Swift and Co.

In the Matter Of SWIFT AND COMPANY and UNITED PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. 0. Case No. 18-R-1351.-Decided April 11, 1946 Messrs. Arthur R. Curtis and L. A. Van Fossam, both of Chicago, Ill., for the Company. Messrs. E. R. Fitzpatrick and John A. Jordan, both of Chicago, Ill., for the C. I. 0. Mr. Kenneth Somers, of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and Mr. H. W. West, of Marshalltown, Iowa, for the A. F. of L. Mr. Don Mahon, of Des Moines, Iowa, and Messrs. Leslie Krough, Ray Kopel, and Ralph Brown, all of Marshalltown, Iowa, for the Brotherhood. Mr. Jerome J. Dick, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a petition duly filed by United Packinghouse Workers of America, C. I. 0., herein called the C. I. 0.., alleging that a question affecting commerce had arisen concerning the representation of employees of Swift and Company, Marshalltown, Iowa, herein called the Company, the National Labor Relations Board provided for an approproate hearing upon due notice before Clarence A. Meter, Trial Examiner. The hearing was held at Marshalltown, Iowa, on Feb- ruary 21, 1946. The Company, the C. I. 0., National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, Local No. 50, C. U. A., herein called the Brotherhood, and Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 574, A. F. of L., herein called the A. F. of L., appeared and participated .1 All parties were afforded full op- portunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the hearing, the Brother- hood moved that the petition be dismissed. The Trial Examiner re- 1 The Brotherhood and the A . F. of L. filed motions to intervene which were granted at the hearing by the Trial Examiner 67 N. L. R. B., No. 36. 262 SWIFT AND COMPANY 263 served ruling on the motion for the Board. For the reasons which appear in Section III, below, the motion is granted. The Trial Ex- aminer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. All parties were afforded opportunity to file briefs with the Board. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY Swift and Company is an Illinois corporation with its principal office and place of business in Chicago, Illinois. The Company is en- gaged in the business of meat packing and processing , operating plants in numerous States throughout the United States. Only the Company's Marshalltown, Iowa, packing plant is involved in this proceeding. The Company purchases all of its livestock for the Marshalltown plant from stockyards located within the State of Iowa. During the year 1945, the Company shipped processed meat, exceeding $10,000,000 in value, to points outside the State of Iowa. The Company admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. II. THE ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED United Packinghouse Workers of America is a labor organization affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, admitting to membership employees of the Company. National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, Local No. 50, is a labor organization affiliated with the Confederated Unions of America, admitting to membership employees of the Company. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, Local No. 574, is a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, admitting to membership employees of the Company. Ill. THE ALLEGED QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION In November 1942, the Brotherhood was certified by the Board as the bargaining representative for the employees here concerned, and the Brotherhood and the Company executed a contract, retroactively effective as of August 20, 1942, to continue in operation until August 11, 1943, and for annual periods thereafter, "subject to reopening by either party on written notice mailed at least thirty days prior to August 11 of any year." This contract was renewed automatically in 1943. Before the 1944 effective date of the renewal clause, the A. F. of L. apprised the Company of its rival claim to representation. Upon 264 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Company's refusal to bargain with it, the A. F. of L. filed a repre- sentation petition with this Board 2 An election was then held in accordance with the Board's Direction,8 the Brotherhood, the A. F. of L., and the C. I. O. having appeared on the ballot. The Brotherhood won this election and was certified by the Board on October 13, 1944. On May 15,1945, the Brotherhood and the Company entered into a new agreement for a term expiring August 11, 1946. Thereafter, on July 6, 1945, the C. I. O. notified the Company of its claim to represent the employees, and on July 7, filed its petition herein. The Brotherhood raises the May 15, 1945, agreement as a bar to this proceeding. But the C. I. O. insists that, having asserted its rival claim in timely fashion insofar as the 1942 contract is concerned, the 1945 agreement cannot be considered to preclude a present determina- tion of representatives inasmuch as it is nothing more than a premature extension of the earlier contract.4 This Board has unanimously held that a certified union is entitled to a reasonable time (usually 1 year) in which, undisturbed, it may bargain collectively for the employees it represents.5 Thus, at the time of the completion of the 1945 agreement, approximately 7 months after its certification, the Brotherhood's status was not subject to challenge and it was entitled to exercise its rights as a bargaining rep- resentative. Moreover, in the Kimberly-Clark case 6 it was held that a contract of reasonable term, automatically renewed about 7 months after certification, effectively barred a representation proceeding for the period of its duration, despite the fact that a rival claim had been asserted prior to its renewal.7 Even assuming, therefore, that the C. I. O.'s claim had been made before the execution of the 1945 contract in this case, under the Kimberly-Clark doctrine it would nevertheless be a bar, unless it is, as the C. I. O. contends, no more than a prema- ture extension of the 1942 agreement. In these circumstances, how- ever, the principle of premature extension is not applicable. To hold otherwise would be to compel a union to adhere to an agreement made before its certification and prevent it from executing a new one in pursuance of such designation, as is its right. We find, consequently, that the agreement of May 15, 1945, bars the instant proceeding, and we shall dismiss the petition." The C. I. 0. Intervened in the proceeding. 8 Matter of Swift and Company, 58 N. L. R. B. 12. 4 See Matter of Memphis Furniture Mfg. Co., 51 N. L. R. B . 1447; Matter of Wichita -Union Stockyards Company, 40 N. L R. B'369. 6 See Matter of Aluminum Company of America, Newark Works, 57 N. L. R. B. 913; Matter of Bohn Aluminum and Brass Corporation, 57 N. L. R. B. 1684. 6 Matter of Kimberly-Clark Corporation, 61 N. L. R. B. 90. ° See also Matter of American Woolen Company, 61 N. L. R. B. 1045. 8 Matter of Swift and Company, 66 N. L . R. B. 845. SWIFT AND COMPANY ORDER 26& The National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the petition for investigation and certification of representatives of employees of Swift and Company, Marshalltown , Iowa, filed by United Packing- house Workers of America, C. I. 0., be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MR. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order.