United Aircraft Corp.

In the Matter of CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION OF UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION and LODGE 1639, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIA- TION OF MACHINISTS Case No. 16-CA-130.-Decided July 14,1949 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a charge filed on January 17, 1949, by Lodge 1639, Inter- national Association of Machinists, herein called the IAM, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the General Counsel, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region (Fort Worth, Texas), issued a complaint dated May 3, 1949, against Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation,' herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charge and the com- plaint, together with notice of hearing, were duly served upon the Respondent. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance (1) that on December 2, 1948, the Respondent suspended and, on February 21, 1949, it discharged employee Pierre L. Rossini because he joined or assisted the IAM or engaged in other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and thereafter failed and refused to reinstate him; (2) that the Respondent (a) interrogated its employees concerning their union affiliations (b) urged, persuaded, threatened, and warned its employees to refrain from assisting, becoming or remaining members of the IAM and (c) made promises of benefits to its employees for the purpose of inducing them to withdraw from the IAM and made threats of reprisal if such employees did not withdraw from that labor organiza- The name of the Respondent appears as amended at the hearing. 85 N. L. R. B., No. 32. 183 184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion; and (3) that on or about October 15, 1948, Respondent's foreman Fleischer, told an employee that "I was going to reprimand Rossini when he supposedly left for his mother's funeral. I know that he its the one who has been writing about me in the Union paper and because of his union activities I am going to lay him off when he gets back." On May 17, 1949, the Respondent filed its answer to the complaint, denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Dallas, Texas, on May 24, 25, 26, and 27, 1949, before William E. Spencer, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the IAM, and the Respondent were represented by counsel or other representatives and participated in the hearing. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the close of the hearing, the Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. With the consent of all the parties, the Trial Examiner orally analyzed the evidence in lieu of an Intermediate Report and granted the Respondent's motion? During the course of the 1i earing, the Trial Examiner made rulings on other motions and on the admis- sion of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. After the close of the hearing, the IAM filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's findings, and a supporting brief. The Board has con- sidered the IA-TNT's exceptions and finds them to be without merit. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : FINDINGS Or FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY United Aircraft Corporation is a Delaware corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of aircraft and related products. It operates plants in many parts of the United States. At Grand Prairie, Texas, it operates an aircraft manufacturing plant known as the Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation. This plant is still in the process of organization. However, the Re- spondent has purchased for its Grand Prairie plant, raw materials such as aluminum and steel valued in excess of $100,000, of which 90 percent has been shipped to the plant from points outside the State of Texas. 'The TAM excepts to the procedure adopted by the Trial Examiner in dismissing the complaint without issuing a written Intermediate Report . As all parties originally agreed to this method of disposing of the case, we find no merit in this exception. CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 185 It has made sales of products manufactured at the plant valued in excess of $100,000, of which 90 percent has been shipped to points out- side the State of Texas. We find that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meanig of the Act .3 II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Lodge 1639, International Association of Machinists, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The alleged discriminatory discharge of Pierre L. Rossini (a) Chronology of events In the summer of 1948, the Respondent transferred its Chance Vought Division from Stratford, Connecticut, to Grand Prairie, Texas. In connection with this plant shift, it also transported a con- siderable number of its Stratford personnel, including the discharged Rossini, to the new plant in Texas. The employees in the Stratford plant had been represented by -In- ternational Union, United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural Im- plement Workers of America, CIO, herein called the UAW, of which Rossini was a member. After the establishment of the Texas plant, the JAM and the UAW both actively sought to organize the new plant's employees. Rossini became the leading organizer for the IAM in the plant and the president of its local organization. The Respondent was aware of his leadership in behalf of the IAM. Apparently, there was considerable rivalry between the IAM and the UAW, and complaints were made to the management that various employees were conducting organizing activities on company time on behalf of either the UAW or the IAM. The Respondent dis- charged one UAW organizer and forced the resignation of another, in both cases on the complaint of the IAM. The Respondent also warned Rossini in October 1948 against organizing for the IAM on company time under penalty of discharge, after the UAW had com- plained that he was involved in such activities. While there is no evi- dence that Rossini did any organizing work on company time, he was frequently away from his work bench without permission and was observed by the Respondent's supervisors in unauthorized conversa- 3 Matter of United Aircraft Corporation, 67 N. L. R. B. 594. 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion with employees in his own and other departments during working hours. Our dissenting colleagues assert that Rossini was not derelict in the performance of his duty and that therefore his alleged deficiencies in that respect afford no basis for his suspension and ultimate disc charge. We disagree. After considering all the testimony, the Trial Examiner found in this connection that "lie [Rossini] was taking too much time off the job, and I believe that there was a legitimate ground for complaint there." The record clearly. supports the Trial Exam- iner's finding and negatives the dissent's contention. The record shows that Fleischer was a strict disciplinarian who kept tabs on all his men, not only on Rossini as the dissent implies.4 The record shows and be believe, that Fleischer and Williams did not consider Rossini's behavior satisfactory.5 Finally, our dissenting colleagues rely on the testimony of Skaer and Walsh. Both of the witnesses admitted that they worked with their backs to Rossini. They could not readily observe Rossini's excursions in and out of the department. Further- more, a reading of their testimony clearly indicates that they had no credible knowledge of the peregrinations of Rossini. Under these cir- cumstances, we are convinced, and agree with the Trial Examiner, that Rossini was derelict in his duties and that the Respondent had legiti- mate cause for complaint on that account. As part of its program of readjustment, the Respondent allowed transferees from the Stratford plant to take as many as 3 days off with pay to straighten out their personal affairs. Rossini was absent from the plant on November 18, 1948. He later reported to his foreman, Fleischer that he had used the time to move his furniture from the place of storage to his new home .6 Upon this representation, he was paid for the day. On or about November 29, 1948, Fleischer received a routine notice from the accounting department which said that.Ros- sini's furniture was still in storage, and that Rossini would have to pay ' Skaer, a union official and witness for the General Counsel , admitted that Fleischer kept a "close observance . . . on all the men." ° Although Rossini continued to loaf on the job, Fleischer "bent backwards ," did not complain to his superiors, and refrained from discharging Rossini not only because, as the dissent points out , supervision was "lenient ," but also because Fleischer took into account Rossini 's youth and veteran 's status and the pregnancy of Rossini 's wife as well as the Respondent 's expense in transferring Rossini and his family to Texas. Rossini unequivocally testified that Williams warned him against soliciting on company time ; that he had promised Williams that he would not do so; and that Williams had acknowledged Rossini's cooperation in this matter. With respect to Rossini 's neglecting his work, Williams testified that Rossini had admitted that he was [ still] talking on the job and that he had nothing to worry about if he cut out this loafing. Accordingly, we do not believe that Williams thanked Rossini for keeping his promise to stay on the job, but for keeping his promise not to solicit on company time. ° Rossini denied that he had given this explanation of how he used the November 18 day off. We credit Fleischer's testimony on this point. CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 187 for any storage charges in excess of 60 days. Foreman Fleischer was disturbed by what he considered to be Rossini's untruthful explana- tion for his absence on November 18, 1948. He asked the plant per- sonnel head if Rossini could not be discharged, because he did not want any man who lied working for him. The personnel department head dissuaded Fleischer from any such action, but suggested that they in- vestigate the excuse given by Rossini the next time he took any time off.7 The very next day, November 30, 1948, Rossini asked for and was given 2 hours off, without pay, upon stating that he wished to take his wife to the doctor. The Respondent assigned one of its internal secu- rity investigators to follow Rossini and check on how he used the time off." The investigator reported back that Rossini had not taken his wife to the doctor and, moreover, had not even gone home.9 The fol- lowing day, December 1, 1948, the personnel department head con- fronted Rossini with the investigator and accused him of lying when he asked for the 2 hours off. On December 2, 1948, the Respondent suspended him for lying, pending further investigation to determine whether he should be reinstated or discharged. On February 21,1949, after a full investigation of Rossini's activities the Respondent dis- charged him.10 The principal alleged reasons for the discharge were Rossini's untruthfulness, which was the immediate cause of his sus- pension, his loafing on the job, and his roaming around the plant with- out permission. The dissent argues that there is "no evidence in the record that the excuse given by Rossini for his November 18 absence was contempo- raneously asserted on December 2 as a reason for his suspension on the latter date." We do not agree. The record shows that both Fleischer, and Skerritt, one of the Respondent's personnel advisers, testified credibly that on December 2, they advised Rossini that one of the rea- sons for his suspension was his lying to the Respondent on different ' The personnel department head testified that he was reluctant to take immediate action against Rossini because his family and friends were in Connecticut, his wife was pregnant, and he wanted to be absolutely certain of the facts before invoking any disciplinary procedure against so prominent a union man. 8 There was nothing unusual in this check-up procedure. This investigator testified that he had made approximately 6 investigations during the 4-month period ending December 31, 1948, checking on whether employees had given truthful reasons for taking time off. He also made about 300 investigations during the same period to determine why employees were absent from work. The Trial Examiner found, and we agree, that the Respondent made this check not because of Rossini's union activity, but in order to ascertain whether his explanation in taking time off was true. G Rossini admitted that he had not taken his wife to the doctor, but contended that his wife had felt better and therefore there was no need to take her there. 10 Meanwhile, on January 17, 1949, the IAM had filed charges with the Board alleging that Rossini had been discriminatorily discharged. 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD occasions li Our dissenting colleagues further rely upon the testi- mony of Skerritt and Melton, international representative of the IAM, to show the Respondent's animosity to Rossini's union leader- ship. We do not attach this significance to this testimony. Nor does the record bear it out. It is clear from a reading of Skerritt's testi- mony that when he stated that Rossini "should have been smarter and stayed on the job," he was referring to organizing on company time and not to Rossini's protected activities. Furthermore, Personnel Man- ager Wacks' statement concerning Rossini, made in a conversation with Melton, is more reasonably interpreted as an expression of opinion concerning Rossini's personal character rather than to any animosity towards his union leadership. During this conversation Wacks men- tioned to Melton that Rossini had been lying and loafing. It seems noteworthy that Melton himself did not attach the significance to Wacks' remarks that our dissenting colleagues do. Under these cir- cumstances, we believe, contrary to our dissenting colleagues, that the record does not show a dislike for Rossini's union leadership, but rather a dislike for Rossini's personal characteristics as an employee. (b) Conclusions The Respondent honestly and reasonably believed that Rossini had not given a truthful explanation for the time which he took off on No- vember 18 and 30, 1948. The Respondent says that it suspended him for that reason. The General Counsel and the IAM contend that Rossini's union activities were the real reason for the suspension. But the burden rests on the General Counsel to prove that the assigned rea- son was only a pretext designed to obscure the real reason-Rossini's union activities. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the General Counsel has not sustained this burden. We regard as particularly significant the fact that the respondent is actively recognizing and bargaining collectively with both the IAM and the UAW at other plants, and that there is not the slightest evidence of favoritism on the part of the Respondent toward either of the unions now seeking to organize the employees in the Grand Prairie plant. Nor indeed is there any competent legal evidence of antiunion bias on the part of the Respondent. Nor can we find discriminatory the decision to discharge Rossini. His known prominence in the IAM did not afford him immunity against discipline. We agree with the Trial Examiner that there was "Fleischer testified that "I told him [Rossini] that lie was always lying to me on so many occasions already . . . Skerritt told Rossini that ". . . you wanted some time off for one reason and you had another reason, you used it for another purpose." CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 189 nothing unreasonable in the Respondent's making a full investigation of Rossini's conduct before determining whether to lift his suspension or to discharge him, especially since he had threatened the Respondent with Board action at the time of his suspension. We can perceive no impropriety in the Respondent's taking into account Rossini's delin- quent work habits in reaching its decision to discharge him. The fact that the Respondent did not earlier seek to discipline him for such conduct did not bar it from considering that conduct in determining whether to lift the suspension or to discharge him. Accordingly, we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Respondent did not discharge Pierre L. Rossini in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We shall therefore dismiss this allegation of the complaint. B. The alleged interference, restraint, or coercion 1. The complaint alleged that the Respondent interrogated its em- ployees concerning their union affiliations. No proof was offered in support of this allegation. Accordingly, we shall dismiss it. 2. The complaint also alleged that on or about October 15, 1948, Foreman Fleischer told an employee that he was going to discharge Rossini because of his union activities. The only witness who testified to this alleged conversation said that he did not observe Fleischer make the statement, nor the person to whom it was made, but merely heard Fleischer's voice through a partition. Fleischer denied making the statement. The Trial Examiner credited his denial. We accept the Trial Examiner's resolution of this issue of credibility, as it was not clearly erroneous.12 Accordingly, we shall also dismiss this allega- tion of the complaint. 3. The only evidence offered in support of the allegation that the Respondent threatened employees, or offered them benefits, in order to influence their union activities was orientation speeches made by Per- sonnel Adviser Taylor, in the fall and winter of 1948, to small groups of employees. During these talks, which were intended to acquaint employees with the Respondent's policies and procedures, Taylor said that the Respondent would prefer to operate without a union for a year and asked the employees to wait that long before they decided whether they wanted a union. He mentioned the benefits that the Respondent had already given and contemplated giving its employees, including retirement benefits, insurance, medical service, hospitaliza- tion, credit union, a company store, and a company club. As a matter of company policy, these benefits were granted to employees in all of the Respondent's plants throughout the United States. They had also 12 Matter of Kentucky UtiUt %es Company, 83 N. L. R. $. 981. 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD formerly been enjoyed by the employees at the Stratford, Connecticut, plalit, the former site of the Chance Vought Division plant. Neither expressly, nor by implication, can Taylor's speech fairly be said to have tended to convey the thought that these benefits would be granted or withheld depending upon whether employees did or did not join a union. Under these circumstances, we find (in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the speech, although it indicated the Respond- ent's preference for no union for at least a year, did not contain a promise of benefit nor a threat of reprisal and therefore was privileged under Section 8 (c) of the Act.13 Accordingly, we shall unanimously dismiss these allegations of the complaint. As we have found that the Respondent has not engaged in any of the alleged unfair labor practices, we shall dismiss the complaint in its entirety. ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein against the Respondent, Chance Vought Aircraft Division of United Aircraft Corporation, Grand Prairie, Texas, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBERS REYNOLDS and MURDOCH, concurring in part and dissent- ing in part : We concur in so much of the majority opinion as dismisses the 8 (a) (1) allegations in the complaint. We would not, however, dismiss the 8 (a) (3) allegation in the complaint. The majority finds, as did the Trial Examiner, that Rossini was suspended on December 2, 1948, and later discharged on February 21, 1949, for continued absences from the job, for loafing on the job, and for lying to a supervisor. We do not agree. Rossini reported to the Grand Prairie plant on August 2, 1948?4 About the first week in October 1948, Earl Williams, assistant to the chief tool engineer, warned Rossini that his job would be in jeopardy if he was caught loafing. Rossini promised Williams that he would pay is Section 8 (c) provides : The expressing of any views , argument , or opinion . . . shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 14 There can be little doubt that Rossini's work was satisfactory prior to his transfer from the Stratford , Connecticut, plant to the Grand Prairie, Texas, plant . Otherwise, the Respondent would not have spent $1,100 to transfer Rossini from Connecticut to Texas. Nor, if his work at Stratford had been unsatisfactory , would Rossini have been able to secure the signatures of four members of the Respondent 's supervisory staff at Stratford as required for transfer in instances where the individual was not earning $300 a month. There is no convincing evidence in the record to show that Rossini's work was unsatis- factory during the months of August and September at the Grand Prairie plant. CHANCE NOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 191 stricter attention to his job. Williams at that time advised Kurt -Fleischer, Rossini's immediate supervisor, to keep a close watch on Rossini's activities. Rossini was then instructed to report his ab- -sences, no matter how trivial, from his department . His activities ,were thereafter closely watched. As a result, on about November 6, Rossini sought out Williams to inquire why so much "pressure" was being applied to him. In the course of this discussion, according to Rossini's undenied testimony, Williams thanked Rossini for keeping his promise to stay on the job made during their October conversation. It appears, therefore, that Williams was satisfied that Rossini had not, been neglecting his work during October and the first week in, November. Sometime during the first week in November, Arthur Skerritt, a .personnel advisor, was instructed by his superior, Peter Wacks, plant personnel manager, to inform Fleischer that Rossini should be dis- charged if he was caught loafing or was otherwise derelict in his du- ties. Fleischer nevertheless did not terminate Rossini for any alleged infractions during the month of November. For that matter, Fleischer testified that he never had reason to complain to a superior about Rossini.- Therefore, it appears that Rossi ni's behavior during the months of October and November , the crucial period here in ques- tion, was considered satisfactory by Fleischer and as indicated above also by Williams , Fleischer's superior. In coming to a contrary conclusion and apparently adopting the Trial Examiner's finding that Rossini "took too much time off of his job," we believe that our colleagues have failed to accord certain vital facts their entitled weight. Accepting the Trial Examiner's ruling that the testimony of the Respondent 's witnesses concerning Rossini's ,alleged loafing and absences was exaggerated, the credibility of these, witnesses on this particular issue is impugned. It is our opinion that the Board should, therefore , independently consider the testimony of two witnesses for the ,General Counsel to the effect that Rossini was not absent or loafing any more than other ' employees. We perceive no reason why this testimony of witnesses Skaer and Walsh should not be credited , as it appears forthright and.'honest. Furthermore, as- suming that Rossini was away from his department on occasion,16 the "In view of this testimony of Fleischer , and in view of Fleischer's further testimony that he first thought of suspending Rossini on December 1, we do not credit Wacks' testi - mony, as does the majority, to the effect that Fleischer asked him sometime before the- November 30 episode "If Rossini could be discharged , because he did not want any man; who lied working for him." (The quotation is from the majority opinion.) " Skaer testified that he did not "notice" that Rossini left his work bench any more frequently than other employees. And Walsh's testimony was to the effect. that Rossini: did not take "any more or less time" off during working hours than did other employees. 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD evidence discloses that the Respondent viewed occasional absences as normal during the period in question. At that time operations were admittedly in a state of flux due to the incompleted organization of operations at Grand Prairie. The record shows that machinery was then being installed' and that the number of employees at -the Grand Prairie plant increased from 700 in September to 1,900 in December. Fleischer, Rossini's supervisor, testified that there was considerable "confusion" in the departments under his supervision in the fall of '1948, and that because of this condition supervision was "lenient" at that time. Upon the basis of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that Rossini was not derelict in the performance of his duties during the months of October and November, and that, contrary to the contention of the Respondent, his alleged work dereliction during those months affords no justifiable reason for his December 2 suspension and his ultimate discharge. We come now to the episodes which the Respondent asserts were the immediate cause for the disciplinary action taken against Rossini. Sometime in November, Rossini was advised by his supervisor, Fleischer, that in keeping with the Respondent's readjustment policy Rossini was entitled to a day off which if not taken immediately would be lost. Rossini thereupon did not report for work on November 18. Since Rossini had presumably taken this day off pursuant to the advice of Fleischer, it indeed seems unusual for the Respondent to raise a question concerning the veracity of any excuse given by Rossini for this absence. The Respondent nevertheless contends that because of the alleged untruth of Rossini's excuse on this occasion, it decided to check Rossini's excuses for future absences and accordingly, during the 2 hours leave granted him on November 30, subjected him to the sur- veillance which led to his December 2 suspension. However, for rea- sons appearing below, we are of the opinion that (1) the alleged un- truth of Rossini's explanation on November 18 was not the real reason for the surveillance of his activities on November 30,x7 and (2) the alleged untruth of Rossini's excuse of November 30 was used as a pre- text to suspend and then discharge Rossini. "In this posture of the case, the excuse , if any, given by Rossini on November 18 Is unimportant . We therefore find it unnecessary to choose between the conflicting testi- mony of Fleischer and Rossini on this point. Accordingly, we do not take issue with the credibility finding of the majority made in footnote 6, supra. Moreover, assuming that Rossini did not move his furniture on November 18 despite his assertion to Fleischer that :he did, we do not believe that this disparity proves that Rossini improperly used company compensated time. The record discloses that the 3 clays allotted for readjustment were to be used to settle "personal affairs," such as housing, banking, and insurance. There is no ,evidence in the record to show that Rossini did not so use November 18. CHANCE VOUGHT AIRCRAFT DIVISION 193 Early in October 1948, reports reached the Respondent that Rossini was soliciting membership in the IAM during working hours. There- after, because of these reports, Rossini's activities on the job came under the close surveillance of top management officials is as well as of Rossini's immediate supervisors. While the Respondent's right to engage in such surveillance cannot be questioned, we are convinced, that the background and the intensity of the surveillance in this case exceeded the bounds of caution usually taken to enforce rules against solicitation. On the record before us, it appears that the excessiveness of this incident, including the final surveillance of November 30, stern- med from the Respondent's desire to rid itself of Rossini's services because of the totality of his activities on behalf of the IAM. We rely on the following in support of this position. There is no evidence in the record that the excuse given by Rossini for his Novem- ber 18 absence was contemporaneously asserted on December 2 as a reason for his suspension on the latter date. Skerritt, the Respondent's personnel adviser, in explaining to Rossini the reasons for his suspen- sion told him on December 2, among other things, that he "should have been smarter and stayed on the job, to organize a plant you got to be careful that you don't just roam all around." Since Skerritt testified that he did not know that Rossini ever organized on company time and that he did not on December 2 tell Rossini that the latter had been organizing on company time, we construe Skerritt's explanation of the suspension as indicating that the suspension was prompted by Rossini's participation in protected union activities. . Further evidence of the part Rossini's union activities played in his suspension may be gleaned from personnel manager Wacks' remarks on December 8 to Melton, international representative of the IAM. On that occasion, according to Melton's undenied testimony, Wacks stated that "Rossini is not the type of man you want to represent the union. We just don't want him here. Why don't you get him a job some place else? Get him a job at Consolidated. We don't want him. He is not the type of lean we want." In our opinion, these remarks disclose an animosity for Rossini's union leadership. It is sig- nificant to note that Rossini's suspension came soon after the announce- ment on November 24 that Rossini was the sole nominee for the presi- dency of the IAM local at the Grand Prairie plant, and that the 18 The list of top management personnel who engaged in the surveillance is impressive. It includes the personnel director of all plants of the United Aircraft Corporation, the personnel manager of the Grand Prairie plant, a personnel adviser, and the superintendent of detail manufacturing . In addition , as stated above, Rossini's activities were closely watched by the supervisors in his own department , as a result of instructions from the assistant to the chief tool engineer. 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD foregoing statement of Wacks was made shortly after Rossini's elec- tion on December 2, making Rossini the chief JAM official with whom the Respondent would have to deal. In considering the Respondent's antiunion animus toward Rossini, we have not overlooked the fact that the Respondent is actively recognizing and bargaining collectively with both the IAM and the UAW at its other plants. We merely treat this fact as consistent with our belief that the Respondent's discrimina- tion resulted not necessarily from a dislike for a particular labor organ- ization, but from a dislike for a particular union leadership. We agree that Rossini's leadership in the IAM did not immunize him against discharge. However, we have difficulty in attaching the same significance to the November 30 episode as does the Respondent. On that date, Rossini requested 2 hours leave. It was granted unhes- itatingly by Fleischer; it caused no disruption in production; and it caused the Respondent no monetary loss as it was taken on Rossini's own time. Therefore, even if the Respondent honestly believed that Rossini lied in the reason given for taking off, we are convinced that the alleged lie was of little consequence. Accordingly, in view of the Respondent's antiunion animus toward Rossini, we are of the opinion that the alleged November 30 lie merely served as a pretext for the discharge. Upon the basis of all the evidence in the case with particular empha- sis upon the intensity of the surveillance and upon the statements of Skerritt and Wacks on December 2 and December 8, respectively, we are of the opinion that the surveillance herein was motivated by the Respondent's animus toward Rossini because of his prominence in the TAM and his activities on its behalf and that the alleged episode of November 30 was used as a pretext to obscure the real reason for Rossini's discharge, namely said union activities. Contrary to the ma- jority, we believe that the General Counsel has sustained the burden of proof and, therefore, that the 8 (a) (3) allegation in the complaint should be sustained.