067 NLRB 72
The Colson Corp.
In the Matter of THE COLSON CORPORATION and FEDERAL LABOR UNION
No. 23859,{ AFL )
Case No. 8-R-1960.-Decided April 4, 1946
Messrs. Glen O. Smith and Reese Dill, of Cleveland, Ohio, for the
Company.
Mr. Jesse Gallagher, of Cleveland, Ohio, and Mr. Alva Kemp, of
Elyria, Ohio, for the Union.
Mr. Arnold Ordman, of counsel to the Board.
DECISION
AND
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a petition duly filed by Federal Labor Union No. 23859
(AFL), herein called the Union, alleging that a question affecting
commerce had arisen concerning the representation of employees of
The Colson Corporation, Elyria, Ohio, herein called the Company,
the National Labor Relations Board provided for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice before Thomas E. Shroyer, Trial Examiner.
The hearing was held at Cleveland, Ohio, on September 27, 1945,
and on October 5, 1945.
The Company and the Union appeared and
participated.,
All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard,
to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence
bearing on the issues.
At the hearing, and in its brief, the Company
moved to dismiss the petition.
For reasons stated below, this motion
is hereby denied.
The Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing
are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.
All parties
were afforded full opportunity to file briefs with the Board. Inas-
much as the Company's brief adequately discusses the issues, which
we carefully considered in the recent Jones d Laughlin case,' the
Company's request for oral argument is denied.
' Foreman's Association of America was duly served with Notice of Hearing, but failed
to appear
2 Matter of Jones 1 Laughlin Steel Corporation , Vesta-Shannopin
Coal Division,
66
N. L. R. B. 386.
67 N. L. R. B., No. 5.
72
THE COLSON CORPORATION
73
Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY
The Colson Corporation is an Ohio corporation which operates a
plant at Elyria. Ohio, where it produces children's vehicles and hos-
pital equipment.
Its annual volume of business is in excess of
$1,000,000.
A substantial proportion of its finished products passes
in interstate commerce, and a substantial proportion of its raw mate-
rials comes to it from points outside the State of Ohio.
The Company admits that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
IT. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Federal Labor Union No. 23859 is a labor organization affiliated
with the American Federation of Labor, admitting to membership
supervisory employees of the Company .3
III. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION
The Company has refused to recognize the Union as the collective
bargaining representative of certain of its supervisory employees.
The contentions of the Company, upon which it bases its motion
to dismiss the petition in this proceeding, are strikingly similar to
those of the employer in the Jones eb Laughlin case .4
Here, as in that case, the argument was made that foremen are not
employees within the meaning of the Act, and that therefore the
Board lacks jurisdiction to proceed with a determination of repre-
sentatives.
This contention had been repeatedly rejected by the
Board 5 and by the courts,6 and was again found to be without merit
in the Jones d
Laughlin case.
Foremen and other supervisory
employees, when acting in their own interest to better the terms and
conditions of their employment, are quite clearly employees.
We
find that the foremen involved in this proceeding are employees
within the meaning of Section 2 (3) of the Act.
Noting that the Union is affiliated with the parent body of the
labor organization which represents the rank and file employees of
!'Although the Union' s charter is not clear and does not have any bylaws as yet, the
evidence reveals that it has ]united its membership to supervisory employees of manufac-
tntiug plants in Elviia Ohio
At the time of the hearing, all of its members were super-
visorv emplovees of the Company
' See footnote 2, supra.
'Matter of Soss Manufacturing Company, et at., 56 N L R B 348 ; Matter of Packard
Motor Car Company, 61 N L R . B 4, and 64 N . L R. B 1212 , Matter of The Midland
Steel Products Company . Parish& Bingham Dtvistion, 65 N. L R B 997.
°Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation V N L R B, 146 F (2d) 833 (C C A 5)
N L N B t Skinner ^t Kennedy Stationey Company, 113 F (2d) 667 (C C A 8)
74
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the Company 7-a matter which we will discuss in Section IV, infra-
the Company points out that the rank and file organization has for
several years past had a contract with the Company in which super-
visors were expressly excluded from the bargaining units This con-
tract, the Company argues, estops the Union, a sister organization,
from seeking to represent the Company's supervisory employees.
But most collective bargaining agreements contain a coverage clause
which enumerates certain classifications of employees as being out-
side the scope of the contract unit.
And, as the Jones ct; Laughlin
case indicates, no undertaking can be implied from such exclusion
that the contracting union has agreed not to enroll the exempted,
employees in its ranks, or thereafter not to seek to represent them in
some other appropriate collective bargaining unit.
We find that the
agreement between the Company and the rank and file union is not a
bar to this proceeding.
A statement of a Board agent, introduced into evidence at the hear-
ing, indicates that the Union represents a substantial number of em-
ployees in the unit hereinafter found appropriate.9
We find that a question affecting commerce has arisen concerning
the representation of employees of the Company, within the meaning
of Section 9 (c) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
IT. THE APPROPRIATE UNIT
The Union requests a unit of all production foremen 10 employed
by the Company at its Elyria plant.
The Company does not dispute
the composition of the unit sought, but opposes the request merely on
the broad ground that no unit of supervisory employees is appropriate.
In support of its position, it argues (1) that it is not in a mass produc-
tion industry, and that its foremen are more than mere "traffic cops,"
being vested with broad supervisory powers; (2) that the contractual
exclusion of supervisory employees from the rank and file unit 11 con-
stitute an admission of the inappropriateness of a supervisor's bar-
gaining unit; and (3) that inasmuch as the Union is affiliated with
the parent body of the labor organization which represents the rank
7 The union which represents the Company's rank and file employees is Federal Labor
Union No. 19343 (AFL).
8 The pertinent provision reads as follows : "The Company recognizes the Union as the
exclusive collective bargaining agent upon all matters
.
.
. affecting all employees In The
Colson Corporation , Elyria plant, with the exception of Metal Polishers and Foremen and
Supervisors and Clerical help."
° The Field Examiner reported that the Union submitted 17 application cards bearing
the names of 15 employees listed on the Company's pay roll of August 8, 1945.
There are 16 employees In the appropriate unit.
10 This would exclude non-production foremen such as those in the production control
department, methods department, personnel department, etc.
11 See Section III, supra.
THE COLSON CORPORATION
75
and file employees of the Company, the Union is disqualified as a
collective bargaining agent herein.
The "tra'ff'ic cop" argument
The Company at the time of the hearing employed about 500 rank
and file workers.
There are about 16 production foremen exclusive
of those foremen who are not strictly in production. Supervision
above the rank of foreman consists of an assistant superintendent,
a superintendent, and a factory manager.
The Company's plant, cov-
ering an area of from 1 to 2 acres with connected buildings, makes little
use of conveyors and is in no sense a maps production industry.
Fore-
men have undisputed authority to hire, promote, discharge, and disci-
pline their subordinates.
They are largely responsible for time-study
work, job evaluation, departmental layout, quality of work produced,
and maintenance of their own departments. In all respects they have
broad powers of supervision.
However, in the Young and Goodrich
cases,12 the Board held that foremen, as "employees," are entitled under
the Act, like non-supervisory employees, to be placed in some appro-
priate bargaining unit; that the particular kind or type of industry
in which foremen are employed is immaterial; and that the scope of
the foremen's authority and responsibility is relevant only insofar as
it might affect the grouping of such employees for purposes of collec-
tive bargaining.
Consequently, we find this argument of the Company
to be without merit.
The "admission" argument
As hereinbefore indicated, the Company contends that the con-
tractual exclusion of supervisory employees from the rank and file
unit constitutes an admission of the inappropriateness of a supervisor's
bargaining unit.
Although the views of parties regarding the appro-
priateness of a unit are entitled to some consideration, they are not
controlling.
We fail to perceive, moreover, why the mere exclusion
of supervisors from the coverage of an agreement is tantamount to
an admission by the contracting parties that such employees may not
comprise an appropriate unit.
The "offaliation" argument
The sole remaining argument of the Company 13 is that the Union
is not an independent unaffiliated organization, but is in fact affiliated
with the same labor organization as the union which is presently
2 Matter of L. A. Young Spring & Wire Corporation, 65 N. L. R. B. 298 ; Matter of The
B. F. Goodrich Company, 65 N. L. R. B. 294.
1° Aside from other general contentions which we have carefully considered and find to
be without merit.
76
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOAPD
bargaining for the rank and file employees of the Company,' and
therefore is disqualified as a collective bargaining agent herein.
In Section III, supra, we found that foremen are employees within
the meaning of the Act. The Act guarantees to all employees the
right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing.
In the absence of specific language in the Act, we may not
disqualify a freely-chosen, legitimate labor organization, not com-
pany-dominated, as the collective bargaining agent of employees.
Nor have we the discretion, frequently ascribed to us under Section 9
(b) of the Act, to limit the employees' choice of a legitimate bargain-
ing representative.
That section merely concerns the question of how
employees are to be grouped, not who is to represent them 15 In the
Jones d Laughlin case. careful consideration led us to the conclusion
that the Act, as written today, requires that we protect the right of
employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, not of our choosing.
For these reasons, and for other
reasons indicated in the Jones cf Laughlin decision, we find no merit
in the Company's contention that the Union may not represent the
supervisory employees of the Company.
We find that all the production foremen of the Company at its
Elyria, Ohio, plant, excluding the assistant superintendent, the super-
intendent, and the factory manager, constitute a unit appropriate for
the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section
9 (b) of the Act.
V. THE DETERMINATION OF REPRESENTATIVES
We shall 'direct that the question concerning representation
which has arisen be resolved by an election by secret ballot
among employees in the appropriate unit who were employed during
the pay-roll period immediately preceding the date of the Direction
of Election herein, subject to the limitations and additions set forth
in the Direction.
DIRECTION OF ELECTION
By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the National
Labor Relations Board by Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Re-
lations Act, and pursuant to Article 111, Section 9, of National Labor
Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 3, as amended, it is
hereby
14 Both organizations have the same business agent, and they meet in the same union
hall, but not together
The rank and file group is a completely separate body, having
separate meetings. sepaiate officers, and a sepaiate treasury
Both unions owe ultimate
allegiance to the A F of L
15 See Matter of L A. Young Spring it Aire Corporation, supra
THE COLSON CORPORATION
77
DIRECTED that, as part of the investigation to ascertain representa-
tives for the purposes of collective bargaining with The Colson Cor-
poration, Elyria, Ohio, an election by secret ballot shall be conducted
as early as possible, but not later than thirty (30) days from the date
of this Direction, under the direction and supervision of the Regional
Director for the Eighth Region, acting in this matter as agent for
the National Labor Relations Board, and subject to Article III, Sec-
tions 10 and 11, of said Rules and Regulations, among the employees
in the unit found appropriate in Section IV, above, who were em-
ployed during the pay-roll period immediately preceding the date of
this Direction, including employees who did not work during said
pay-roll period because they were ill or on vacation or temporarily
laid off, and including employees in the armed forces of the United
States who present themselves in person at the polls, but excluding
those employees who have since quit or been discharged for cause and
have not been rehired or reinstated prior to the date of the election,
to determine whether or not they desire to be represented by Federal
Labor Union No. 23859 (AFL), for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining.
MR. GERARD D. REILLl. dissenting :
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in Matter of Pack-
ard Motor Car Corporation , 61 N. L. R. B. 4, and Matter of Jones d
Laughlin Steel Corporation ,
Vesta-Shannopin Coal Division,
66
N. L. R. B. 386, I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion
in this case.