Pacific Gamble-Robinson Co.

In the Matter Of PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY and INTER- NATIONAL BROTIIERII00D OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSE- MEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 328, A. F. OF L. Case No. 18-CA-85.-Decided February 3,1950 DECISION AND ORDER On September 9, 1949, Trial Examiner Horace A. Ruckel issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, in which he found that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor prac- tices alleged in the complaint, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed excep- tions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Re- spondent filed a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds. that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Interme- diate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda- tions of the Trial Examiner only insofar as they are consistent herewith.2 1. We agree with the Trial Examiner that up to about August 30, 1948, the Respondent did not refuse to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of its employees in an appropriate unit. However, the record shows, and unlike the Trial Examiner we find, that the Respondent thereafter refused to bargain collectively, in vio- lation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act.3 IPursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Reynolods]. 2 We do not agree with the Trial Examiner's findings with respect to the proviso in Section 10 (b). except insofar as they are consistent with our decision in Cathey Lumber Company. 80 NLRB 157. 3 The evidence as to working foremen shows, and the Trial Examiner found, that there is only one, Webber, who is a supervisor. We shall exclude working foremen from the unit found appropriate by the Trial Examiner. 88 NLRB No. 100. 482 PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 483 In 1947 the Union, representing a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit, executed a contract with the Respondent which expired on May 31, 1948. This contract provided in part for the fol- lowing rates of pay : 77 cents an hour for the first 6 months of em- ployment, 821/2 cents an hour for the next 6 months of employment, and 88 cents an hour thereafter. The contract did not provide that the Respondent could increase these rates on an individual basis with- out further consultation with the Union; in fact, the evidence shows: that it was the Respondent's general practice to adhere to these rates. In the spring of 1948, before the expiration of the contract, the Union notified the Respondent of its desire to negotiate a new agreement. As a result, bargaining conferences were held at various times between May 12 and August 18, 1948. On August 3, the Respondent offered,, among other things, to "increase the hourly wage rates [sic] 10 cents per hour," as it concedes in its brief to the Board.' This offer would have boosted the starting rate to 87 cents an hour, and would also, have raised the other rates. Thereafter, following an impasse, the Union called a strike on August 27 to enforce its demands. All 13, employees in the appropriate unit participated in the strike. On August 30, 1948, if not before, the Respondent, in order to break the strike, began offering replacements a starting rate of 98 cents an hour, 11 cents more than the starting rate of 87 cents an hour .pre- viously offered to the Union.5 Within 2 or 3 days, the Respondent had recruited a sufficient crew of replacements and was able to resume, normal operations. On September 8, the Respondent again met with the Union for an alleged bargaining conference. At that time the Respondent was still hiring replacements at 98 cents an hour. However, the Respondent repeated to the Union its August 3 offer, which, as we have found, would have raised the starting rate only to 87 cents an hour.6 On October 8, the Respondent filed a petition with the Board, re- questing an election to determine whether the Union still represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit. On October 12, at a State mediation conference called to settle the strike, the Respond- ent advised the Union that it would bargain only if the Union showed a current majority in a Board election. The Union then initiated this. proceeding by filing a charge. 4 The Trial Examiner incorrectly found that the Respondent also proposed the abandon- ment of all seniority provisions. The record shows, and we find, that such proposal was limited to the "seniority" article in the contract, which provided that seniority should govern layoffs and rehirings. 5 The Trial Examiner incorrectly found that the Respondent's wage offer to new em- ployees was "equal" to the offer it had made to the Union. This finding is hereby reversed. O Four of the striking employees returned to .work thereafter and were paid 9S cents an hour. One of these, Carl Smart, had been paid 77 cents just before the strike, so that he received a wage increase of 21 cents an hour. 882191-51-32 484 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The foregoing evidence convinces us that the Respondent refused to bargain collectively in good faith in several respects : (a) On and after August 30, if not before, by bypassing the Union and individually offering old and new employees a higher wage rate ,than it had offered the Union, as the exclusive statutory representa- tive ; and on September 8 by again offering the Union a rate lower than it was actually offering to individuals.' Nor is it a defense that the .Respondent's employees were then on strike. On August 30, the strike was still' Current, a majority of the strikers had not been replaced, .and the Union retained its status. With respect to wages and other terms and conditions of employment, the Respondent thus remained "legally obligated to continue to bargain with the Union." 8 Moreover, :i. loss of majority thereafter, following the unfair labor practices, is -no defense to a refusal to bargain; 9 (b) On October 12, by questioning the Union's majority, withdraw- ing recognition, and refusing to recognize the Union unless and until its majority was reestablished in a Board election. The Respondent argues that it should always be privileged to hire at the highest contract rate, or indeed at any wage whatsoever, under the circumstances of an economic strike. The Trial Examiner in effect agreed with this view, when he found that no rule of law forbade the Respondent to pay. the higher wage scale here offered to replacements. lVe.have.carefully. considered these arguments and find. that they lack merit. We agree that the Respondent is privileged to replace eco- nomic strikers in order to continue its business operations.10 But, as -the Supreme Court pointed out, this privilege must be exercised in such .a fashion that the employer is "guilty of no act denounced by the statute." 11 Here, as we have found, the Respondent bypassed the ;statutory representative of its employees and unilaterally offered a higher wage scale on.an individual basis. 2. The Trial Examiner found that the strike was not caused or prolonged by any unfair labor practices of the Respondent and that .the Respondent consequently did not violate Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act by refusing to reinstate the strikers upon their appli- 7 See N. L. R. B. v . Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U. S. 217. 8 See N. L. R. B. v . Reed & Prince Manufacturing Company, 118 F. 2d 874 , 885 (C. A. 1), cert . den. 313 U. S. 595. Even if a strike were considered to be an emergency, as the Respondent contends , the obligation to bargain covers "the exceptional as well as the routine . as the Supreme Court pointed out in Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency Inc ., 321 U. S. 342 , 346, 347. See also N. L. R. B. v. J. H. Allison & Company, 165 F . 2d 766 ( C. A. 6), cert. den . 335 U. S. 14, rehearing den. 335 U. S. 905. 8 See Medo Photo Supply Corp . v. N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 678; Franks Brothers Co. v N. L. R. B., 321 U. S. 702; N. L. R. B. v. Bradford Dyeing Association . 310 U. S. 218. xo See N. L . R. B. v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, 304 U. S. 333, 345, 346. Ibid., p. 345. See also footnote 8, supra. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 485 cation. We agree only with the finding that the strike was not originally caused by any unfair labor practice of the Respondent. The record shows that shortly after the strike began, however, the Respondent recruited a complement of replacements by unlawfully offering them a higher wage than it had offered the Union, and re- sumed normal operations. By letter of February 28, 1949, the Union unconditionally requested group reinstatement of the complainants 12 On March 8, the Respondent rejected this request by advising the Union that it would consider reemploying the strikers Only if a vacancy should occur in the future 13 We have found that it was an unfair labor practice for the Re- spondent to offer individuals a higher starting rate than it had offered the Union. As we held in Cathey Lumber Company, supra, similar illegal actions, which ultimately enabled the employer to break an economic strike and resume operations, "beyond peradventure of a doubt . .. were instrumental in prolonging the strike." As we fur- ther held in that case, the strike, "which was economic in its inception, became an unfair labor practice strike" when the employer embarked on his illegal course of conduct, and the strikers were thereafter en- titled upon appropriate application to displace their replacements. We adopt that holding in this case, particularly because the Respond- ent's illegal conduct here bypassed the statutory representative on the crucial question of wages. We find that the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8 (a) (1) and (3) by rejecting the reinstatement application of the complainants.- 3. In view of the above, we, like the Trial Examiner, deem it un- necessary to resolve the conflict of testimony between the Respondent's labor relations official, Schoenecker, and the strikers as to alleged interference on August 30. Unlike the Trial Examiner, however, we do not make any hypothetical findings on, the assumption that the strikers' testimony is credible. Accordingly, we do not adopt the Trial Examiner's findings that the remarks attributed to Schoenecker were isolated and did'not contain any threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. ' Although there is uncontroverted evidence that Schoe- necker told striking employees that the doors were open and they could "The Union inadvertently omitted the name of one of the complainants, Gerald Wilson, and added his name in a further letter of March 14. " Such a vacancy occurred on March 25. The Respondent thereupon offered the vacancy to the striker with the greatest seniority, but with the stipulation that the striker was to be considered as a new employee, and, in effect, to lose his seniority. When the striker refused, the Respondent repeated the offer in turn to each of the remaining strikers, but received similar refusals. 14 Because we agree with the Trial Examiner that Webber is a supervisor, to whom Congress has denied the protection of the amended Act, we find that the Respondent did not engage in any unfair labor practice with respect to him. 486 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD come back without discrimination, we believe and find that, under the particular circumstances herein, the statements were not the type of solicitation which violate the Act. 15 The Effect of the Unfair Labor Practices Upon Commerce The activities of the Respondent set forth above, occurring in connection with the operation of the Respondent described in Section I of the Intermediate Report, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. The Remedy Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor prac- tices, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom and take cer- tain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We have found that the Respondent illegally refused to bargain and to reinstate the complainants. We are of the opinion, upon the entire record in this case, that the commission in the future of other unfair labor practices may be anticipated from the Respondent's con- duct in the past. We shall therefore order that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed to its employees in Section 7 of the Act 16 The record indicates that the Respondent's complement of employ- ees, is seasonal at this plant, fluctuating from about 9 to 13, some of whom at the time of the hearing were former strikers. We shall direct the Respondent to reinstate the complainants to their former or substantially equivalent positions," without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, if necessary dismissing all replacements hired on or after August 30, 1948, and not employees of the Respondent on that date. If, despite such reduction in force, there are not sufficient positions available, all existing positions shall be distributed among the complainants and the former strikers em- ployed in the unit, without discrimination against any of them be- cause of his union affiliation or activities, following a system of sen- iority, or such other nondiscriminatory practice as may have hereto- fore been applied in the Respondent's business. Any complainant or former striker remaining after such distribution, for whom no employ- "Cf. Cincinnati Steel Castings Company, 86 NLRB 592 ; Sam'l Bingham's Sari Mfg. Company, 80 NLRB 1612. 16 Daniel Hamm Drayage Company, Inc., 84 NLRB 458 ; Morristown Knitting Mills, In- corporated., 86 NLRB 342. 17 See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York, San Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch, 65 NLRB 827, 829. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 487 went is immediately available, shall be placed upon a preferential list and offered reemployment as work becomes available and before other persons are hired for such work, in the order determined among them by such system or practice. We shall further order the Respondent to make whole the com- plainants for any loss of wages they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount which he would normally have earned as wages from the date of the Respondent's discrimination against him to the date of the Respondent's compliance with the reinstatement provi- sions hereof, less his net earninge during this period.18 However, ,computation of back pay shall exclude the period between the date of the Intermediate Report and the date of our Decision and Order.'° We expressly reserve the right to modify the back-pay and reinstate- ment provisions, if made necessary by a change of conditions since the hearing or in the future, and to make such supplements thereto as may hereafter become necessary in order to define or clarify their applica- tion to a specific set of circumstances not now apparent. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS or LAW 1. All employees of the Respondent at its Sault Ste. Marie, plant, including truck drivers, receiving and shipping clerk, and warehouse- Inen, but excluding office and clerical employees, working foremen, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 2. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., was at all material times and now is the exclusive representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bar- gaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 3. By refusing to bargain collectively with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of the employees in the aforesaid unit, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 4. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of Lawrence Tubman, Charles Halonen, George Chapman, Nor- 11 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440. 11 Hamilton -Scheu d Walsh Shoe Co., FO NLRB 1496. 488 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD bert Roy, Jr., Ernest Gregg, Charles Strobridge, Garfield Gibbons, Ivan Avery, and Gerald Wilson, thereby discouraging membership in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., the Re- spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices -within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Pacific Gamble-Robinson Company, Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, and its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of its employees at its Sault Ste. Marie, plant, including truck drivers,, receiving and shipping clerk, and warehousemen, but excluding office and clerical employees, working foremen, and supervisors as defined in the Act; (b) Unilaterally offering or granting higher rates of pay or other improved terms or conditions of employment, without first bargaining: in respect thereto with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,. Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., as such representative; (c) Discouraging membership in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., or in any other labor organization of its employees, by in any manner discriminating in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or other terms and conditions of their employ- ment; (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., or any other labor organization to PACIFIC G4MBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 4891 bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,. and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and. all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected. by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of its aforesaid employees and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement; (b) Offer to Lawrence Tubman, Charles Halonen, George Chap- man, Norbert Roy, Jr., Ernest Gregg, Charles Strobridge, Garfield Gibbons, Ivan Avery, and Gerald Wilson, immediate and full rein- statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions, with- out prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, as provided in The Remedy section above; (c) Make whole Lawrence Tubman, Charles Halonen, George Chapman, Norbert Roy, Jr., Ernest Gregg, Charles Strobridge, Gar- field Gibbons, Ivan Avery, and Gerald Wilson, for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount. which he would normally have earned as wages during the period from the date of the Respondent's discrimination against him to the date of the Intermediate Report herein, and during the period from the date of this Decision and Order to the date of the Respondent's compliance with the reinstatement provisions herein, less his net earnings during said periods, as provided in The Remedy section above; (d) Post at its plant at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, copies of the notice attached hereto, marked Appendix A.20 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; . "In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be inserted in the notice , before the words "A DECISION AND ORDER," the words "A DECREE OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ENFORCING." 490 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (e) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in all other respects the complaint be, and it hereby is, dismissed. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL BARGAIN collectively, upon request, with INTERNA- TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS or AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 328, A. F. of L., as the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All employees at our Sault Ste. Marie plant, inc'_ading truck drivers, receiving and shipping clerk, and warehouse- men, but excluding office and clerical employees, working foremen, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL oFrER to the following named individuals immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination, as,set forth in the Decision and Order : Lawrence Tubman Charles Strobridge Charles Halonen Garfield Gibbons George Chapman Ivan Avery Norbert Roy, Jr. Gerald Wilson Ernest Gregg WE WILL NOT unilaterally offer or grant higher rates of pay or other improved terms or conditions of employment without first bargaining in respect thereto with INTERNATIONAL BROTHER- HOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 328, A. F. of L., as such repre- sentative. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right.to self-organiza- PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 491:. tion, to form labor organizations, to join or assist INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL UNION No. 328, A. F. of L., or any- other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted. activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all 'such activities,. except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree- ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition, of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named union, or any other labor organization. We will not. discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against any employee because of member- ship in, or activity on behalf of, any labor organization. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY, Employer. By ----------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) Dated ---------------- This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,. and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. Clarence A. Meter, for the General Counsel. Messrs. Perry R. Moore and Robert W. Dygert, of Minneapolis, Minn., and Dixon D. Moorhead, of Sault Ste, Marie, Mich., for Resppndent. Mr. Arnold Alsten, of Escanaba, Mich., for the Union. STATEMENT Or THE CASE Upon an amended charge filed on March 29, 1949,1 by International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, A. F. of L., herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the' National Labor Relations Board, herein called respectively the General Counsel' and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region (Minne- apolis, Minnesota), issued a complaint dated May 12, 1949, against Pacific Gamble-Robinson Company, herein called Respondent, alleging that it had en- gaged in, and was engaging in, unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint, accompanied by a notice of hearing, were duly served upon Respondent and the Union. With respect to the alleged unfair labor practices the complaint alleged in substance that Respondent: (1) On and after May 12, 1948, failed and refused 1 The original charge was filed on November 3, 1948. a This term includes particularly counsel appearing at the hearing on behalf of the General Counsel. 492 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit; (2) on and after March 8, 1949, following a strike alleged to have been caused and prolonged by Respondent's unfair labor practices, failed and refused to reinstate in their jobs Lawrence Tubman, Charles Halonen, George Chapman, Norbert Roy, Ernest Gregg, Charles Stro- bridge, Garfield Gibbons, Burtis Webber, Ivan Avery, and Gerald Wilson, fol- lowing their unconditional application for reinstatement, because of their union membership and activity, including their going on" strike; and (3) during the strike urged and induced its employees to abandon the Union, promising them benefits if they did so. On May 27, 1949, Respondent filed an answer admitting certain allegations of the complaint with respect to the nature of its business, but denying that it had engaged in any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held from June 6 to 10, 1949, at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, before Horace A. Ruckel, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly appointed by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, Respondent, and the Union, were represented by counsel and participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded all parties. At the conclusion of the hearing the Trial Examiner granted a motion by the General Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof in formal matters, but reserved ruling on a motion by Respondent to dismiss the complaint. This motion is disposed of by the recommendations hereinafter made. The parties waived oral argument but were granted until June 25 to file briefs with the Trial Examiner. Subsequently, this time was extended by the Chief Trial Examiner to August 8. On August 6, the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses the undersigned makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Delaware corporation with its principal office and place of business at Seattle, Washington. It operates more than 100 plants. at various places within the United States, one of which is located at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, the only one involved in this proceeding. At this plant Respondent is engaged in the wholesale distribution of fruit, vegetables, groceries, and other produce. During the calendar year 1948 Respondent purchased products in excess of _$500,000 in value for distribution through the plant, of which more than 85 percent represented purchases and shipments to the plant from points outside the State of Michigan. During the same year Respondent made sales from the plant in excess of $500,000, substantially all to customers within the State of Michigan. No contention is made by Respondent that it is not engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of America, Local Union No. 328, affiliated with the American Federa- tion of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of Respondent. PACIFIC GAMBLE- ROBINSON COMPANY 493 III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The alleged refusal to bargain 1. The appropriate unit The complaint alleges that all employees of Respondent at its Sault Sce. Marie plant, including truck drivers, receiving and shipping clerk, warehousemen, and working foremen, but excluding office, clerical, and supervisory employees, con- stitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. Respondent does not dispute the appropriateness of this unit except as to fore- men or working foremen in the warehouse. The record discloses that there is only one of these-Burtis Webber.- Webber, the evidence shows, had been fore- man of the warehouse since 1940, with about 12 employees under his direction, including warehousemen and truck drivers. He spent, according to his own testi- mony, about three-quarters of his time in shipping, receiving, and waiting on customers, and the other quarter in directing the activities of other employees. There was no other employee • who directed the work of employees excepting his immediate superior, Plant Manager Robert Gilray. Webber was paid 51/^ cents an hour more than the other employees, and although he had no authority to hire or discharge he occasionally effectively made recommendations as to discharge, and he possessed authority to transfer men from one job to another. The record is clear that Webber was commonly regarded both by Respondent and the other employees as a supervisor, and the undersigned finds that he was. He should not be included in a unit with nonsupervisory employees.` The undersigned finds that all employees of Respondent at its Sault Ste. Marie plant, including truck drivers, receiving and shipping clerk, warehousemen, and working foremen, and excluding office, clerical, and supervisory employees, -among them Webber, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 2. Representation by the Union of a majority within the appropriate unit Organization of Respondent's employees into the Union began in the spring ,of 1946. A majority of those in the appropriate unit joined the Union, which then entered upon negotiations for a contract. The record is not clear as to :how the Union's majority was originally determined. Respondent, however, does not question the Union's majority status at the time of the strike, hereinafter -described, and the undersigned finds that on or before May 12, 1948, and at all material times thereafter, the Union was the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other conditions of employment. 3. The alleged refusal to bargain (a) Negotiations prior to the strike A contract between Respondent and the Union was signed and became effective oon March 29, 1947, to run until May 31, 1948, with an automatic renewal clause 'Originally Respondent contended that Garfield Gibbons was a supervisor. In its brief -Respondent states that it no longer insists on this contention. 4 The finding that Webber was a supervisor does not affect the majority status of the Union, and bears only upon the matter of Ills subsequent discharge and his remedy under the Act. 494 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and a provision for terminating the contract on 60 days' notice. On March 31, 1948, the Union, by Arnold Alsten, its business representative, served Respondent with a notice reopening the contract, and requesting a meeting for the purpose of negotiating new terns and conditions. On April 19 Respondent, by S. M. Corbell, its secretary, wrote the Union expressing a willingness to meet with its representatives, and after some further correspondence the first meeting of the parties took place on May 12, at Sault Ste. Marie. At the outset, 35 separate matters were listed for discussion con- sisting of 22 articles of the old contract, 7 changes proposed by the Union, and 6 entirely new provisions. Included in the Union's demands were those for a wage-increase from the existing rate of 88 cents an hour to $1.25 an hour, a 45- hour week in place of the 40-hour week provided for in the existing contract, a union shop with checkoff of dues, and a longer vacation period. All the demands of the Union were discussed at three meetings during the days of May 12 and 13, without any agreement being reached on any provisions of a new contract. Respondent, however, expressed a willingness to renew the old contract.' When the meetings adjourned on May 13 no date was agreed upon for a renewal of negotiations, although Corbell expressed a willingness to meet at any time with the Union. Alsten testified that at no time thereafter did the Union directly request a further meeting from Respondent. Such meet- ings as took place thereafter were arranged for by the State Labor Conciliator, at the request of either the Union or Respondent, or by a Federal conciliator.' The contract between the Union and Respondent expired on May 31, 1948. On June 4, at the request of the Union, James Greenfield, conciliator for the State Labor Mediation Board (Michigan), wired the parties setting a meeting for June 15. On the following day, June 5, the Union filed notice of an impending strike and requested that, in the event of a deadlock at the June 15 meeting, a strike ballot be taken. Representatives of the parties met with Greenfield in a fourth meeting on June 15. Alsten, for the Union, submitted the Union's original demands without any modification, and Respondent merely reiterated its offer to renew the old contract. A fifth meeting on the following day, June 16, found no change in the position of the parties. As a result, negotiations were again broken off. As Alsten put it while testifying, the Union's representatives "just left the building-we left the conference room, nothing to do but leave town." On July 2 a strike ballot was taken under thf^ auspices of the State Mediation Board. On July 20, Corbell telephoned Greenfield proposing another meeting of the parties, and stated that Respondent inteided at that meeting to make a new proposal in an attempt to effectuate a settlement of the dispue. Corbell in- formed representatives of the Union to the same effect. On July 27 Corbell wired the Mediation Board agreeing to a 30-day extension of the strike limitation period.' The Union agreed to this extension on the same 5 Alsten testified on this point merely that Corbell asked, "what was wrong with the old contract I" without offering to renew it. Corbell, Gilray, and C. I. Frost, division manager, who were present at the meetings on May 12 and 13, testified that Respondent made a definite offer to renew the old contract, and the undersigned acccepts their version as being in accord with the fact. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the Union waited until March 31, the last day under the reopening clause of the contract, to serve notice on Respondent, and the fact that Respondent had not up to that time served such a notice upon the Union, which would indicate that it was willing to continue the existing contract in effect. R However, on August 18, Alsten telephoned Corbell, as hereinafter related. 7 Under Michigan Law a strike must occur within 30 days after the taking of a strike ballot, in this case by August 1. This interval is not a "cooling off" period. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 495 ,or following day. The new limitation period set by the Mediation Board was September 2. The sixth meeting between the parties took place on August 3. At its incep- tion, Respondent offered a new contract containing a wage increase of 10 cents .an hour, but proposing abandonment of all seniority provisions in the old con- tract. Both Corbell and Gilray testified that Alsten remained adamant on the Union's original demands, without making any concession in respect to wages or in other essential demands. Alsten testified to the same effect when he first took the stand. On the following day, however, on cross-examination, he changed his testimony to state that at this meeting the Union submitted a counter- proposal reducing its demand for a wage increase to 10 cents an hour, with a guarantee of a 451/3-hour week,' seniority to remain intact, and the contract to be retroactive to June 1, 1948. The undersigned accepts the testimony of Corbell .and Giiray, together with Alsten's original testimony on this point, as being in accord with the facts, and finds that on this occasion the Union did not make .any reduction in its wage demand in response to Respondent's offer of a 10-cent wage increase. At the seventh meeting, on August 4, the position of the parties did not further change. On August 18, Alsten telephoned Corbell and made the counterproposal as to wages, coupled with conditions, which Alsten ipistakenly testified he made oil August 3. Corbell indicated that the Union's new demands were unacceptable to Respondent, and urged the Union not to strike. According to Alsten, Corbell went on to state that he would attempt to get in touch with other officials of Respondent, scattered throughout the county, within the next 2 or 3 weeks to discuss the Union's latest proposals. On August 23 John Lueke, a commissioner for the Federal Mediation and Con- ciliation Service, wired Corbell suggesting another meeting on August 26. Cor- bell replied that the earliest date on which he could meet would be September 7 or 8. No agreement for a meeting on either of those dates was reached with the Union, which, on August 27, struck Respondent's plant. (b) Negotiations during the strike The first meeting of the parties after the beginning of the strike, or the eighth meeting in all, took place on September 8, upon the initiative of Lueke, who presided. At this meeting Respondent renewed its offer of a 10 cent wage in- crease without seniority rights, and the Union repeated its revised demands of August 18. No further progress was made toward a settlement of the dispute when the meeting adjourned. This was the last meeting between the parties at which a contract was discussed, although a mediation meeting was arranged for by the Mediation Board on October 1.2, at which Respondent appeared spe- cially to question the jurisdiction of that Board. No further contract discussions took place on this occasion. On November 3, 1948, the Union filed its original charge herein. Conclusions The General Counsel contends that the course of events above related demon- strates that Respondent had no intention of bargaining in good faith with the Union, and that its failure and refusal to do so precipitated the strike on August 27. With this contention the undersigned disagrees. 8 The old contract guaranteed a 40-hour week after June 1, 1947, although in practice the plant worked 45% hours. 496 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Union and Respondent had been under contract since March 31, 1947, and so far as the record discloses the relationship between the parties had been amicable. There is no evidence at all of any hostility of Respondent toward the Union, prior to the strike,' so that if Respondent's unfair labor practices caused the strike they can be found only in Respondent's course of conduct during the negotiations for a contract. The evidence convinces the undersigned, however, that the strike was economic in character. From the first, Respondent expressed its willingness to renew the old contract with all its terms and conditions intact. It is apparent that the principal bone of contention was the Union's demand for a wage increase for the employees from 88 cents an hour, the prevailing wage, to $1.25, an increase of 37 cents. The Union did not recede from this demand from May 12, the date of its first meeting with Respondent, until August 18, and then only after Re- spondent, on August 3, had offered an increase of 10 cents. It is true that Re- spondent's offer was coupled with an abandonment of the seniority provisions of the old contract, a condition which it is understandable that the Union was unwilling to accept. The seniority provision of the contract, however, was subject to collective bargaining as well as wages. The record, in the opinion of the undersigned, does not support the General Counsel's contention that Re- spondent's position with respect to seniority was taken in the hope that the Union would find it unacceptable, and that a strike might be precipitated. Seniority, as well as all other matters in controversy, continued to be discussed. After May 12, the Union on no occasion requested a meeting directly of Respond- ent's representative, all further meetings coming about either as the result of Respondent's initiative, or the intervention of third parties. The Union receded from its original demands only 9 days before the strike on August 27, and substantially met Respondent's proposal of a 10-cent wage in- crease. This narrowed the issues to a point where it should have been reasonably apparent to the Union that an agreement with Respondent was still possible, although seniority, length of work week, vacations, and the proposed retroactivity of the contract remained in issue. Nevertheless, the Union made no attempt to resume negotiations with Respondent after August 18, but instead resorted to strike action. On September 8, following the strike, the Respondent again met with the Union and renewed its offer of settlement, which the Union rejected, the situation remaining exactly as it had been on August 18. As early as June 5, after only two meetings with Respondent-those on May 12 and 13-the Union filed a notice of impending strike. It was Respondent, not the Union, which on July 20 contacted Greenfield, State Labor Conciliator, to propose a meeting at which Respondent made a wage concession. The record as a whole persuades the undersigned that the Union elected to depend upon its economic strength in enforcing its demands upon Respondent. He finds that Respondent did not, at any time, fail or refuse to bargain collec- tively with the Union, and that the strike on August 27, was economic in character. B. Events occurring during the strike 1. Alleged interference, restraint, and coercion At the inception of the strike the Union threw a picket line around Respond- ent's plant. On August 29 Arnold Schoenecker, Respondent's labor relations D The only evidence in the record of any statements in opposition to the Union concerns certain remarks addressed by Arnold Schoenecker, Respondent 's labor relations representa- tive, to certain employees on the picket line, which are hereinafter considered. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 497 representative, arrived in Sault Ste. Marie. On the following day, upon receipt of word that union pickets were attempting to interfere with a truck at the warehouse, Schoenecker went down to the loading dock and directed that the truck be unloaded. Garfield Gibbons, the Union's steward, whom Respondent originally contended was a supervisory employee, but whom the undersigned has found was not, approached the dock, and Schoenecker asked him what he was doing on the picket line inasmuch as he was, in Respondent's view, a supervisory employee; and why Webber, previously found to be a supervisor, was also active in the strike. A conversation ensued which attracted the attention of other pickets, including Gregg, Halonen, Strobridge, and Chapman. The dis- cussion then became general, the strikers accusing Schoenecker, formerly a union member, of having "sold out" the Union, and criticizing the managerial ability of St. John, one of Respondent's officers. During the course of conversation, Schoenecker, according to several witnesses, asked them why they didn't "wise up" and come back to work, saying that the Union was not doing them any good, and that at one of the Respondent's plants the employees had come back to work during a strike, without the Union, had later received a wage increase, and were now "one big happy family." According to this account, some of the strikers questioned the accuracy of Schoenecker's statement concerning the wages paid at another of Respondent's plants, and Schoenecker offered to pay the expense of a telephone call to ascer- tain the facts. The testimony of Gibbons, who was present throughout the entire conversation, is to the further effect that Schoenecker said that the strikers at. Sault Ste. Marie could come back without discrimination, to which Gregg replied "Yes, but not without the Union," adding that without seniority, provided for in the contract their jobs would not last long. Same discussion seems to have then taken place concerning the position of the Union and Respondent as to seniority and other demands of the Union. Schoenecker denied, while testifying, that he made any reference in this con- versation to a wage raise at the Iowa plant, or that he offered to pay for a telephone call. The undersigned, for reasons hereinafter set forth, does not find it necessary to resolve the conflict of evidence thus presented. 2. The 6-month limitation applies Respondent makes two defenses to the allegation of the complaint that Schoe- necker's remarks on August 30 constituted interference, restraint, and coercion in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. First, it contends that they are barred from consideration by the language of the proviso of Section.10 (b) of the Act 10 because they were made more than 6 months prior to the filing of the amended charge on March 29, 1949. The amended charge contained an allegation as to Schoenecker's statements ; the original charge, filed on November 3, 1949, within the 6-month period, did not. Second, Respondent contends that Schoe- necker's statements did not constitute a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) because they did not include any threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The General Counsel does not argue the first of the above propositions in his brief, and the undersigned is hence without the benefit of his views respecting it. Prior -to Taft-Hartley, it was constantly argued, and frequently held, that the only purpose of a charge was to set the Board's investigating machinery in mo- 10 Section 10 (b) of the Act reads, in part, as follows : "Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge. . . . -498 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion, and that a charge having been once filed it might later be amended or :superseded by another charge amplifying the alleged violation of a particular section of the Act, or even adding a new section.. There was no time limit -binding upon either the Board in issuing the complaint or upon an aggrieved person in filing a charge. The legislative history of the Act, as amended, throw little light upon the pur- pose sought to be effectuated by Congress in enacting the present 6-month statute .of limitation. It seems to the undersigned, however, that Congress must have had something in mind other than merely imposing a time period within which the General Counsel's machinery must be set in motion. The principal reason for any statute of limitation is that after a certain length of time it becomes dif- ficult for a defendant to prepare a defense to an action; events become clouded by the passage of time, witnesses become unavailable; etc. If these considera- tions are pertinent here, it is difficult to see how Respondent, or a labor organi- zation in similar circumstances, could be protected by being served within 6 months with a charge under Section S (a) (5), alleging a failure to bargain, and nothing else, and after the expiration of that period by another charge, called .an "amended charge," charging him for the first time with interference, restraint, and coercion in violation of another and different section,-that of 8 (a) (1) of the Act. In essence, since the second charge contains entirely new matter, not related to the former, it is a new charge. A recent discussion of the Board in Erving Paper Mills " seems to the under- :signed to support the view that the amended charge here is, in fact, a new charge. In that case an original charge and a first amended charge were served upon a -respondent within the 6-month period, and a second amended charge several days ..after its expiration. The complaint was issued on the charge as last amended. The Board pointed out, however, that there was no material difference between the original charge and either of the amended charges. No new section of the .act which the Respondent was charged with violating, was added. The Board, in its opinion, said: We believe that Section 10 (b), properly construed, requires that the 6- month period be computed from the date of the alleged unfair labor practices to the date of service on the Respondent of the first charge (or amended charge) relating to such unfair labor practices. . . . [Emphasis supplied.] In this case the original charge had no relation to the allegations in the amended charge. It was concerned only with Section 8 (a) (5)-refusal to bargain. The undersigned therefore believes and finds that an unfair labor practice find- ing may not be based upon Schoenecker's statement made on August 30, 1948. 3. Schoenecker's statements were not, in fact, violative of the Act Assuming, however, that the above construction of the Act is not the proper .one, the undersigned does not believe that Schoenecker's statements were in violation of the Act. Nor does he find it necessary to resolve the conflict in evidence here presented as to what Schoenecker said. Accepting the composite testimony of witnesses called by the General Counsel at its face value, the undersigned does not find that Schoenecker's remarks included any threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. The testimony of Gibbons, as well as that of Schoenecker, is that the latter stated that the strikers could come back -without discrimination against them because of their union affiliation . His fur- 11 82 NLRB 47. PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 499 ther statement, assuming that he made it, that at another plant employees had received a wage raise after coming back to work during a strike, the under- signed does not find, in the circumstances, to constitute an implied promise of benefit. The statement, at the worst, was not part of any concerted effort to break the strike, but was an isolated one made during a general conversation which, in various of its phases, was initiated by the strikers themselves, and during which the whole question of the management of the plant and the merits of the dispute between Respondent and the Union were discussed. Assuming further that Schoenecker's remarks should be given the construc- tion contended for by the General Counsel, there is still no evidence in the record-and it may not be merely assumed-that they prolonged the strike and converted it into an unfair labor practice strike. 4. Respondent's alleged discriminatory refusal to reinstate the strikers Within a few days after the strike began, the strikers were replaced by new employees who were hired at wages of 98 cents an hour, 10 cents more than had previously been paid employees, and equal to the August 3 wage offer of Re- spondent, related above. Four of the strikers who voluntarily returned to work on their individual applications prior to March 1, were paid the increased wages." This increase, unilaterally made by Respondent without consultation with the Union, is urged by the General Counsel to constitute additional evidence of a failure to bargain collectively. The undersigned disagrees. The old contract had expired. Moreover, a strike situation existed. Respondent was privileged to attempt to continue in business by hiring replacements for the strikers, and the undersigned knows of no rule of law which, in such a situation, forbids an employer to pay a higher wage scale than previously prevailing provided that there is no discrimination between strikers and nonstrikers, or other unlawful motive. There was none such here 13 On February 23 or 24, the Union called a meeting of the strikers at which it was voted to instruct Alston to request reinstatement of the strikers as a group. Such a request was made on February 28. Respondent replied on March 8 stating that it would "consider without discrimination" the employment of the strikers "if in the future any vacancy should occur." 14 The Union renewed its applica- tion by letter, on March 14, including the names of Ivan Avery and Gerald Wilson, omitted from its first application. Respondent made no reply to this letter. On about March 25 the first vacancy occurred in Respondent's plant and Corbell instructed Gilray to call the strikers in order of their previous seniority. Gilray accordingly contacted Gibbons, Gregg, Tubman, Halonen, Roy, Strobridge, Chap- man, Avery, and Wilson, all the employees named in the complaint. Each of these men, when offered the job, refused to accept it without first obtaining a "release" from the Union. Those who testified on the point explained that by "release" they meant they were willing to go back to work only on a group basis. Respondent insists, and it is a reasonable conclusion which the undersigned accepts as his own, that by "release" it was further meant that Alston, the Union's business representative, must give his approval before any acceptance of Re- spondent's offer. Moreover, the witnesses stated that they objected to taking the job as new employees "on the same general basis as the men now employed"- 11 Carl Sniart , Donald Kelley , Allen Edwards, and Frederick Lounds. L9 See: Shell Oil Co., Inc., and Hawaii Employers' Council, et al., 77 NLRB 206; N. L. R. B. v. Penokee Veneer Company, et al., 168 F. 2d 868 (C. A. 7). 14 With the exception of Burtis Webber , herein found to be a supervisor , and two or three others who had left Respondent 's employment prior to the strike. 882191-51-33 500 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that is the replacements-and without the seniority guaranteed them under the previous contract. As a result, none of the strikers to whom Respondent offered the job accepted it, and none of them, with the exceptions of Smart, Kelley, Edwards, and Lounds, who applied individually before March 1, were rehired. Conclusions It has been found above that the strike which took place on August 27, 1948, was economic in character and was not caused or prolonged by any unfair labor practices of Respondent. It follows, therefore, as a matter of familiar law, that Respondent was not required to take back the strikers as a group upon their application, discharging employees hired during the strike if necessary. Moreover, as appears from the facts related above, the application of the strikers was not unconditional. A "release" had first to be obtained from Alsten, and seniority rights which had existed under the old contract-then expired- would have to be continued. In effect, the strikers refused to go back to work except under the terms and conditions of the old contract. It is also familiar law that any application for reinstatement under circumstances such as these must be unconditional in nature. The undersigned accordingly finds that Respondent, by refusing to reinstate the strikers as a group, or by increasing the starting rates of new employees without consultation with the Union, did not discriminate in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or fail to bargain collectively. He will accord- ingly recommend that the complaint be dismissed. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ° 1. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local No. 328, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. Respondent, Pacific Gamble-Robinson Company, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent, Pacific Gamble-Robinson Company, has not engaged in any unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this case, the undersigned recommends that the com-, plaint herein be dismissed. As provided in Section 203.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board any party may, within twenty (20) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 203.45 of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Washington 25, D. C., an original and six copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (in- cluding rulings upon all motions or objections) as lie relies upon, together with the original and six copies of a brief in support thereof ; and any party may, within the same period, file an original and six copies of a brief in support of the Intermediate Report. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of excep- tions and/or briefs, the party filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties. Statements of exceptions and briefs shall designate by precise citation the portions of the record relied upon and shall be legibly printed or mimeographed, and if mimeographed shall be double spaced. Proof of service PACIFIC GAMBLE-ROBINSON COMPANY 501 on the other parties of all papers filed with the Board shall be properly made as required by Section 203.85. As further provided in said Section 203.46 should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefore must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of service of the order transferring the case to the Board. In the event no Statement of Exceptions is filed as provided by the aforesaid Rules and Regulations , the findings, conclusions , recommendations , and recom- mended order herein contained shall, as provided in Section 203.48 of said Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes.. Dated at Washington, D. C., this 9th day of September 1949. HORACE A. RuCKEL, Trial Examiner-