International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

In the Matter of LOCAL 160, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELEC- TRICAL WORKERS, A. F. OF L. and ROANE-ANDERSON COMPANY Case No. 10-CC-11-Decided April 4, 1949 DECISION AND ORDER On November 2, 1948, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re- spondent had engaged and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, only the Respondent filed ex- ceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Respondent's request for oral argument is hereby denied, as the record and the brief, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and the positions of the Respondent. The Board has considered the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings and conclusions, and also the recommendations of the Trial Examiner except where inconsistent with the following Order. ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Local 760, Inter- national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., and its agents, shall : 1. Cease and desist from engaging in, or inducing or encouraging the employees of Roane-Anderson Company or any other employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employ- ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform 82 N. L. R. B., No. 79. 696 LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 697 any services, where an object thereof is to force or require Roane- Anderson Company or any other employer or other person to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post at its Knoxville, Tennessee, business office, copies of the notice attached hereto as an Appendix.' Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent; be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply herewith. APPENDIX NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 760, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, A. F. OF L. Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our members that : WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage employees of ROANE-ANDERSON COMPANY or any other employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to per- form any services, where an object thereof is to force or require any employer or other person to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company. LOCAL 760, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, A. F. OF L. By: ------------------------------------------- Representative Title Date: ------------ This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other materiaL I In the event that this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be inserted before the words "A DECISIQN AND ORDER" the words "DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING." 698 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. Robert E. Mullin, of Washington, D. C., for the General Counsel. Mr. W. O. Lowe, of Knoxville, Tenn., for the Respondent. Mr. Porter C. Greenwood, of Knoxville, Tenn., for the charging Company. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon an amended charge, filed August 16, 1948, by Roane-Anderson Company, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued his complaint, dated August 20, 1948, against Local 760, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, A. F. of L., herein called the Respondent,' alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (June 23, 1947, Public Law 101, 80th Congress Chapter 120, 1st Session), herein called the Act. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that on and after July 29, 1948, the Respondent violated Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act in that it called a strike and/or by orders, threats and/or promises of benefits induced and encouraged the maintenance electricians, utility linemen and trouble men, employed by the Company, and members of the Respondent, to leave the Company's employ, an object thereof being to force or require the Company to cease doing business with another person, namely, Kiser Elec- tric Company. T Copies of the complaint, accompanied by notice of hearing thereon, were duly served upon the Respondent and the Company. Thereafter the Respondent filed an answer admitting certain allegations of the complaint, but denying the commission of unfair labor practices, deny- ing that the Respondent's activities have any effect upon commerce, setting forth certain affirmative defenses more fully discussed below, and praying for the dismissal of the complaint. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Knoxville, Tennessee, on September 8, 9, and 10, 1948, before Arthur Leff, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly appointed by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Company were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues, was afforded all parties. At the conclusion of the hearing, motions made by the General Counsel and by the Respondent to conform their pleadings to the proof in formal matters were granted. Opportunity was afforded the parties to argue orally before the Trial Examiner, and to file briefs and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Briefs were thereafter filed by the General Counsel and by the Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Roane-Anderson Company, a Tennessee corporation with its principal office at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is engaged, under contract with the Atomic Energy 1 The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are referred to as the General Counsel , the National Labor Relations Board as the Board. 2 The Respondent's parent International is called the I. B. E. W. LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 699 Commission in performing the maintenance and operation functions of the town site and military reservation of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Closely analogous to those performed by municipal corporations elsewhere, these functions in- elude street maintenance, sewage disposal, water supply, building maintenance, and the transmission of electrical energy. Among other things, the Company operates and maintains the outside electrical distribution system, as well as the water plants, reservoirs and river pumping stations which supply water both to the town and to some of the plant facilities located in the restricted area. The Company also maintains the houses and other real estate facilities in the town of Oak Ridge, a city of some 30,000 people, most of the adult popu- lation of which is employed in the plant manufacturing area and in the related facilities on the Oak Ridge reservation. During the 12 months' period pre- ceding August 20, 1948, the Company purchased materials and supplies, con- sisting, among other things, of coal, electrical apparatus, pipe, and pharmaceu- tical supplies, and having a value in excess of $6,500,000, of which over 50 per- cent represented purchases which were shipped to the Company from States other than the State of Tennessee. Although most of the fissionable material produced at the Oak Ridge Reservation becomes the property of the United States Government, some of the output is sold commercially. The record es- tablishes that radioactive isotopes, of a value in excess of $50,000 a month, are sold and shipped to hospitals and research laboratories, about 95 percent of which are located outside the State of Tennessee. It is found that the Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act a II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 760, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to mem- bership certain employees of the Company. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. Background In July 1948, the Company employed some 115 electrical workers at Oak Ridge. They were contained in two of its operating divisions-the building maintenance division to which about 70 "inside" maintenance electricians were attached, and the utility division which had on its rolls about 45 "outside" electrical workers, among them linemen and trouble men, servicing the electri- cal distribution system. This divisional separation conforms generally to the Respondent's own organizational grouping which divides "inside" and "outside" electrical workers into different trade units, each having its own job stewards and to some extent its own trade unit organization, but both integrated never- theless and managed by a common business manager. All the Company's elec- trical workers, including foremen, were members of the Respondent, whose jurisdiction as a subordinate local of the I. B. E. W. covers the city of Knox- ville and surrounding territory including the town of Oak Ridge. In this area approximately 95 percent of all electrical jobs are unionized. Electrical workers desiring work on union jobs are in practice expected first to obtain clearance 3 The Board has previously held in two separate cases that the operations of the Company affect commerce and fall within its jurisdiction. See Matter of Roane-Anderson Company, 71 N. L. It. B. 266; 77 N. L. R. B. 953. 700 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD through the office of the Respondent's business manager . Under the Respond- ent's constitution and by-laws the business manager is empowered , inter alia, to "remove any member from any job or shop ... when he decides the best interests of the Local Union require such removal." Although the Respondent does not have a separate collective bargaining agree- ment of its own with the Company , the various classifications of electrical workers in the Company 's employ are covered along with other craftsmen by a contract in closed -shop form, entered into on February 24, 1947 , for a 2-year term , between the Company and the American Federation of Labor represented by the Knoxville Building Trades Council with which the Respondent is affil- iated. Under this contract, the Company has dealt directly with the Respondent with regard to electrical workers, and has looked to the Respondent to supply it with such workers when needed. In the past , there had been some dissatisfaction among the Respondent's mem- bers, to which the Respondent on their behalf gave due expression , arising from the Company's classification and assignment of certain work as falling within the category of maintenance work rather than in the category of construction work which carried a substantially higher rate of pay. Conferences on this sub- ject were held between the Company and the Respondent in May and June 1948. On June 25, 1948, an understanding, incorporated in an unsigned memorandum, was mutually reached on the principles thereafter to govern the classification of work as maintenance or as construction. After June 25, 1948, no grievance or complaint was presented by the Respondent to the Company concerning wages, or for that matter, concerning any other subject , except to the extent that the Respondent's expressed displeasure, noted below , over the letting of a contract to Kiser Electric Company, may be viewed as a complaint. B. The work stoppage beginning on July 29, 1948, and events preceding it In May 1948, the Company was instructed by the Atomic Energy Commission to substitute fluorescent for incandescent lighting fixtures at a school building located on the Oak Ridge town site. Public advertisement for sealed bids was made by the Company in accordance with the established procedures. On June 18, 1948, when the bids were opened, it was found that the lowest bid on the advertised specifications was that of Kiser Electric Company, a contractor which employed non-union labor , and which not many months before had had one of its other jobs picketed for a brief period by the Respondent as well as by another American Federation of Labor affiliated union. About 2 or 3 days after the bids were opened, Lyle D. Worrell, the Company's assistant project manager , received a telephone call from R. J. Martin, the Respondent's business agent. Stating that he had learned that Kiser had been the low bidder, Martin asked whether anything could be done to prevent Kiser from obtaining the contract . This was not possible , however, under the then existing procedures , established by the agreement between the Company and the Atomic Energy Commission , and Worrell so informed Kiser several days later. On July 1, 1948, the Company formally awarded the contract to Kiser. The following week , Worrell received another telephone call from a union represent- ative concerning the Kiser contract-this time from W. J. Petty, the regional vice-president of the I. B. E. W., the Respondent's parent international . Refer- ring to the Kiser award, Petty stated that the I. B. E. W. felt that it lay within the power of the Company to refuse to make an award to a non-union contractor. He had hoped , he said, that the I. B. E. W. and the Company could get together LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 701 and make a separate agreement, but he was afraid the Union would have to change its mind if the Company insisted on following through on its award to Kiser. For, he added, the Union did not allow anyone under contract with it to sub-contract to a non-union subcontractor. After Worrell explained the situa- tion confronting the Company, Petty closed by saying that if the Company and the Atomic Energy Commission did not value their good relations with the I. B. E. W. any more than to let a contract to a non-union contractor, he was sorry and that was all he had to say. Kiser began performance of its contract about July 23. During the ensuing week there was some discussion, at least among certain of the electrical workers, about the fact that a non-union contractor was at work at Oak Ridge. Yet none of the employees during that period saw fit to exercise his right as an individual to quit his employment because of any deep-rooted conviction about working at a location where non-union men were employed. On July 29, the electricians on the day shift reported for work as usual at 7: 30 a. in. Later that morning, however, electricians in the "inside" building maintenance department, including their foremen, began coming to their division office in small groups of 2 or 3 at a time to announce that they were quitting their jobs and to request their terminations.' Most of the men gave as their reason for quitting that they were leaving to accept better jobs; the others gave no reason. None voiced any specific complaint against the Company. Of those scheduled to work on the shift beginning at 4 p. m., 1 or 2 came to work but did not clock in. By the following morning, none of the approximately 70 build- ing maintenance electricians was left on the job-with one exception, Snyder, the maintenance electrician at the hospital. Although Snyder at one point also indi- cated an intent to quit along with the others, he was told by Robert Houts, the Respondent's steward in the building maintenance department, according to the latter's testimony, to remain at his post "for the sake of humanity." The approximately 45 electrical workers in the utility division continued at work on July 29 without any overt sign that they also intended to quit. On the following day, however, the action of the building maintenance electricians was substantially repeated by their union brethren in the utility division. Shortly after lunch on the afternoon of July 30, the linemen and others in this division began to return to the utility division office from their widely separated locations to resign their jobs or to clock out. No reasons were given by them for quitting, nor were any specific complaints made. By 4 p. m., the regular quitting hour of the day shift, the only day shift men left on the rolls, apart from several who had clocked out but had not yet signified their intent to terminate, were 2 apprentice linemen who were working on a pole line inventory at an isolated location, 2 electricians who were working at another facility, and 3 trouble men whose duty it was to take care of emergencies. The 2 linemen on the pole inventory quit shortly after their return to the office at 4 p in., and the remaining employees on the roll, although they did not quit, were to fail to report on July 31 and for some time afterwards. Those scheduled to work on the night shifts either failed to report for duty, or, if they did report, did not clock in. On July 31, the utility division had no electrical employees at work. Shortly before the end of the day shift on July 30, after most of the men on that shift, but not the trouble men, had already signified their intent to terminate, Under the contract between the Company and the Building Trades Council , employees are entitled to 26 days annual vacation leave as well as 15 days annual sick leave An em- ployee, upon termination of his employment, becomes entitled to a lump sum payment to cover all unused vacation leave. 702 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a conference was arranged between officials of the Company and of the Respond- ent to discuss arrangements for providing stand-by crews to handle emergency electrical service. Clyde Goodman, the Respondent's assistant business manager, and Jack Campbell, its utilities division steward, met with James C. Hayden, electrical superintendent of the Company's utilities division, and later also with Lyle D. Worrell, the Company's assistant project manager. Together they worked out a list of certain vital facilities and otherwise discussed plans for an emergency set-up. At one point, after a telephone call to Knoxville, Goodman reported to Hayden that he had spoken to Business Manager Martin who had agreed to the emergency list. Goodman stated that men would be available to take care of any emergencies that might occur at the water pumping station, the river filtration plant, the hospital, or certain other locations. Campbell as- sured Worrell that if certain emergencies arose, he, as job steward, would under- take to supply men to take care of them. When Goodman left for Knoxville at about 4 p in., it appeared that a meeting of minds with regard to the Respondent furnishing emergency service had been reached. As events developed, however, the union officials were to reconsider their decision to go along with the emergency arrangements. The trouble men on the 4 p. in. to midnight shift, who were to make up part of the emergency crew, reported at the usual hour but did not go to work. They remained, instead, at the utilities division office until about 6 p. in., as did also Steward Campbell and one or two of the trouble men on the night shift, who, al- though not due to report until midnight, had also come to the office. At about 5 p. in., Campbell, who had left the office for a time, returned to announce that he was awaiting word from Knoxville as to whether or not the trouble men would go to work. At about 6 p. m., when Hayden closed the utilities office, Campbell apparently had not yet received definite word. And the trouble men were still uncertain as to their position. When Campbell left Hayden's office at 6 p. m., the trouble men asked him to notify them whether or not they were to hold themselves available for emergency work, so that they might know what to do.` In the meantime, however, another company official had received an indication from the Respondent's office at Knoxville that the emergency arrangements would be shelved. Shortly before 5 p. in., Ben Manchester, operations manager for the utilities division, telephoned the Respondent's office at Knoxville to in- quire whether the trouble men were going to work. He was told by Goodman, "We are having a meeting about that right now." Martin then came to the phone to predict that he did not think the trouble men would come back to work. When Manchester protested that this would leave the Company in an "awful hole" and asked what he could do about it, Martin cryptically remarked that "that was entirely up to Roane-Anderson." Martin's prediction proved to be correct. About 7 p. m. that evening, John Baer, the trouble dispatcher of the utilities division, contacted Campbell to re- port an outage at the local bus station and to ask that Campbell handle it in accordance with the plan for emergency service previously agreed upon. Camp- bell refused, stating with reference to the emergency plan, "That is out. We aren't going to do any work." When Baer indicated that Campbell' s position was inconsistent with the arrangement he understood had been reached earlier that day, Campbell's only answer was, "I am sorry, Mr. Baer, but that's the way it is." I According to the undenied and credited testimony of Hayden. LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 703 From July 31 to September 2, 1948, save for Snyder at the hospital, no build- ing maintenance electricians reported for work. In the utilities division, except for six men who returned during the week of August 9, there were likewise no electrical workers on the job during that period! On July 30, after the bulk of the electrical workers had quit, Worrell on behalf of the Company communi- cated with Business Manager Martin to request replacements. Martin curtly informed Worrell that he was doing everything possible to get replacements, that if he tried real hard he might be able to get perhaps two men in several weeks, but that he would be lucky if he did. Until September 2, however, no actual re- ferrals were made by the Respondent to the Company. During the period from July 31 to September 2, no demands were made upon the Company by the Respondent, nor was any picket line maintained. After the original charge was filed early in August, counsel for the Respondent sub- mitted on its behalf a statement purporting to explain the work stoppage. In it the Respondent denied responsibility for the work stoppage and contended that electricians had voluntarily terminated as individuals because of dissatisfaction arising from their wage scales as well as from the presence of a non-union subcontractor on the job. But, although disclaiming responsibility in its state- ment to the General Counsel, the Respondent did nothing to notify its members or the public that as a union it was not supporting the work stoppage. On August 31, 1948, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in the case of Styles v. Local 760 (Civil Action No. 1152) granted a petition for an injunction under Section 10 (1) of the Act, and, on September 2, 1948, entered an order restraining the Respondent from calling or continuing a strike for the purpose of compelling the Company to cease doing business with Kiser. On the day the order was issued, the Respondent issued a notice to its members to the effect that it was not engaging in a strike or inducing or encour- aging its members to cease working for the Company. The notice stated : Members of this Union are free to accept or reject employment by Roane- Anderson Company without fear of threats or promises of benefits from their Union concerning the exercise of each individual's judgment. After this notice was issued, and up to the date of the opening of the hearing (September 9, 1948), approximately 67 of the Company's former employees, after obtaining referrals from the Respondent, applied for and received their old jobs with the Company. About 45 of them returned on the very day the notice was issued. C. The disputed issues It is the Respondent's contention that the employees' action in quitting their jobs did not constitute a strike or a concerted refusal to work.' It represented, rather, the Respondent asserts, a "simultaneous quitting by individuals," each for his own reason and in the exercise of his own independent judgment. There- fore, argues the Respondent, their conduct is immunized by the savings provision 9 The six who returned during the week of August 9 had never formally terminated their employment. One of them, Andrew Copeland, who had been crippled on the job and had litigation pending against the Company , returned after he had been informed that Business Manager Martin had indicated at a union meeting that he should go back to work. The others apparently returned voluntarily without prior approval from the Union. 4 The term "strike" as defined in Section 501 (2) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, "includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees .. . 704 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.° The Respondent contends, more- over, that even if the simultaneous quitting be found a strike or concerted refusal to work, the General Counsel has failed to sustain the burden of proving the Re- spondent's responsibility therefor, or, if such responsibility be established, that an object of the work stoppage was to force the Company to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company, all as alleged in the complaint. The findings of fact made thus far, based upon substantially undisputed evi- dence, have been confined in the main to a history of the events connected with the work stoppage as they were openly revealed to the Company at the time. With this as a framework of reference, we turn now to a more detailed considera- tion and analysis of the evidence pertaining to the particular factual issues in dispute. D. Analysis of evidence pertaining to disputed issues and conclusions with respect thereto 1. As to the contention that the employees quit as individuals Apropos of the Respondent's contention that the work stoppage was the result of individual rather than collective action, the fact that looms perhaps most significantly of all is that more than 100 employees, representing substantially all the members of an organized group, elected practically simultaneously either to resign their jobs or to fail to report for work. It is quite true, as the Respond- ent contends, that the simultaneous quitting by a group of employees does not, standing alone, give rise to a conclusive presumption that the employees engaged in a strike or concerted refusal to work. The possibility, however remote, can- not be ignored entirely, that some special circumstance, such as a sudden change in working conditions affecting the group as a whole, may impel even a substantial number of employees coincidentally to decide, each for himself and independently of the others or of his labor organization, to cease work. Nevertheless, ex- perience teaches that it is exceedingly improbable that virtually the whole of a group of more than 100 men, particularly where they are organized, will, without common agreement or direction, quit work virtually en masse as a result of as many different individual decisions arrived at independently, yet fortuitously at the same time. The very fact of such mass quitting alone supplies persuasive evidence, sufficient in the absence of a plausible and adequate contrary explana- tion, to support an inference that the cessation of work was the outcome of strike or concerted action aimed at a common objective.' In this case, the record provides no plausible and adequate explanation to rebut that inference. This is apparent-even before reaching and considering the affirmative evidence offered by the General Counsel-from an analysis of the testimony of the Respondent's own witnesses. To support its contention that the employees quit or failed to report as a result of individual decisions separately arrived at, the Respondent called some 13 witnesses who were employed by the Company at the time of the events in ques- tion. These witnesses gave varied reasons for terminating or suspending their employment. Those most frequently assigned were dissatisfaction with wages, inadequacy of safety equipment, displeasure over the letting of a contract to a 8 Section 502 provides : "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in this Act be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an illegal act . . . 9 That is not to say, however, that, where the employees are organized, an inference is also justified that the strike or concerted action was authorized by their labor organization. Union responsibility must be established by an independent showing. LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 705 non-union contractor, or a combination of one or more of these factors.10 In most instances, the reasons ascribed in their testimony were not those given at the time when the witnesses left their jobs. At that time, as has been noted. the employees either gave no reason at all, or else simply stated that they were leaving for better jobs. Almost without exception, these witnesses, their testi- mony would have it, quit or failed to report for work as a result of an entirely private judgment made without prior discussion with anybody ; indeed a sub- stantial number of them professed that they did not even know that any others were quitting on the same day. Yet, although most of them quit in mid-shift or after they had once taken the trouble to report for work, they were unable to refer to any specific incidents arising at the particular time to prompt their suddenly made "individual" decisions to quit. In general, as a reading of the record will readily reflect, most of the Respondent's witnesses-and to a certain extent some of the employee witnesses called by the General Counsel-left a clear impression that, at least as to certain critical issues, they were guided in their testimony more by a sense of allegiance to their union than by a spirit of candor. Their testimony that their quitting was entirely a matter of personal decision is not such as to invite credence 11 10 Two witnesses assigned different reasons. One-Hammond, a maintenance elec- trician-, according to his testimony , after reporting for work on the afternoon shift on July 29 and noting that the others had quit, but without inquiring why, decided there and then to quit to take a vacation, and did so without clocking in At that time he had 6 to 8 days accrued vacation leave , but did not request such leave. He returned to the Company on September 5, after the injunction was granted and the Respondent had advised its members that they were free to go back. The other-Cornett , a trouble man-testified that he did not report in for the midnight shift because he was sick . Further examination developed that he was not so sick that he could not have reported , and that in fact he had not come in on that or subsequent days because, having heard that the others had quit, he did not want to be a "scab " On August 9, he formally terminated because he needed money. Thereafter he made no effort to seek another job and returned to the Company after the injunction In an affidavit given to the representative of the General Counsel on August 9, he stated that he liked his job but that he was quitting because "I don't want to get in bad with my Union or I could not get a job anywhere in the country " 11 Without burdening this report by detailing testimony of each of these witnesses, the following two typical examples ( in addition to those in the preceding footnote ) are given to illustrate the point: Leslie Head , a building maintenance electrician , testified that , just as he was about to clock in on July 29 for the afternoon shift, "I guess it just hit me to quit and I quit." His reason for quitting : "I guess for a better job That was what we usually quit for." On cross-examination , he conceded that he had not known he was going to quit just before he came to work He had no definite plans at that time for another job Several weeks later he obtained another job at Gary, Indiana, leaving his family at Oak Ridge When notified of the injunction, he promptly gave up his Gary job and returned to the Company's employ. Pearl Jackson Jones , a lineman with the Company for 2 years, quit shortly after lunch in the middle of his shift on July 30 , after his crew was visited by Assistant Business Manager Goodman He gave no reason at the time, but at the hearing testified that he decided to terminate, entirely of his own volition , because he was dissatisfied with the safety equipment and because non-union men were on the job Although he travelled from his distant job location with others in his crew who quit at the same time , his testimony would have it that he did not know that the others were planning to quit that day or that the maintenance electricians had quit the day before . He decided to quit, he testified, before reporting for work at 7 a . in that day, yet he made no mention of it to anyone including his wife ; and waited until after lunch before he terminated. His testimony shows that he had known of the presence of the non -union men on the job for a week, but had not theretofore reacted to it On September 2, when the Respondent notified its members that they were free to work for the Company , he immediately returned to work, not according to him for that reason, but simply because he took a "notion " to do so. Several days later he quit again , but for an entirely different reason. 706 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Moreover, even if the alleged individual reasons for quitting could be viewed as credible if applied to given individuals, the testimony inspires no confidence when applied to explain on the basis of separate personal decisions the mass quitting within a space of 36 hours of more than 100 men. With regard to wages, there had been no complaints and no demands since the Respondent and the Company had reached a mutual understanding more than a month before on the dispute as to whether certain work should be classified as con- struction or maintenance. As for the alleged inadequate safety equipment, the testimony, generally speaking, was vague and unimpressive, and, in any event, applied only to the linemen and not to the maintenance electricians. No particular incident had occurred that might impel a group of employees suddenly to decide to quit on that account. By the Respondent's own admission, it had presented no grievance on that score for more than 6 months. And there had been no acci- dents due to unsafe equipment in the entire 4-year history of the Company. Of final significance is the failure of the Respondent to allude at all to safety conditions in the statement purporting to explain the work stoppage which it originally filed with the General Counsel. Nor does the presence on the job of a non-union contractor adequately account for the mass quitting on the theory advanced by the Respondent, that the employees as individuals resented working with non-union men, and as indi- viduals freely quit for that reason without mutual consultation or direction from any source. Only a few of the employees, while testifying, claimed that as even one of the factors motivating their action ; and those who did failed to explain why, if that were a matter of personal conviction with them, they did not quit a week before when Kiser first began performance of his contract at Oak Ridge. Moreover, it is apparent from the testimony that many of those who quit had no personal interest or feeling concerning Kiser and would not have left on that account were the decision one for them to make. Other facts clearly established by the record are likewise inconsistent with a hypothesis that what was involved was an individual quitting of work. Among them are the fact that in almost each instance the men left either in mid-shift or as they were about to report for work ; that they had no plans to resign their jobs before coming to work; that many of them after they left did not seek other jobs but maintained what was in effect a stand-by status ; and that a majority of them returned to work almost immediately following the Respond- ent's notice announcing to its members its intention to comply with the injunction. Those facts, rather, are consistent only with the conclusion that what was in fact involved was a work stoppage in the nature of a strike. But this conclusion does not here rest upon inference alone. It is rein- forced by direct evidence relating to the manner in which the work stoppage was brought about and carried on-to which we shall now refer. 2. As to the Respondent's responsibility for the work stoppage The Respondent's officials denied that the Union had ordered or engaged in any strike or concerted refusal to work. Bfsiness Manager Martin testified that he did not even know that the inside electricians had quit until after they had all left. According to him, on July 30, at about 10 a. in. he received a telephone message from Steward Campbell of the utilities division that the men in that division were about to quit, and thereupon sent Assistant Business Manager Goodman to Oak Ridge with specific instructions to keep the men on the job. Goodman, while testifying, could not recall whether Martin had LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 707 given him these instructions. He remembered, however, that accompanied by Campbell, he had visited employees in the utilities division on July 30, before any of them had quit. The only object of his visit, he stated, was to keep the men on their jobs-a statement rather difficult to reconcile with the testimony of the men themselves that prior to their quitting (which followed Goodman's visit) they had not communicated to anyone their intention so to do. Campbell, Said to be unavailable, did not testify. Steward Houts, of the building mainte- nance division, testified that he knew nothing of the work stoppage on July 29 ; that while he had heard that day in "a roundabout way" that some of the men were quitting, he did not know it to be a fact. Although he was job steward, he made no effort, according to his testimony, to verify whether the men were quitting, or for what reasons.' He testified that he felt under no obligation to tell the men to remain on their jobs, but he did, he conceded, tell Snyder, the hospital electrician, to stay on his job "for the sake of humanity." The general disclaimer of union responsibility by the Respondent's officials is to be measured and appraised against the following specific incidents con- cerning which the General Counsel adduced evidence : " 1. As Robert Hulsey, a maintenance electrician, was preparing to go to work on July 29 at about 7: 15 a. in., before the work stoppage began, he was accosted by Houts, who, thereby indicating that he knew what was in the offing, stated : "Don't be in a hurry to go out this morning. I think the boys is going to quit." Later, about 11: 30 that morning, Houts came up to Hulsey and his helper at their job location, and told them that 20 to 21 of the men had already quit, and that they "could go in and quit when [they] got ready." After finishing the particular job on which they were then at work, Hulsey and his helper repaired to the maintenance shop where about 20 to 25 of the maintenance electricians, standing about, were engaged in general conversation to the effect that all were quitting because a non-union contractor had come on the job. Hulsey, as appears from his testimony, was satisfied with his job and did not want to quit, but, nevertheless, did so because, as he stated, "when all of them quit I better quit." " 2. Herman Keating, another maintenance electrician, upon returning from an assignment about noon on July 29, found a group of employees gathered in the shop. From one of them Keating learned that it was understood by the men that "we were all to be out by 2: 30." He was told by others that they were telling management that they were "quitting for a better job." Keating had no other job in mind, but promptly resigned because, as he stated, "They were all about gone and I didn't want to be there by myself." 3. Vaughn R. Turner worked on the shift beginning at 4 p. in. On the after- noon of July 29, lie reported for work, clocked in, and went to the electric shop. Routs, whose own shift ended at 4 p. in, was the only one at the electric shop. Houts informed Turner that everyone had quit. Thereupon Turner-without even asking any questions, according to his testimony-promptly resigned. 4. The Company's utilities division operated two line crews in July, one under Foreman Robert Fiddler, the other under Foreman D. L. McLendon. On July 12 Routs' testimony at the hearing , that he did not ask the men why they were quitting, was inconsistent with a verified statement which he had theretofore given a representative of the General Counsel. He had there stated that he had inquired of the men why they had quit, and had been told that it was because Kiser was non-union. 11 Where not otherwise noted , the evidence to be referred to is based upon uncontradicted testimony, credited and found as a fact. 14 The findings in this paragraph are based upon credited testimony of Hulsey. Routs did not specifically deny the statements attributed to him. 708 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 30, these crews were at work at widely separated locations. That day at about 11: 15 a. in., Fiddler's crew was visited at its job location by Assistant Business Manager Goodman, Steward Campbell, and Alton E. Mounts." As appears from the testimony of John H Barnes, an apprentice lineman on Fiddler's crew, a discussion ensued about the maintenance electricians who had quit the day be- fore. In response to a question by a crew member, Goodman stated that it was Business Manager Martin's "wish" that the linemen quit too.1B Goodman, Camp- bell and Mounts then left. Shortly afterwards, the entire crew drove to the utilities division building in the crew's truck and terminated their jobs. 5. After leaving Fiddler's crew, Goodman, Campbell, and Mounts proceeded to the site where Foreman McLendon's crew was at work. Goodman told the crew that a non-union contractor had bid the school, that the maintenance elec- tricians had quit the day before, and that "Mr. Martin wanted [tbe men] to quit." When Andrew Copeland, an apprentice lineman who had been crippled in the job, reminded Goodman that he would be unable to find work elsewhere if he quit, Goodman advised him to clock out and take sick leave. After spend- ing only a few minutes with the men, Goodman and Campbell departed Ini Mounts' car. As in the case of Fiddler's crew, McLendon's men then drove to the utilities building where, save for Copeland, the entire clew terminated their jobs. Copeland did not formally terminate, but merely punched out and went home.17 6. On July 30, when Andrew Proffitt, a helper on the afternoon shift, reported for work shortly before 4 p. in., he observed a group of employees gathered "Campbell worked as a trouble man. Although , as steward , he could leave his work station with permission when it was necessary to iron out difficulties , he had not sought such permission that day. Mounts , a formar vice president of the Respondent , but not then an official , although employed on the day shift , had not reported for work that day 16 Barnes' testimony concerning the statement made by Goodman , although denied, is credited . It is in effect corroborated by Copeland 's testimony , shortly to be referred to, concerning a similar statement made by Goodman to Fiddler 's crew . To contradict Barnes' testimony, the Respondent called Goodman , Mounts, Albert Talbott , and Pearl Jones, the latter two members of Fiddler 's crew According to Goodman, he told the men that the housing situation was bad and that they had better stay on their jobs . Since, as the record reflects , none of the men on the crew had expressed an intention to quit, prior to Goodman's visit, Goodman 's testimony in that regard was unconvincing. Moreover, Good- man himself testified at another point that he "thought " he told the men that he knew they were working for nothing, an approach scarcely in harmony with his professed aim to keep the men on their jobs Mounts, who denied hearing any such statement , was, as the record reflects, an evasive and hostile witness whose testimony in many respects was patently unreliable Thus , for an example , he stated that he could not remember whether he drove Goodman about various plant sites on July 30, or whether he was with Goodman at the time in question-facts clearly established by the record Talbott "disremembered " whether Goodman was there at all that day. His further and somewhat inconsistent testimony that "If I remember correctly I had quit when I saw [Goodman ]" is contradicted by his own statement as to the time he quit, which was after Goodman's visit Jones' testimony that he had made up his mind to quit at 7 a . in that morning , a decision which he did not com- municate to anyone , but that he went to work , nevertheless , and chose to quit only after Goodman told him that he had better stay there , is clearly implausible Despite the quantity of the testimony adduced by the Respondent on this subject , its quality was such as to lack conviction , and the denials are, accordingly , rejected 17 The findings in this paragraph are based upon the credited testimony of Copeland Goodman denied that he told the men that Martin wished them to quit , and testified that he told Copeland to remain on the job to protect a law suit he had pending against the Company Goodman 's denial is not credited for reasons already indicated Two other members of McLendon 's crew were called as witnesses by the Respondent-John Tefteller and James Witt Both denied that they saw Goodman visit the crew at the time in question-a fact which Goodman admitted , and both were unable adequately to explain their sudden decision to quit that day. Their testimony , found to be unconvincing, is rejected. LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 709 about the parking lot at the utilities building, with Steward Campbell in their midst. Inquiring as to the trouble, Proffitt was informed by Campbell that the men "have all quit [because] they have given a non-union man a contract out here." Proffitt protested that that had nothing to do with them, and then asked, "Well what are we going to do?" Campbell's response was clear and firm. "All I know to tell you to do," lie said, "is to go home and wait until this is settled, and I will send someone after you or I will come after you myself." Proffitt went home. 7. Carl Chambers, an employee in the utilities division, worked on the night shift. He was not scheduled to report to work until 10 p. in. on July 30. About 4: 30 p. in. that afternoon, Goodman telephoned Chambers at his home. Their conversation was substantially as follows : GOODMAN. This is Clyde. Do you know the boys quit out at Roane- Anderson today? CHAMBERS. No, what's the trouble? GOODMAN. Well, Roane-Anderson let a contract to a non-union contractor to do some work on a school building. CHAMBERS. Then I don't guess there is any use of me going in today. GOODMAN. I guess not. Chambers did not report for work that day. 8. As disclosed by findings made in an earlier section of this report, the Respondent's officials on July 30 worked out a plan with the Company's repre- sentatives for providing emergency crews-an obligation a union would nor- mally assume only in the event of a strike. The explanation given by the Respondent, that it was obliged to abandon the emergency arrangement because those designated for the emergency crews refused to work, is wholly unconvinc- ing.18 As has been shown, the Respondent withdrew from participation in the emergency plan only after a meeting of union officials was held on that very subject. Evidence in the record clearly reflects that employees designated to work on the emergency crews were guided by instructions from the Respondent's officials. Thus, as found above, the trouble men at Hayden's office, while they were waiting for Campbell to receive further instructions from Knoxville, ex- pressed no objection to working. On the contrary they asked Campbell to notify them whether they were to hold themselves available so that they might know what to do. Campbell himself had earlier assured Worrell that if certain emergencies arose, he, as job steward, would undertake to supply men to take care of them. He had later arranged with employee George Carmichael-as appears from the latter's undenied and credited testimony-to have Carmichael picked up by car in the event of an emergency. Campbell's sudden shift of posi- tion later that evening, and his statement to Baer that the emergency plan was "out," can plausibly be explained only upon the ground that the union officials 18 According to Martin, he made an effort to contact only 5 of the 12 trouble men who would have served on the emergency crew Of the 5, only 2 appeared as witnesses One, Cornett, was not asked to corroborate Martin's testimony. In an affidavit signed by him prior to the hearing and received in evidence, Cornett stated that he wanted to work but remained away from the job because he did not want "to get in bad with my union." The other, Napier, testified that Martin asked him to do emergency work, but was unable to fix the time or give other details Napier was one of the employees who was at Hayden's office while Campbell was awaiting word from union officials at Knoxville as to whether the trouble men should go to work. Although Napier testified at one point that he told Hayden he was quitting that afternoon , he later, in effect, contradicted his own testimony when he admitted that he did not actually quit, but "only quit in my mind." 838914-50-vol. 82-46 710 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD meeting at Knoxville had in the meantime issued countermanding instructions. It is so found. 9. During the course of the work stoppage , employees of the Company, in order to keep abreast with the situation , kept in touch with union officials by visits and telephone calls. Carmichael testified without contradiction, and it is found, that on one occasion in early August when he and a group of men were at the union hall, he asked Goodman when the men would go back to work, to which Goodman replied that he hoped to have a settlement soon and would let Carmichael know. Employee Frank Montgomery testified , likewise without denial, that he spoke on separate occasions about this subject to Martin and Goodman . On one occasion in August he called Martin to ask how "every- thing was on the job" at Roane-Anderson. Martin replied, "just as was." Montgomery then asked if Martin felt "we will get it straightened out anyways soon." Martin answered , "I hope so in a few days ," and promised that when that happened the Respondent "would notify all the boys." On another occa- sion, Montgomery spoke to Goodman about obtaining another position , but one not out of town. Goodman informed him that he had hopes of getting the Roane- Anderson situation settled shortly. 10. As already noted, the bulk of the employees returned to work almost immediately after the Respondent notified its members on September 2 that they were "free to accept or reject employment by Roane-Anderson Company." The contention of the Respondent , as well as such testimony as was offered in sup- port of it , that the men returned only because, as individuals , they considered themselves bound to do so by the injunction decree, is wholly unpersuasive. The decision in the injunction proceeding was publicly announced on August 30. When news of the decision appeared in the morning papers on September 1, a large group of employees gathered in the union hall. Yet none asked for or received referrals to the Company on that day. As one of them testified, it was felt that some time would elapse "before a ruling would be handed down from the local hall" and the members "would get instructions from Mr. Martin as to the outcome of the injunction ." On the following day, however , when the Re- spondent notified its members that it was not engaging in a strike and that all members were free to return , the approximately 25 employees then at the hall immediately applied for and received referrals , as did a substantial number of others later. The cumulative weight of the specific evidence set out above is more than enough successfully to refute and to command rejections of the testimony of the Respondent's officials that they played no part in the work stoppage other than to attempt to keep the men on their jobs. The record does not, perhaps, present a complete and detailed picture of the manner in which the stoppage was brought about. Yet, it does provide an outline of what occurred, suffi- ciently clear to leave no doubt that responsibility must be attributed to the Respondent's officials both for the cessation of work on July 29 and 30 and for the continued refusal of the men to work thereafter until the Respondent, on September 2, instructed its members that they were free to return. It is true, as the Respondent asserts, that the Union conducted no strike veto, issued no formal strike call, and maintained no picket line. But the absence of such indicia of strike action is not decisive on the question of whether the Respondent actually engaged in a strike or induced or encouraged employees to do so. The law looks to substance, not to form. Analysis of the evidence in this case clearly establishes that the Respondent, while studiously attempting to avoid LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 711 the technical appearance of a strike, nevertheless initiated, promoted, and spon- sored what in fact and in law was a strike action. A formal strike call was unnecessary for the Respondent's purpose. A like effect was achieved by making it known to at least certain of the employees, through the union stewards and the assistant business manager, that union members were quitting and that the union's business manager wanted them to quit, and by having that information generally circulated by word of mouth. The transmission through union officials of such information to disciplined union members in an organization such as the Respondent's, where substantial authority is vested in its business manager, must be viewed realistically as carrying the import of a strike call or order. That it was readily recognized and interpreted as such is clearly evident from the record of this case, if only from the prompt and mass response of the employees, some of whom, at least, admitted that, as individuals, they did not want to quit. As the record also shows, one employee, Proffitt, who protested mildly, was directed by his steward in no uncertain terms to "go home and wait until this is settled." The only employee who did not cease work-Snyder, the hospital electrician-was specifically directed by his steward to remain on his job, after it appeared that he was prepared to leave along with the others. Snyder provides an example of how the Respondent managed the work stoppage and controlled the decision of employees as to_ whether they were to engage in it or not-but there are others as well. A more pointed illus- tration is found in Steward Campbell's announcement to a Company representa- tive on the afternoon of July 30 that he was awaiting word from union officials at Knoxville on whether or not the trouble men were to go back to work. The trouble men themselves, that same afternoon, left no room for doubt that they were simply following and obeying union instructions, when they requested Campbell to notify them whether or not they should hold themselves available for emergency work. The Respondent's sponsorship, control, and direction of the work stoppage is proved in other ways. The original position taken by the Respondent with respect to providing emergency service, and its designation of emergency crews, constituted in itself a tacit admission of its sponsorship and control of the strike. Its subsequent retreat from that position, following a special meeting of its officials held to consider that very subject, can only be construed, on the record of this case, as a further reflection of a purpose technically to avoid the appear- ance of strike status. That the Respondent and its members as a practical matter viewed the work stoppage throughout its course as a Union-inspired and promoted project, is clearly revealed by the various statements made by its business and assistant business managers, in response to queries put them by members, that they hoped to effect a "settlement" and then to notify the "boys" so that they might return to work. Final proof that the employees were comply- ing with union direction in refraining from work, is found in the return of the majority of the men almost immediately following advice from the Respondent that they were "free to accept or reject employment by the Company." It is clear that the men interpreted this letter for what in fact it was-a rescission of a strike call. The finding of union responsibility here reached rests, to be sure, in part, although not alone, upon subsidiary findings that the Respondent' s representatives on July 29 and 30 made certain oral statements to employees that led them to cease work. Contrary to the Respondent's contention, however, it is found that these statements, in the circumstances of this case , were not privileged as a valid exercise of the right of free speech, protected by the Constitution and by 712 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Section 8 (c) of the Act. Considered realistically and in their total setting, the statements cannot be regarded as expressions of views, arguments, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof. They constituted, rather, it is found, the trans- mission of official instructions or directives to the membership to engage in strike action, and were so intended and so understood. As such, they were in the nature of verbal acts, falling outside the constitutional and statutory immunity upon which the Respondent relies. And since views, arguments, or opinions are not involved, it is immaterial that the statements in question contained na threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. Nor, upon the facts of this case, can the Respondent avoid responsibility for the acts of its officers and agents upon the alleged ground that the statements and activities in question carrying the import of a strike call were unauthorized and beyond the scope of authority of those who made them. A union's respon- sibility for the conduct of its agents does not, under the Act, necessarily turn upon the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized, or subsequently ratified, by formal action of the Union.'9 Responsibility attaches if, applying the "ordinary law of agency," it is made to appear that the union agents were acting in their capacity as such2° The Board in its very recent decision in the Sunset Line and Twine case zi took occasion to enunciate certain fundamental rules of agency law applicable to the issue of union responsibility. It stated, inter alia: A principal may be responsible for the act of his agent within the scope of the agent's general authority, or the "scope of his employment" if the agent is a servant, even though the principal has not specifically forbidden the act in question. It is enough if the principal actually empowered the agent to represent him in the general area within which the agent acted. In the instant case, it is true that the constitution of the Respondent's parent International forbids any local union to "cause or allow a stoppage of work in any controversy of a general nature before obtaining the consent of the Inter- national President," and that no such consent appears to have been obtained. The International, however, is not a party to this proceeding; no responsibility is sought to be imputed to it; and the relationship between the Respondent and its parent organization is not here involved. What is involved is the responsi- bility of the Respondent as a separate legal entity,22 and it is not controlling in that connection that the International's constitution, including the requirement concerning strike action, is made part of the by-laws of the Respondent A labor organization cannot escape the consequence of unfair labor practices, for which it otherwise would be responsible, upon the plea that there has been non-com- pliance with one of its internal laws. A contrary conclusion would provide a 19 See Section 2 (13) of the Act In the course of the debates of the 1947 amendment to the Act, Senator Taft, explaining the intent of the cited section, stated (93 Cong Rec. 7001) : Similarly union business agents or stewards, acting in their capacity of union officers, may make their union guilty . . . when they engage in an unfair labor practice in the bill, ea.en though no formal action has been taken by the union to authorize or approve such conduct [Emphasis supplied.] 20 The quoted phrase is from Senator Taft's analysis of the 1947 amendments For other statements to the same effect, see House Conf Rept. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 ; 93 Cong. Rec 6599. 7001 21 Matter of International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, C I. 0. Local 6 et al , and Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 N L R. B. 1487. 21 "It is clear that the Act treats labor organizations, for all practical purposes, as juridical entities " Sunset Line and Twine Company case, supra. FOCAL 76O, INTERNAT ' L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 713 ready contrivance for evasion of its statutory obligations. The question, there- fore, reduces itself to this: In making the statements and engaging in the activities which induced the work stoppage, were the Respondent's representa- tives acting in an official capacity within the general area in which they were em- powered to act, so as to make their conduct the conduct of the Respondent? Analysis of the facts in the light of the applicable principles set out in the Sunset case makes the answer apparent. Martin, as business manager of the, Respondent, was an elected officer employed upon a full-time basis to manage its affairs. From his title and the nature of his position alone, it may be inferred that he was vested with the powers of a general agent of the Respondent,23 and there is nothing in the record to rebut that inference.24 Inference aside, how- ,ever, it appears specifically from the Respondent's constitution and by-laws that its business agent is charged with broad responsibility for protecting the jurisdiction of the Union, and that he is expressly empowered on his own initia- tive to remove members from any job when he decides the best interests of the Union require such action. The authority to protect the Union's jurisdiction is broad enough to include authorization of measures considered by him neces- sary to secure the Union against the invasion of competitive non-union labor, and the power of removal encompasses the authority to "pull" any or all mem- bers off a job when in his sole judgment it lies in the interest of the Union to do so It is thus clear that any action taken by Martin or any directions given by him, directly or through his subordinates, requiring electrical workers at the •Compagy to leave their jobs fell within the range of his general authority, con- stituted action in his official capacity, and was attributable to the Respondent. The stewards and assistant business manager, who made the front line state- ments inducing the employees to leave their jobs, have, it is true, more limited ,authority. But, as appointees of the business manager, they are sub,,ect to his authority and are under his direction. To the extent, then, that they acted sunder the direction of the business manager, or with his approval, within the broad range of the latter's general authority, their conduct also fell within the scope of their employment and was likewise binding upon their union. In this case, the evidence sufficiently supports a finding that Stewards Houts and Campbell and Assistant Business Manager Goodman were in fact acting under the direction and with the approval of Martin, and thus within the scope of their employment, on July 29 and 30 when they in effect directed employees to leave their jobs. This finding is supported not alone by the record evidence that at least two of them, Goodman and Campbell, represented to employees that they were acting on behalf of Martin. It is shown as well by other record evidence reflecting Martin's supervision and management of the work stoppage, such as Goodman's telephone communication with Martin on the afternoon of July 30 for approval of the emergency list ; Campbell's announcement later that afternoon that he was awaiting word from Knoxville as to whether or not the 21 See Sunset Line and Twine Company case, supra. 24 Except for the constitution and by-laws of the Respondent and that of its parent organization, no evidence was adduced at the hearing concerning the duties and authority (or limitations thereon ) of the representatives in question. Such findings as are made Herein concerning that subject are based entirely upon the documents mentioned. u Stewards, for example, may not themselves cause any work stoppage, but "in case of any trouble" are required immediately to notify the business manager. They, however, act as the on-the -job representatives of the business manager "under his direction and - . . subject to his authority." The duties and authority of an assistant business manager are not defined other than by the statement that he shall work under the business manager and be subject to his authority. 714 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD trouble men would work ; Goodman's statement to Manchester that a meeting presumably with Martin was being held on that very question; Martin's pre- diction to Manchester (made while the trouble men were still awaiting instruc- tions as to whether or not to work) that he did not think the trouble men would return ; and the subsequent fulfillment of that prediction. In any event, even if it be assumed that Goodman, Campbell, and Houts were acting outside the scope of their employment when they initiated the work stoppage, it is clear that by its subsequent conduct, the Respondent adopted and ratified their conduct and assumed sponsorship of the stoppage. This is evident not only from Martin's conduct on the afternoon of July 30, described above, and from the failure of the Respondent to disavow, until directed so to do by court injunction, responsibility for the stoppage which it knew was being at- tributed to it, but also by the conduct of its business officers who, by their responses to employee inquiries as to when the situation would be "straightened out," in effect confirmed the views of the employees and affirmatively represented that the stoppage was under the Respondent's sponsorship, and thereby induced and encouraged the employees to continue to engage in the work stoppage. 3. As to the objective of the work stoppage It having been found that the employees were engaged in a work stoppage, in the nature of a 'strike, for which the Respondent is responsible, there is left only to consider the objective of the strike. As to that the Respondent took no position since it relied on its claim that there was no concerted refusal to work, but a quitting by individuals for personal reasons. Most of the facts pertinent to a consideration of that question have already been set forth. As has been shown, no grievances or complaints concerning wages or working conditions had been filed during the month preceding the work stoppage. The Respondent, through its business manager and through the International repre- sentative charged with representation of the local, had expressed displeasure over the award of a contract to Kiser Electric Company, a non-union contractor. Steward Campbell, before telling Proffitt to go home, notified him that the em- ployees were quitting because the Company had awarded a contract to a non- union contractor ; and Assistant Business Manager Goodman made a similar statement to Chambers when he called Chambers at his home. Credited evidence in the record reflects that the employees generally understood that that was the cause of the work stoppage.2° In a statement filed with the General Counsel after the charges were filed, the Respondent, although denying responsi- bility for the work stoppage, asserted that the cessation of work was due to "dissatisfaction [resulting] from the wage scale . . . and also dissatisfaction of a non-union subcontractor on the job at Oak Ridge." These facts combine to dispel doubt that the strike was motivated, in part at least, by the presence of Kiser at Oak Ridge, and that at least one of the objects of the strike action was to force the Company to cease doing business with Kiser. It is so found. 4. General conclusion Upon the basis of the foregoing analysis, and on the record as a whole, the Trial Examiner is persuaded, and he finds, that between July 29, 1948, and Septem- 26 Thus, Hulsey, an "inside" electrician, testified that at the time he quit, there was general conversation among the 25 to 30 employees standing about the office to the effect that all were quitting because a non-union contractor had come in the job. Fitzgerald, an "outside" electrical worker, stated, "We knew it was over the fuss about the non-union contractor coming to work at the Glenwood school." LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 715 her 2, 1948, Respondent engaged in, and, by orders, induced and encouraged the electrician employees of the Company to engage in a strike or a concerted re- fusal in the course of their employment to perform any services for the Com- pany, an object thereof being to force the Company to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Company set forth in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead, and have led to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local 760, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. Roane-Anderson Company is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. 3. By engaging in, and by inducing and encouraging employees of Roane- Anderson Company to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services for Roane-Anderson Company, an object thereof being to force or require Roane-Anderson Company to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., their officers and agents, shall : 1. Cease and desist from engaging in or inducing the members of the Re- spondent to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their em- ployment to perform services for their employer, where an object thereof is to require Roane-Anderson Company or any other person to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which it is found will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Post in conspicuous places at its business office in Knoxville, Tennessee, copies of the notice attached hereto as an appendix. Copies of the notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being signed by a representative of the Respondent, be posted by the Respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where 716 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ; (b) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region in writing within twenty (20) days from the date of receipt of this Intermediate Report what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. It is further recommended that, unless the Respondent shall, within twenty (20) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, notify said Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommenda- tion, the National Labor Relations Board shall issue an order requiring the Respondent to take the action aforesaid. As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board-Series 5, as amended August 18, 1948, any party may, within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203 45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C. an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Inter- mediate Report and Recommended Order or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof; and any party may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report and Recommended Order. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed, and if mimeo- graphed shall be double spaced. Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section 203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board. In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom- mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Dated at Washington, D. C., this 2nd day of November 1948. ARTHUR LEFT, Trial Examiner. APPENDIX NOTICE To ALL MEMBERS OF LOCAL 760, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, A. F. OF L. Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our members that : WE WILL NOT engage in, or induce or encourage the members of Local 760 to engage in, any strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform any services for their employer, where an object thereof is to LOCAL 760, INTERNAT'L BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 717 force or require Roane-Anderson or any other person to cease doing business with Kiser Electric Company. LOCAL 760, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, A. F. OF L., Employer. By -------------------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) Dated-------------------- This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.