Patrick & Co.

390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Patrick & Company and Department Store Employ- ees Union, Local 1100, United Food and Com- mercial Workers International, AFL-CIO.' Case 20-CA-145 10 March 12, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELLO On November 20, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapiro issued the attached Deci- sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a motion for reconsideration of the Board's refusal to accept its brief in support of its exceptions.2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,3 and conclu- sions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Patrick & Company, San Francisco, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. The name of the Charging Party, formerly Department Store Em- ployees Union, Local 1100, Retail Clerks International Union, AFL-CIO, is amended to reflect the change resulting from the merging of Retail Clerks International Union and Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butcher Workmen of North America on June 7. 1979. 2 In its exceptions, Respondent states that its brief in support of its ex- ceptions would be filed separately at a later date, "Pursuant to extension of time previously granted." Our administrative review of the matter shows that, although Respondent had been granted previous extensions of time to file both its exceptions and brief, it failed to file its brief within the time granted pursuant to its last request for an extension of time, and its request for an additional extension of time was denied. Respondent, therefore, is in error that its last request was granted. Thereafter, Respon- dent filed a motion for reconsideration of rejection of its brief in support of exceptions which, on February 7, 1980, was denied by direction of the Board as lacking in merit, pursuant to Sec. 102.46(a) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. 'Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibil- ity unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 248 NLRB No. 61 DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this case, which was held August 7, 1979, is based on an unfair labor practice charge filed by Depart- ment Store Employees Union, Local 1100, Retail Clerks International Union, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union, on April 2, 1979, and a complaint issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board on April 27, 1979, which was amended at the hearing and which, as amended, alleges that Patrick & Company, herein called the Respondent,t has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by refusing to bargain with the Union 2 "since on or about March 28, 1979, and continuing to date" as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's salespersons. Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record, from my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and having considered the oral argument of the General Counsel and Respondent, make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidence Respondent operates a retail store in San Francisco, California, where it sells office supplies. The Union has represented Respondent's salespersons for at least a quar- ter of a century and has entered into successive collec- tive-bargaining agreements with Respondent covering these employees. The most recent agreement was effec- tive from June 1, 1975, until May 31, 1978. Respondent's collective-bargaining agreements with the Union have been patterned after the Union's agree- ment with the major retail department stores in San Francisco: Macy's and The Emporium. The wage provi- sion for salespersons in the Union's retail department store contract and in its contracts with Respondent have been identical, except that the Union's retail department store contract provides for a I-percent sales commission for salespersons, whereas the Union's contract with Re- spondent has not included such a provision and Respon- dent does not in fact pay its salespersons a commission. The collective-bargaining negotiations between Re- spondent and the Union for a successor contract to take the place of the one which terminated May 31, 1978, were delayed because of a representation petition filed with the National Labor Relations Board seeking to de- certify the Union as the collective-bargaining representa- tive of Respondent's salespersons. In the meantime the Union had entered into a new retail department store The record establishes that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the Act and meets the National Labor Relations Board's applicable discretionary jurisdic- tional standard. Accordingly, I find it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdiction over this dispute. 2 The record establishes that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act. PATRICK & COMPANY 391 contract which, among other things, provides for a mini- mum hourly wage scale of $4.94 for salespersons who work more than 145 days as well as a I-percent commis- sion on sales. During the latter part of 1978, Respondent, at the Union's request, instituted this minimum pay scale for its salespersons inasmuch as Respondent and the Union realized that they could not negotiate the terms of a new contract while a decertification petition was pend- ing. The matter of the decertification petition was ulti- mately resolved in the Union's favor. An election was conducted by the Board on November 20, 1978, which the Union won. On January 18, 1979, the Union was cer- tified by the Board as the exclusive bargaining represen- tative for Respondent's salespersons. On March 28, 1979, representatives of Respondent and the Union met at the Union's office to negotiate the terms of a new collective-bargaining agreement. This was the parties' first negotiation meeting. Previously, the Union had furnished Respondent's president, James Pat- rick, and its attorney, Wesley Sizoo, with a complete contract proposal in writing. The proposal differed in significant respects from the terms of the collective-bar- gaining agreement entered into between the Union and the retail department stores. The provisions dealing with wages, pensions, and health and welfare which were in- corporated in the Union's contract proposal differed from the provisions encompassing these subjects con- tained in the Union's retail department store contract. Regarding wages, the Union was proposing that Respon- dent pay its salespersons a minimum hourly wage of $5.21 after 145 days of employment, whereas the Union's retail department store contract provided for a minimum hourly wage of $4.94 for these employees. The Union was represented at the March 28 negotia- tion meeting by its secretary-treasurer, Richard Williams, Business Representative Betsey Blom, and two employ- ees from the Company. Respondent was represented by President James Patrick, his administrative assistant, and Attorney Wesley Sizoo. The meeting lasted approximate- ly 15 minutes. Sizoo began the meeting by stating that Respondent had received the Union's proposed contract and had several question about it. He indicated that Re- spondent did not understand some of the classifications proposed by the Union and wanted an explanation for the Union's wage proposal insofar as it called for 27 cents an hour more than the wage provision included in the Union's retail department store contract. Williams re- quested that the negotiators consider the Union's con- tract proposal section by section. He stated that the union representatives would explain each section and answer Respondent's questions about each section. Pat- rick refused to do this. He stated Respondent wanted to discuss immediately the Union's wage proposal and asked why the Union was proposing that Respondent pay its salespersons 27 cents an hour more than the sales- persons who worked under the Union's retail department store contract. Williams answered that salespersons who worked under the terms of the Union's retail department store contract received a -percent sales commission in addition to their hourly rate of pay, that Respondent did not pay its salespersons a commission, so the Union was proposing a higher hourly rate of pay for Respondent's salespersons which would be identical to the general util- ity rate included in the retail department store contract. Patrick replied that Respondent was "absolutely firm" in refusing to pay its salespersons more than $4.94 an hour and asked whether the Union was "firm" in proposing an hourly rate of $5.21. Williams answered that the Union's proposal was a "serious one." Williams asked that the ne- gotiators consider the several sections of the Union's contract proposal to determine which sections were not in dispute, thus narrowing the issues. Patrick refused to do this. Patrick told Williams that "until we settle that 27 cents and get the $4.94 there is no use of us talking" and indicated that Respondent's representatives intended to leave. Williams asked Patrick to stay and discuss the other provisions contained in the Union's contract pro- posal. Patrick refused and left the room with Respon- dent's other representatives. 3 On April 2, 1979, the Union filed the unfair labor prac- tice charge in the instant case against Respondent alleg- ing that Respondent "has refused to bargain with [the Union]" in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On April 27, 1979, the complaint issued in this case, based on the Union's charge alleging that Respondent, since on or about March 28, 1979, had refused to bargain with the Union within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On May 22, 1979, Williams and Blom, on behalf of the Union, wrote Patrick as follows: We have reviewed your apparent adamant posi- tion on not being agreeable to instituting the De- partment Store General Utility rate in lieu of com- mission, with the members of the Union. They gra- ciously agreed to "live" with the general settlement of what had previously in wages been executed by you during the Decertification Election. We are enclosing a signed copy of the Macy set- tlement, along with a complete Agreement for your Store. You will readily see that we have removed "tons" of material which pertained to problems more "tuned" to department stores. Your father had previously signed the complete so-called "master Department Store Agreement" and you have dem- onstrated no interest in the contract we tried to settle with you. We, therefore, in the interest of both parties, are presenting a greatly modified con- tract which encompasses the basic provisions the Union has sought and settled upon with various em- ployers, along with your old contract language. The new provisions are as follows: (section num- bers listed are the signed Macy Agreement) 3 The description of what took place at the March 28 negotiation meetlig is based on the testimony of Wilhlams and Blont. ho mpressed me as credible witnesses In anser o leading questlions, Patrick estified that he Iold the Union', negotialor Ithat he was "absoluel firm" ahout his klage offer of 4 94 arid that the U[ion responded that its \i age pro- posal kka a firm" one This sua the elenl of his teslinmonl about the Mallhl 28 negotliation niceting I re.ject his leslmin l Il, inlofar as it indl- cate,\ Villiarn, stated that Ihe Ulllis 5 "age proposal \ia a "firm" one W'illi n. ho specifically denied making thii stalenllell. imlprecsed me is a more INIlst ortlh itl.ess,, PATRICK & COMPANY 391 392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The above improvements represent the changes in the Master Agreement 1978--1981, less the dele- tions. The Union is ready to meet as soon as you and your counsel have had an opportunity for review. Thereafter, Williams phoned Patrick and indicated he thought the Union's new proposal was a good one which should result in an agreement inasmuch as the Union had removed Respondent's biggest objection by changing its wage proposal. Williams stated he would be happy to meet with Patrick and settle the contract. Patrick replied he would negotiate if the Union would drop the unfair labor practice charge it had filed with the National Labor Relations Board which Patrick stated was a frivo- lous charge. Williams stated the Union would drop the charge only if Respondent would sign an agreement ex- tending the recently terminated contract for the period of the contract negotiations. Patrick would not agree to do this, at which point Williams stated in substance that he would have to give further consideration to Patrick's proposal. Williams consulted his superior about Patrick's propos- al that the Union withdraw the charge it had filed against Respondent with the Board as a condition for re- suming contract negotiations. The result was that, after apparently unsuccessfully trying to reach Patrick by phone, Williams and Blom on July 19 sent Patrick the following mailgram: Your last position with the Union was, if [we] withdraw our charges with the National Labor Re- lations Board, you will then sit down and bargain on the contract. The Union is quite willing to settle the contract, however, in order for us to accept your offer we want protection for our members--in writing-- which extends the old contract for the period of negotiations. I frankly am surprised that you did not sign the last proposal the Union sent to you because it removed the extra 27 cents per hour we were asking for. This delay is only denying Pat- rick employees important benefits that should have been effective months ago. We are awaiting your reply. On July 27, 1979, in answer to the Union's July 19 mailgram, Patrick phoned Williams and stated he was willing to start contract negotiations if the Union with- drew the charge against Respondent it had filed with the Board. Williams refused to do this, explaining to Patrick that before the Union would withdraw its charge Patrick would have to sign an agreement extending the terms of the recently terminated contract for the duration of the negotiations. Patrick answered that an extension agree- ment was unnecessary because he was continuing to live up to the terms of the recently terminated contract and offered to shake Williams' hand, in place of signing an extension agreement, to show his good faith. Williams stated Patrick's proposal was one-sided, that Patrick was asking the Union to withdraw its charge without conced- ing anything to the Union, and all the Union wanted was something in writing which would demonstrate Patrick's good faith. Patrick refused to sign the extension agree- ment and stated he was inclined "to go through this deal with the Board and run out the string, you know, it's going to take a long time." Williams acknowledged this but indicated he would not withdraw the charge without a signed extension agreement. B. Conclusionary Findings I am of the opinion that Respondent breached its bar- gaining obligation by conditioning the negotiation of the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement on the Union's acceptance of Respondent's wage proposal. As described supra, Respondent President James Pat- rick responded to the Union's initial contract proposal on March 28, 1979, by rejecting that part of the proposal which dealt with employees' wages and indicated to the Union's negotiators that Respondent was "absolutely firm" in its demand that the Union accept Respondent's wage offer. When the Union's principal negotiator, Wil- liams, in an attempt to narrow the issues separating the parties, asked Patrick to discuss the several other eco- nomic and noneconomic provisions contained in the Union's contract proposal, Patrick flatly refused and stated in essence that there was no sense in the parties discussing any of the other provisions included in the Union's contract proposal until the Union agreed to accept Respondent's wage proposal. Thus, the record demonstrates that Respondent re- fused to bargain with the Union for a new collective-bar- gaining agreement by insisting that the Union accede to its position on wages before there could be any negotia- tion on other issues. Such conduct obstructs the process of meaningful contract negotiations because progress in negotiations on certain economic or noneconomic issues often induces parties to yield ground on other disputed issues. In this case, Respondent's obstructionist tactics prevented the Union from exploring Respondent's posi- tion regarding any of the economic and noneconomic issues other than wages; the likelihood of reaching agree- ment on a full contract was thereby substantially re- duced. Respondent's refusal to discuss the Union's con- tract proposal unless the Union accepted Respondent's wage proposal was therefore incompatible with Respon- dent's statutory duty to negotiate in a manner facilitating agreement and violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. See N.L.R.B. v. Benne Katz, etc., d/b/a Williams- burg Steel Products Co., 369 U.S. 736, 742-743 (1962); NL.R.B. v. Patent Trader, Inc., 415 F.2d 190, 197-198 (2d Cir. 1969); Yama Woodcraft, Inc., d/b/a Cal-Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co., 228 NLRB 1337, 1340-42 (1977). See also Federal Mogul Corporation, 212 NLRB 950, 964 (1974), enfd. 524 F.2d 37 (6th Cir. 1975). Respondent argues that its refusal to discuss the non- wage provisions of the Union's contract proposal oc- curred after an impasse had been reached on the subject of wages and that the impasse justified its refusal to bar- gain. However, the record evidence shows that no im- passe had yet been reached when Respondent refused to discuss the Union's contract proposal. Furthermore, an impasse regarding wages would not have excused the Respondent's obligation to bargain regarding the other economic and noneconomic provisions included in the Union's contract proposal. PATRICK & COMPANY 393 Impasse has been defined by the Board as that point of time in negotiations when the parties are warranted in as- suming that further bargaining would be futile. See Alsey Refractories Company, 215 NLRB 785, fn.l (1974), citing Taft Broadcasting Co., WDAF AM-FM-TV, 163 NLRB 475, 478 (1967), enfd. sub nom. American Federation of Television and Radio Artists, AFL-CIO, Kansas City Local v. N.L.R.B., 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Here, there is a lack of evidence that on March 28, when Respon- dent refused to bargain, it was realistically warranted in assuming that further bargaining would have been futile. Although the Union, in the face of Respondent's rejec- tion of the Union's wage offer, indicated to Respondent that its wage proposal was a "serious" one, there is no evidence that the Union indicated to Respondent it was unwilling to make any concessions on this issue or other issues. Nor is there evidence that when Respondent re- fused to bargain on March 28 that the Union, either by word or deed, had indicated its wage proposal was a final offer. 4 Moreover, as described supra, the parties in this case had met only once for 15 minutes to attempt to negotiate a collective-bargaining agreement when the im- passe urged by Respondent supposedly occurred and, other than this brief 15-minute discussion about wages, there was no discussion about the other significant eco- nomic and noneconomic provisions included in the Union's proposed contract. In short, "the negotiations were not sufficiently exhaustive to find that an impasse had already been reached." Carpenter Sprinkler Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 603 p.2d 959 (2d Cir. 1979). For the very nature of collective bargaining presumes that, while movement may be slow on some issues, a full discussion of other issues, which as in the instant case have not been the subject of agreement or disagreement, may result in agreement on stalled issues. "Bargaining does not take place in isolation and a proposal on one point serves as leverage for positions in other areas." Keorn In- dustries, Inc. v. A.L.R.B., 389 F.2d 117, 121 (4th Cir. 1967). Thus, "had the respondent been willing to bargain further, much more might have been accomplished through the give and take atmosphere of the bargaining table." A'L.R.B. v. Sharon Hats, Inc., 289 F.2d 628, 632 (5th Cir. 1961). Under the circumstances, I conclude that on March 28, 1979, when Respondent initially refused to bargain with the Union, negotiations had not reached the point where there was "no realistic possibility that con- tinuation of discussion at that time would have been fruitful." American Federation of Television and Radio Art- ists [Taft Broadcasting Co.] v. A:L.R.B., 395 F.2d at 628. However, assuming arguendo that on March 28 an im- passe had been reached regarding wages, this would not have justified Respondent's refusal to discuss the remain- der of the Union's contract proposal. As noted supra, the principal reason a party may not condition discussion of significant economic or noneconomic contract proposals upon agreement regarding wages is that full discussion of I Since it is cmmon bargaining practice for a part to ask fi r more than he can pssibl hpe to recci.e, particularly on a itial proposal. Respondent had no basis For assuming Ihal the Union Wkould prose wholly Intractable on the skage i,sile thoul a least diScussing the other issues With the Union Indeed. he Union. as descrlhbed iipru. In its nexl contract proposal acceded to Respondcnt's \age offer other significant issues which have not yet been the sub- ject of negotiation may facilitate agreement regarding the temporarily deadlocked wage issue. This statutory pur- pose would be directly frustrated if, as Respondent has contended, an impasse on one subject justified a refusal to bargain regarding other subjects where, as here, the other subjects include significant ones and have never been discussed. I also am of the view that the record shows that, when the Union submitted a new contract proposal to Respon- dent, which proposal accepted Respondent's wage offer, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by insisting to the point of impasse that, as a condition of resuming collective-bargaining negotiations, the Union withdraw the unfair labor practice charge it had filed against Respondent with the National Labor Relations Board. As described supra, after the Union submitted its May 22, 1979, contract proposal which acceded to Respon- dent's position on wages, Respondent President James Patrick refused to resume contract negotiations until the Union withdrew the charge it had filed against Respon- dent in the instant case. The Union's secretary-treasurer, Richard Williams, advised Patrick that the Union would withdraw its charge if Respondent signed an agreement extending the recently terminated contract for the dura- tion of the negotiations for the new contract. Patrick re- fused to do this, at which point Williams indicated he would have to give further consideration to Patrick's proposal that the Union withdraw the charge in this case. Thereafter, on July 19, 1979, Williams by mailgram notified Patrick that the Union would agree to withdraw the charge it had filed with the Board against Respon- dent only if Respondent agreed in writing to extend the recently terminated contract for the duration of the ne- gotiations for the new contract. On July 27, 1979, Wil- liams spoke to Patrick and reiterated this message, at which time Patrick refused to modify his position that contract negotiations would not resume until the Union withdrew the charge filed against Respondent with the Board and stated that Respondent would not sign an ex- tension agreement in exchange for the Union's withdraw- al of the charge. The foregoing clearly establishes that by July 27, 1979, the parties had bargained to an impasse concerning Re- spondent's proposal that the Union withdraw the unfair labor practice charge it had filed against Respondent with the Board. Accordingly, as this is a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, I find that Respondent, by insisting to the point of impasse that the Union withdraw the charge, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 5 I Respondent s proposal that the Union vsithdravs its charge is a mon- mandator 5 subhiect of bargaiing X\L R.B Local 964. l Utrd Brorther- ho)nd of (arperters ud Joiners of 4n, rica. AFL-CIO. 447 F 2d 643. 64b (2d Cir 1971) It is settled that insistence to inpa.sse on a nonmaidators ,slhiect of hbargaining is a:i unfair hlbor pracltice in iolation of Sec X(a)tS) and (1) of the Act \ 1. R B Io ,wr Divuio hJ Bor,-Harur. 35 r U S 342. 349 1958) Aso. it is setlled that insistetnce onis a onnmanda- tor, iletil need not hbt Ihe stle or prinalr\ reason fr ;1l illpalsse to he inlastfil. buit must he a reasotl for the Impasse .\UIionital Frh; / Fru li Ig(,tahh (olpatl uand Qualhtv BRa,iai C,. Inc. 227 NI RH 2014. 201h 14977) PATRICK & COMPANY 393 _ _ .. . .. . 394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Patrick & Company, the Respondent, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All full-time and regular part-time salespersons em- ployed by Respondent at its 560 Market Street, San Francisco, California, retail store, excluding all other em- ployees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. At all times material herein the Union has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to discuss issues in contract negotiations other than wages and by insisting to the point of impasse that the Union withdraw the unfair labor practice charge which it had filed against Respondent with the Board, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affir- mative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In order to insure that the employees in the appropri- ate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining representative for the period provided by law, I shall recommend that the initial period of certification be construed as beginning on the date Respondent com- mences to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the appropriate unit. See Mar-Jac Poultry Company, Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Commerce Company d/b/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964). Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER6 The Respondent, Patrick & Company, San Francisco, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided b Sec 102 46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National L.abor Relations Board. the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 10248 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment with Department Store Employees Union, Local 1100, Retail Clerks International Union, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em- ployees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time salespersons em- ployed by the Respondent at its 560 Market Street, San Francisco, California retail store, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Insisting to the point of impasse that the above- named labor organization or any other labor organization which represents its employees agree to a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec- essary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, hours, wages, and other terms and condi- tions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. Re- spondent's obligation to bargain with this Union shall extend 1 year from the date it first commences to bargain in good faith. (b) Post at its place of business in San Francisco, Cali- fornia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main- tained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con- spicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 20, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. become its findings, conclusions and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed saived for all purposes 7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National labhor Relations Board " PATRICK & COMPANY 395 APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively con- cerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with Department Store Employees Union, Local 1100, Retail Clerks International Union, AFL-CIO, as the collective- bargaining representative of our employees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time salespersons employed by us at our 560 Market Street, San Francisco, California retail store, excluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as de- fined in the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT insist to the point of impasse that the above-named labor organization or any other labor organization which represents our employees agree to a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in- terfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Sec- tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above- named labor organization as the exclusive represen- tative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. Our obligation to bargain with the above-named labor organization shall extend for 1 year from the date we first com- mence bargaining in good faith. PATRICK & COMPANY