United States Rubber Co.

In the Matter Of UNITED STATES RUBBER Co., DETROIT PLANT and LOCAL No. 6, MECHANICS EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA, AFFILIATED WITH THE C. U. A. Case No. 7-R-1975.-Decided June 23, 1945 Mr. David Karasick, for the Board. Mr. John E. Lynch, of Detroit, Mich., for the Company Messrs. Lewis F. Brady and Matthew Smith of Detroit, Mich., for the M. E. S. A. Mr. Robert E. Shoff, of Akron, Ohio, for the C. I. O. Mr. Earl Falconer, of Detroit, Mich., and Mr. David Previant, of Mil- waukee, Wis., for the A. F. L. Air. Jack Mantel, of counsel to the Board DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a petition duly filed by Local No. 6, Mechanics Educational Society of America, affiliated with the C. U. A., herein called the Company, the National Labor Relations Board provided for an appropriate hearing upon due notice before Charles E. Persons, Trial Examiner. Said hearing was held at Detroit, Michigan, on April 24 and 25, 1945. The Company, MESA, United Rubber Workers of America, Local Union No. 101, CIO, herein called the CIO, and United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, herein called the AFL, appeared and participated. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the hearing, the CIO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that its contract with the Company was a bar to this proceeding. The motion was referred to the Board. For reasons hereinafter set forth, the motion to dismiss is granted. The Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. All parties 62 N L. R B., No. 100. 795 796 DECISIONS OP' NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD were afforded an opportunity to file briefs with the Board. The CIO's request for oral argument is hereby denied. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY United States Rubber Co. is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and dis- tribution of tires and automotive equipment at Detroit, Michigan, where it owns and operates two plants known as the Detroit Plant and the Milwau- kee Avenue or Hupp Plant. Both plants, which are approximately 3 miles apart, are regarded by the Company as a single plant for the purposes of its operations. During the year 1944, the Company purchased raw materials valued at approximately $5,000,000, of which 92 per cent was shipped to the Company at its 2 Detroit plants from points outside the State of Michi- gan. During the same period, the Company manufactured, sold, and dis- tributed finished products valued at approximately $5,000,000, of which approximately 75 percent represented shipments of-such finished products from the 2 plants to points outside the State of Michigan. The Company admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. II. TFIE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED Local No. 6, Mechanics Educational Society of America, affiliated with the Confederated Unions of America, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Company. United Rubber Workers of America, Local No. 101, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations , is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Company. United Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Company. III. THE ALLEGED QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION On December 15, 1944, the Company and the CIO entered into a written collective bargaining contract to expire on January 31, 1946, subject to a 30-clay automatic renewal clause. Plake, a MESA representative, testified that he telephoned the Company in mid-November 1944, and talked to "some person in the office." On stating that he represented MESA, Plake testified he was told, "We are sorry, but we have a contract here. We won't bargain with you whatever." Plake further testified that thereafter on November 28. 1944, "we immediately sent a letter to the Company." A copy of the alleged letter, introduced into evidence, was addressed to the "Personal UNITED STATES RUBBER CO. 797 (sic) Department" of the Company in which it was stated, in effect, that MESA desired to he recognized as collective bargaining representative of the Company's employees. J. E. Lynch, the Company's manager of indus- trial relations, testified that he had no knowledge of the phone call, and that the had never received the letter. Lynch further testified that he had no knowledge that any other representative of the Company had been noti- fied. On December 27, 1944, MESA sent a second letter by registered mail properly addressed to Lynch with return receipt requested, in which MESA referred to the letter of November 28, and asserted its interest in collective bargaining Lynch replied by letter that the Company was operating under a contract with the CIO, and that the letter of November 28 was not received. On February 9, 1945, MESA filed its petition herein. The CIO moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that its contract with the Company con- stitutes a bar to thus proceeding. In support of their contention that the contract is no bar MESA and the AFL allege that notice of MESA's claim for exclusive recognition was made prior to the signing of the contract, that the CIO had ceased to function effectively as collective bargaining agent, that the contract was not ratified by the membership of the CIO, and that the CIO did not have a majority at the time the contract was ,executed.' The rule is well settled that proof that a letter properly directed was placed in a post office creates a presumption that it reached its destination and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. However, such presumption is not conclusive, but a mere inference of fact founded on the probability that the Post Office Department will do its duty. But, as here, when the presumption is opposed by evidence that the letter was never received, such evidence must be weighed with all the other circumstances of the case in determining the question whether or not the letter was actually received.' From the record in this case we are of the opinion that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the letter of November 28 was received, or that notice of MESA's claim for exclusive bargaining representative was presented to the Company before the contract was en- tered into with the CIO on December 15, 1944. MESA and the AFL also contend that in view of the many handbills and amount of literature distributed during MESA's organizational campaign, ' The latter 2 contentions are clearly without merit Although 2 of the members of the CIO's plant negotiating committee refused to sign the contract, 5 other members of the same committee did sign the contract , which had the approval of a membership meeting held in September 1944. The question of the CIO's majority status at the time the contract was entered into was not litigated Moreover , it is the Board ' s general practice in representation cases to presume the regularity and legality of a collective bargaining contract and to refuse to admit evidence on the question whether or not a maiority of employees covered by such a contract had actually designated the contracting union as their representative at the time the contract was made See Matter of The Lamson Brothers Company, 59 N. L R B. 1561 zRosenthal v. Walker, 111 U S 185, 193, and cases cited therein ; Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co,, 140 U. S. 25, 37; Columbia Nat. Life Ins Co v. Rodgers, 93 F. (2d) 740, 742 798 IJELISIONS OF NATIONAU, LABOR REL.ATIONS ROARJ) the Company had constructive notice of MESA's claim of interest prior to the execution of the contract. The present case is distinguishable from Matter of Dossin's Food Products,' on which MESA and the AFL rely in support of their contention. In that case, the Board found that the Com- pany was aware of a change of allegiance of its employees manifested by a unanimous vote to withdraw from the contracting union in order to affiliate with a rival union. Such factors are not present in the instant case to obviate the necessity of a formal representation claim by MESA. Mere campaign- ing by a labor organizatibn is not equivalent to a claim by such organization that it represents a majority of the employees and requests exclusive bar- gaining rights under the Act.` The contention that the CIO did not function effectively as collective bargaining representative, is based upon the fact that there were 68 work stoppages during the year 1944, and the alleged deficiency of the CIO in handling grievances. Although there was considerable unrest among some of the employees, and a suspension of 570 employees as the result of an unauthorized strike, such facts do not approximate situations where the Board has ordered elections due to the defunct status of the contracting labor organization, or to the existence of a serious doubt as to its identity In view of the foregoing, it appears that it was not until December 28, 1944, that the Company received notice from MESA of its request for recognition as collective bargaining representative. Since the contract be- tween the Company and the CIO was entered into prior to that date, we are of the opinion that the contract constitutes a bar to a certification of representatives at this time, and, consequently. the petition of MESA shall be dismissed. ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire rec- ord in this proceeding, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the petition for certification of representatives of employees of United States Rubber Co., Detroit Plant, Michigan, filed by Local No. 6, Mechan- ics Educational Society of America, affiliated with the C. U A., be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 8 56 N L. R. B. 739 . (Board Member Reilly dissenting ) ' See Matter of American White Cross Laboratories, Inc , 60 N L R B 1148 s See Matter of White Bros Smelting Corp., 61 N. L R. B 340; cf Matter of Central Illinois Light Co, 60 N. L R B. 1217