Central Packing Co.

CENTRAL PACKING COMPANY Recommendations 19 As reflected in its motion for remand, the Respondent seeks "a new decision and order upon a reconsideration of the entire case." The Respondent, however, has filed neither a brief nor a motion defining explicitly the scope of the "new decision and order" which it seeks. I have concluded in effect that the evidence adduced upon the remand does not warrant any modification of the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and remedy embodied in the Board's Decision and Order. It would, therefore, be needlessly repetitive for the Board to issue a Decision and Order reiterating the provisions of the one now in effect. Accordingly, upon the basis of the entire record in this proceeding, including the evidence adduced at both the first and second hearings, and upon the foregoing findings of fact, I recommend that : 1. The Board construe the Respondent's position before it as in effect an appli- cation for the entry of a new Decision and Order containing such modification of the one now in effect as may be warranted by a reconsideration of the additional evidence adduced at the second hearing ; and 2. The Board enter a Decision and Order denying the application for modifi- cation of the Decision and Order now in effect and reaffirming its terms and provisions. CENTRAL PACKING COMPANY, AND RABBIS M. BURNSTEIN AND TIROR STERN 1 and UNITED PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL No. 36, CIO, PETITIONER. Case No. I-2-RC-962. July 6, 1951 Decision and Direction of Election Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Eugene Hoffman, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Styles]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer, as defined in paragraph numbered 2, below, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The Petitioner, a labor organization, claims to represent the five :schochtim and the two tag men performing kosher butchering work at the plant of Central Packing Company, herein called the Company, at Kansas City, Kansas. The Petitioner contends that these workers are employed by the Company with which it desires to bargain. The Company contends that it does not employ these workers, but that they are employed by Rabbis Burstein and Stern. The Rabbis, while desiring to control the provisions of any collective bargaining agree- ment for these employees which may touch upon the religious aspects 1 The name of the Employer is amended to conform with our finding heieln. 95 NLRB No. 8. 961974-52-vol. 95-3 20 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of their work, state that they are not concerned with any of the other conditions of employment of the kosher workers. The Company, a Kansas corporation, is engaged in the slaughter- ing and dressing of cattle which it ships to consumers for sale as meat products for human consumption. During the calendar year 1950 the Company shipped more than $1,000,000 worth of meat to points outside the State of Kansas. Approximately one-third of the Company's business is devoted to its kosher products. When the Company first attempted to enter the business of shipping kosher food, its president, Weil, contacted Rabbis Burstein and Stern .who, it had learned, were authorized to supervise such operations in the Kansas City area. The Rabbis explained to Weil that the schochtim and tag men who would perform the work must be under the complete supervision of the Rabbis, who should have the sole right to hire and discharge them.2 The Company and the Rabbis then agreed on a flat rate to be paid by the Company for the cattle which the Company should offer for kosher slaughtering, regardless of whether or not they were eventually found fit for shipping as such. The' number of men to be hired and the amount they should be paid was left to the Rabbis. The Rabbis then decided between themselves how they would divide the money paid by the Company. Shortly after operations began, the Rabbis discovered that they were unable to keep books with regard to paying the men, and the Company agreed to perform the bookkeeping functions for them 3 Thereafter the Rabbis notified the Company's bookkeeper what percentage each of the kosher workers was to receive from the amounts due. Since that time the bookkeeper has computed the pay from the amount due each week for kosher work. The kosher workers work on the same floor with the Company's employees, who slaughter cattle for sale as nonkosher beef. All of their work takes place on the Company's premises, but the Company furnishes none of their tools or equipment other than the tags which go on the products. Although the Company does not tell the kosher workers specifically what their hours shall be and does not control their holidays or vacations, the Company does in great measure control their general working hours by its scheduling of the kosher slaughter- ing and by increasing or decreasing the amount of kosher slaughtering to be performed. The Company does not exercise control over the working conditions of the kosher workers and Company President Well testified that they are not subject to company regulations. How- ever, the kosher workers are included in the Company's workmen's 4 On at least two occasions the Rabbis have suspended workers for violations of religious rules. ' The Company states that it did so as a "favor" to the Rabbis. J. HOWARD SMITH, INC. 21 compensation policy along with the general employees of the Company. On the basis of the foregoing, particularly the facts indicating that the killing of kosher cattle and shipping of kosher products forms a large portion of the Company's business, that the kosher workers perform all of their work at the. Company's plant, and are indirectly controlled through the Employer's operation of its plant, we find that the Company and the Rabbis, who supervise and directly control the working conditions of the kosher workers and determine their salaries, constitute a single employer within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Act. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. As the kosher workers are the only employees employed by the Company and the Rabbis as a single employer, and in view of the religious aspects of their work which is unlike that of the other em- ployees in the plant, we find that they should function as a unit separate and apart from the general production and maintenance employees of the Company:' We find that all schochtim and tag men employed by the Employer at the Company's plant in Kansas City, Kansas, excluding all super- visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this volume.] * The Board has consistently found units of schochtlm to be appropriate bargaining snits. Armour & Company, 72 NLRB 717, and cases cited therein . We therefore find no merit in the Rabbis' contention that the religious nature of their work precludes their representation for purposes of collective bargaining. J. HOWARD SMITH , INC. and SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA , AFL, PETITIONER . Case No. 4-RC-814. July 6, 1951 Decision and. Order ,Upon a. petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held in September 1950 before Fred G. Krivonos, hearing officer. Following that hearing, the Em- ployer, hereafter called Smith, moved to reopen the hearing on the ground that it was changing its method of fishing operations for the 1951 season. The Board remanded the case for hearing on the alleged 95 NLRB No. 9.