties are not different from other office clericals cov-
ered by the unit description. The General Counsel and
the Union oppose her inclusion averring that she is a
confidential employee.
At the outset of the hearing the parties stipulated that
Respondent already employed two confidential employ-
ees, Mary Ann Van Landingham and Elaine Finley.
Schamp was hired in November as a secretary and was
assigned to work for the Hospital's assistant administra-
tor, Harry Bouton. Bouton continued to be employed by
Respondent for only 3 more months and, according to
Acting Administrator Shanks, in November Bouton's au-
thority had been substantially diminished for he was not
included in the Hospital's future plans. Schamp became
secretary to the project inspector overseeing the con-
struction of the new wing in March 1979.
Schamp testified she did general typing for Bouton,
who had little work to do, and as a result during the
latter part of 1978 was available to perform overflow
work for others. She says Bouton did some personnel
work, but during that time the personnel department had
an acting manager, David S. Weiss. She said Bouton had
no confidential files in his office; the personnel office had
its own secretary, Finley; and she never had access to
Finley's
files.
Respondent
submitted
several
items
Schamp had typed and she stated that they were typical
of the matter that she was asked to work on. None of
those appear to involve confidential material, although
some are personnel related. On one occasion she typed a
letter for Weiss acknowledging an employment applica-
tion and offering an interview to a technologist. On an-
other occasion she typed a memo for Bouton regarding
an employee who was dissatisfied with her pay rate. She
says that is the only time she did that.
During the course of the election she typed one docu-
ment for Grimes which could be described as campaign
material and she also typed, pursuant to a directive from
the personnel department, the voter eligibility listS which
was later given to the Union after having been submitted
to the Board's Regional Office. She describes both of
those items as overflow work.
Based on this testimony I am unable to conclude that
she is a confidential employee. I am particularly im-
pressed by the fact that the parties have stipulated that
there are already two confidential employees employed
by Respondent and it seems unlikely that a third would
be required. Furthermore, none of the documents she
typed was of a confidential nature and she did not,
except in a marginal way, serve as a secretary to anyone
engaging in labor relations work. Neither her typing one
item of campaign propaganda nor her typing the eligibil-
ity list, both on an overflow basis, warrants that conclu-
sion. Accordingly, I conclude that she is a rank-and-file
employee properly includable in the unit.
Comtmonly know. n as Ihe Excelsior list.
James Randall: Randall
is a long-time
employee
having been hired in 1967 as a medical technician. He
was the first individual so hired. He was followed by the
current head of his department, Donald Hahn, a medical
technologist. Later, other medical technologists were
hired and for some time Randall remained a technician.
Those technologists were certified by the American So-
ciety of Clinical Pathologists as being competent medical
technologists. Randall remained a technician until 1975
when he was certified as a medical technologist by the
United States Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare for Medicare purposes. The other technologists in
that department have bachelor's degrees as well as
having successfully completed the ASCP national exami-
nation. Randall does not have a bachelor's degree but
has graduated from a medical technician school. He has
performed essentially the same work as the technologists
since his hire. Indeed, in 1975, after having been certified
as a medical technologist by HEW, his duties remained
exactly the same as they had been before. It appears that
Randall and the other technologists routinely perform
the same work. Only occasionally, when a particular task
is beyond Randall's expertise, is the work given to one of
the ASCP technologists. Like the others he regularly
fills out lab reports,6 calls physicians to report abnormal
test results, and routinely places those reports in the pa-
tients' charts. In fact, from 6:30 to 8 a.m. every day Ran-
dall works in the technology lab by himself.
In view of the fact that Randall has the same supervi-
sion as the other technologists, performs the same rou-
tine functions, and is also considered a responsible tech-
nologist by the Hospital it appears to me that he should
be excluded from the bargaining unit as a professional as
are the other technologists. The Mason Clinic, 221 NLRB
374, 375 (1975).
Thus, having determined that Schamp should be in-
cluded in the unit and Randall should be excluded it ap-
pears from a stipulation that between November 25 and
the December 19 election the voting unit ranged be-
tween 94 and 98 employees. The next question which
must be answered is whether the Union prior to the elec-
tion had achieved majority status. Proof of that status
must be determined by the authorization
envelopes
signed by the employees on behalf of the Union. Re-
spondent challenges four such authorizations:
Roma Hamrick: Hamrick, a licensed practical nurse in
the coronary care unit, testified that she had received an
authorization envelope (the back side of the business
reply envelope containing authorization language) which
she signed on October 8. She testified that she placed it
on her television set at home but never sent it to the
Union as she had changed her mind. Nonetheless, the
Union submitted her envelope to the Board's Regional
Office on November 28 together with others in support
of the election petition. Contrary to her testimony, her
pretrial affidavit states that she did mail the envelope.
However, she now denies telling the Board investigator
who drafted the affidavit that she had mailed it even
though she admits signing the statement to that effect.
6 Hahn routinely reviews all the reports issued by the technologists.
Randall's reports receive the same review as that given the ASCP's.
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
617
The business reply envelope does not show any evidence
that it was mailed; usually the postal service causes those
items to be affixed with a cancellation mark.
Even though Hamrick now denies she mailed the doc-
ument and even though she claims no one could have
mailed it without her consent, I nonetheless conclude
that she did so and that she intended to designate the
Union as her collective-bargaining representative. Her
admission in her affidavit that she had mailed it (even if
that simply meant she had turned it over to a union so-
licitor, which would explain the absence of a postmark)
merely demonstrates that she has had second thoughts
about her action and now wishes to cancel it. Such a
cancellation in July 1979 is of no effect with regard to its
validity in late 1978. Her card should be counted.
Judy Tourville nee Butler: Butler's authorization card is
dated November 21. She testified that she had a conver-
sation in her home with Frances Borth and Union Orga-
nizer Richard Holober and one of them told her that by
signing the slip she was not joining the Union and its
purpose was to bring in the Union so that "we have a
chance to vote upon it." However, she did not then sign
it. Several days later she went to a local laundromat, met
with Borth, and actually signed the envelope.
Butler's testimony here is out of chronology as Ho-
lober did not arrive in Arizona until early December. If
she had such a conversation with Holober it must have
been after she signed it. Thus it does not seem likely that
Holober was the individual who induced her to sign but
Borth. Even assuming Borth made the remarks which
Butler recalls, Butler admits having read the card and it
is clear the remarks she attributes to the solicitor were
not calculated to deliberately change the plain meaning
of the authorization language or to induce her to disre-
gard it. In that circumstance, Butler's card is deemed
valid. N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575,
606 (1969). See also Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144
NLRB 1268 (1973); and Levi Strauss & Co., 172 NLRB
732 (1968).
Vivian Derosia: Derosia is a licensed practical nurse
who has been employed for about 3 years. She was one
of the members of the Union's organizing committee in
October and signed an authorization card on October 10.
On December 14, after having attended one of the physi-
cians' meetings discussed supra, section III,C, she wrote
a letter to the Board's Regional Office attempting to
revoke her previously executed card.
It is clear that until that her authorization was unques-
tionably valid and includable as part of the Union's
claimed majority status. Nonetheless, her revocation fol-
lowing on the heels of the unlawful threat made during
the physicians' meetings must be deemed ineffective. The
law is settled that a Respondent may not take advantage
of its unlawful act in such a fashion. See Medo Photo
Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944),
and The Colson Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.2d 128,
134 (8th Cir. 1965). Accordingly, I concluded that Dero-
sia's card is valid for all purposes.
Darlene Geiser: Geiser is a food service worker who
testified she received her authorization envelope in the
mail. She says she signed it and returned it just before
Thanksgiving. However, the Union never received it and
it appears to no longer be in existence. She was shown a
sample envelope and testified she signed one exactly like
it. The Board has held in Hedstrom Company, a subsidi-
ary of Brown Group, Inc., 223 NLRB 1409, 1411 (i976),
that it will accept as true an employee's testimony that
he or she signed a card and will count that assertion for
majority purposes even though the document itself has
been misplaced. In Hedstrom the employee's testimony
was corroborated by a fellow employee who remem-
bered collecting it. That is not the case here, but the
considerations are the same. It is unlikely that Geiser fal-
sified her testimony here and there is no reason to think
that she did. Accordingly, I conclude, based on Hed-
strom, that Geiser in late November authorized the
Union to represent her for collective-bargaining
pur-
poses. Her designation should be counted.
Thus, Respondent's challenge to all four of the above-
cited employee designations fails. On November 25 the
unit consisted of 94 employees and the Union had ob-
tained 49 valid authorizations, a majority. On November
28 the bargaining unit consisted of 96, but because one
card signer had quit, the Union only had 48 designations.
On that day it did not have a majority, only half. On the
following day another employee was hired and the
Union fell one person below half. Similarly, on Novem-
ber 30 it fell one more person behind as another individ-
ual was hired. However, on December I four more em-
ployees signed authorizations. On that day the unit con-
sisted of 98 and the Union had 51 valid designations,
reattaining its majority. It maintained that majority there-
after until the election, obtaining three more signatures
as late as December 17. In that circumstance I conclude
that as of Respondent's first unfair labor practice on De-
cember 14 the Union had obtained the valid representa-
tion designations from a majority of the bargaining unit
employees.
IV. THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of
the Act by impliedly threatening its employees with loss
of their jobs by creating the specter of financial disaster
in the event that they obtained union representation, I
shall recommend that it shall be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action de-
signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. At the very
least these threats, made by Doctors Jochim and Futral
during the December 14 employee meetings, are grounds
to set aside the election. See Dal-Tex Optical Company.
Inc.,
137 NLRB 1782 (1962), where the Board said:
"Conduct which is violative r Section 8(a)(l) is, a for-
tiori, conduct which interferes with a free and untram-
meled choice in an election." But the Board has gone
further and held such threats to be sufficiently egregious
to warrant a bargaining order as a remedy. See The
Stride Rite Corporation, 228 NLRB 224, 236 (1977), and
the citation found therein, Milgo Industrial, Inc., 203
NLRB 1196, 1200-01 (1976). Here, too, it seems to me
that the threats, while subtle, were not lost on the em-
ployees whose livelihood depended on a viable economic
entity such as Respondent, the second largest employer
in the community. Accordingly, I find the threats to be
618
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
so pervasive as to have undermined the Union's majority
and to be unremedial except by a bargaining order.
In addition, I have also found that Respondent took
advantage of a minimum wage law requirement to grant
a wage increase to all employees as a reward for their
having voted against union representation and to gain an
unfair advantage in the event of a second election. Both
the Board and the courts have held that such a wage in-
crease cannot be remedied in the ordinary way by a
cease-and-desist order. Westminster Community Hospital,
Inc.., supra, Raley's. Inc., supra. Certainly the across-the-
board wage increase affected a large number of the unit
employees and will have a long-lasting, if not permanent
effect, on their freedom of choice in selecting or reject-
ing a bargaining representative. In that circumstance,
too, I conclude that a fair second election cannot be run.
To remedy both types of unfair labor practices I shall
recommend that the petition be dismissed and that Re-
spondent be ordered to bargain with the Union. 7 The
bargaining order shall be retroactive to December 14,
the day it embarked upon its effort to undermine the
Union's majority status. See N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing
Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Trading Port, Inc., 219
NLRB 298 (1978); and Beasley Energy, Inc., d/b/a Peaker
Run Coal Company, Ohio Division #1, 228 NLRB 93
(1977). 8
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the
entire record in this case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hospital is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec-
tion 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and a health care insti-
tution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act.
2. Office and Professional Employees International
Union, Local No. 56, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. Respondent, on December 14, 1978, acting through
its agents, Dr. Robert Jochim and Dr. Joel Futral, violat-
ed Section 8(a)(l) by threatening employees with loss of
their jobs in the event they selected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative.
4. Respondent, on January 1, 1979, as announced on
January 5, 1979, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by
granting certain of its employees a wage increase as a
reward for their having voted against union representa-
tion and in order to obtain an unfair advantage in the
event that a second election was directed.
5. The unfair labor practices found in paragraphs 3 and
4 above are so pervasive and egregious that they cannot
be remedied by a cease-and-desist order and have created
an atmosphere which will not permit the holding of a
fair second election and therefore can only be remedied
by an order requiring Respondent to recognize and bar-
gain with the Union.
6. Respondent did not engage in any other unfair labor
practices as alleged.
I7 I is therefore unnecessary to determine if Respondent's conduct also
violated Sec. 8(a)(5) as the remedy is the same in any event.
I Because o(if the pervasive nature of Respondent's violations I shall
recommend a broad cease-and-desist order. Hickmot Foods, Inc.. 242
NLRB No. 177 (1979).
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following
recommended:
ORDER9
The Respondent, Marcus J. Lawrence Memorial Hos-
pital, Cottonwood, Arizona, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Restraining or coercing employees with regard to
the exercise of their Section 7 rights by threatening them
with loss of employment in the event that they selected a
union to represent them for collective-bargaining pur-
poses.
(b) Granting wage increases to its employees in order
to reward them for having rejected the Union as their
collective-bargaining representative and to induce them
to reject the Union as their representative in the event a
second representation election is held. This order shall
not be construed as to require rescission of wage in-
creases or economic betterments previously granted.
(c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec-
essary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Immediately recognize and bargain collectively
with Office and Professional Employees International
Union, Local No. 56, AFL-CIO, as the exlcusive bar-
gaining representative of the employees in the following
apropriate unit, retroactive to December 14, 1978, and,
upon request, embody in a signed agreement any under-
standing reached:
All employees employed by Respondent at its hos-
pital in Cottonwood, Arizona, excluding doctors,
registered nurses and other professional employees,
security guards and supervisors within the meaning
of the Act.
(b) Post at its Cottonwood, Arizona, facility copies of
the attached notice marked "Apendix." '0 Copies of said
notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for
Region 28, after being duly signed by Respondent's au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by
it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous
places, including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find-
ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in
Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and
become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto
shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
'0 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
MARCUS J. LAWRENCE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL
619
(c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 28, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election held on De-
cember 19, 1978, among Respondent's employees be set
aside, and that the petition in Case 28-RC-3582 be, and
it hereby is, dismissed.