075 NLRB 905
National Grinding Wheel Co, Inc.
In the Matter of NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC. and
DISTRICT 50, UNITED MINE WORKERS Or AMERICA, LOCAL
12419,
A. F. or L.
Case No. 3-C-943.-Decided January 01, 1948
Mr. Francis X. Helgesen, for the Board.
Mr. Edward D. Flaherty, of Buffalo, N. Y., and Weber, Schank,
Baumler c Trost, by Mr. Howard Schank, of Buffalo, N. Y., for the
respondent.
Mr. Angelo P. Taibi, of Niagara Falls, N. Y., for District 50.
DECISION
AND
ORDER
On February 25, 1947, Trial Examiner Charles E. Persons issued
his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the respondent, National Grinding Wheel Company, Inc., had engaged
in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommend-
ing that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached
hereto 2
The Trial Examiner also found that the respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices and recommended dis-
missal of the complaint as to them. Thereafter, the respondent and
counsel for the Board filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
supporting briefs.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at
the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The
rulings are hereby affirmed.
The Board has considered the Intermedi-
ate Report, the exceptions and briefs filed by the respondent and coun-
sel for the Board, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts
the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations,
with the exceptions noted below :
2 The power of the Board to issue a decision and order in a case such as the instant one
where the charging union has not complied with the filing requirements specified in Sec-
tion 9
( f), (g), and
( h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , was decided by
the Board in Matter of Marshall and Bruce Company , 75 N L R B 90.
2 Those provisions of Section 8 (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act which
the Trial Examiner herein found were violated, are contained in Section 8 (a) (1) and:
Section 8 (a) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
75 N. L R. B., No. 112.
905
'9O6
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1. We find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the elimination of
the rest or lunch periods was a proper subject of collective bargaining.
Indeed, the respondent, in effect, conceded this when it originally
bargained with the Union with respect to the establishment of these
periods.
However, we-are persuaded by the facts, fully recited in the
Intermediate Report, that the respondent did consult with the Union
with respect to their elimination and so conducted itself as to have
fulfilled its obligation under the Act.
2. The Trial Examiner found that the respondent's proposal that
tlui-d step grievance conferences be held in Buffalo was manifestly
unreasonable and amounted to a refusal to bargain.
We do not agree.
While it is true that the respondent proposed that these conferences
'be held in Buffalo, approximately 14 miles from the plant, which pro-
posal the Union rejected, the record discloses that the disagreement
arose not because of the distance involved in meeting in Buffalo, but
because the respondent had refused to pay for the employees' trans-
portation and time lost.
Moreover, at the hearing, the respondent
-Offered to meet with the Union at any place, including the plant.
We
find, contrary to the Trial Examiner, that the respondent did not, in
this connection, refuse to bargain collectively with the Union.
For the reasons stated by us in the Marshall and Bruce Conipany
-case, si1pr'a, and the Planzkinton Packing Company case,3 both of which
involved a violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act, as well as non-com-
-pliance by the charging union with the filing requirements specified
in Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act, as amended, we shall not
issue the recommended unqualified order that the respondent, upon
request, furnish the Union with information in regard to pay rates and
changes and adjustments therein such as will enable the Union to
-discharge its functions as a statutory representative of the employees
in the appropriate unit, but shall instead condition our order, in part,
upon compliance by the Union with that section of the amended Act,
-within thirty (30) days from the date of the order herein.
3. The Trial Examiner found. and we agree, that the respondent's
i efusal to give employment to Davignon, Clench, and Heubusch upon
termination of the strike was not violative of the Act.
As set forth in
-the Intermediate Report, on April 19, 1946, all the respondent's em-
ployees participated in an economic strike arising out of differences
between the Union and the respondent during bargaining negotiations.
The strike continued until July 13, 1946, when the parties concluded
aln agreement.
Thereafter the respondent invited all striking employ-
ees to return to work.
However, when tine three complainants applied 4
' 75 N L R B 241
6 Contrary to the Trial Examiner , we find that the evidence does not indicate that the
•complamants conditionally applied for reinstatement.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
907
they were refused reinstatement for the stated reason that the respond-
ent understood that they had "quit ."
At that time , the complainants
denied any intention of having quit the respondent's employ and as-
serted that, notwithstanding their acceptance of other employment,
they had intended to return to work upon termination of the strike.
It is well settled under that Act that, although strikers run the risk,of
being permanently replaced during an economic strike, an employer is
nevertheless under a duty not to discriminate in regard to the reinstate-
ment of such strikers because of their concerted or union activity.5 In
certain instances , depending upon the particular circumstances in-
volved, discrimination may be reasonably inferred from the employ-
er's arbitrary and unexplained refusal to reinstate the strikers upon
application.
But in the present case, there is no warrant for such an,
inference, for the record contains a credible non-discriminatory expla-
nation for the respondent's refusal to reinstate the complainants.
According to the testimony of Works Manager Russ , which we credit
as did the Trial Examiner, the respondent understood from undis-
closed sources that, during the strike, the three complainants had'
obtained "permanent jobs" with other companies in the area and had.
severed their employment relationship with the respondent, and the
respondent therefore refused to give them employment because of its-
outstanding policy "not to [hire] men away from other companies in
the area."
The fact that the complainants challenged the respondent's
understanding that they had quit, goes to the reasonableness of the
respondent's belief, but we are not prepared on the basis of the record-
to find that the respondent could not have reasonably relied on its-
outside source of information.
Indeed, as set forth in the Inter-
mediate Report, the testimony of Davignon and Clench shows, and-
we find, that both unequivocally told their new employers that they,
had severed their employment relationship with the respondent and'
accepted new employment on a, permanent basis.
While the testimony
of Heubusch is somewhat equivocal, admittedly, as found by the Trial
Examiner, lie gave his new employer the impression that he was
doubtful as to whether he would ever return to the respondent's,
plant because of general dissatisfaction.
This testimony adequately
established the reasonableness, if not the correctness, of the respond-
ent's belief based on the information it had at the time in question.
Our conclusion that the respondent did not violate Section 8 (3)
of the Act does not necessarily depend on whether or not the coin-
plainants actually severed their employment relationship with the
respondent prior to their application for reinstatement, for the pre-
scription in the Act against discrimination applies to applicants for
c N L R 13 v Macbay Radio Go, 204 U S 333.
908
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment as well as to employees., In our opinion, whether the com-
plainants be regarded as employees or applicants, the record fails to
establish that the respondent denied them reinstatement in order to
penalize them for their strike activity or to discourage self-organiza-
tion among its employees. To the contrary, we are convinced and find
from the record as a whole, as did the Trial Examiner, that Davignon,
Clench, and Heubusch were refused reinstatement because the respond-
ent reasonably believed that their reemployment would be contrary to
its policy of not employing persons working elsewhere in the area.7
In reaching a contrary conclusion with respect to the issue of dis-
crimination, Mr. Houston relies primarily on the Mid-Continent Pe-
troleum Corp. (54 N. L. R. B. 912) and Fafnir Bearing Co. (73 N. L.
R. B.1008) cases.
But clearly, the Mid-Continent case is not apposite.
In that case, the employer in effect conceded that certain strikers were
being penalized- for their strike activity, but sought to avoid statutory
liability on the ground that their strike activity amounted to "unlawful
conduct" which disqualified them from invoking the protestation of
the Act. Inasmuch as the alleged unlawful conduct was inseparably
connected with the strike, the Board held that the employer's "defense
has nothing to do with motive-a factor upon which alleged violations
of Section 8 (3) ordinarily turn" (emphasis supplied), and that there-
fore the employer must affirmatively establish that the strikers in
question actually had engaged in such unlawful conduct. In the pres-
ent case, the respondent's principal defense involved no question of
"unlawful conduct" and therefore, in accord with the applicable de-
cisional theory reiterated in the Mid-Continent case, we have given con-
trolling weight to the respondent's motive.'
Nor do we believe that our
decision in the present case constitutes a departure from the holding
and theory of the Fafnir case.
It is axiomatic that issues of discrimi-
nation, such as those raised here, must necessarily be decided on a case
8 Phelps Dodge Corporation v N L R. B, 313 U S 177
4 We also agree with the Tiial Examiner that Heubusch 's conduct on the picket line in
refusing to permit an official of the respondent to enter the plant , as fully described in the
Intermediate Report, would , therefore , in any event, provide justification for the failure
to reinstate
8In the AAA Dental Laboratory case (41 N L R B 263), the employer refused to rein-
state three strikers for the stated reason that they had engaged in a conspiracy during
the strike to put the employer out of business
The Board stated that certain testimony
and an affidavit "lend credence to the respondents' contention that they refused to rein-
state French because of a reasonable belief that French « as not a trustworthy employee.
Moreover, whether or not the accusations in the affidavit, which mentioned French by
name, were true, nevertheless we are persuaded by the record that the respondents
believed the accusations to be true and were so motivated in
denying French reinstate-
ment ' (Emphasis supplied )
As to the other two stokers, the Board found that the
respondents did not establish any reasonable basis for believing that they were engaged in
any such activity" and, in view of their pi ominence in the Union, the employers' proven
hostility toward the Union, and the failure to establish any reasons for refusing to rein-
state the two strikers , concluded that theie was discrimination because of union activity
and membership
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
909
to case basis, depending upon the particular facts involved.
Thus, in
the Fafnir case, where we found no merit in the employer's explana-
tion that lie refused to reinstate striker Bolduc because he had obtained
a "quit-slip," the record showed, and the Board found, that the em-
ployer had,also unlawfully refused to reinstate other strikers who had
not obtained "quit-slips."
In the present case, the respondent engaged
in no coercive course of conduct and consequently, in the light of its
credible explanation for denying reinstatement to the complainants,
we find no substantial evidence in the record, and none has been alluded
to in the dissenting opinion, to support a finding of discrimination.
To
the extent that our dissenting colleague relies on the Fafnir case as
standing for the proposition that, subject to certain conditions not here
present, a striking employee has an absolute right to be reinstated to
his job, we feel that he is in error.
For clearly, the "right [of a striker]
to be reemployed upon the reopening of the plant or the termination
of the strike," referred to in the Fafnir case, can be construed to mean
only that a striker may not be denied work for discriminatory rea-
sons.
Otherwise, a striker would have more job security than a work-
ing employee who, in the language of the Supreme Court,9 may be dis-
charged "for any reason other than union activity or agitation for
collective bargaining" (emphasis supplied).
ORDER
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, National Grinding
Wheel Company, Inc., North Tonawanda , New York, and its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns shall:
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with District 50, United Mine
Workers of America, Local 12419 , A. F. of L., if and when said labor
organization shall have complied, within 30 days from the date of this
Order, with Section 9 ( f), (g), and (h) of the Act, as amended, as the
exclusive representative of all its production and maintenance em-
ployees, excluding watchmen, office and clerical employees, confidential
employees, chemists, salaried employees, assistant foremen, foremen,
and all other supervisors , by refusing to furnish information to Dis-
trict 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L.,
in regard to pay rates and changes and adjustments therein;
(b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of District 50,
United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L., if and when
9 Associated Press v. N. L. R R, 301 U. S 103, 132 See also N L R. B. v Mackay
Radio Co., supra.
910
DECISIONS OF
NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
said labor organization shall have complied with the filing require-
ments of the Act, as amended, in the manner set forth above, to nego-
tiate on behalf of the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit, as
their exclusive bargaining agent.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act, as amended :
(a) Upon request, and upon compliance by the Union with the
filing requirements of the Act, as amended, in the manner set forth
above, furnish District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local
12419, A. F. of L., with information in regard to pay rates and changes
and adjustments therein such as will enable District 50, United Mine
Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L., to discharge its func-
tions as the statutory representative of the employees in the above-
described appropriate unit;
(b) Post immediately at its plant at North Tonawanda, New York,
copies of the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A." 1"
Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the
Third Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's rep-
resentative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt
thereof, and maintained by it for'thirty (30) consecutive days there-
after and also for an additional thirty (30) consecutive days in the
event of compliance by the Union with the filing requirements of the
Act, as amended, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall
be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other inaterial;
(c) Notify the Regional Director for the Third Region in writing,
within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, and again within ten
(10) days from the future date, if any, on which the respondent is
officially notified that the Union has met the condition hereinabove set
forth, what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the respondent violated Section 8 (5) of the Act by eliminating lunch
and wash-up periods, and by demanding that conferences with respect
to grievances having reached the third stage under the established
grievance procedure be discussed at a location unreasonably distant
from the plant, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that
the respondent violated Section 8 (3) of the Act, be, and it hereby is,
dismissed.
10 In the event that this Oider is enforced by decree of a Circuit Court of Appeals, there
shall be inseited, before the words, "A DECISION AND ORDER" the words "A DECREE
OF THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING."
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
911
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees
WE WILT NOT refuse to bargain collectively with District 50,
United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L., as
the exclusive representative of all production and maintenance
employees, excluding watchmen, office and clerical employees, con-
fidential employees, chemists, salaried employees, assistant fore-
men, foremen, and all other supervisory employees with respect
to furnishing information to District 50, in regard to pay rates
and changes and adjustments therein; provided said labor organ-
ization complies, within thirty (30) clays from the date of the
aforesaid Order of the Board, with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with the efforts of
District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F.
of L., to negotiate on behalf of the employees in the aforesaid
bargaining unit, as their exclusive bargaining agent ; provided said
labor organization complies within thirty (30) clays from the date
of the aforesaid Order of the Board, with Section 9 (f), (g), and
(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
WE WILL FURNISH DISTRICT 50, United Mine Workers of America,
Local 12419, A. F. of L., upon request, information in regard to
pay rates and changes and adjustments therein such as will enable
said labor organization to discharge its functions as the statutory
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit described
below; provided said labor organization complies within thirty
(30) clays from the date of the aforesaid Order of the Board,
with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees, excluding watch-
men, office and clerical employees, confidential employees,
chemists , salaried employees , assistant foremen , foremen, and
all other supervisory employees.
ALL our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-
named union or any other labor organization.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL CO_MIPANY, INC.,
Employer.
Dated ----------
By -------------------------------------------
(Representative )
( Title)
912
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material, and must remain posted for 30 clays from the date hereof,
and also for an additional 30 days in the event of compliance by the
Union with the filing requirements of the Act, as amended.
MEMBER HOUSTON, dissenting in part:
Clench , Davignon, and Heubusch were participants with their fellow
employees in a strike for higher wages .
Shortly after the strike began,
and for an understandable reason-the need to support their families-
they applied to other employers for work.
Having been advised that
employment would involve a relinquishment of their employment with
the respondent, and it appearing that this condition was inflexible,
they pretended agreement.
Upon termination of the strike, and after
an invitation by the respondent, they returned and requested that they
be given their jobs.
They were rebuffed , despite the fact that their
places had not been filled, despite the fact that they were not told that
there was no work available , and although they at no time had in-
formed the respondent that they had quit.
The refusal to reinstate
them was made with the assertion that the respondent had learned
from "undisclosed sources" that they had accepted permanent jobs
elsewhere and, consequently , had quit the respondent's employ. Slight
attention was paid to their repeated disclaimers and they have not been
employed .
In bare essentials , these are the facts upon which my col-
leagues have decided that these employees ought not to be reinstated.
Although the issue appears quite simple, its disposition by the major-
ity carries the most intensely significant implication that the equality
between an employer and his striking employees , sought hitherto so
religiously to be preserved in these circumstances , has now been set
awry by overweighting the balance in favor of the former.
We discovered early the necessity for setting out a code of rights
and obligations so that an equitable balance might be fixed between
the interests of employer and employee in our industrial society, when
economic rivalry culminated in a strike .
At that point it became
important that each contestant should conduct himself with full
knowledge not only of his liberties but of reasonable limitations im-
posed on his conduct by fairness .
Our formulation of principles to
govern the relationship of an employer and his striking employees
took careful account of the need to protect the former in his right to
operate his business .
That this right should be meaningful , he was
left free to replace the strikers .
He was also left free to refuse to
reinstate the strikers if he had replaced them, if he had no work for
them due to a legitimate change in operations resulting in the elim-
ination of the type of job, or.if they had seized his property , engaged
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
913
in violence, or struck in violation of a contractual obligation not to dog
so.
These protections were granted so that he might compete upon a
fair basis with the strikers.
Correlatively, and in order to establish
a inilieu of freedom for the striker, his right to reinstatement was
protected.
Not without qualifications, however.
He must have un-
conditionally abandoned his strike, and he must not have been re-
placed.
These qualifications met, his right to return was guaranteed
against discrimination by his employer.
These correlative principles
are well established.
Their essential desirability lies in their definitive
justness and in the fact that their applicability is made facile because
it is quickly ascertainable from the proof in any case. I have set
them out only because, as I have said, I find that the majority, although
apparently aware of them, has created an imbalance between them by
granting an added defense to an employer which so comprehensively
sanctions any refusal to reinstate strikers as to make that right quite
empty.
The majority decision amounts to this : that an employer who has
not replaced his striking employees and who has work for them may
nevertheless refuse to reinstate them because he has a reasonable be-
lief that they have disqualified' themselves.
He may assert any num-
ber and variety of excuses, drawn from "undisclosed sources" and,
according to my colleagues' decision, if this Board is impressed with
the reasonableness of his attitude he is protected in his refusal.
The
validity of his defense will not be judged by actuality, i. e., whether
the striker in fact was disqualified.
This is deemed to be immaterial.
Although this concept of reasonableness has a surface appeal and
outwardly appears equitable, its ramifications in this context invite
gross injustices.
Consider with what criteria we should judge an
employer's assertion that he barred a striker for whom he had a place
because he had heard from an "undisclosed source" that the employee
drank, beat his wife, failed to pay his bills, did not attend church,
changed his job frequently, flirted, gambled, or was guilty of kindred
immoralities.
Consider also that the employee was in fact not guilty
of any of these frailties. It would be extremely absorbing even if it
were somewhat frustrating to deliberate upon the precise measure of
doubt we should have to entertain of his innocence before we should
be prepared to certify as reasonable his employer's belief that he was
guilty.
To avoid such barren possibilities, the Board, in a carefully rea-
soned decision, not too long ago, held that an employer who barred
strikers for whom there was work, even upon an honestly mistaken
belief that the employees had engaged in forbidden conduct, had no
`914
DECISIONS
OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
-valid defense if, in fact, the employees were not 'guilty.,' In refusing,
in that case, to work a forfeiture by the 18 affected employees of their
recourse to ordinary Board remedies, the Board explained :
In other words, this defense has nothing to do with the question
,of motive-a'factor upon which alleged violations of Section 8
(3) ordinarily turn.
Once it is pleaded, as in the case here, that
the discharge was made for unlawful conduct inseparably con-
nected with the strike, the burden was on. the respondents to
.show that all the striking employees discharged therefor had,
in fact, been guilty of unlawful conduct-in this instance the
seizure of the respondents' refinery and leaseholds.
As we have
-found, the respondents met the burden imposed upon them with
respect to all discharged strikers other than these 18.
With re-
spect to them, we are of the opinion that the respondents failed
to establish affirmatively their participation in the unlawful
seizure and occupancy of the respondents' property. [Emphasis
mine.]
Underlying this decisional policy was the almost conclusive pre-
sumption predicated upon the cumulative experience of this Board,
-that an employer who refuses to take back a striker who uncondition-
ally offers to resume his employment, when there is work for him, is
motivated by a bias against the employee's participation in the strike.
But the employer, to rebut the presumption, need only prove that the
striker, in fact, had disqualified himself.
Because an employee who
abandoned his strike, and consequently, had only his individual bar-
power to rely upon, was placed in an inferior position vis-a-vis
his employer, the standard of conduct which the employer was re-
quired to meet to rebut the presumption, was necessarily set high.
The presumption can be satisfied, not by assumptions or beliefs, how-
ever reasonable or honest, but by facts alone showing that the em-
ployee had disqualified himself for employment.
By my colleagues'
decision today, these salutary concepts are severely shaken and what
was before clear is now made shadowy. This Board will no longer
"Matter of Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation , 54 N L. R B 912. The principle
established in the Mid-Continent case grew out of the alleged unlawfulness of the strikers'
conduct-seizure of the employer 's property.
Obviously such conduct involves a grave
measure of danger to the employer's interest for which he properly may be granted con-
siderable freedom to protect his property .
Nevertheless , the Board, in deciding that the
employer must affirmatively prove that the strikers actually had engaged in the alleged
unlawful conduct , thereby regarded the right of strikers for whom there ' was work to be
a paramount interest , and consequently held that the employer 's motive in refusing to
reinstate the strikers was irrelevant
Surely then , in a case as the one before us, in
which no unlawfulness is charged , it cannot be inequitable to hold an employer at least
to a similar standard.
In view of the sweeping nature of the decision in the bfid-Continent
case , the AAA Dental Laboratory case cited by my colleagues , must be considered as over-
fuled insofar as it is inconsistent with the principles I have noted
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
915
primarily find facts, but rather concern itself with weighing the
reasonableness of beliefs, and, as a consequence, the right to engage
in collective action, guaranteed by the Act, as amended, is gravely
impaired.
What we must determine here, without regard to this employer's
belief, is whether these employees in fact quit and consequently are
no longer entitled to reinstatement, or whether they did not.
On this
issue, the burden of proof is on the respondent. If these individuals
did not quit, then they remained employees because Section 2 (3) pre-
serves their status as such and they have a right to be reinstated to
the unfilled jobs for which they are suited.
My colleagues do not
undertake to decide this question because, as I have noted, they believe
it immaterial.
But, in view of the case, it is crucial.
I think the employer has failed to establish affirmatively that
Clench, Davignon, and Heubusch had, in fact, quit.
On the contrary,
the record establishes that these employees were employees of the
respondent when they applied for reinstatement.
Although all three
had taken employment elsewhere during the strike, and although two
of them had promised the employer involved that they would quit
the respondent, while the third took an equivocal position'12 the fact
nevertheless remains that at no time did any of the three employees
notify the respondent that they had quit their employment.
This is
understandable since all three had no intention of quitting the re-
spondent's employ.
Any doubt that the respondent may have fornnu-
lated from other sources as to the status of these employees must have
been resolved by the return of these employees for the purpose of
claiming their jobs after the strike, by the insistence of all three em-
ployees that they had never abandoned their jobs with the respondent,
and by their unconditional offer to resume their employment. In such
circumstances, including the fact that the respondent had itself noti-
fied these employees along with others on or about 'July 1013 of its
intention to reopen the plant on July 15 and to notify each one "in
person or by card when he or she is to return to work," any insistence
by the respondent in its view that they had quit must be regarded as
arbitrary. We have passed quite recently on a strikingly analogous
11 Employee Heubusch meiely expressed a doubt as to the probability of his return to the
respondent's plant after the strike
Moreover, although Clench and Davignon may have
misled their interim employer as to their intent to return to work at the respondent's
plaiit, after the termination of the strike , such action in no way prejudiced the respondent.
Nor should it be considered as misconduct of the nature that deprives an employee of the
protection of the Act.
11 Clench and Davignon received their notices on July 10
Heubusch received his letter
a few clays later after a conversation with Sitgreaves, secretary of the respondent, in
which lie disclaimed an imputation by Sitgreaves that he was no longer an employee of
the respondent.
.
766972-48-vol 75
59
916
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
case in Matter of the Fafnir Bearing Company (73 N. L. R. B. 1008).
In that case, the Board ordered one Bolduc, a striking employee, re-
instated even though he had procured a "quit slip" from his employer
during the course of the strike. In rejecting the respondent's at-
tempted justification of its refusal to reinstate on the ground that the
employee had thereby voluntarily terminated his employment, the
Board stated :
-
However, the record shows, and we find, in procuring the "quit
slip" Bolduc did not intend to terminate permanently his employ-
ment with the respondent but intended merely to use it as a means
of obtaining employment elsewhere, during the shutdown of the
plant.
The mere acceptance by a striking employee of a "quit slip"
to enable him to secure temporary employment elsewhere dwrirng
the shut down of a plant, does not forfeit his right to be reem-
ployed upon the reopening of the plant or termination of the strike,
unless he has been validly replaced in, the meantime.
[Italics
mine.]
,
As in the cited case, the purpose of the strikers here in "quitting" was
to enable them to secure interim employment for the purpose of dis-
charging a basic responsibility, that of feeding their families.
Clearly,
then, if the Board declined to protect a refusal to reinstate an em-
ployee who "quit" with full knowledge and through the cooperation of
the employer as in the Fafnir case, then here, obviously, no protection
ought to be granted inasmuch as the employer was never advised that
the strikers had quit or, in fact, ever intended to quit.i"
Even if I assumed that these employees, by reason of their con-
duct during the strike, had acquired the status of applicants for em-
ployment when they sought work with the respondent at the end of the
strike, the respondent's arbitrary refusal to consider their application
at a time when work was available cannot be condoned. This is quite
clear because the asserted policy of the respondent not to employ per-
sons working elsewhere in the area was insisted upon in the face of
direct denial by the strikers that they were not available for employ-
ment.
This cavalier rejection of their requests impels an inference
that the strikers were penalized because they struck.
" My colleagues attribute to my reliance upon the Fafnir case, a misconception which
the quoted language I have set out clearly proves to be unfounded
No plainer meaning
could be conveyed by language I find the underlined portion of that language to estab-
lish unequivocally the proposition that an employer may not satisfy the duty to prove
facts , which has been imposed by the doctrine of the Mid-Continent case, merely by point-
ing to a condition which his striking employee must fulfill to obtain interim employment.
There is, similaily , no substance to the charge that I would grant to strikers such an abso-
lute right to be re-employed as would place them in a preferied position in contrast to
employees who remained at work I have already noted above the qualifications which
have customarily been invoked in these cases .
Certainly enough risk attaches to the right
to strike to make it unnecessary for me to elaborate on this contention.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
917
Consequently, I am convinced that these employees took interim
employment upon the only basis it was available to them, intending
always to return when the strike was settled. I cannot condemn them
for it.
Indeed the law encourages strikers to do so in order not only
that production and commerce be sustained, but that amount of back
pay for which an employer might be liable ought to be mitigated. A
decision which discourages efforts to take interim work has the neces-
sary effect of conditioning the right to reinstatement upon the endue
ance of the strikers to remain idle on a picket line.
But this decision,
unfortunately, goes much further. Its most serious effect involves a
return to the era when the collective strength of employers could be
freely used in an economic contest with individual workmen. It is
indeed a strange commentary that this Board should today decide to
give such disproportionate preference to the employer when Congress
in enacting the recent amendatory legislation unequivocally stated its
firm purpose to establish a more just equality in the relationship be-
tween an employer and his employees. I cannot believe that this deci-
sion, in any manner, effectuates that purpose and therefore I must
dissent from this portion of the decision.15
INTERMEDIATE REPORT
Francis Y. Helgesen, Esq, for the Board
Edwai d D. Flaherty, Esq , of Buffalo, N. Y, and Weber, Shank, Baumler cC Ti ost,
by Howard Schank, Esq, of Buffalo, N Y, for the Respondent.
Angelo P. Taibi, Esq, of Niagara Falls, N. Y, for District 50.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On a charge duly filed on July 19, 1946, by District 50, United Mine Workers
of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L, herein called District 50, the National Labor
Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Third
Region (Buffalo, New York), issued its complaint dated November 20, 1946,
against the National Grinding Wheel Company, Inc, herein called the Respond-
ent, alleging that the'Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5),
and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat 449,
herein called the Act
Copies of the charge, the complaint, and notice of hearing
thereon, were duly served upon the Respondent and District 50
With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint, as amended at the
hearing, alleges in substance that: (1) on or about July 15, 1946, the Respondent
discharged Gerard Davignon, Earl Heubusch, and Eugene Clench, and since that
elate has refused or failed to reinstate them to their former or substantially
equivalent positions for the reason that they joined and assisted District 50,
and engaged in concerted activities with other employees for the purposes of
collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection; (2) on May 9, 1946,
the Respondent discharged John Nightingale "because of his past membership
"I wish to reserve the question as to whether Heubusch 's conduct on the picket line
disqualified him from exercising his right to reinstatement.
918
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in and activity on behalf of District 50" ; (3) on or about July 15, 1946, the
Respondent unilaterally eliminated wash-up and lunch periods and has since
refused and failed to reinstate such periods for the reason that a majority of
the employees joined and assisted District 50, and engaged in concerted activities
with other employees for the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual
aid and protection; (4) by such discharges and refusals to reinstate and by
the elimination of wash-up and lunch periods the Respondent has discriminated
in regard to the hire and tenure and terms and conditions of employment of its
employees and discouraged membership in District 50; (5) a unit consisting of
all production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's plant, excluding
watchmen, office and clerical employees, confidential employees, chemists, salaried
employees, assistant foremen, foremen, and all other supervisory employees with
authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline or otherwise effect changes in
the status of employees or effectively recommend such action, constitute an
appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of
Section 9 (b) of the Act; (6) on or about January 17, 1946, a majority of
employees in this unit in a secret election designated District 50 as their repre-
sentative for the purposes of collective bargaining; (7) on or about August
15 and October 21, 1946, the Respondent, although duly requested by District 50,
refused to bargain with District 50 as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees in the above-defined unit; and (8) the Respondent by its officers and
agents through these acts has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
On or about December 3, 1946, the Respondent duly submitted its answer in
which it admits the facts alleged in the complaint as to its corporate organization
and the nature and extent of its business 1 The answer denies, however, the
commission of any unfair labor practices and denies "any knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief" as to the claim of District 50 to be the statutory
representative of its employees in the above-defined unit.
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on December 4 and 19, 1946, at North
Tonawanda, New York, before the undersigned, Charles E Persons, the Trial
Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the
Respondent were represented by counsel and District 50 by one of its officials.
Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to
introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties.
At the begin-
ning of the hearing, the Board moved to amend its complaint by adding the names
of Earl Heubusch and Eugene Clench to that of Gerard Daviguon as having been
discriminatorily discharged and refused reemployment and to further amend
to the effect that John Nightingale was discriminatorily discharged on May 9,
1946.
The Respondent interposed no objection to this motion but reserved its
right to ask for adjournment at the close of the Board's presentation and to
recall any of the Board's witnesses, if desired for further cross-examination.
The motion was granted with these conditions attached
At the close of the
Board's presentation at the request of the Respondent adjournment was taken
from December 4 to December 19, 1946. The Respondent made no request for
the recall of any of the Board's witnesses
At the close of the Board's case-in-
chief Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for failure of proof and other
reasons stated.
The motion was denied without prejudice to its renewal later.
Respondent renewed the motion at the close of the hearing at which time ruling
1 At the hearing Respondent further admitted that District 50 was a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
919
was reserved. It is now disposed of by the findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and recommendations in this Intermediate Report.
At the close of the hearing
the Board moved to conform the pleadings to the proof as to such immaterial
matters as names, dates, and spelling.
This motion was granted without ob-
jection.
At the conclusion of the presentation of testimony all parties waived
oral aignment before the Trial Examiner.
The parties were duly advised that
they had the privilege of presenting briefs for the consideration of the Trial
Examiner.
The Board and the Respondent have duly presented such a brief.
Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT'
The Respondent, National Grinding Wheel Company, Inc, is a corporation
duly organized under the laws of the State of New York. It has its office and
principal place of business at North Tonawanda, New York, where it is engaged
in the,manufactuie, sale, and distribution of abrasive products
During the
calendar year 1945 the Respondent purchased raw materials, products, and
supplies valued in excess of $25,000, which were transported in interstate com-
merce from and through other States than New York. In the same period it
manufactured and sold outside the State of New York products valued in excess
of $500,000.
The Respondent admits, and the undersigned finds, that it is
engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act.
II. LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L., is a
labor organization which admits to its membership employees of the Respondent.
Local 12419 confines its membership to such employees.
III.
THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Prior to 1942 the employees in Respondent's plant had had no statutory
representative.
District 50 entered a petition for investigation and certification
of representatives on May 4 in that year' A consent agreement for a card check
against a pay-roll list was executed by the Respondent and District 50
As a
result the Regional Director, on May 6, 1942, certified that District 50 was entitled
to be the exclusive representative of the production and maintenance employees,
excluding watchmen, chemists, confidential employees and clerical, salaried, and
supervisory employees.'
This appropriate unit has been maintained until the
present and is not now in dispute
A contract was executed with District 50.
Contractual relations have since been maintained except for the period from
November 21, 1945, to July 13, 1946
On October 5, 1945, a rival organization, the United Gas, Coke, and Chemical
Workers of America, C. I. 0, herein called CIO, filed a petition with the Board.`
2 These findings aie based on allegations of the complaint admitted by the Respondent
in its answer and on a stipulation between the parties entered on the record
I In Case No 3-R-408
4 This is substantially the unit defined by the Board in the complaint.
I This was Case No
3-R-1103
920
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The parties entered into an agreement for a consent election. This was held on
November 8, 1945, and the result was inconclusive. Each union received the sauce
vote while a plurality was cast for the "neither" choice.
A run-off election was
held in which the same three choices appeared on the ballot. In the second elec-
tion on November 27, 1945, District 50 received a plurality of the votes but less
than a majority. Since the Regional Office had no authority to conduct a second
run-off election the case was dismissed on December 11, 1945.8
District 50 promptly filed a new petition on December 17, 1945 7 A new consent
election was held on January 17, 1946, in which the C1O again participated. Dis-
trict 50 received a majority of the valid votes cast and was duly certified as
the statutory representative on January 24, 1946.
The contract in force in 1945
had lapsed by its provisions on November 21, 1945. After the final determination
of the representation question as just stated, conferences were opened between
the Respondent and District 50
Because of stern differences on issues, for The
most part not material here, negotiations were long di awn out. On April 18,
1946, District 50 called a strike and established a picket line.
The strike was
100 percent effective and after a brief period the pickets were withdrawn.
Nego-
tiations continued and on July 13, 1946, a contract was executed.
Employees
were called in on July 15 to prepare for a resumption of operations and on July
16 all departments were reopened.
B. The alleged discrinvinatorif dischai ge and refusal to rehire Geiard A.
Davignon, Eugene Clench and Earl Heubusch s
Davignon was first hired by the Respondent in October 1944 and was continu-
ously employed until the date of the strike
He joined the Union at an indeter-
minate (late prior to February 1945 when he was elected a member of the negoti-
ating committee and steward of the Oven Department
He struck with the other
employees and acted as a picket during the period that the Union maintained a
picket line.
About 4 or 5 clays after the strike began Davignon interviewed the
employment manager of a plant located within a block of Respondent
He gave
the following unassailed and credited account of this interview :
Well, I went over and asked them for a job and lie asked me where I was
working and I told him over to the [Respondents which is on strike; so I
don't know we talked quite a while, and he says, "I can't employ you unless
^ on are going to stay here, and quit the other job" ; so I told him, "If that is
the only way I can get a job here, I iu i11 do that," and that is about all there
was to it.°
Despite his admitted commitment to his new employer Davignon.assented under
redirect examination to the question, "I understand from your testimony . . .
it was always your intention to return to the [Respondent] at the conclusion of
the strike."
° The undersigned has checked these cases in the Board's permanent records .
Some de-
tails are stated here which were not entered on the record of this proceeding
This is Case No 3-R-1151
Factual data herein is drawn from the credited testimony of these three employees.
The Respondent does not dispute its validity
° On cross-examination Davignon gave the following version
I told him [the employment manager ] I needed the job; that I had my family to feed
and things were getting kind of low, so I said , "Ain't there no possible way at all I
could get a job here I" Then he says , "Well , we could put you on if you want to stay
here and quit the other place ."
Then , I told him, "If that is the only way I can get a
job, then I will have to."
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
921
Under (late of July 10, 1946, Davignon received a letter, which Respondent
admits was sent to all strikers, reading as follows:
This is to notify you that the contract is now being drawn up and it is our
understanding that it will be submitted to the Local at a meeting Friday
night.
If it is approved at this meeting, it is our intention to begin reopening
the plant Monday July 15. Since all operations cannot be started at once,
each employee will be notified in person or by card when he or she is to
report for work.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL CO, INC.
A couple of days after the receipt of this letter Davignon called at Respondent's
office and inquired of Personnel Director Harold Hemingway when he was to
be called back.
He was then told that he was not to be reinstated since lie
had quit
Davignon protested saying, as he testified, "I told him that I hadn't
told them anything about quitting and I wanted to come back to work. [Heming-
way] said there was nothing he could do about it."
Up to the time of the
hearing Davignon had made no further effort to secure reinstatement nor had
he been offered his former position by the Respondent
For reasons not stated
in the record he had removed to a position in a plant about 6 miles from that
of the Respondent. Its advantages, as compared to his job with the Respondent,
are not reflected in the record.
The contract executed on July 13, 1945, provided for an increase of 18y_> cents
an hour over the rates in effect prior to October 22, 194.510 As further therein
stated, "Payment of retroactive pay shall be made in six weekly consecutive
installments commencing with the first regular pay day-after the execution
of this agreement,"
The record reflects that Respondent did not make such
retroactive payments to employees who it considered had quit their employ-
ment before July 13, 1946
Davignon's testimony indicates interest in the pos-
sibility of getting this back pay
An excerpt reads, "I figure we would be en-
titled to that back pay regardless if I go back or not because I worked there
during that time."
When pressed under cross-examination to state whether he
would still desire reinstatement if his claim to back, or retroactive, pay was
justly settled, Davignon, although he persisted in his statement that it was
always his intention to return, was reluctant to give a positive reply.
He
finally answered, after a period of reflection, "Well, I am not sure at this time."
Clench was hired by the Respondent in May 1941. At the time of the strike
he was serving as a grinding wheel moulder
His employment was interrupted
by a call to the armed services on a date not stated.
His military service ter-
minated on December 11, 1945.
He was not given an "honorable discharge" but
his discharge read "under honorable conditions."
As a result Hemingway
raised questions whether such a discharge entitled him to full rights under the
terms of the Selective Training and Service Act.
These questions were ulti-
mately resolved in Clench's favor but his rehiring was delayed and it is evident
that the incident left doubts in Clench's mind as to the justice of Hemingway's
attitude, and that of the Respondent's officials generally, toward him.
Clench joined the Union in "January or March" 1946.
His testimony reflects
no union activity, other than membership, in the brief period remaining before
the strike on April 18, 1946
He participated in the strike and served as a
picket "about one or two days " Thereafter lie made application for employment
1° A 10 percent increase had been given at this time
This 10 percent payment was cred-
ited toward the 181k cents an lioui.
922
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
at the same plant where Davignon was later hired. In his testimony he gave
the following account of his interview with the employment manager,
Well, first before I went [there] I went down to [another plant] and tried to
get a job down there and they wouldn't hire me because I was on strike ; so
I went to Durez, I was all prepared to tell them I quit the [Respondent], in
order to get a job, just a big lie in order to get a job. He told me, "Okay" if
I quit the [Respondent] he would hire me. But I had intentions of going
back to the [Respondent] when the strike was over.
Clench received Respondent's letter of July 10, 1941
Not having been notified
to return within a week lie went to the plant and asked Heiningwa. when he
would be called back
He was told, in effect, that the Respondent regarded him
as no longer in its employ because he had accepted a job with the neighboring
plant
Clench protested as had Davignon that he lead not notified the Respondent
of his intentions to quit and asked Hemingway where he had n eceived such
information
Hemingway declined to divulge this stating, as Clench testified,
" \Ve got word."
Clench then and on a second visit inquired about his right to retroactive pay
under the terms of the strike settlement
Hemingway informed Clench that
under contractual provisions this was due only to employees reinstated after the
strike.
Clench admitted that, at this juncture, lie had declared to Hemingway,
"something along [the] line that [lie] didn't give a damn about the job; that
[he] wanted the back pay."
He explained that he was "a little heated" at his
treatment after he had received a letter stating he would be recalled and had
given his current employer 3 days notice of his intention to quit
Clench mani-
fested suspicion also of Hemingway's good faith because of the doubts expressed
as to his right to be reemployed on his return from service in December 1945.12
At the time of the hearing Clench had had three jobs since his employment at
the Respondent's plant
His wages and working conditions at these plants are
not disclosed.
His testimony contains no positive statement that lie now desires
to return to his employment with Respondent.
Ieubusch was hired by the Respondent on October IT, 1939
His last job was
as weigher in the Vitrified Mix Department
His employment was interrupted
by approximately 2 years in the armed services ending January 29, 1946.
On his
return questions were raised by the Respondent's officials whether he was entitled
to reinstatement under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act
-since he had not been drafted but had relinquished his position and volunteered.
Resolution of this question caused a slight delay in his reinstatement 12
Heu-
busch's testimony indicates that he retained a grievance over this incident
Heubusch joined the Union among the first applicants and served as president
for a year before enlisting in the armed forces.
He was also a member of the
grievance committee until he left in 1944
Heubusch joined the strikers and
acted as a picket captain. In that capacity he had a colloquy with Hemingway
which he candidly stated in his testimony as follows:
21 At another point in Clench 's cross-examination the following interchange is recorded :
I am just trying to find out what you said in the heat of the moment .
You did say
there were better places to work or that you didn't care about the job , what you
wanted was the back pay?
A At the time I did ; just a personal argument between Mr .
Hemingway and
myself
Heubuscli testified that he waited about 2 weeks after his discharge on January 29,
1946, betoie applying for reinstatement.
He was rehired on February 18, 1946.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
923
Q. You say that Mr. Hemingway knew that [you were in the picket line]
because you stopped him; what did you mean by that?
A Well he was going to go in, and I told him that there was nobody going
in; that was my orders I was a captain on the picket line.
Q. And you refused to let him go through the picket line; is that right?
A. That is right.
Q And did he go through the picket line?
A. No, he didn't.
Q. That is, you prevented him from going through the picket line?
A. I didn't prevent him ; I didn't hold him; I just merely told him.
Q That you had orders that no one was to go through the picket line?
A. That is right.
Q And as captain on the picket line, you were going to see those orders
were carried out.
A. That is right.
Q. And that is why you were on the picket line.
A Sure.
Heubusch applied for work in a plant in North Tonawanda, where he had
previously worked, "about a week after the strike started."
His testimony rela-
tive to his hiring interview reads,
Well, I walked in and asked for a job and he [the employment manager] asked
me where I had been because I had worked there before, and I told him I
had been working at [the Respondent] and he asked inc how long, and I told
him; and he said that was too long, that I would go back there as soon as the
strike was settled ; and I told hint, "I don't know whether I would or not
because I got a shoving around down there" and that is all I said and I got a
job's
Heubusch did not receive the letter announcing the plans for reopening the
plant and recalling the strikers at the time they were mailed to the employees
generally
At a chance meeting with Carl Sitgreaves, purchasing agent for the
Respondent and secretary of the corporation, Heubusch asked him when the em-
ployees would be recalled.
Sitgreaves then said, "Oh, are you still working there?"
Heubusch replied, "As far I know ; I haven't quit."
A few days later he received
the letter sent to all striking employees
However, he was not notified to return
After waiting until employees junior to lira had been recalled Heubusch applied
at the plant, a week or more after the plant reopened, and had an interview with
Hemingway about which he testified as follows,
Well, I walked in and asked him how come I wasn't back to work yet. He
said I had quit, so I asked him how come I had quit; I never notified any-
body of the Company or him or anyone else that I had quit; so he told ine,
he said, "We get pretty good information," lie says, "And it is in our
records that you quit, and that is the way it is going to stay for now" ; so
that was that, so I gave hum to understand I hadn't quit ; and that I had
no intentions of quitting, and I didn't notify anybody to the effect that I
did quit.
Heubusch admitted that when employed at another plant during the strike,
he gave the impression to the employment manager that he was doubttul about
"Elsewhere Heubusch gave the following testimony relative to this interview
"He
[the eniploynient manager] says that 'I had a lot of seniority there and that I would go
back right after they opened up,' and I told him, 'I don't know if I will or not.'"
924
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
returning to the Respondent's plant because he "was dissatisfied with the con-
ditions" and that he was being shoved around
However, he insisted that it
was his intention then and thereafter to return. As he stated the matter, "I got
a lot of seniority down there, and it is tough to lose."
Hemingway was not called as a witness
Works Manager Fred W Rugs, in
his testimony, gave the following statement. as to the reason Davignon, Clench
and Heubusch were not reinstated after the strike,
Well, we understood that they had taken jobs, with other companies,
permanent jobs
They had quit the employ of the [respondent], and it has
been the policy of the Company not to be luring men away from other
companies in our area
Q. You say that has been the policy of your Company not to hire employees
from other companies?
A Yes, if they are woiking there; if they are working at other plants.
Q Was that the policy during the war or could you'hire them troni other
plants during the war?
A Well, it was even the policy during the war if they came in and stated
they were working at a place, we didn't consider them If they said they
had quit a plant, and then we would call up and check on the Company
that was in the area
The undersigned notes that North Tonawanda is situated in an area rated as
critical in manpower and credits this testimony.
It is further noted that both Davignon and Clench in their testimony plainly
indicated that their application for reinstatement was not an unqualified one.
It was conditioned on the receipt of the back pay provided in the contract exe-
cuted on July 13, 1946. This back pay was for the period from December 15,
1945, to the strike on April 18, 1946
The question of the right of these com-
plainants to receive such back pay falls without the ambit of the Act
No ref-
erence to such right is here made or intended
The claim of Davignon and
Clench for the back pay provided in the agreement reached on July 13, 1946,
is discussed above only because of its significance as an indication that their
application for reinstatement was not unconditioned.
Respondent contended at the hearing that Heubusch's action in forbidding
Hemingway to enter the plant was sufficient grounds "to warrant the dismissal
of the complaint as to him." The undersigned finds merit in this contention.
In the Fansteel Mctallurgwcal Company" case the Supreme Court clearly held
that employees who deprive an employer of the rightful use of his property
forfeit their right to reinstatement.
The right to strike is there defined as
"the mere quitting of work and statement of grievances in the exercise of
pressure recognized as lawful.s15
The undersigned concludes and finds that the Respondent refused to rein-
state Davignon, Clench and Heubusch because it believed they had quit their
jobs
Some 20 to 25 other employees out of approximately 200 employed
at the time of the strike did not return thereafter.
Heubusch is further
shown to have engaged in unlawful conduct while acting as a picket. The
Board has not shown that the failure to reinstate Davignon, Clench and
Heubusch was motivated by their participation in lawful conceited activities.
The policy Respondent pursued was not in derogation of the Act
Nor does
failure to rehire under the conditions shown constitute discrimination within
14 306 U S 240.
31 Ibid 256.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
925
the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act'6 It'will accordingly be recommended
that this allegation of the amended complaint be dismissed.
C The alleged discriminatory discharge
John Nightingale was first hired by the Respondent in February 1933," as a
worker on the bushing table
Approximately 4 years later he was taught to
run a lathe and edge wheels in the Finishing Department.
He was made an
assistant foreman on July 25, 1942.
His promotion to supervisory status was
under unusual circumstances.
At the time Nightingale was president of the
local in District 50 In that capacity he was spokesman in presenting a
grievance to the Respondent against Superintendent Charles
Weinke who
exercised supervision on four operations, shipping, inspection, speed testing
and finishing
District 50 demanded that he be removed from such super-
vision
The Respondent, since "the employees did not cooperate" with Weinke,
acceded to their demand and assigned Weinke to other non-supervisory duties.
Carl Goerss had been foreman of the finishing department under Weinke.
He
assumed control of this work.
Respondent's President John J. Russ then asked Nightingale if he would
accept an assignment as assistant foreman under Goerss.
After consultation
with District 50 officials, and being advised by them to do so, Nightingale ac-
cepted.
At this time he withdrew from District 50. As he testified, "It was
insisted upon that I do so by both management and the Union "
When the strike was called Nightingale, with other supervisors, was told by
President Russ that they would be retained and paid during the continuance
of the strike.
They were further instructed, as Nightingale's credited testimony
reads, "Mr Fred Russ, who is general manager, said there was no sense of
any of the foremen coming to the plant because you couldn't get in anyway, so
stay home." 'x
Two of Nightingale's stepbrothers were prominent in District 50
at the time
Edward C Schnell was president of the local and Donald Schnell
was chief steward
Each signed the contract executed on July 13, 1946, as mem-
ber of the negotiating committee.
Nightingale testified that this relationship
was known to General Manager Russ since he had applied to Russ successfully
for the employment of each of his stepbrothers by the Respondent
Under date of May 9, 1946, Nightingale was laid off, and in effect, discharged,
in a letter dictated by President John J Russ and signed by Works Manager
Fred W Russ The letter reads as follows,
Mr. JOHN NIGHTINGALE,
222 Zimmerman St.
North Tonmwanda, N. Y.
DEAR JOHN :
I am enclosing a check for the balance of your April pay and also a check
to cover pay from May 1st to May 15th Am sorry to have to inform you that
we will not be able to use an Assistant Foreman in our Finishing Depart-
ment in the future, as our business before the strike was just about cut in
16 Cf
Montgomery Hardwood Flooring Co, The, where the Board held that failure to
give employment to two employees who the Gmplover had discovered were employed in a
neighboring mill was nondiscriminatory .
72 N L R . B 113. Issued January 15, 1947
19 L R. R. 1144
17 The facts stated as to Nightingale's service are drawn from his testimony which lacks
precision as to dates and periods
18 F W. Russ corroborated the statement that all supervisors were advised to stay home.
926
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
half in comparison with our business through the war period, and we expect,
of course, the strike will cut it considerably more, and I therefore will
have to lay you off as of May 9th.
I thought it would be best for us to give you this advance notice so
you could make application for your Unemployment Insurance, commencing
after May 15th.
I am sorry to have to do this, but I think you, yourself, realize there will
not be work for two foremen in our finishing department, with probably less
than one third of the business done through the war.
-
Again, would like to say that I am very sorry that I have to do this, and
any references you may need, I will be pleased to make them for you.
On receipt of this letter Nightingale called at the home of President Russ where,
under stress of strike conditions, the plant's business was being transacted
On
inquiry he was told that he was the only supervisor laid off
He requested a
couple of letters of recommendation and was promised that they would be pre-
pared and sent to him as soon as Russ' daughter, who was carrying on the Re-
spondent's clerical work, was available
About a week later, not having received
them, Nightingale again called at the John J. Russ' home. On this occasion he
talked with Fred Russ who assured him that they would be prepared and sent
through the mails.
At the (late of the hearing he had not received them.
Re-
spondent explains, through the testimony of Fred Russ, that failure to prepare
and send the letters is purely an oversight.
Russ further testified that he had
received no inquiries from other employei s relative to Nightingale.
At the time Nightingale became assistant foreman the finishing department
had about 50 employees. It reached the highest point of 59 in the fall of 1943.
Just prior to the strike it had about 30 employees 3
Works Manager Fred W.
Russ testified that the decision to lay off Nightingale had been made by himself
and his father, Respondent's president, John J. Russ, as a result of conversations
during the strike in which they discussed the possibility of introducing economies
in their operations.
While the finishing department was the largest in point of
employees, operations there were few and simple consisting of smoothing the
sides of grinding wheels and edging them to correct irregularities in the diame-
ters'"
Russ and his father consulted Foreman Goerss and were assured by him
that he could handle the department without an assistant foreman.
Russ criti-
cized Nightingale's performance as follows,
I don't think he [Nightingale] ever gave instructions.
The majority of the
times when there was any instructions given he usually took another man-
that is, if there was a new man hired, he took a new man off of another
machine and had him break him in.
I think it was mentioned to the foreman at the time, saying if an assistant
foreman couldn't break a man in or put his time in, he would have to take
"Works Manager Russ so testified after consultation of Respondent 's records.
"F W. Russ gave the following ciedited testimony relative to the character of the
work in the finishing department:
Well, .
In
the other [departments] there is the manufacture of the article,
what goes into ]he article.
Here is just the finishing of the article
After a man is
broke in, he just woiks on the machine and lie can accoidingly carry on all day long
practically without any-just the foreman has to lay out the work for him and be
there for airy questions he may ask
Otheiwise the men go along all day long pos-
sibly without the foreman ever talking to them some days
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
927
another man off another machine, we didn't see that we required the assist-
ant toreman there.
Russ testified that neither he nor his father had mentioned these criticisms to
Nightingale.
The Board contends that Nightingale's termination was motivated by his pre-
vious activity in District 50, and by his close relationship to the President of the
Local and its chief steward. It emphasizes the admitted facts that no other
supervisory employee was terminated and that the finishing department had
more employees than any other. The undersigned notes that Nightingale's activ-
ity in District 50 had ceased approximately 4 years before his termination.
Be-
yond a nominal honorary membership he had had no connection with District 50
during this period.
During this time he had retained his supervisory status and
salary.
Works Manager Fred Russ denied that he was aware that the Schnells
were stepbrothers of Nightingale 21
The undersigned credits this denial
The
Board contends that such knowledge is proven by the requests Nightingale made
of Rnss for the hiring of his stepbrothers. Such applications had been made
6 and 10 years earlier, respectively.
Russ testified at length and displayed a
faulty memory on details similarly remote, concerning matters of importance
to Respondent's contentions.
To find that the decision to terminate Nightingale
was affected by that relationship requires an inference fetched from far in face
of the fact that both Edward C. Schnell, presiddnt of the local and Donald Schnell,
its chief steward, were reinstated after the strike, were still employed at the
time of the hearing and had suffered no discrimination because of their participa-
tion therein.
Works Manager Russ insisted in his testimony that the fall in the burdens on
supervisors resulting from the decline in the number of employees in the finishing
department from the high point of 59 to 30 or 31 just prior to the strike justifies
the statements made in Respondent's letter laying off Nightingale. It was his
testimony that the letter stated the basis of the lay-off accurately and fully and
that the decision to terminate Nightingale was based on legitimate business
reasons.
After consideration of the full record and the demeanor of the witnesses in-
volved, the undersigned concludes and finds that the Board has not proven that
Nightingale's termination was in any degree affected by his union activities or
that of his stepbrothers.
There is no direct evidence in the record to support
such a finding.
The Respondent has full control of discharges unless such dis-
crnrnnation is proven. It will accordingly be recommended that so much of the
amended complaint as alleges that John Nightingale was discriminatorily dis-
charged be dismissed.
D The refusal to bargain collectively
1. The appropriate unit and District 50's majority status therein
There is no dispute as to the definition of the appropriate unit. The complaint
states that all production and maintenance employees employed at Respondent's
"Russ was asked whether lie recalled Nightingale's applying to him for jobs for his
stepbrothers
He replied,
No, I can't recall a thing of it. I can't deny that he didn't; but I don't have any
recollection of his ever making the request or stating that they were brothers
At this time Russ reaffirmed that lie had not known at the time Nightingale was termi-
nated that lie was related in any way to the Schnell brothers
928
DECISIONS
OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plant excluding watchmen, office and clerical employees, confidential employees,
chemists, salaried employees, assistant foremen, foremen, and all other super-
visory employees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline or other-
wise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such
action, constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining.
This is substantially the unit for which the-Respondent recognized District 50
as statutory representative in the contracts executed in 1944 and on July 13,
1946.
At the hearing the Respondent stated that it did not question its appro-
priateness under the Act.
The undersigned finds that it is an appropriate unit
within the meaning of Section 9 subdivision (b) of the Act.
As stated above, District 50 won an election held on January 17, 1946, under
the provisions of a consent election agreement and was certified on January 24,
1946, as the statutory representative of the employees in the above-defined unit.
The Respondent accepted the results of the election ; recognized District 50
'thereafter as the statutory representative and on July 13, 1946, executed a collec-
tive bargaining agreement with District 50. It raised no question at the hearing
in the instant proceeding as to the validity of this election and certification.
Ac-
cordingly, the undersigned finds that District 50 has at all times since January 17,
1946, been the statutory representative of the employees within the above-defined
appropriate unit.
2. The refusal to bargain
The Board makes four contentions which it asserts constitute refusal to
bargain:
(a) That the Respondent after July 15, 1946, withdrew, by unilateral action,
the privilege of using its telephone for District 50 business ;
(b) That on July 15, 1946, and thereafter, the Respondent unilaterally with-
drew the afternoon lunch or rest period of 15 minutes and also wash-up time
previously taken at the end of shifts ;
(c) That on or about August 15, 1946, the Respondent demanded that District
50 discuss grievances at a location unreasonably distant from the plant; and
(d) That the Respondent on or about October 21, 1946, refused to provide
District 50 with information with respect to rates of pay of employees essential
to the intelligent and effective representation of the employees
These four contentions are discussed seriatim below :
(a) It is admitted, that Respondent on July 15, 1946, when the plant reopened
after the strike, enforced a rule that employees would not be called to the phone
for any matters, whether or not union business was involved
Prior to this date,
Angelo P. Taibi, representative of record for District 50 in this proceeding, had
been accustomed to telephone the plant and have employee Edward C. Schnell,
president of the local, and chairman of the grievance committee, called to the
telephone, at any time that he had District 50 business to discuss.
After the
strike settlement, Taibi was told by the switchboard operator and by Personnel
Manager Hemingway that he could not communicate directly with Schnell over
Respondent's phone during work time.
Hemingway, however, transmitted Taibi's
messages to Schnell on request.
Schnell also protested to his foreman after being
refused permission to telephone Taibi on Respondent's telephone in work time.
After consultation with Works Manager Russ, his foreman reported, as Schnell
testified, "I am sorry but we cannot let you use the telephone for anything
regardless of whether it is union business or anything else."
Works Manager Russ gave the following explanation in his testimony relative
to conditions which caused the Respondent to formulate this rule,
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
929
Well, I didn't take any of the calls or transfer them myself, but I under-
stood from the switchboard operator that it had been the general practice
previously, and it got to the point where there were so many employees being
called to the phone . . . for all their, own personal business, that our trunks
were so crowded we were getting complaint from customers and distributors
and agents that every time they called long distance they couldn't get any
connection.
The switchboard operator has been instructed when that rule was put in
that she would take any message and have it delivered for any employee in
the plant.
Russ further gave credited testimony that provision was made for employees to
use the telephone in case of emergency
After consideration of the full record the undersigned finds no merit in this
contention of the Board. In a decision which is decisive of this issue, the Board
stated : "The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and
enforcing reasonable rules concerning the conduct of employees on company
time.
Working time is for work " 22 Insistence that employees' work not be
interrupted by telephone calls the undersigned finds to be such a reasonable
rule covering the conduct of employees during the time compensated for by
wages received.
(b) Rest periods of 15 minutes in each half day were established in June 1944
Edward C Schnell, president of the local, testified concerning conditions prior
to that date, as follows :
The employees used to eat at anytime they desired, morning and afternoon
and some went so far as to lunch three or four times in a half a day; so
they called the Union Committee in.
The Committee suggested that lunch or rest periods be established
As Schnell
testified, the committee suggested, "if they (lid that, that would be a chance for
them to discharge or set up some sort of rules whereby anybody that lunched
outside of those periods would be taken care of."
After consideration, Works
Manager F W Russ adopted this suggestion and under date of July 31, 1944,
promulgated a notice to the employees which provided,
There shall be a morning lunch period from 9: 15 a in to 9: 30 a in. and an
afternoon lunch period from 2: 45 p. in. to 3: 00 p in. for all employees,
except in a few cases where the foreman may designate a different period.
Smoking is permitted during these periods in places designated by State
Smoking Permits only. Signals will be sounded at beginning and end of
periods with a 3 minute warning signal before the end of the period. All
employees are to be at their working station when the final signal'sounds.
Both Tatbi and Schnell testified, and the undersigned finds, that the Respond-
ent's representatives brought up the question of dropping the afternoon lunch
period at either the first or second conference held in February 1946. The Union
representatives replied that they would talk it over and have further discussions
regarding it
However, the matter never came up for further discussion.
Howard Schank, counsel of record for the Respondent in this proceeding,
who had represented it in bargaining conferences with District 50 since con-
tractual relations had been established in 1942, testified that the elimination of
2 -"See Matter of Peyton Packing Co , Inc, 49 N. L R B. 828, 843; enf'd 142 F
(2d) 1009
(C C. A. 5) ; cert. denied , 323 U. S 730.
930
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the afternoon rest period had been discussed in conference on March 5 and 8,
1946
His pertinent testimony is recorded as follows,
The matter was first discussed at the second negotiations meeting between
the company and the Union which.was on March 5th. The matter was fleet
brought up after receipt of the Union demands on a new agreement. The
company made a counterproposal concerning wages, and one of the counter-
proposals was that the afternoon lunch period be discontinued in view of
the fact that there remained apparently only an hour or an hour and a
quarter after the expiration of the afternoon lunch period until the time the
men went home . . and that same day when the Union came back with
a counterproposal listed among their couuterpropositions, was a proposition
that the afternoon lunch period be discontinued; that it was satisfactory
to them.
*
The very same thing happened on the 8th of March.
We made a series of
counterproposals among which was one that the afternoon lunch period be
discontinued, and the Union came back with a set of counterproposals and
made a like offer.
Schank further testified that, according to his best recollection, District 50 did
not later "discuss or refer in any manner whatsoever to the afternoon rest period."
The Board made no attempt to rebut this testimony It is credited by the under-
signed.
When the plant reopened on July 15, 1946, the Respondent had posted new
rules which eliminated the afternoon lunch period. The rule as changed further
stated : "Lunching and the use of the milk and candy machines is to be limited
to the above designated period and the regular noon day lunch period "
The right to wash-up time at the end of shifts had never been formally recog-
nized.
Rules posted by the Respondent on July 1, 1942, provided miter ales, "Em-
ployees shall not quit work until the quitting signal sounds at noon and night.
Hereafter, any one so doing will be docked for the time lost
These rules were
definitely accepted by District 50 in an agreement reached on July 27, 1944, in
settlement of a brief strike 23
The employees generally, and those in the lathe
room in particular, opposed a notice posted there which forbade leaving the
lathes to visit and talk to other employees. The agreement signed by Russ and
by a representative of District 50 and six representatives of Local 12419, pro-
vided that the notice posted in the lathe room should be removed ; and that copies
of the Shop Rules of July 1, 1942, should be posted in all departments. The final
paragraph of the agreement reads,
The Union will give its full cooperation in the company's enforcement of the
rules as set forth in such notice of July 1, 1942, and such other rules as the
company may establish from time to time
However, this rule was not enforced. The practice grew up and was tolerated
by the Respondent of employees leaving their work places to wash up 5 or more
minutes before the quitting bell rang
Work in the manufacture of grinding
wheels is dirty and washing up is necessary before donning street clothes. It is
2J Edward Schnell and Russ gave credited testimony, which is in substantial agreement,
covering these events in July 1944.
Russ testified as to the agreement,
This covers an agreement made at the time of a walkout of the employees in objection
to a notice that was posted in one department, and this was agreed to and signed by
the Union upon removal of the notice in one department that they would agree to
cooperate in the company's enforcement of the rules as set forth in July 1942.
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
931
in evidence that the number of wash basins was limited and pressure on this
facility was great at the close of the shift.
Moreover, the making of a wheel
is a somewhat lengthy process and once begun must be finished before the em-
ployees are free to leave In consequence, the employees were accustomed to
cease work at any time before the quitting bell when they felt that the remaining
time was insufficient to allow them to finish a wheel of the size and type under
manufacture."
It is clear from the record that the loss of time from this
practice was substantial
For the most part, the employees were paid on time
rates
This matter was not discussed during the bargaining conference.
How-
ever, the rules posted on July 15 1946, declared,
Employees shall not quit work or wash up or otherwise prepare for leaving
the plant until the quitting signal sounds at noon and night.
Anyone so
doing will be docked at least 15 minutes.
The attention of the employees was pointedly called to the new rules and they
were warned that it was the intention of the Respondent to enforce them
rigidly 25
Works Manager Russ explained that the reason for allowing the practice of
quitting early to wash up during the war years was because "we had to over-
look a good many things to keep production up.
We were all working toward
the war effort "
He further testified that it was done "in order to hold your
men. It was a hard time to get men."
The elimination of the afternoon rest period and of wash-up time were each
made the subject of a formal grievance submitted to the Respondent.
These are
dated July 24 and July 25, 1946, respectively.
At the time of the hearing these
grievances had not gone through the full grievance procedure
Edward C.
Schnell, who was both president of the local and chairman of its grievance
committee, testified that it was the intention of District 50, both when their
grievances were filed and at the date of the hearing, to follow through-to
arbitration.
The Respondent, by its president, John J. Russ, under (late of August 1, 1946,
replied to District 50's written statements of these grievances.
This answer
was in the following terms :
Attention : Edward Schnell, President
Gentlemen of the Grievance Committee
Your two Grievances, one regarding wash up period and the other re-
garding afternoon lunch period have been referred to me, and I want to
reply as follows :
The lunch period was given voluntarily by management of this Company
for the reason of the longer hours worked during the was period
As we
are now working three and one half hours in the afternoon, I feel that no
lunch period is necessary.
In regard to the wash up period which management never has granted.
You state we took this away from you, and I wish to refer you to para-
graphs of notice put up in 1942 and again in 1944, and in the 1944, signed
by your Regional Director and the entire Committee of the Union.
These paragraphs read as follows :
24 Works Manager Russ testified that the wheel manufactured varied in weight from 2
grams to 450 pounds
s5 Russ testified that the rules were explained to the supervisors who were told Re-
spondent "wanted the rules lived up to and if the men couldn 't abide by the rules, we
would have to dischaige them."
7 6 6 9 7 2-1 8---vol 75
60
932
DECISIONS
OF NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
"Each employee shall report for work on time and be ready for work at
his station at starting time
Employees shall not quit work until the
quitting signal sounds at noon and night.
Hereafter, anyone so doing will
be docked for the time lost."
"The union will give it's full co-operation in the Company's enforcement
of the rules as set forth in such notice of July 1, 1942 and such other rules
as the company may establish from time to time."
This still stands and we hope that we have your co-operation as you agreed
to give in this notice, which you signed, I think in good faith.
Hoping for your kind co-operation, I am
Respondent calls attention to the fact that hours of work had been shortened
from 9 to 8 per day. This change became effective with V-J Day, August 14,
1945
Works Manager Russ explained the delay in moving to eliminate the
wash-up and afternoon rest period as due to the delicate situation created by
the rivalry between District 50 and the C I 0
As stated above, this situation
was not cleared up until January 24, 1946. Thereafter ensued the bargaining
conferences and a strike on April 18, 1946. As Russ testified :
Well, this was just about the time when our contract was expiring and
we had two unions who had filed as bargaining representatives, so I thought
it was very poor policy at that time to make any change of that type. One
union would probably just use it as an electioneering point.
Under the shortened hours, the afternoon rest or lunch period fell within
an hour of 4 o'clock, the closing time.-' If wash-up time were also taken, the
final period of work would be correspondingly shorter. Further, the Respondent
stresses the substantial wage increase of 181/! cents an hour granted in the strike
settlement.
This materially increased the burden of deductions from the fuil
work time paid for
Russ gave the following testimony regarding the motives
which caused the Respondent to discontinue the afternoon rest period and to
eliminate the practice of employees using working time to wash lip:
The change was made after we had gone into this new contract on 18r/
cents increase and felt that the wage increase was such that we would
have to start to get some production out and cut down on lost time.
We
couldn't afford to be paying these high wages and them quitting work from
5 minutes to a half hour ahead of time.
Q Now, it has been suggested-and that is an understatement-that we
discontinued the lunch period and the wash up period because of the fact
that these employees participated in this strike.
A. No, there was no grounds for that at all. It was based entirely, I would
say, on our higher labor costs.
The undersigned concludes and finds that District 50 had accepted and on
July 27, 1944, definitely bound itself to assist in enforcing Respondent's rule
against quitting work before the end of working hours. Temporary laxness in
enforcing the rule under stress of war conditions did not abrogate the rules.
It must be remembered in this connection that District 50's contract lapsed on
November 21, 1945, and that District 50 twice failed to show a majority status
in secret Board-conducted elections.
When bargaining began after District
50 was certified by the Board on January 24, 1946, the parties bargained de nova.
re Some 18 employees in the mixing department who began a half hour earlier than
other employees quit at 3: 30 p. m
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
933
The elimination of the afternoon rest period after hours had been shortened was
per se a reasonable regulation as defined by the Board in its Peyton Packing
Company decision referred to above.
Respondent had definitely raised the ques-
tion of such change in hours of work during the bargaining conference which
resulted in the agreement signed on July 13, 1946. It will be remembered that
the previous collective bargaining agreement lapsed by its provisions on November
21, 1945.
The new contract makes no mention of rest periods." It is an extensive
and detailed document with comprehensive provisions as to work hours. The
undersigned finds that the provisions incorporated in this agreement must be
understood to comprehend all contractual obligations on this subject assumed
by the Respondent.
Further, it is found that District 50 by initiating grievance procedure, under
the provisions established by that document, in effect accepted Respondent's
regulations subject to District 50's rights under this grievance procedure.
The
record contains no direct evidence to support the Board's allegation that these
changes were made "for the reason that a majority of said employees joined
and assisted the Union and engaged in concerted activities with other employees
for the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection."
Rather the record indicates that the Respondent was motivated by a desire to
make full use of the working time which it had agreed to remunerate at a sub-
stantially increased hourly rate.
The undersigned notes that District ^50 is in the position of seeking a remedy
for these matters at the same time through the grievance procedure which culmi-
nates in arbitration and through the Board's processes
The charge was filed on
July 19, 1946, and District 50 entered grievances on July 24 and 25 respectively.
Under analogous circumstances the Board has recently said,
It is evident that the Union has concurrently -utilized two forums for the
purpose of litigating the matter here in dispute
Although the arbitrator
determined the issues before him within the framework of the 1943 agreement
and expressly refrained from prejudicing the rights of either party before
the Board, it would not comport with the sound exercise of our administra-
tive discretion to permit the Union to seek redress under the Act after having
initiated arbitration proceedings which, at the Union's request, resulted
in a determination on the merits.' In the interest of ending litigation and
otherwise effectuating the policies of the Act, we shall dismiss that portion
of the complaint relating to the respondent's refusal to bargain as to the
Employee's Manual
2 We do not thereby imply that the determination of an arbitrator is binding on
the Board.
Section 10 (a) of the Act provides that the power of the Board to prevent
unfirir labor practices affecting commerce shall be exclusive and shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has or may be established by
agreement. code. law, or otherwise
[Citing cases 1
Moved by the considerations above stated and in conformity to this pronounce-
ment of the Board the undersigned finds no merit in this allegation of the coin-
27 Respondent in its brief places emphasis on the inclusion in the Management Clause
of the following provisions , quoting in part only,
Subject to the provisions of this Agreement , the management and operation of the
plant and direction of the working forces .
to make and enforce reasonable
rules to promote safety, efficiency, order, discipline, and protection of the Company
property from sabotage or other sources are vested in the Company .
[ Italics added 1
"Matter of ,The Timken Roller Bearing Co , 70 N . L R. B. 500.
934
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
plaint.
It will accordingly be recommended that so much of the complaint as
alleged that elimination of the afternoon lunch or rest pei iod constituted refusal
to bargain collectively or that it amounted to discrimination in the hire or
tenure or the terms and conditions of employment, be dismissed
(c) Conferences on grievances which had reached the thud stage in the estab-
lished procedure had been held but rarely
Schnell, whose service with the
Respondent antedated contractual relations between District 50 and the Respond-
ent, testified that he could remember but one such conference
Works Manager
Russ corroborated this statement, testifying, "I think there was only one that
was taken up to the last step . . . I don't know whether there was a meeting
which was called for the third step or not."
From the lapse of the 1945 contract
on November 21, 1945, to the execution of a new agreement on July 13, 1946,
no grievance conference had been held
By August 15, 1946, over a dozen griev-
ances were advanced to the third stage.
The proposed conference required the
attendance of the full grievance committee of five members.
Schank gave unassailed and credited testimony relative to this matter recorded
as follows,
Mr. Taibi some time before the 15th of August had asked me if we would
arrange for a third step grievance meeting; that there were a goodly number
of them that had to be disposed of.
My recollection is that I told him that I
would take it up with the company and see just when we could get together
and where, and on my best recollection, as in the complaint, it was on the
15th of August that Mr Taibi called me or I called hint.
After I had talked
the matter over with the company and at that time I suggested that after
having talked with the company that the meeting be held at the Lafayette
Hotel [Buffalo].
Mr Taibi said, "Well, that is all right with me, but how
about the question of lost time?" "Well," I said, "Angelo, I have also talked
with the company on that, and there will be no payment for lost time"
There was some talk about having it at night, but nobody wanted to have
the meeting at night, I think Mr Taibi nor myself, nor anybody else con-
cerned.
Mr, Taibi at that time said, "Well, if the company isn't going to pay
for the time lost, we shall not have the meeting at the Lafayette Hotel
Schnell estimated that preparation for the trip to Buffalo and return therefrom
with the transaction of the business in hand would require an entire day.
Schank and Works Manager Russ agreed in testifying, that the original sug-
gestion as to this meeting place came from the Respondent.
Russ explained
that it had been customary to hold grievance conferences in the plant cafeteria.
This was contiguous to the office.
Russ further testified,
,
But I say it was interfering too much with the rest of the office, the talk,
when the men would go out of the cafeteria out into the hall. It was dis-
turbing the rest of the office.
At the hearing in this proceeding, the Respondent reaffirmed its refusal to
pay the committee members for time lost in attendance on third stage griev-
ance conferences.
However, Respondent's counsel further stated that its rep-
resentatives would be willing to meet District 50 representatives on Respondent's
property at any time mutually convenient to discuss grievances advanced to the
third stage of the established procedure.
The undersigned concludes and finds that the Respondent's proposal that
third step grievance conferences be held in Buffalo was manifestly unreasonable-
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
935
and amounted to a refusal to bargain collectively in these matters under the
procedure established in the contract executed on July 13, 1946.
(d) It has been customary for the Respondent to grant merit increases on an
individual basis within the wage system established by its agreement with Dis-
trict 50.
During the bargaining conference certain employees informed their
representatives that they were unjustly treated in that they were receiving
less pay than other employees doing the same work
Taibi then requested that
information "of various wage rates and classifications" be given District 50,
"so that we could more or less screen certain cases in the plant and try to eliminate
certain grievances that existed." It was Taibi's further testimony that District
50 did not press the matter since its representatives felt that they could gather
adequate information themselves
Respondent's representatives at the time
suggested that District 50 could take up individual adjustments of wages through
the grievance procedure
Nine such grievances were filed by District 50 on
dates between July 29 and September 18. 1946 30
On October 15, 1946, Taibr addressed a letter to Works Manager Russ reading
as follows :
On behalf of our Local Union, we are requesting that you make available
to us a list of names of the employees in your plant and their present in-
dividual rates of pay.
We would also appreciate having the information on
the rates of pay that these same individuals received in October 1945.
Please understand that this information is necessary to us in order that
we may intelligently represent our people, and properly carry out the work
on behalf of the Local Union.
In addition, we would appreciate being advised by you when any individual
wage adjustments are given by Management to any member of our Union.
Trusting that you will send this information as soon as possible, I am . . .
On October 21, 194(;, Ross acknowledged receipt of this letter and advised that
the matter had been referred to Respondent's attorney
At the lieaiing, Re-
spondent stated that it did not comply with this request at any time.
Works
Manager Russ testified that on receipt of the letter from District 50 it was decided
as "a matter of polieN . . that we couldn't open up our books to the Union giving
them this information *1
Shank testified that after the matter was referred
to him in conversation with Taibi he had stated "we could not give him that
list at this time, as far as the individual rates of employees wei e concerned "
Respondent in its brief ai gued in effect that District 50 by withdrawing its
demand for this information during the bargaining conference is estopped from
renewing the request later
Respondent admits ui quendo that District 50 might
have been entitled to this information while a contract was being negotiated.
Howes er. if such a demand was withdrawn because of concessions made by the
Respondent such withdrawal should be effective during the life of the contract.
The record does not sustain this argument in that no Showing is made that
such a trade was made
Rather District 50 withdrew the demand in reliance
on its ability to gather the information from its members
20 See Matter of Atlas Steel t Tube Co ., 68 N L R. B 868
Cf Matter of P. Lorillard
Co , 66 N L. R B 615
11 Six were filed on July 29 ; another on August 12 , and two on September 18, 1946.
936
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Board held in the Aluminum One Covi.pan J case' that the Respondent's
refusal to furnish the Union job classifications and pay-roll information con-
stituted a refusal to bargain
The Board said,
Even if it were conceded , as the respondent contends, that the Union could
actually have secured the wage history of all the jobs in the unit from
the employees themselves , such a prospect at the time of the respondent's
refusal of that information must have seemed doubtful and certainly attended
with great difficulty and loss of,time. In this situation , an employer bar-
gaining in good faith would not have withheld the information requested,
nor would the employees be privileged against its disclosure since the infor-
mation is essential to the intelligent bargaining on their behalf required
by the Act
Upon these considerations , we are of the opinion , as was the
Trial Examiner, that the respondent's refusal to disclose the information
sought by the Union , and its failure thereby to clarify its incomplete state-
ment of position as to the wage matters under discussions , were inconsistent
with the principle of collective bargaining and served to promote controversy
rather than to encourage agreement.
This decision was sustained on this issue on appeal to the United States Circuit
Court: 32
The Court said:
Again we do not believe that it was the intent of Congiess in this legislation
that, in the collective bargaining prescribed , the union , as representative of the
employees , should be deprived of the pertinent facts constituting the wage
history of its members
We can conceive of no justification for a claim
that such information is confidential .
Rather it seems to go to the very root
of the facts upon which the merits were to be resolved In determining
what employees should receive increases and in what amounts , it could have
been only helpful to have before the bargainers the wage history of the
various employees , including full information as to the work done by the
respective employees and as to their respective wages in the past, their re-
spective increases from time to time, and all other facts bearing upon what
constituted fair wages and fair increases .
And if there be any reasonable
basis for the contention that this may have been confidential data of the
employer before the passage of the Act , it seems to us it cannot be so held
in the face of the expressed social and economic purposes of the statute.
Peti-
tioner announced the increases it would bd willing to make but it refused to
supply the wage history.
From this refusal, we think the Board was justi-
fied in concluding that petitioner had failed to cooperate wholeheartedly in
collective bargaining.
The undersigned finds these principles decisive of the instant issue. It will be
noted that Taibi made his request for specified information after District 50 had
presented nine grievances to the Respondent material to his request.
The infor-
mation requested was'mamfestly pertinent to enable the Union representatives
to appraise intelligently these grievances and present them effectively before the
Respondent.
The information requested was in the possession of the Respondent
and could have been assembled easily by it.
While the Respondent admits that
3139 N. L. R. B 1286 at 1297. Cf Matter of J H. Allsoni if Company, 70 N L. R B.
377, issued August 26, 1946 in which the Board found refusal to bargain in a refusal
of the employer to furnish the union information on merit increases during the contract
period
Such information the Board stated was "necessary to the Union in oider for it
adequately to represent the employees on the subject of merit increases
32 Alnnimnant Ore Co. v. N. L. R. B., 131 F. (2d) 485 at 487 (C C A 7).
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
937
it failed to furnish the information requested, it did not at the hearing advance
any convincing explanation or defense for such failure
Under these conditions
the undersigned finds merit in this contention of the Board, and concludes as
stated by the Board under closely similar circumstances, that such refusal by the
]Respondent was "inconsistent with the principle of collective bargaining"
By demanding that the representatives of District 50 meet for the discussion
of grievances at a point distant from Respondent's plant, and by failing to furnish
information essential to the intelligent consideration of grievances as to individual
wage rates, the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively within the meaning
of Section S (5) of the Act.
By these acts it has interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of
the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The actin iiies of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring
in connection with the operations described in Section I, above, have a close,
intimate. and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the
several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor prac-
tices, the undersigned will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain of i niative action found necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.
The undersigned has found that on August 15 and October 21, 1946, the Re-
spondent refused to bargain collectively with District 50 as the exclusive
representative of the Respondent's employees within an appropriate bargain-
ing unit, although District 50 on these dates was the statutory representative
of the employees for the purposes of collective bargaining It will accordingly
be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to bargain collectively with
District 50
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record
in the case, the undersigned makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAw
1 District 50, United Mine Workers of America, Local 12419, affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor, is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2 (5) of the Act
2
All production and maintenance employees of the Respondent, excluding
watchmen, office and clerical employees. confidential employees, chemists, sal-
aried employees, assistant foremen, foremen, and all other supervisory em-
ployees with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise
effect changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such action,
constitute an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9 (h) of the Act
3
District 50, United Aline Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L.,
on January 17, 1946, and at all times thereafter, has been the exclusive repre-
sentative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, hours, wages, or other conditions of
employment, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.
938
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
4 By refusing to bargain collectively with District 50, on August 15 and
October 21, 1946, as the exclusive representative of it' employees in the above-
described unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor
practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act
5
By such refusal the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and co-
ereed its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, and has thereby engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act.
6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
ccmmerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act
7. The Respondent has not committed unfair labor practices by discharging or
refusing to reinstate Gerard Davignon, Earl Heubuscli and Eugene Clench on
or about July 15, 1946, nor by discharging John Nightingale on May 9, nor by
eliminating wash-up and lunch periods on July 15, 1946.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the under-
signed recommends that the Respondent, National Grinding Wheel Company,
Inc , its officers, agents, successors, officials, and assigns shall:
1 Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with District 50, United Aline Workers
of America, Local 12419, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all its
production and maintenance employees employed at its plant, excluding watch-
men, office and clerical employees, confidential employees, chemists, salaried
employees, assistant foremen, foremen, and all other supervisory employees with
authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline or otherwise effect changes in
the status of employees or effectively recommend such action with respect to
meeting for conferences on grievances at convenient times and locations and
furnishing information to District 50 in regard to pay sates and changes and
adjustments therein ;
(b) Any other acts in any manner interfering with the efforts of District 50,
United Aline Workers of America, Local 12419, A. F of L., to negotiate on behalf
of the Respondent's employees in the appropriate unit.
2 Take the following affirmative action with the undersigned finds will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Upon request meet with representatives of District 50, at some convenient
location in North Tonawanda, New York, for the discussion of grievances which
have advanced to the third stage of the established grievance procedure ;
(b) Upon request furnish District 50 with information in regard to pay rates
and changes and adjustments therein such as will enable District 50 to discharge
its functions as a statutory representative of the employees within the defined
appropriate unit;
(c) Post immediately at its plant at North Tonawanda, New York, copies of
the notice attached hereto and marked "Appendix A " Copies of said notice, to be
furnished by the Regional Director for the Third Region (Buffalo, New York),
shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Re-
spondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60)
consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted
Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent, to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material ;
NATIONAL GRINDING WHEEL COMPANY, INC.
939
(d) Notify the Regional Director for the Third Region in writing within ten
(10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report and Recommendations,
what steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith
It is recommended that so much of the complaint as alleged the discriminatory
discharge and refusal to rehire Gerard Davignon, Earl Heubusch, and Eugene
Clench the discriminatory discharge of John Nightingale, and the elimination of
wash-up and lunch periods, constitute unfair labor practices, be dismissed
It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) days from the
receipt of this Intermediate Report the Respondent notifies said Regional Director
in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National
Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respondent to take the
action aforesaid.
As provided in Section 203 39 of the Rules and Regulations of the National
Labor Relations Board, Series 4, effective September 11, 1946, any party or
counsel for the Board may, within fifteen (15) days from the date of service of
the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203 38 of said
Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rocharnbeau Building, Washington
25, D G, an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such
exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or pro-
ceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon,
together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof ; and
any party or counsel for the Board, may, within the same period, file an original
and four copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Immediately
upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party or counsel
for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other
parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director.
Proof of service on
the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as
required by Section 203 65.
As further provided in said Section 203 39, request
therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the
date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board.
CHARLES E PERSONS,
Trial Examiner.
Dated February 25, 1947.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that
WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of DISTRICT 50, UNITED
MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 12419, A. F. OF L, to bargain collectively
with us.
WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above-named union
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit de-
scribed herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment or other
conditions of employment, will meet with this Union for the consideration
of grievances at reasonable times and places in North Tonawanda and will
furnish such pay-roll and wage data as will enable the representatives to intel-
ligently and effectively represent the employees.
The bargaining unit is:
940
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All production and maintenance employees, excluding watchmen, office
and clerical employees, confidential employees, chemists,
salaried em-
ployees, assistant foremen, foremen, and all other supervisory employees
with authority to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect
changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such action.
NATIONAL GRINDING WIIEEL COMPANY, INC,
Employer.
Dated --------------------
By ----
-------------------------------
(Representative )
( Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must
not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.