Charroin Manufacturing Co.

In the Matter Of CHARROIN MANUFACTURING Co., EMPLOYER and- TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER Case No. 21-I?C-592 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER January 10, 1950 On April 15, 1949, pursuant to the Board's Decision and Direction of Election herein,' an election by secret ballot was conducted under the direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Twenty- first Region. At the conclusion of the election, the parties were furnished with a Tally of Ballots, which showed that of approxi- mately 320 eligible voters, 304 valid votes were cast. Of this number 71 votes were cast for and 184 votes against the Petitioner. There. were 49 challenged and 2 void ballots. On April 22, 1949, Petitioner filed objections to the election, and on May 5, 1949, the Employer filed its reply thereto. On May 25,. 1949, after having duly investigated the issues raised by such objec- tions, the Regional Director issued his Report on Objections in which he found without merit certain of the Petitioner's objections 2 and recommended that these objections be overruled. However, the Re- gional Director found that other objections of the Petitioner and. matters disclosed by his investigation raised substantial and material issues. He therefore recommended that a hearing be directed to re- solve such issues. Neither the Petitioner nor the Employer filed ex- ceptions to the Regional Director's report. By order dated June 15, 1949, the Board remanded the case to the Regional Director and ordered that a hearing be held on such ob- jections. Thereafter a hearing was held before Eugene M. Purver,. ' Unpublished. 2 Objections based on the following allegations were found to be without merit: ( 1) The. Company kept employees in the plant without work for the period immediately prior to the election; ( 2) officers of the Company made speeches asking employees to support the Com- pany ; ( 3) although the Company refused to agree to time off to permit employees to vote, it did, in Pact , give the employees an hour and one-half off to vote; ( 4) the employees were forced to listen to the speeches and thereby became a "captive audience." 88 NLRB No. 11. 38 CHARROIN MANUFACTURING CO. 39 hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Mem- bers Reynolds and Murdock]. There is no serious dispute as to the facts in this case. The matters alleged to raise substantial and material issues were established with- out contradiction at the hearing. The record shows that the Em- ployer, by certain supervisory personnel, by its attorney, and by others, whose status as supervisors was in doubt, had, shortly before the election, delivered a series of speeches to the employees urging and requesting employees to vote in the forthcoming election; that the Employer's president had mailed a letter to substantially all its em- ployees, which letter as part of its context contained the statement "DON'T BE FOOLED-YOU MUST VOTE"; that the Employer's plant manager had announced an extension of time for voting; and that the Employer had furnished free transportation to the polls in a bus which carried on its side a sign reading "Vote for Charroin." The Petitioner claims that in view of the foregoing, the employees could not fail to understand that the Employer was urging and as- sisting them to vote against the Petitioner. It contends, therefore, that the foregoing conduct of the Employer constituted pressure, coercion, inducement, and threat, and that by such conduct the Em- ployer interfered with the election. Moreover, the record discloses that the plant manager had engaged in certain conduct hereinafter considered. By reason of such fact the Petitioner further contends that this conduct cast such ridicule on the election and election pro- cesses of the Board as to make a fair election impossible. It points out that the effect of such conduct was made apparent by the activities of one of the employees.3 We find nothing in the facts and circumstances of this case to support the conclusion of the Petitioner that the conduct of the Em- ployer so interfered with the election as to make a free election im- possible. With respect to the Employer's letter of April 13, we believe that it was not coercive so far as the employees were concerned. In our opinion, the words, "DON'T BE FOOLED-YOU MUST VOTE", do not, standing alone, establish an act of compulsion on the part of the Employer and do not support the inference of an implied threat of economic reprisal. 8 This employee, who customarily entertained at parties sponsored by the Employer, sang, played a guitar, and "clowned" before the line of voters who were in the lobby of.the hotel waiting their turn at the polls which were located in the hotel basement. 40 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Petitioner's objection that the Employer rewarded the em ployees for voting, by granting paid time off and by furnishing free transportation to the voting polls, is also without merit. It is un- disputed that the Petitioner agreed to an extension of the noonday voting period.4 The Employer, after having announced earlier the agreement between the parties to extend the time for voting during the noonday voting period, later announced to the employees that those who had voted in the early morning hours could make free use of the extra time which had been granted others to vote. The ex- planation given at the hearing for this action was that the Employer did not believe it could effectively operate its plant with the greater number of its employees at the polls. Therefore, it made this time available for those employees. In our opinion, there is nothing in the record to sustain the contention that the free time resulting from this act on the part of the Employer was for the purpose of reward- ing those employees who had voted in the election. Furthermore, as such free time was made available only to those who had already voted and was not anticipated at the time they cast their ballots, it cannot be said to have influenced the results of the election. Nor do we find merit in the Petitioner's objections based on the Employer's furnishing free bus transportation to voters, or its use of letters and speeches to set forth its position toward the Petitioner. Board precedent establishes that the mere furnishing free transpor- tation, when extended to all employees without distinction, does not constitute interference with an election.5 Moreover, we do not agree with the Petitioner that the Employer exceeded his rights of free speech "in bombarding its employees with letters and speeches [there were six speeches made in the course of -a day and a half, all during working hours] indicating the company's attitude toward the union." It is clear that the speeches in and of themselves did not exceed the bounds of free speech, even if we assume that they expressed a hostile attitude toward the Petitioner. Such speeches must be considered as being within the scope of the free speech guaranty of Section 8 (c) of the amended Act, as they contained neither threat of force or reprisal nor promise of benefits Furthermore, their concentrated frequency " The noonday voting period, which was originally set to run from 10: 45 a. in. to 11 : 45 a. in. was subsequently extended by a provision that it should begin at 10 a. in. The Peti- tioner's contention that it would not have agreed to the extension of time had it realized that the employees would be compensated for such time by the Employer is not persuasive. 0 (fray Drug Stores, Inc., 79 NLRB 1140; Hercules Motor Company, 73 NLRB 650; The Pure Oil Company, 73 NLRB 1; cf. Hoague Sprague Corp., 80 NLRB 1699. The case of Big Lake Oil Company, 56 NLRB 684, 691, enforced 146 F. 2d 967 (C. A. 5) is distin- guishable on its facts. 9 The Babcock & Wilcom Co., 77 NLRB 577. We also find that the use of the sign "Vote for Charioin" on the side of the bus falls within the guaranty of free speech. See Wrought Iron Range Company, 77 NLRB 487. CHARROIN MANUFACTURING CO. 41 cannot have the effect of depriving the Employer of the advantages of that guaranty. Accordingly, we find nothing in the record to support the assertion that all elements of the Employer's conduct taken together establish that the Employer was interfering with the Union to an extent which must be considered improper 7 There remains for consideration the Petitioner's objection relating to the incident referred to as "the Simon Legree incident." On the morning of April 15, 1949, the day of the election, and on the previ- ous day, the plant manager, in a costume understood to be representa- tive of the literary character, Simon Legree, went among plant em- ployees cracking a whip and exclaiming, "You must vote. You gotta vote." At the hearing, the plant manager testified that he had in- tended no reflection on the Board or the Board's processes, but rather that the whole matter was an appropriate response to a piece of union literature which he thought depicted him in the character of Simon Legree. None of the employees who witnessed the event and later testified at the hearing believed the plant manager's conduct to be directed at the Board. In fact it was considered to be no more than a humorous incident in the course of an election campaign. In our opinion, the event has no such significance or effect that it can be said that governmental procedures were so unfavorably portrayed as to make a free and untrammeled election impossible. We find, on the basis of the record in this case, that the Employer did not interfere with the conduct of the election or the free choice of a bargaining representative by the employees participating therein. As noted above, the Petitioner has filed no exceptions to the Regional Director's Report on Objections. As we have overruled Petitioner's remaining objections, and as the Tally of Ballots shows that no col- lective bargaining representative has been chosen, we shall dismiss the petition herein. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 4 The Babcock k Wilcox Co., supra.