Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.

In the Matter Of WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY and INTERNA- TIONAL WOODWORKERS OF.AMERICA, LOCAL 6-12 Case No. 19P-C-47.-Decided December 15, 1949 DECISION AND ORDER On May 24, 1949, Trial Examiner J. J. Fitzpatrick issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent and the Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rul- ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the additions and modifications noted below. The Trial Examiner found, in effect, and we agree, that the meals furnished by the Respondent to its employees at its sawmill and log- ging camps are "conditions of employment" and "wages" within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, and, accordingly, that the Re- spondent's admitted refusal to bargain with the Union concerning increases in the price charged by the Respondent for such meals was a violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act and Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act as amended. We find no merit in the Respondent's contention that its meals are not "conditions of employment" because it does not require any of its employees to eat at company facilities but maintains such facilities purely as a convenience. Impliedly the Respondent's argument is that the term "conditions of employment" as used in the Act applies only to those conditions under which employees are compelled to work and does not embrace any conditions which the employer establishes 87 NLRB No. 123. 672 WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 673 as a matter of convenience for its employees. While we do not agree with this narrow interpretation of "conditions of employment" because we believe that term was meant to encompass many noncompulsory aspects of the employer-employee relationship,' we do agree that that term certainly applies to conditions under which employees are re- quired to work. And, contrary to the contention of the Respondent, we are of the opinion that, under the circumstances here present, the meals served by the Respondent to its employees fall into the latter category. Of the four operations 2 comprising the Respondent's Klamath Falls Branch, with which we are here concerned, the one nearest to any city or town is 5 miles away from the nearest city .3 Moreover, there is no public transportation to or from any of the operations, and the Respondent does not furnish any. It is true that the Respond- ent does not require its employees to eat at company facilities, in the sense that the Respondent imposes no express obligation on its em- ployees to do so as a condition to obtaining or retaining employment. Indeed, as the record shows, many of its employees with access to private transportation to and from the job provide their own food and shelter. However, because of the isolated location of its opera- tions and the lack of public or Respondent transportation to its operations, employees without feasible means of transportation are necessarily obliged to live and eat at company facilities. If these employees are to work, the circumstances of employment created by the Respondent require them to use the Respondent's living and eating facilities 4 The net result is that such facilities not only repre- sent a necessary condition of employment as it affects these employees, as found by the Trial Examiner, but one that exerts the same force and effect as a condition that is expressly made a necessary part of 1 We have previously rejected, with the approval of the courts, the similar argument that "conditions of employment" has no broader meaning than that perhaps spontaneously suggested by the term "working conditions," and that it therefore only refers to the physi- cal conditions under which employees are compelled to work rather than to the terms or conditions under which employment status is afforded or withdrawn . Inland Steel Com- pany, 77 NLRB 1 ; enforced, 170 F. 2d 247 (C. A. 7) ; cert. denied, 336. U. S. 960. See also Abbott Worsted Mills, Inc., 36 NLRB 545; enforced, 127 F. 2d 438 (C. A. 1), where we held that the lease of company-owned houses to employees, which apparently was done simply as a convenience for the employees , constituted•a condition of their employment within the meaning of the Act. 2 One sawmill and three logging camps. s This is the sawmill. The three logging camps are approximately 20 miles or more away from the nearest city or town. 4 Contrary to the assertion of our dissenting colleague , we thus rest our finding that certain employees are obliged to eat at company facilities on what the Respondent has done , viz, the creation by the Respondent of certain circumstances of employment, and not on what he describes as the "fortuitous circumstances of a small number of employees." His view, we think, erroneously assumes that all rank and file workers today own private means of transportation , or at least that such workers who do not , represent a rare exception . We believe that it is still to be reasonably expected that many rank and file workers do not own their own cars. '674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employment. This type of condition, which is a necessary asps-et of employment, is clearly a condition under which certain of the Respond- ent's employees are compelled to work, and therefore constitutes a "condition of employment" within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act.5 Nor do we find any validity in the Respondent's argument that the eating facilities at the sawmill are not a necessity because the sawmill is not in an isolated location and only 5 percent of the sawmill employees use such facilities. In our opinion, any distinctions that exist along these lines between the sawmill on the one hand and the logging camps on the other represent distinctions in degree rather than in substance. Thus, the sawmill, although not as isolated as any of the logging camps, is still 5 miles away from the nearest urban community. And since there is no public or Respondent transporta- tion to or from the sawmill either, it is quite obvious that those sawmill employees without private means of transportation are no less de- pendent on the Respondent's eating and living' facilities than such employees in the logging camps. It would be little, if any, more feasible for employees to walk or "hitchhike" to and from work for 5 miles than 20 miles. The sawmill is thus sufficiently isolated to nullify any alleged ground of distinction in this respect. Similarly, the fact that a smaller proportion of sawmill employees than logging camp employees eat at company facilities proves that the eating facilities at the sawmill represent less of a necessity only in the sense that such facilities are a necessity for a lesser percentage of em- ployees. The fact still remains that such facilities are a necessity for those sawmill employees without means of transportation, to the same extent that they are a necessity for the larger percentage of similarly situated employees at the logging camps. And, as pointed out by the Trial Examiner, the Act vests in a bargaining representa- tive the authority to bargain for each and all of the employees in an appropriate unit, and correspondingly requires an employee to bar- gain on matters that affect only a portion of the employees in the unit, regardless of what that portion may be.° There is thus no distinction 6 Our dissenting colleague expresses the view, in substance , that the meals served by the Respondent represent merely a "personal need" on the part of certain employees, and cannot therefore be held to be a "condition of employment" within the meaning of the Act. As already indicated, we do not agree that the term "conditions of employment," as used in the Act, was not intended to encompass any "personal needs" of employees. What was, clearly a "personal need" was held to be a "condition of employment" in the Abbott Worsted Miles case, supra. In any event, however, the meals served by the Respondent do not represent a mere "personal need " as to certain employees but rather, as we have found, a necessary aspect of their employment, and therefore clearly con- stitute a "condition of employment" within the meaning of the Act. 6 For this reason, we consider as immaterial, and accordingly do not adopt : ( a) the Trial Examiner's conjecture in this, connection , that changing conditions may result in more employees being affected by the subject in issue, as an additional reason for finding WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 675 on this basis between the sawmill and the logging camps which affects, either our conclusion in fact that the eating facilities at the sawmill as well as those at the logging camps represent a necessity as to certain employees, or our conclusion in law that the Respondent is obligated to bargain on the subject in issue at the sawmill as well as the logging camps. The Respondent also contends that its meals are not "wages" within the meaning of the Act, because of its alleged claim that it does not. require any of the employees to eat at company facilities but main- tains such facilities purely as a convenience. For the reasons already stated in our rejection of the Respondent's similar contention as. applied to "conditions of employment," we likewise find no merit in this contention. Moreover, even if the factual premise of this con- tention were correct, the Respondent's argument would have no bear- ing on the question as to whether the subject in issue is "wages." This is so because we do not believe that even a colorable argument can be presented to support the proposition that the term "wages" as used in the Act was intended to. apply only to such aspects of employment as employees are compelled to work under. Although it is not spelled out, we interpret the Respondent's argument as meaning most logically that "wages" are thus confined to the remuneration received by em- ployees for the actual performance of work or productive activity. This Board, with the approval of the courts, has previously rejected such a narrow and technical definition of "wages." 8 And in so doing,. we have construed the term "wages" broadly to include "emoluments of value . . . which may accrue to employees out of their employment relationship," 9 and the Court in the Cross case said that this term "... must have been meant to comprehend emoluments resulting from employment in addition to or supplementary to actual `rates of pay' 11 (emphasis supplied in both quotations). We are of the opinion that the meals served by the Respondent to. its employees clearly fall within these broad definitions of the term "wages." 10 That the privilege of eating meals provided by the Re- immaterial the fact that the subject in issue does not affect many of the Respondent'& employees ; and (b ) the Trial Examiner's finding, that a "considerable" number of employees are affected by the subject in issue, as the immediate premise for his finding that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively. ' Such remuneration is ordinarily the only type of remuneration necessarily affecting employees in such manner as to fall clearly within the Respondent's apparent concept of a compulsory aspect of employment. 8Inland Steel Company, supra ; W. W. Cross and Company, 77 NLRB 1162, enforced, 174 F. 2d 875 (C. A. 1). ' Inland Steel Company, supra. 10 In view of the finding herein that under the particular circumstances of this case meals constitute a "condition of employment" within the meaning of the Act; Member Reynolds 'deems it unnecessary to pass upon the issue of whether meals constitute ,"wages," and therefore does not concur in the above finding. 877359-50-vol. 87-44 676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD spondent flows from the employment relationship is not open to ques- tion. And contrary to the dissenting opinion, it can scarcely be ques- tioned that such a privilege in and of itself represents an "emolument of value," in that it saves the employees the otherwise necessary ex- pense at least of the transportation involved if they had to obtain their meals elsewhere. Moreover, as pointed out by the General Counsel, the fact that the Respondent serves its meals below cost is an additional reason for finding that such meals constitute "wages." This repre- sents an "emolument of value" not only to the extent that the meals are served below cost, as argued by the General Counsel, but rather to the further extent that meals are served below the retail price em- ployees would have to pay if they ate elsewhere. Accordingly, we find that the meals served by Respondent to its employees are "wages" within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act 11 The Respondent contends further that, contrary to the finding of the Trial Examiner, importance should be attached to the fact that no lumber companies in the area have ever had contracts covering the price of either room or board at logging camps or sawmills. This argument is disposed of by our rejection, and that of the courts, of the even broader argument that the Act was intended to impose a bargain- ing obligation only with respect to such matters as had been bargained on generally prior to the passage of the original Act in 1935.12 As the Court said in the Cross case in rejecting this broader argument, ". . . Congress intended to impose upon employers a duty to bargain collectively with their employees' 'representatives with respect to any matter which might in the future emerge as a bone of contention be- tween them, provided, of course, it should be a matter `in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em- ployment' " (emphasis supplied). Moreover, as pointed out by the Trial Examiner, the record discloses that there has been bargaining concerning the price charged for board and room not only by other large lumber concerns in the States of Washington and Oregon, but also by the Respondent itself with another local of the Union at the Respondent's Longview Branch." It appears, therefore, that there n Cf. Abbott Worsted Mills , Inc., supra, where we held that the lease of company-owned houses to employees at a nominal rental ". . . is a privilege amounting in effect to a part of their wages. . . . Because we find it unnecessary to consider for purposes of this decision , we express neither agreement nor disagreement with the General Counsel 's further theory that the meals served by the Respondent are "wages" because the "real" wage of an employee who eats at company facilities is directly affected by the price of the meals. n Inland Steel Company, supra ; W. W. Cross and Company, supra. 13 It is true, as pointed out by the Respondent , that its Longview Branch contract covers the subject of board and room only at the logging operations, but, contrary to the contention of the Respondent , the record does contain evidence of bargaining by other com- panies concerning board at sawmills as well as logging camps. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBEIR COMPANY 677 has been a substantial amount of collective bargaining on the subject in issue in the industry, and that it is by no means a new or excep- tional.area of bargaining.14 We find, therefore, that the meals served by the Respondent to its employees at both the sawmill and the logging camps represent a man- datory subject of collective bargaining under the Act; that the price of such meals is an integral part of the subject of meals; and, accord- ingly, that the Respondent, by unilaterally raising the price of meals in July 1946, May 1947, and May 1948, and by refusing on July 31, 1946, and thereafter to bargain with the Union concerning the price of meals, has refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8 (5) of the Act and Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act as amended. The Remedy The Union takes the position that the Board, in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, should not only order the Respondent to bar- gain on the subject in issue, as recommended by the Trial Examiner, but should also order the Respondent to restore the price that was charged for meals prior to the Respondent's unilateral changes of the price, and reimburse the employees affected by the changes the amounts they have been charged for meals in excess of the original price. We disagree. The merit of the Union's position that the original price for meals should be restored is, in our opinion, a matter that is and may be properly determined through the procedures of collective bar- gaining, the use of which is assured to the Union by our order herein; and not. something to be determined by this Board. Moreover, this is not a case, such as the check-off of dues for a company-dominated union, of money exacted from employees for an inherently illegal purpose, and from which the employees presumptively derive no value, so as to support the reimbursement order urged by the Union 15 It is rather a situation of money exacted from employees as a necessary, but only incidental, consequence of unlawful conduct, and for which the employees received value of a perfectly legal nature, viz., their daily sustenance. Finally, there is no certainty that even if the Re- spondent had fulfilled its statutory duty to bargain, there would have been no increases in the price of meals.l" This factor militates against 14 There is also evidence in the record that there has been collective bargaining in the industry with respect to other matters relating to room and board, such as health certifi- cates for cookhouse employees and bedmakers, proficiency of cooks,. quantity and quality of food, cleanliness and capacity of bunkhouses, types of beds, the nmber of persons to eat at a table, and the number of persons that one waitress should serve. 'a Cf. Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N. L. if. B., 319 U. S. 533. 15 Indeed, it is highly probable, in view of the general increase in the cost of commodities during the period involved, that collective bargaining would have produced at least some increase in the price of the Respondent' s meals. 678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD our ordering the Respondent either to restore the original price for meals or to make reimbursement of any monies in excess of that price. Under such circumstances, and also in view of the limited type of refusal to bargain by the Respondent, which so far as appears was, based on a bona fide doubt that the subject in issue was a mandatory bargainable subject, we are of the opinion that the additional order urged by the Union is neither appropriate nor necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act. We are also of the opinion, however, that the order to bargain recommended by the Trial Examiner is subject to the possible inter- pretation that it requires the Respondent to bargain only with respect to any contemplated price changes that the Respondent may in the future wish to effect. So interpreted, that order would not cure the Respondent's past unfair labor practices, and would not effectuate the policies of the Act. Accordingly, we shall modify that order to the extent necessary to make it clear and unambiguous that the Re- spondent shall be required to bargain now, upon request, with respect to the price of. meals. ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Woodwork- ers of America, Local 6-12, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the units set forth in paragraph 2 of that section of the Intermediate Report entitled Conclusions of Law, with respect to the price for meals at the Respondent's sawmill and logging camps ; (b) Making any unilateral changes in the price of meals at said sawmill or camps affecting any employees in such units without prior consultation with the Union. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the Union, as the ex- clusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate units, with respect to the price for meals charged employees at its sawmill or camps ; (b) Post in conspicuous places throughout its sawmill and its three camps in the Klamath Falls.Branch, copies of the notice attached WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 679 hereto marked Appendix A 17 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Re .spondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. MEMBER GRAY, dissenting : The majority's holding in this case that the Respondent is required to bargain with the Union concerning the price of meals it serves at its sawmill and logging operations solely as an accommodation to the employees desiring this service, appears to me to be an unwarranted extension of the bargaining obligation placed on employers under the Act. To reach its conclusion, the majority erroneously assumes that meals and the price thereof are "conditions of employment" and "wages" which are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. In lny opinion, these assumptions are neither factually nor legally ten- able. The majority infers that the service of meals is a condition of em- ployment principally from the fact that a small number of employees "without feasible means of transportation" are obliged to live and eat at the Respondent's facilities. The majority thus equates the bar- gaining obligation created by the Act with the personal needs of a few employees- nay, not even of a majority of the employees. Such an approach to the problem of employer-employee relations is novel, to say the least. It has never heretofore been held, to my knowledge, that the personal necessities of individual employees, without more, determine the extent of an employer's bargaining obligation. True, an employer may, if he desires, bargain with a union as he may with an individual employee, concerning the service of meals. But neither the language nor the history of the original or amended Act requires him to do so. Moreover, insofar as the majority's opinion implies that the Re- spondent imposes an obligation on its employees who lack the means of transportation to patronize its dining-room, the record does not 1' In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a Court of Appeals , there shall be inserted before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER" the words "DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING." 680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD support this position: ': indeed, only a very small percentage of its em- ployees actually avail themselves of these facilities. In these circum- stances, the fallaciousness of the majority's reasoning, based, as it is, not on what the Respondent has said or done, but on the fortuitous circumstances of a small number of employees, is transparent. Nor can I subscribe to the majority's view that the privilege of using the Respondent's eating facilities is' an "emolument of value" and therefore constitutes "wages" within the meaning of the Act. In the first place, I am not convinced that the record establishes that this privilege is "an emolument of value." For, apart from the fact that this privilege obviously does not lend itself too readily to objective evaluation, it has not been shown that the Respondent's service of meals was, more than a convenience to the few employees availing themselves of this privilege. There is no evidence that comparable meals at comparable prices could not have been obtained elsewhere or that the Respondent's service was otherwise economically beneficial to the employees. Indeed, for aught that appears, the only reason for patronizing the Respondent is convenience. Secondly, there is nothing in the record to support the majority's assumption that the furnishing of meals is part of the compensation paid for services rendered: It is not-nor can it be-contended that the Respondent at any time offered, and the employees accepted, em- ployment on such a basis. On the contrary, it is clear that the Re- spondent has at all times voluntarily maintained dining facilities merely as an accommodation for those employees desiring to use them. In the final analysis, I am not satisfied that it has been shown in this case that the matter of meals relates to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment-concededly the only mandatory subjects for collective bargaining under the Act. Accordingly, I would not find, as the majority does, that the Respond-- .ent failed in its statutory duty to bargain but would dismiss the complaint. APPENDIX A NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with INTERNATIONAL. WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 6-12, as the exclusive repre- sentative of all employees in the bargaining unit's described herein, with respect to the price of meals at our logging camps and at our sawmill. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 681; WE, WILL NOT make any unilateral changes in the price charged such employees for meals at our camps or at our sawmill without prior consultation with the Union. WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, as t^e exclusive represen- tative of all employees in the bargaining units described herein, with respect to the price of meals at our logging camps and at our sawmill, and if an understanding is reached thereon, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The appropriate bargaining units herein referred to are as follows : (a) All employees in the logging operations at the Kla- math Falls Branch of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, in- cluding scalers, but excluding supervisory and clerical employees, machinists, and conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers, and hostlers employed on the logging trains. (b) All production and maintenance employees of Weyer- haeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, includ- ing W. D. Crawford and J. Robinson, but excluding supervisory and clerical employees, conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers, and hostlers on the Company's logging trains, employees of the machine shop, electricians, car men, millwrights, and their helpers, and John Bushong. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY, Employer. Dated-------------------- By-.-------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. Robert E. Tillman, for the General Counsel. George and Babcock, of Portland , Oreg., by Mr. William A. Babcock , for the Union. Mr. Oliver Malm, of Tacoma, Wash., for the Respondent. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed by International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region (Seattle, Wash-, ington), issued his complaint dated February 17, 1949, against Weyerhaeuser Tim- ber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, herein called the Respondent, alleging that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices: affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (5) and Section. 682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, and Section S (a) (1) and ( 5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Labor Management Rela- tions Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136.' Copies of the charge, the complaint, and the notice of hearing were duly served upon the Union and the Respondent? With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that the Respondent on or about July 31, 1946 , refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in appropriate bargaining units, described hereafter , with respect to the cost of meals and board furnished to its employees at its sawmill and logging camps ; and that in July 1946, May 1947, and May 1948, the Respondent by unilateral action and without consulta- tion with the Union put into effect increases in the cost of meals and board furnished to the employees at both its mill and its logging operations , and has at all times since July 1946 continuously refused to bargain with the Union as to such subject. The answer of the Respondent substantially admits the factual allegations in the complaint , but denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. It alleges that the board and lodging facilities are provided at its mill and at its camps for the convenience not only of its employees , but also for the guests and anyone else having business with or who happens to be visiting at the mill or at one of the camps, that the use of such facilities is entirely optional with the employees , and that only a small number of the employees actually use such facilities regularly. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held on March 1, 1949, at Klamath Falls, Oregon, before J. J. Fitzpatrick , the undersigned Trial Examiner duly desig- nated by the Chief Trial Examiner . The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the Union were represented at the hearing and participated therein. Full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-examine witnesses , and to intro- duce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties . At the close of the hearing the General Counsel argued orally on the record , but the other par- ties waved oral argument . Briefs have been received from the Union and from the Respondent. Upon the entire record of the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following : FINDINGS OF FACT' 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Weyerhaeuser Timber Company is a Washington corporation having its prin- cipal office and place of business in Tacoma , Washington. It is engaged in log- ging and lumber operations in the States of Washington and Oregon. The only operations with which we are here concerned are located at or near Klamath Falls, Oregon, designated as the Klamath Falls Branch. In the course and conduct of its business at this Branch, the Respondent cuts logs from which it produces lumber having a value annually in excess of $1,000,000 , of which I The National Labor Relations Act, and as reenacted as the Labor Management Rela- tions Act, 1947, will herein collectively be referred to as the Act unless otherwise indicated. 2 The charge filed June 17, 1947, was served on the Respondent July 2, 1947. A copy of the complaint and notice of hearing was mailed to the parties by registered mail on February 22, 1949 , and all parties on March 1 , 1949, signed a waiver of the 10 -day notice requirement provided in the Board 's Rules and Regulations for service of the complaint and notice of hearing. 3 There is no controversy as to the essential facts herein . Consequently, unless other- wise indicated all findings herein are based on admissions in the pleadings , stipulations of the parties, or uncontroverted and credited testimony. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 683 more than 90 percent in value is shipped to points outside the State of Oregon. The Respondent concedes and the undersigned finds that it is engaged in com- merce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The approprite units and representation by the Union of a majority therein By separate representation proceedings in 1942, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative in the following appro- priate units : (1) All employees in the logging operations at the Klamath Falls Branch of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, including scalers, but excluding super- visory and clerical employees, machinists, and conductors, brakemen, fire- men, engineers, and hostlers employed on the Company's logging trains. (2) All production and maintenance employees of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, including W. D. Crawford and J. Robin- son, but excluding supervisors and clerical employees, conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers, and hostlers on the Company's logging trains, employees of the machine shop, electricians, car men, millwrights, and their helpers, and John Bushong. The Union is now, and at all times since such certifications has been, the duly designated collective bargaining representative of a majority of the employees in the above-described appropriate units. I accordingly find that at all times material herein the Union was the duly designated bargaining representative. of a majority of the employees in the afore- said appropriate bargaining units, and that pursuant to the provisions of Sec- tion 9 (a) of the Act, the Union at all times since such certifications was and now is the exclusive representative of all employees of the aforesaid units for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment. B. The refusal to bargain The Union and the Respondent in 1942 executed two contracts, one covering the employees in the above-described production and maintenance unit at the sawmill, and the other covering employees in the logging camp unit. Both these contracts were effective to April 1943 and thereafter from year to year unless either party notified the other approximately 60 days prior to April 1 of any particular year of a desire to "terminate, revise or amend" the agreement. Thereafter the parties continued under these contractual arrangements, or modi- fications thereof. At the time of the hearing, both the current contracts were open for negotiations but no date had been set for such negotiations. Neither the original contracts nor any of their revisions, modifications, or renewals, contained any provision relative to the amount the Respondent should charge for board and room either at the mill or at the camps. However, from 1942 to July 1946, the prevailing charge of 55 cents per meal and 20 cents a night for lodging remained unchanged. 684 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In July 1946 the Respondent raised the price of meals served at the mill and at the camps from 55 cents to 65 cents per meal. On July 24, of that year, the union business agent requested a meeting with the Respondent for the purpose of negotiating vacations with pay for returning veterans. The letter also stated : I have also been instructed to negotiate with you on the matter of the 10-cent per meal raise in board in your logging department and in your hotel. It is the Union's contention that the posting of the notice pertaining to raise in board by your Company constituted a wage decrease for those em- ployees involved; therefore, was a direct violation of the contract that is now in existence between the Local Union and your Company. Pursuant to the requests in the above letter, a conference was held on July 31 between representatives of management and the Union. When the conferees reached the question of the cost of meals furnished the employees, R. R. Macartney, manager of the Klamath Falls Branch, stated that the Respondent was willing to discuss the subject and show that management was serving meals at a loss, but that the matter of the price charged for board at the mill or the camps was not a proper subject for collective bargaining with the employees' representative. In May 1947 and again in May 1948 the Respondent unilaterally raised the price of meals 10 cents so that the price charged for each meal became 85 cents, where it now stands. Aside from filing the charge in June 1947, upon which the complaint herein is based (in which charge it was alleged that the Respondent "has refused to bargain with the undersigned Union with respect to the amount charged to employees and deducted from their pay for meals furnished by the Company and has increased the charges made in the operation without negoti- ating such increase with the Union"), the. Union has not since July 1946 re- quested the Respondent to negotiate with it on the subject of room or board, although the Union has since that time participated in two annual contract revisions, successfully negotiated three pay increases, and secured other benefits for the employees.' For a better appreciation of the issue here involved, some comment is indicated relative to the lumber business in the Pacific northwest generally and the Re- spondent's business particularly. It is traditional in the larger lumbering operations that the employer provide facilities for bed and board for the em- ployees doing the logging as such operations are usually carried on in isolated forest regions far from centers of population. To a lesser extent this is also true of sawmill operations. Lumbering is heavy work and to attract and keep competent workers, it is imperative that they have generous quantities of good food as well as reasonably comfortable sleeping quarters The Respondent's business is no exception in the above respect. At its Klamath Falls Branch it operates a sawmill located about 5 miles from the city of Klamath Falls and 3 logging camps with a total of above 1,000 production and maintenance and logging workers 6 Camp 4 is located 35 miles west of 'For example, as a result of negotiations ending in March 1948, the. Union secured new beds and mattresses at Camps 4 and 6 at a slight additional cost per month to the em- ployees involved. 6 Unsatisfactory camp conditions have, on occasion, caused loggers to go on strike. 0 Eighty percent of the employees working at the sawmill are represented by the Union, the other 20 percent being represented by the International Association of Machinists. The Union represents approximately 88 percent of the employees at the three logging camps, representation among the remaining 12 percent being divided between two railroad brotherhoods. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBEiR COMPANY 685 Klamath Falls ; and Camps 6 and 11 are located, respectively, about 65 and 75 miles northeast of Klamath Falls. At the sawmill the boarding house provided can accommodate 98 persons, abut only 42 or 43 regularly use this accommodation out of a total of over 700 workers. There are about 25 company houses at the mill also, but these are mostly occupied by supervisors and their families. The remaining employees live at or near Klamath Falls and provide their own transportation to and from the mill. At Camp 4, employing 103 workers and about 20 miles from Keno,7 the near- est town, there is a cook house that regularly boards 43 workers, while 37 family men live in houses supplied by the Respondent.' The remaining 23 em- ployees live outside the camp, most of them either at Keno or Klamath Falls, and furnish their own transportation. Camp 6 is about 18 miles from the nearest town, Bly. Of the 114 employees at the time of the hearing, 75 were boarders, 25 lived in company houses and the remaining 14 commuted from Bly. The Respondent opened Camp 11 in December 1948 and operated it until about the middle of February 1949, when it was closed due to weather conditions. Management plans to reopen the camp about the middle of April 1949 and operate for about 3 months when the camp will be returned to Sprague River, about :35 miles from Klamath Falls.' As presently located Camp 11 is 25 miles from the nearest town, Chemute. At this camp there is a cook house and also bunk houses for single men, but no facilities for families of workers. When in -operation, the proportion of workers living in Camp 11 is comparable to those living in the other camps, and as there are no family units, all those residing in camp must eat at the cook house. The facilities at Sprague River consist of a cook house, family units, and presumably bunk houses. Those workers who live outside furnish their own transportation to and from the camps." Employees are not required to live or board at the sawmill or the various camps. There is no public transportation to either the sawmill or any of the camp, nor does the Respondent furnish transportation to any of these opera- tions. Those employees who do not have or cannot arrange for private trans- portation facilities must of necessity live at the particular operation. C. Conclusions Does the refusal of the Respondent to negotiate with the Union on the price of meals, under the circumstances herein outlined, constitute a 'refusal to bar- gain within the meaning of the Act? No cases directly in point have been cited by any of the parties, and I have found none. The specific question is therefore one of first impression. The applicable sections of the Act are as follows : SEC. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9 (a). Population 150. 8 Management has 38 family houses at Camp 4, one of which apparently is vacant. 0 The record does not disclose the number of workers employed at Camp 11, but it prob- ably did not exceed that of either of the other camps heretofore referred to. 10 As the operation each day in the woods is usually several miles from the permanent location of each of the camps above described, it is customary to serve the noonday meal on the job. The cook houses furnish the boarders with this noonday meal. Ordinarily, the other workers bring their lunch with them. 686 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment : The language above quoted is identical in the original Act and as reenacted. The subject matter of collective bargaining is not an abstraction. It is It living concept embracing the realities of the employer-employee relationship ; and those realities supply a substance to the concept. Employers and employees are required to bargain about subjects which mutually affect their interests. Under the broad provisions of Section 9 (a) unions and employers have bar- gained together for more than 12 years, and the Board has often been called upon to apply the formula therein outlined as new situations arose in the Nation's wide-spread industrial framework. Fairly recent examples of required bargain- ing subjects in this ever broadening field are merit increases,' pension plans," group health,13 group insurance.14 Mandatory bargaining also covers such varied subjects as rest or lunch periods, sanitary and lighting conditions, bonuses, methods of paying employees, and the issuance of passes. The kind of food and lodging furnished for employees by an employer in isolated areas where such facilities are not otherwise readily obtainable, as well as the price to be charged therefor, is of comparable importance to the employees directly concerned as any of the matters above referred to. The record discloses actual bargaining concerning the charge for board and room by representatives of employees with some of the other large lumber concerns in the States of Washington and Oregon. In fact, the Respondent has a current contract with Local 5-36 of the International Woodworkers of America at its Longview Branch where the subject of board and room is specifically covered.' The Respondent does not dispute that representative companies in the lumber industry, including itself, have on occasion bargained with employee repre- sentatives on the price to be charged for room and board. It asserts, however, that no such type of bargaining has ever taken place in its Klamath Falls Branch operations, and argues that, while room and board may be a permissible subject for bargaining, it does not follow that it is a subject on which it, as an employer, is "obligated under the Act" to bargain about with the repre- sentative of its employees, as contended by the General Counsel and the Union. The Respondent contends that its refusal to negotiate on a change in the price of meals does not affect "wages" or "conditions of employment" within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act above quoted. In support of its position. the Respondent says that the facilities for board and room are furnished by it as a matter of convenience and not as a matter of necessity, none of the employees are required to patronize them, and in fact only a small number of the total employees regularly use the facilities. 11 J. H. Allison & Co., 70 NLRB 377; enforced 165 F. 2d 766, cert. den. 335 U. S. 814.. 12 Inland Steel Co., 77 NLRB 1 ; enforced 170 F. 2d 247 ; cert. den. 336 U. S. 960. 13I1'. TV. Cross & Co., 77 NLRB 1162. 14 General Motors Corporation, 81 NLRB 779. 15 At its Longview Branch the Respondent'in 1947 posted notice of an increase In the price of board. The Union protested and negotiations followed resulting in an agreement incorporated in the current contract signed January 1, 1949, "that the charge for board he 65 cents per meal, bed charge 20 cents a night. .. . WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 687 The record discloses that only about 5 percent of the more than 700 mill employees eat regularly at the boarding house.16 The camps, however, tell a somewhat different story. In July 1946, when the charge was filed, 43 percent of the employees at Camp 4, and 70 percent of those at Camp 6, ate regularly at the cook houses.17 At irregularly operated Camp 11 the proportion of boarders to total employees was at least as much as in the other camps. The other employees who eat at home (excepting those who live in company houses) must arrange for or furnish their own transportation to and from work as there is no public transportation system available. It thus appears that for the considerable number of employees without feasible means of getting to and from their work, the facilities for eating as well as sleeping at the mill and the camps is in fact a necessity, and not just a convenience as claimed by the Re- spondent. If these employees are to work, they have to use the only living facilities available-those furnished by the Respondent. The fact that a very substantial percentage of the mill employees, and a lesser percentage of camp workers, are not presently directly affected by the price charged for meals by the Respondent is not too important. Conditions may change and some of the employees now not directly concerned may find that, because of adverse circumstances or otherwise, they too must live on the Re- spondent's property if they want to work. Furthermore, an authorized union bargains as the representative of each and all of the employees in the certified unit. Often an employer is required to negotiate on matters that directly affect at the time only a portion of the workers in the unit. Rates of pay for hourly workers, piece-rate pay, in-plant feeding, seniority, and voluntary sick and accident benefits are common examples. It is also unimportant that no lumber companies in the Klamath Falls area have up to this time ever had contracts with their employee representatives containing any reference to charges for board and room at logging camps or at sawmills. Insofar as the Respondent's Klamath Falls Branch is concerned, there was no attempt to change the existing charge for either bed or board from the time the Union first represented the employees in 1942 until 1946. It can be assumed, lacking any contrary showing, that this was also true with the competing companies in the area. In July 1946, when the Respondent posted notice of an increase in the price to be charged for meals, the Union almost im- mediately requested negotiations on the subject. When the negotiations were refused the Union filed a charge upon which the present complaint is based. It thus appears that the question of changing the price of board and bed did not arise in the Klamath Falls area until the year 1946. When the subject was raised in other areas, including the Respondent's Longview Branch, it was disposed of by negotiations and the disposition written into the contracts, as has been previously noted. Even at Klamath Falls, the Respondent negotiated with the Union relative to improving the sleeping equipment provided by the Respondent at both Camp 4 and Camp 6, a subject as closely allied to the comfort of the men involved as that of eating. The Respondent also urges that it should not be required to bargain on the price of meals furnished, because the Union does not represent all of the Re- spondent's employees who do board at the mill and camps. Actually the Union 11 In addition, an average of from 3 to over 15 employees eat their noon meal at the mill on working days-that is, from Monday to Friday inclusive of each week. 17 At the time of the hearing the approximate percentages were : Camp 4, 40 percent, and Camp 6, 65 percent. 688 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD represents 80 percent of all the mill workers and 88 percent of all the camp employees. This contention of the Respondent is not an argument against bar- gaining on the price of meals furnished, but rather a concession that other em- ployees' representatives may also have a stake in the price to be charged for board. The fact that other employees are also interested in the subject is no, doubt a very relevant point to be considered in the actual bargaining, but is no, justification for rejecting negotiations on the subject. - I find that the price charged by the Respondent for meals at its sawmill and the camps immediately and directly affect the wages and working conditions of a considerable number of employees represented by the Union, and that the Respondent, by refusing on July 31, 1946, and thereafter to negotiate with the Union on the subject of raising the price to be charged for meals, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, thereby interfering with,. restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that the Respondent, by unilaterally raising the price charged for meals at its camps and sawmill and refusing to negotiate with the Union on the subject, has refused to bargain collectively. In order to effectuate the policies of the Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent be required, upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit on the price of board charged the employees at its sawmill and camps, and to refrain in the future from acting unilaterally in any matters involving the price of board whereby employees in these units may be substantially affected, without prior consultation with the Union. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following : CONCLUSIONS. OF LAW 1. International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. International Woodworkers of America, Local €i-12 is now, and during all times material herein has been, the exclusive representative, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, of all the employees of the Respondent in the two units heretofore found to be appropriate within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act, described as follows : 1. All employees in the logging operations at the Klamath Falls Branch of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, including scalers, but excluding supervisory and clerical employees, machinists, and conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers, and hostlers employed on the logging trains. 2. All production and maintenance employees of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, including W. D. Crawford and J. Robin- son, but excluding supervisory and clerical employees, conductors, brakemen, WEYERHAEUSER TIMBEiR COMPANY 689, firemen, engineers, and hostlers on the Company's logging trains, employees of the machine shop, electricians, car men, millwrights, and their helpers, and John Bushong. 3. By refusing on July 13, 1946, and at all times thereafter to bargain collec- tively with International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate units relative to the price to be charged its employees for board at its mill and at its camps, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section S (5) of the original Act, and of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act as reenacted. 4. By said acts, the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the original Act, and Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act as reenacted. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in the case , I recommend that the Respondent, Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, and its officers, agents, successors , and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Woodworkers of America, Local 6-12, as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees included in the units specifically described and set forth in paragraph 2 of the conclusions of law herein, with respect to changes in the price for board at the Respondent's mill and camps ; (b) Making any unilateral changes in the price of board at said mill or camps affecting any employees in the units above described without prior consultation with the Union. 2. Take the following affirmative action which will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with respect to any changes in the price of board charged employees at its mill or camps with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the aforesaid appropriate units; (b) Post in conspicuous places throughout its sawmill and its three camps in the Klamath Falls Branch, copies of the notice attached hereto marked Appendix A. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by, the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ; (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Nineteenth Region in writing within twenty (20) days from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report what steps the Respondent has taken to comply therewith. It is further recommended that, unless the Respondent shall within twenty (20) days from the receipt of this Intermediate report notify said Regional 690 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the Respondent to take the action aforesaid. As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, any party may , within twenty ( 20) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board , pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations , file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections ) as he relies upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof; and any party may, within the same period , file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties . Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed . Proof of service on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be promptly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section 203.46 should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board , request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten ( 10) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board. In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid Rules and Regulations , the findings , conclusions, recommendations , and recom- mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings , conclusions, and order , and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Dated at Washington, D. C., this 24th day of May 1949. J. J. FITZPATRICx, Trial Examiner. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Manage- ment Relations Act, 1947, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with INTERNATIONAL WOOD- WORKERS oz AMERICA, Local 6-12 as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the bargaining units described herein with respect to changes in the price of board at our camps and at our mill. WE WILL NOT make any unilateral changes in the price to be charged em- ployees for board at our camps or at our mill without prior consultation with the Union. The appropriate bargaining units herein referred to are as follows: (a) All employees in the logging operations at the Klamath Falls Branch of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, including scalers, but ex- cluding supervisory and clerical employees, machinists, and conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers, and hostlers employed on the logging trains. (b) All production and maintenance employees of Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, Klamath Falls, Oregon, including W. D. Crawford WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY 691 and J. Robinson, but excluding supervisory and clerical employees, conductors, brakemen, firemen, engineers , and hostlers on the Company's logging trains, employees of the machine shop, electricians, car men, millwrights, and their helpers, and John Bushong. WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------------------ By ------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 877359-50-vol. 87-45