International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

In the Matter of INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL `YORKERS ,- A. F. OF L., LOCAL No. 16 and AL J. SCHNEIDER CODi- PANY, INC. Case No. 9-CC-2l.-Decided November 18, 19.19 DECISION AND ORDER On July 21, 1949, Trial Examiner John H. Eadie issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief ; the Respondent also filed a brief. The request for oral argument made by the General Counsel is hereby denied, inasmuch as the record and the briefs, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case. It adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner only insofar as they are consistent with this Decision and Order. While we agree with the Trial Examiner's ultimate finding herein, that the Respondent did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, we do not predicate our Decision on an evaluation of the alleged un- lawful acts, as did the Trial Examiner, but on more fundamental grounds. The complaint alleges in substance that, by its picketing activities, the Respondent induced the employees of Schneider, a building con- tractor on the Owensboro, Kentucky, school project, to engage in a concerted refusal to work, with an object of forcing the Owensboro Board of Education to cancel its contract with Abrams, another con- 87 NLRB No. 18. 99 8778,59-50-vol. 87--8 100 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tractor on the same project, and to cease doing business with him, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act provides, in relevant part, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to induce the employees of any em- ployer to engage in a concerted refusal to perform any services where an object thereof is forcing "any employer or other person to cease doing business with any other person" (emphasis supplied). Essen- tial to a disposition of the secondary boycott issue, therefore, is a determination whether the Board of Education of the city of Owens- boro, Kentucky, is an "employer" or a "person" within the meaning of the Act. Section 2 (2) excludes from the definition of the term "employer," "any state or political subdivision thereof." 1 The legislature of Ken- tucky, acting under authority of the State constitution, has divided the State into subdivisions or districts, coextensive with counties and cities, for the purpose of managing and controlling the common school system. The Owensboro Board of Education manages and controls one of these subdivisions. As such it is authorized to establish schools, appoint employees, administer school funds and property, and adopt rules, regulations, and bylaws consistent with the general school laws of the State.2 In interpreting the State constitution and relevant statutes, the Kentucky courts have held that the district boards of education exer- cise a State function,3 are composed of State officers,4 and hold State property.,' And courts in other jurisdictions have declared school districts to be political subdivisions of the State.6 i This language was contained in the original Act and carried over without change in the amended Act. The legislative history of the original, as well as of the amended, Act, is silent as to its precise meaning. 2 Kentucky Revised Statutes, 1946, Title XIII, Sections 150.010, 156.010, 156.030, 156.070, 156.110, 160.010, 160.120, 160.160, 160.200, 160.240, 160.290 ; and State constitution, Section 183. 3 City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 488, 121 S. W. 411. A district board of education is a "taxing district" or other "municipality," and as "such operates in every particular as do other municipal corporations." Lee v. Board of Education of Bell County, 261 Ky. 379, 87 S. W. 2d 961. See also Board of Education of Kenton County v. Talbott, 286 Ky. 543, 151 S. W. 2d 42. 4 Middleton v. Middleton, 239 Ky. 759, 40 S. W. 20 311. 5 City of Louisville v. Leatherman, 99 Ky. 213, 35 S. W. 625. 6 Gulf Refining Company Y. School District, 109 Pa. Super. 177, 167 A. 620; Commander v. Board of Com'rs. of Bicras Levee District, Louisiana, 11 So. 2d 605;Gould v. Richmond School District, 136 P. 2d 864, 58 Cal. App. 2d 497 ; Taylor v. Board of Education of City of San Diego, 89 P. 2d 148, 31 Cal. App. 2d 734; Easier v. Maybank, 5 S. E. 2d 288 , 191 S. C. 511; King's Estate V. School Trustees of IVillaey County (Texas), 33 S. W. 2d 783. Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Shamberg's Estate, 144 F. 2d 998, 1004 (C. A. 2) where the Court quoted with approval the following definition of political subdivision of a State : "The term `political subdivision' is broad and comprehensive and denotes any division of the State made by the proper authorities thereof, acting within their consti- tutional powers, for the purpose of carrying out a portion of those functions of the State which by long usage dnd inherent necessities of government have always been regarded 11 as public. . . . INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 101' In view of the foregoing, we find that the Board of Education of the city of Owensboro is a political subdivision of the State of Ken- tucky and, as such, is not an "employer" within the meaning of the Act.' Section 2 (1) defines the term "person" as follows : "The term 'per- son' includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partner- ships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trus- tees in bankruptcy, or receivers." This definition makes no reference to any state or political subdivision thereof. We consider this omis- sion purposeful and, when viewed together with the exclusion of "the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof" from the term "employer" in Section 2 (2), indicative of a congres- _ sional intent to exempt public instrumentalities from the definition of "person" within the meaning of the Act. In this connection, we regard as controlling the decision of the Supreme Court in U. S. v. John L. Lewis, et al.," in which the argument that the term "person" in the Norris-La Guardia Act includes the sov- ereign, was considered and rejected. The Court there said: The Act does not define "person." In common usage that term does not include the sovereign, and statutes employing it, will ordinarily not be construed to do so. Congress made express provision, Rev. Stat. Sec. 1, 2 FCA Title 1 Sec. 1, for the term to extend to partnerships and corporations, and in Section 13 of the Act it is to extend to associations. The absence of any compar- able provision extending the term to sovereign governments im- plies that Congress did not desire the term to extend to them. Accordingly, we find that the term "person" as contained in Section 2 (1) of the Act, does not embrace within its scope the Board of Education of Owensboro, a political subdivision of the sovereign State of Kentucky. In view of our findings herein, we must conclude that none of the Respondent's picketing activities had as an object thereof, the forcing of "any employer or other person to cease doing business with any other person" within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the amended Act.9 We shall therefore dismiss the entire complaint. ° In representation proceedings arising under the original Act, the Board held that a State harbor district and a State clocks commission were political subdivisions of the State, and accordingly dismissed the petitions. Cf. Oxnard Harbor District, 34 NLRB 1285; Mobile Steamship Association, et at., 8 NLRB 1297. 8 330 U. S. 258. 9 Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf eurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 201, AFL (Supreme Rice Mills, et al. ), 84 NLRB 360. 102 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER Upon the entire record in the case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein against the Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. William A. McGowan, for the General Counsel. Mr. J. D. Inman , of Louisville , Ky., and Mr. R. T. Sweeney, of Owensboro, Ky., for the Complainant. Mr. Norris Vincent, of Owensboro, Ky., for the Respondent. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed by Al J. Schneider Company, Inc., herein called the Complainant, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, respectively called herein the General Counsel and the Board, by the Regional Director of the Ninth Region (Cincinnati, Ohio), issued a complaint dated June 1, 1949, against International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charge, the complaint, and notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respondent and the Complainant. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that on or about April 7, 1949, the Board of Education of the city of Owensboro awarded contracts for the erection of a school building ; that the general contract was awarded to the Complainant; that the plumbing and heating contract was awarded to Ford McCormick Plumbing and Heating Company, herein called McCormick; that the electrical contract was awarded to Frank Abrams, doing business as Frank Abrams Electric Company, herein called Abrams; that com- mencing on or about April 25, 1949, and until the date of the complaint, while Abrams was performing his contract, the Respondent, by its officers and agents, induced and encouraged the employees of the Complainant and of McCormick and other persons in and near Owensboro, Kentucky, to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to perform services for their employers; and that an object of said strike or concerted refusal to perform services was and is to force or require the Complainant, McCormick, and the Owensboro Board of Education to cease doing business with Abrams. The Respondent filed an answer wherein it denied the commission of any un- fair labor practices. As a defense, the Respondent pleaded that after a hearing on June 1, 1949, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, a petition of the General Counsel for a temporary injunction was denied. The Respondent stated in its answer that on April 25, 1949, a picket line was established at the job-site of the school building for the reason that Abrams was a nonunion contractor and failed to recognize the Respondent. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 103 Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Owenboro, Kentucky, on June 21, 1949, before the undersigned Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, the Com- plainant, and the Respondent were represented by counsel. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. The parties stipulated to incor- porate into the record of this proceeding the entire transcript (excepting a certain stipulation therein which related mainly to the jurisdictional allegations in the petition) of the Bearing and proceeding in Jack G. Evans, etc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, Case No. 390 (Owensboro), held in the District Court of the Western District of Kentucky, on June 1, 1949, before Judge Mac Swinford. Opportunity was afforded all parties to argue orally before the Trial Examiner, and to file briefs and/or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The General Counsel and the Respondent filed briefs with the Trial Examiner. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. COMMERCE; THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS The Complainant is a Kentucky corporation with its principal office located at Shively, Kentucky, where it is engaged in the general construction business. During the fiscal year ending March 31, 1949, its gross receipts from construction work amounted to $1,928,586.36. All of such work was performed within the State of Kentucky. During the same period the Complainant purchased ma- terials, such as steel and tile, in the total amount of $672,643.64. Materials having an approximate value of $564,901.21, or 83.9 percent of the total purchases, originated or were fabricated outside the State of Kentucky. During the above period, the Complainant purchased materials having an approximate value of $28,170.19, or 4.9 percent of the said amount of $564,901.21, from sellers located outside the State of Kentucky, and caused said materials to be delivered directly to the sites of construction projects in the State of Kentucky. At the time of the hearing, the Complainant was engaged in the performance of a construction con- tract at Clarksville, Indiana, amounting approximately to the sum of $200,000. Abrams is an individual doing business under the name and style of Frank Abrams Electric Company, with his principal office and place of business located at Owensboro, Kentucky, where lie is engaged in electrical work. During the calendar year 1948, his gross receipts amounted approximately to the sum of $60,000. A small amount of work, or less than 1 percent of said amount, was performed by Abrams in the State of Indiana. From December 31, 1948, to the date of the hearing, Abrams' gross receipts amounted to approximately $25,000. During 1918 his purchases of supplies and materials amounted to approximately $31,000. Approximately 95 percent of said amount was purchased by Abrams from sellers located outside the State of Kentucky. The same percentage applies to purchases by Abrams during the period after December 31, 1948. The supplies so purchased consisted of wire, conduits, fixtures, motors, and sign material. Ford McCormick is an individual doing business under the mane and style of Ford McCormick Plumbing and Heating Company, with his principal office and place of business located at Owensboro, Kentucky, where he is engaged in plumbing and heating work. During the calendar year 1948, McCormick's gross receipts amounted to $545,984.13. During the same period, his total purchases of materials and supplies amounted to $407,391.78. Of this latter 104 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD amount, approximately $282,000 worth of materials was purchased by McCormick from sellers located outside of Kentucky. Such materials consisted of pipe, enamelware, chinaware, boilers, and radiators. During 1948, McCormick per- formed work having a value of approximately $1,000 in the State. of Indiana. From December 31, 1948, until the date of the hearing, his gross receipts amounted to approximately $200,000; and materials having a value of approximately. $75,000 were purchased by McCormick from sellers located outside of Kentucky. Most of the supplies so purchased by McCormick are shipped in interstate com- merce to his establishment in Qwensboro. In the opinion of the undersigned, the above facts demonstrate that to a considerable degree the operations of the Complainant, Abrams, and McCormick involve and affect interstate commerce. The undersigned therefore finds that the Complainant, Abrams, and McCormick are engaged in commerce and also that their operations affect commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The facts On April 7, 1949, the Board of Education of the city of Owensboro, Kentucky, awarded three separate contracts for the erection of a school building. The Complainant was awarded the general contract for the total sum of $223,712.33; McCormick was awarded the plumbing and heating contract for $45,441; and Abrams was awarded the contract for the electrical work in the amount of $13,295. Abrams was a nonunion contractor, that is, he did not recognize the Respondent and (lid not employ any of its members. The Complainant is a union contractor. Shortly after April 7, Robert Risley, assistant business manager of the Re- spondent, conferred with Walter Roberts, an architect who represented the Board of Education. Risley told Roberts, "We are a little surprised-why don't you just go ahead and let Riggs [a union contractor] have the contract [for electrical work]. . . . you don't want to have any trouble on the job." Thereafter, Risley talked to the members of the Board of Education, urging them to award the electrical contract "to the best and lowest bidder" and to take the contract away from Abrams. The Complainant started construction work on or about April 18. On that date Risley appeared at the job and spoke to Al J. Schneider, an officer of the Complainant. Risley told Schneider that Abrams was a nonunion contractor ; that the Respondent accordingly was going to cause "some trouble" on the job ; that he had talked to members of the Board of Education about it ; and that they had assured him that something would be clone about awarding the electrical contract to the next lowest bidder, provided that the Respondent "took action first." Risley also stated that when Abrams started work on the job, a picket line would be established. Schneider replied that if the job was going to be picketed, he would prefer to have it happen at the start of the work rather than in the middle. Schneider then agreed that he would request Abrams to install a light in the Complainant's tool shed in order to get him on the job site. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 105 Abrams first appeared on the job at about 2 p. m. on April 25. Some few minutes later; the Respondent established a picket line of one man.'. The picket carried a placard which stated, "Non-Union Electricians Employed On This Job." About 10 minutes after the picket line was established the Complainant's employees ceased work and left the job site. At the time, the Complainant was employing union carpenters whose local union also was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. As a reason for leaving the job, the carpenters told Henry Kincaid, the Complainant's superintendent of construction, that they were not "going to get in trouble with the picket." Thereafter, and until the date of the hearing herein, the picket line was maintained by the Respondent at the job site. The evidence conclusively shows that picketing was peaceful 'at all times. Kincaid requested Risley on several occasions to remove the picket during conversations with him on and after April 26. Risley refused. Kincaid also urged the Complainant's employees to return to work, but they stated that they could not cross the picket line. Schneider conferred with the business agent of the carpenters' union and requested that the carpenters return to work. The request was refused. On about April 29, Risley told Schneider that he regretted the delay caused the Complainant on the job, and that he was going to see the Board of Education the next day. Schneider asked him to remove the picket so that the Complain- ant could proceed with construction work. Risley replied that he would speak to his superior about it. The following day Risley told Schneider that the picket would be maintained as long as Abrams had the contract for the electrical work. During one of the above-related conversations, Risley requested Schneider to urge the Board of Education to reject Abrams' bid and award the contract to the next lowest bidder. On about May 4, 1949, the Complainant filed with the General Counsel a charge against the Respondent. The General Counsel thereafter petitioned the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky for a temporary injunction against the Respondent. After a hearing on June 1, Judge Mac Swinford of said court denied the petition. At the hearing herein, all parties joined in a stipulation which provides in part as follows : It is further stipulated by and between the parties hereto that Al J. Schneider Company, the general contractor on said job, did on Monday, June 13, 1949, secure the necessary labor, including the necessary crafts, and resumed construction of the work at Sixteenth and Breckenridge Streets in Owensboro, Kentucky ; that said construction work is, on this date, in progress ; that Ford McCormick has not yet commenced work on said project under his contract with the Board of Education for the City of Owensboro, Kentucky ; that the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 16, has continued to maintain a peaceful picket on said site for the same purposes and reasons for which pickets were originally placed on said site; that deliveries of material have been made on said job site since June 1, 1949; that Al J. Schneider Company, Ford McCormick and Frank Abrams Electric Company each have separate contracts with the Board of Education of the City of Owensboro, for the general construction, the plumb- ing and heating and electric wiring and installation, respectively, for the school building ; that the completion of the building depends upon the fn I It appears that a relief man also accompanied the picket. 106 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fillment by each contractor of the obligation of his own contract since neither the plumbing and heating, nor the electrical work can be installed until the necessary preliminary construction has been completed ; that there are no other or additional known facts material to the issues in the above entitled matter. B. Concluding findings Section 8, subsection (b) (4) (A) of the Act provides as follows: 8 (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- (4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any em- ployer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person; The General Counsel contends, in substance, that the Respondent's placing of a picket at the site of the school project constituted an inducement to the em- ployees of the Complainant to engage in a concerted refusal to perform services in the course of their employment ; that an object thereof was to force or require the Board of Education to cancel its contract with Abrams, or to cease doing business with him; and that such activity is proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. I do not believe that a violation of the Act has been proved. The Respondent, by means of peaceful picketing, advertised the fact that nonunion electricians were employed on the job. This was proclaimed by the placard carried by the picket. Although the placard did not mention Abrams, the Respondent actually was taking primary action against Abrams, an employer of electricians, who did not recognize it or employ its members. This is evidenced by the fact that picketing did not start until Abrams first appeared for work at the job site. The evidence conclusively shows that the picketing caused the Complainant's employees to engage in a concerted refusal to work. The Board has held that a labor organization, by peaceful picketing, "induces and encour- ages" employees within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.2 How- ever, the fact that the Respondent's primary pressure on Abrams also may have had a secondary effect, :namely inducing -and encouraging, employees of the Complainant to engage in a concerted refusal to work and thereby tending to force or require the Board of Education to cease doing business with Abrams, does not convert lawful primary action into unlawful secondary action within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) .' Therefore, as I see it, the only issue in the case is whether or not the Respondent's primary action was lawful. I am convinced that it was. 2 Local Ii96, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL (Mont- gomery Fair Co.), 82 NLRB 2'11 ; United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, et al. (Wadsworth Bldg. Co. ), 81 NLRB 802; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 501, et al . (Samuel Langer), 82 NLRB 1028. B Oil Workers International Union, Local Union 31,6 (CIO) (The Pure Oil Company), 84 NLRB 315. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS 107 Absent Risley's admitted attempts to persuade the Board of Education to cancel Abrams' contract or to cease doing business with him, and the agreement or understanding between Schneider and Risley for the former to make a pre- mature request that Abrams work on the job,4 I do not believe that there could be any serious contention that the picketing itself was unlawful. The General Counsel apparently contends that what otherwise was a lawful activity on the part of the Respondent was converted into a violation of the Act by reason of the conduct of Risley, its agent. It is contended that his actions and statements disclosed that an object of the Respondent in establishing the picket was to force the Board of Education to cease doing business with Abrams. There is no contention, nor could there be under the express wording of the Act, that Risley's actions, standing alone, constitute any violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). In my opinion, the General Counsel's contention Would lead to absurd conclusions, and is based upon an erroneoues interpretation of the section, and particularly of the term, "an object," used therein. It places emphasis on the obscure motives of a union in calling a strike, rather than on the apparent object when a secondary action is involved. Since the legislative history of the Act clearly shows that Section 8 (b) (4) (A) was aimed at secondary and not primary action, I believe that the General Counsel's strained construction of the section clearly is con- trary to the intent and purpose of the Congress. The General Counsel has proved that one of the Respondent's motives in the picketing was to induce the Board of Education to cease doing business with Abrams, but did not prove that it was an object within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, it is found that the Respondent has not violated Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act, and it will be recommended that the complaint be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. Al J. Schneider Company, Inc., Frank Abrams, doing business as Frank Abrams Electric Company, and Ford McCormick, doing business as Ford Mc- Cormick Plumbing and Heating Company, are employers who are engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 3. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, A. F. of L., Local No. 16, has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. RECODIDIENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case, I recommend that the complaint against the Respondent be dismissed in its entirety. As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, any party may, within twenty (20) clays from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party 4In this connection it is noteworthy that before any understanding was reached, Risley told Schneider that the job would be picketed when Abrams appeared for work. 108 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of ex- ceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed, and if mimeographed shall be double spaced. Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section 203.46, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten, (10) days from the date of the order transferring the case to the Board. In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and recom- mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Dated at Washington, D. C., this 21st day of July 1949. JOHN H. EAniE, Trial Examniner.