Louisville Shirt Co.

In the Matter of MOLLY S. POMERANCE, SARAH B. STEINBERG, AND NAOMI ESTROFF, A PARTNERSHIP, DOING BUSINESS AS LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY AND MAX ESTROFF, A. K. STEINBERG, AND A. POMERANCE, A PARTNERSHIP, DOING BUSINESS AS SOUTHERN COMMISSION COMPANY and AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO Case No. 10-C-1768.-Decided June 28, 1946 DECISION AND ORDER On December 6, 1945, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report in its above-entitled proceeding, finding that the respondent Louisville Shirt Company had engaged in, and was engaging in, cer- tain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached thereto. The Trial Examiner further found that the respondent Louisville Shirt Company had not engaged in other unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and that respondent Southern Commission Company was not an employer, within the meaning of the Act, of the employees involved in this pro- ceeding, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed in these respects. Thereafter, exceptions to the Intermediate Report were filed by the respondents, the Union, and counsel for the Board. Sup- porting briefs were filed by the Union and counsel for the Board. The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and briefs of all parties, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following exception,. The Trial Examiner found that Estroff's conduct on June 12 and 14, 1945, constituted unlawful interference with the self-organization rights of the employees. This finding is not based on allegations in the complaint, which alleges that "The respondents, from on or about I Subsequent to the issuance of the Intermediate Report, the Union and counsel for the Board each moved to reopen the record for the purpose of receiving further evidence of the Union 's majority representation . The motions are hereby denied 69 N. L. it. B., No. 14. 145 701592-47-vol 69-11 146 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD July 9,194k5, to date . . . have urged, persuaded, threatened, and warned their employees to refrain from joining or remaining mem- bers of the Union." (Emphasis supplied.) As stated above, the events upon which the Trial Examiner based his finding occurred in mid-June. At the hearing, counsel for the Board clearly indicated that he was introducing evidence as to Estroff's conduct in June for background purposes and not as a basis for an unfair labor practice finding. In view of the allegations of the complaint and the explana- tion offered by the Board's counsel at the hearing, we shall reverse the Trial Examiner's finding of unfair labor practices. Inasmuch as we have found that the respondents 8 have not engaged in unfair labor practices, we shall dismiss the complaint. ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint against the respondents Molly S. Pomerance, Sarah B. Steinberg, and Naomi Estroff, a partnership, doing business as Louisville Shirt Company, Louisville, Georgia, and Max Estroff, A. K. Steinberg, and A. Pomerance, a partnership, doing business as Southern Commission Company, Augusta, Georgia, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. INTERMEDIATE REPORT Mr. Mortimer H. Freeman, for the Board. Messrs. Alexander E. Wilson, Jr., and Thomas I. Vickery, of Atlanta, Ga, for the respondents. Mr. Carl F. Albrecht and Mrs Polly Hayden, of Nashville, Tenn, for the Union. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon an amended charge duly filed on September 19, 1945, by Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organi- zations, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by its Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued its complaint dated September 20', 1945, against Molly S. Pom- erance, Sarah B Steinberg, and Naomi Estroff, a partnership, doing business as Louisville Shirt Company, Louisville, Georgia, and Max Estroff, A. K. Stein- berg; and A. Pomeranee, a partnership, doing business as Southern Commission Company, Augusta, Georgia, herein collectively called the respondents, alleging that the respondents, and each of them, had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting couunerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), z In dismissing the complaint 'is to Southern Commission Company we do not pass upon the Trial Examiner's finding that Southern is not an employer within the meaning of the Act, to which finding the Union and counsel tot the Board excepted We find it unneces- cciv to determine Southern's relationship to the employees of Louisville Shirt Compaii in vow of out conclusion that no unfair labor practices have been committed i Eri oneously referred to in the formal papers as A J Steinberg LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 147 (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and amended charge, together with notice of hearing thereon, were duly served upon each of the re- spondents and upon the Union With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that: (1) since June 10, 1945, the Union has been designated and selected as the collective bargaining representative of the persons employed by the Louis- ville Shirt Company, herein called Louisville, in a certain appropriate unit, as evidenced by a Report on Cress-Check of the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, dated July 18, 1945, which Cross-Check was made pursuant to the terms of a written agreement dated July 10, 1945; (2) from on or about July 18, 1945, each respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of the employees in said appropriate unit; (3) from on or about July 9, 1945, each respondent has vilified, disparaged, and expressed dis- approval of the Union and has urged, persuaded, threatened, and warned the employees of Louisville to refrain from joining or remaining members of the Union, (4) since July 18, 1945, each respondent has refused to grant the em- ployees of Louisville in the said unit wage increases because the employees had joined and assisted the Union and because they had designated the Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining ; and (5) by the foregoing acts and conduct, each respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced the employees of Louisville in the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act On October 1, 1945, the respondents filed a joint answer 2 denying the coin- mission of any unfair labor practices The answer also denied the appropriate- ness of the alleged unit, the validity of the Cross-Check agreement, the validity of the Regional Director's report thereon, and the majority status of the Union with respect to the employees of Louisville. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on November 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1945, at Louisville, Georgia. before the undersigned Trial Examiner, Howard Myers, duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner The Board and the respondents were represented by counsel , the Union by representatives. All parties partici- pated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. At the conclusion of the taking of evidence, Board's counsel moved to conform the formal papers. mcludnig the pleadings, to the proof with respect to minor matters, such as the correction of typographical errors, misspellings , and the like. The motion was granted without objection Oral argument, in which counsel for the Board and for the respondents participated, was heard at the conclusion of the taking of the evidence and is part of the record Although afforded an oppoi tunity to do so. none of the parties has filed a brief Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the wirnesses, the undersigned makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT I THE BUSINESSES OF THE RESPONDENTS Louisville Shirt Company is a partnership composed of Molly S. Pomerance, Sarah B Steinberg, and Naomi Estroff. Its principal place of business and itsz two plants are located in Louisville, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manu- facture of men's work clothing, men's shirts, and men's shorts. Except for a 2 Paragraphs I and II of the ansNer were aniended at the hearing to deny, in effect, that Louisville is engaged in commerce, within the meaning of the Act. 148 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contract with the United States Navy , which was started and completed during the spring and summer of 1945, Louisville operates exclusively as a contract shops for Southern Commission Company, herein called Southern. Southern is a partnership composed of Max Estroff, A. K. Steinberg, and A. Pomerance, the husbands of the respective partners of Louisville, and is engaged in the manu- facture, distribution , and sale of men's work clothing , men's shirts, and men's shorts and in the sale of piece goods During the past year, Southern's volume of sales was in excess of a million dollars The raw materials, consisting chiefly of cotton goods and broadcloth , are pur- chased by Southern from mills located at points outside of the State of Georgia and are transported to Augusta , Georgia, where Southern has its principal place of business. Such raw materials as Southern wishes to use in the manufacture of men's work clothes and men's shirts and shorts , are shipped to various plants in Georgia , including the Louisville plants. Upon completion , all finished prod- ucts are delivered by the contractors to Southern's place of business in Augusta and from that point approximately 50 percent of all the finished products is shipped to customers of Southern located outside the State of Georgia . During the past 12 months , Louisville processed in excess of $250,000 worth of merchan- dise for Southern. The undersigned finds that Louisville's operations affect commerce within the meaning of the Act 4 and that Southern is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations , is a labor organization admitting to membership em- ployees of Louisville. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Interference , restraint , and coercion On June 11, 1945, the Union started an organizational drive among the Louis- ville employees . On that day 66 of the then 190 employees joined the Union. The next day an additional 27 joined . The Union 's campaign was the occasion for three talks to the employees by Max Estroff , Louisville's manager,5 on June 12, 14, and 15 , respectively. 1. At about 12 o'clock , noon, on June 12, Estroff assembled the employees of both plants in the large plant d and delivered the first of the three talks. Three former employees, Radford, Henson, and Nora Kitchens , Cook a present em- ployee, and Estroff himself , testified as to the statements made by Estroft on this occasion . Radford testified that Estroff said that some of the girls had 3 As the Board noted in the Matter of Harrisburg Children's Dress Company, 14 N. L R B 1035 , "Many of the manufacturers in the clothing industry avail themselves of the services of contract shops in the manufacture of their product The raw materials are supplied by the manufacturers , who also dispose of the finished product. The intermediate processing , or some of it, is turned over to the contract shop on a contractual basis. It is not unusual for a contract shop to operate exclusively on behalf of a single manufacturer " 4 See N. L R B. v Fainblatt, 306 U S 601 , Matter of Harrisburg Children's Dress Com- pany, 14 N. L R B. 1035. See also N. L. R B v Stremel, 141 F . ( 2d) 317 ( C. C. A 10) ; N. L. R B v Suburban Lumber Company, 121 F ( 2d) 829 (C C A. 3) ; and N. L. R B v. Gulf Pacific Service Company, 116 F ( 2d) 852 ( C C A. 5) 5 Estroff is also an owner of a one third interest in Southern The plants are known as the "large plant" and the "small plant " During all the times material herein , about 165 persons were employed in the large plant and about 25 in the small plant. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 149 shown him some little blue cards' and had asked him if they should sign them; that he had replied that they could sign those cards if they desired, because it was no business of his, but that he was not going to join the Union ; that if the employees joined the Union they would be compelled to strike and that he would not tolerate strikes. Henson testified that Estroff told the employees that he would not operate under a union ; that he would not tolerate being dictated to ; that he would split up the factory and move to the Carolinas; and that if "there were 20 girls that wanted to operate ender the same conditions he would leave 20 machines" for them to operate and move the others elsewhere. Nora Kitchens testified that Estroff : told all the girls to come up to the front where they could hear what he had to say Said he wasn't going to say anything for or against the Union, but lie would be the last one to sign for a union; before he did sign and be dictated to by a Union he would move his plant to Carolina, but if there were as many as 20 girls that wanted to work in an open shop there would be machines left in Louisville for those girls. Cook testified that Estroff said : . . . he wasn't for or against the Union, but that he would not operate under a union. Before he would operate under a union he would close his tactory down and move the machines to Carolina, but if there was as many as 20 that wanted to work just like they had been working that he would leave the machines for them to work . . . He said that if we wanted to know how the boys in the service felt about a strike to write and ask them. Estroff testified that, after asking the employees to listen attentively to what he was about to say, he told them : . . . my reason for making this talk this morning is that some of You have asked me whether "I can join the Union"-or whether "You want me to sign this card," "couldn't we get a raise without signing the card" . . . I want it distinctly understood that those of you who are expecting me to uphold the Union is in for a bad disappointment. I want it also under- stood that those of you who are expecting me to low rate Unions, you, too, are in for a bad disappointment. I then said the rumor is going around that if you join a union you will be-that you can't be fired and if you are fired we will have to pay you your salary while you are fired and give you your job back. I says, don't believe this rumor. I don't believe there is any law in the world that can make a man pay a fired employee. I want to talk to you all on the freedom to work. You, have a right to work anywhere and under any conditions you see fit. You can work with the Union or without a union. To be perfectly frank with you I don't know anything about one, and you don't know anything about them. Now, I am not going to work with a union I said you people have known that I have been trying to get someone to take my place here so I will not have anything to do with a union. That is up to you people. I went on farther and said that if this factory could not operate with a union and it made it prohibitive-I don't know whether I used that exact expression ; but it is the essence of it-and that we could not operate that I didn't see any reason why we couldn't move this factory to another town. However, any of you people who want to work with us, that is one of those freedoms. Y The Union's membership application cards are referred to in the record as "blue cards." 150 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD You are welcome to do it. With as many as 20 of you this factory will operate. Estroff explained at the hearing that the significance of the number "20" was that it was impracticable to use a smaller number of employees in manufac- turing the type of garment made by Louisville. 2. On June 14, Estroff again assembled the employees At this meeting, he handed to each employee a slip reading as follows : Date---------------- This is to certify that I am willing to work for Louisville Shirt Company in an open shop as I have been doing in the past Signed--------------------------------- Estroff testified that before he handed the slips to the employees he explained his purpose as follows : . . . Now, the Union has a card . . . And I said this (Union) card, they (the Union) claim [that] when they have 80% of these cards signed that you people would be in the Union . . . And I said I won't have any way of know- ing if they have 80%. I said I don't believe it takes that many, that I don't know anything about unions, but 51% is the way I have heard it. I says I don't have any way of knowing whether they have this 51% or not, and I have prepared a slip which I called a white slip of paper . . . I read it . . I want it distinctly understood that it isn't compulsory for you to sign one of these I want it also understood that no one in here must take one from my hand when I offer it to them. That no one is going to offer you these but me I don't want anyone accused of working for a union in this building. I am going to hand this out myself You do not have to return these today. If you want to, it is all right. You can send them in in two weeks, three weeks, six weeks. You can mail them in Take them home and think of it. Before you send them in, be sure that you are satisfied. And my purpose in doing that, which I explained to them, was to know if they had 51%. Radford testified that at that meeting Estroff stated that if 51 percent of the employees did not sign the slips he would close the plant the following week ; that it would remain closed indefinitely ; and that if, and when, lie decided to reopen the plant he would write letters to those who had signed the slips to report for work and would write to those who had not signed that they might return to work "if they cared to come back under the same conditions " Nora Kitchens testified that Estroff threatened to close the plant that night if 51 percent of the employees did not sign the slips, keep it closed indefinitely, and "the ones that signed the slips would be written to come back to work as usual and the ones that did not sign the slips could come back if they wished to " Cook's testimony, with respect to this meeting, is in substantial accord with Radford's. In the opinion of the undersigned, there is no substantial contradiction between Estroff's own recollection of what he said to the employees on June 12 and 14, and that of the witnesses who heard his statements. It was inevitable that the employees would retain a more vivid recollection of the warnings that Estroff conveyed than of the confused and contradictory assurances with which he attempted to balance them. His speeches were made in the context of and with reference to the pending organizational campaign and were addressed to em- ployees assembled at Louisville's order, in Louisville's plant, and on Louisville's time. They unmistakably conveyed Estroff's disapproval of the unionization LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 151 of the employees," coupled with a warning as to adverse economic consequences for the employees if the organizational efforts were successful. Estroff made it clear that he would not work with a union and intended to limit production at Louisville to any practicable minimum that would restrict employment to non- union employees' and to move the business to "Carolina" if necessary to avoid dealing with any union . The testimony of Radford , Henson, Nora Kitchens, and Cook, hereinabove recited, makes clear that the employees so understood Estroff's remarks and Estroff's own testimony as to what he said to them permits of no other reasonable interpretation 10 The distribution of the slips upon which the employees were to go on record in approval of an "open shop" was, notwithstanding Estroff's explanation that his purpose was only to determine whether the Union had a majority in the plant, in itself unlawful under the Act," equivalent, as the employees interpreted the situation, to presenting them v ith a choice between joining the Union and being unemployed or staying outside the Union and remaining employed. 3. On June 15, the employees were again assembled and Estroff then read to them the text of a carefully prepared statement of his position. The statement was uncoercive in nature and the Board has made no issue as to its propriety. The statement does not, however, either retract the warnings previously conveyed or neutralize their effect. Estroff's June 12 and June 14 statements incorporated threats and warnings which were coercive in nature and were so understood by those to whom they were addressed. Made by a responsible representative of the respondent Louis- ville, they were official comunications of Louisville's attitude and intent. Because of their coercive significance they were not privileged under the constitutional right of free speech preserved under the First Amendment.12 The undersigned concludes that by Estroff's statements threatening to limit employment at Louis- ville to non-union employees and to move the business of the respondent Louisville to another locality if the employees at Louisville persisted in organizing the Louisville plant, and by attempting to poll said employees with reference to their "Willie Kitchens testified without contradiction that on the night of June 13, Virginia Hardin, bookkeeper for Louisville, relayed to him a message from Estroff to tell the Union 's Organizer to stay away from the plant The undersigned credits Kitchens' testimony. The incident was not explained and is therefore significant evidence as to Estroff's attitude toward organization of Louisville's employees. 0In this connection Estroff used the term "open shop" rather than " non-union ." At the time that he addressed the employees they were in process of organization and no issue of "closed shop" or "union shop " had arisen , so far as the record discloses . The under- signed concludes that Estroff used the term "open shop" as a synonym for "unorganized shop" and that the employees so understood. 10 Evidencing the effect of Estroff's speech of June 12 on the minds of the employees, the record shows that within a half hour afterward, Johnson, one of the employees, requested the Union's organizer to return to her the application card that she had signed the day before. The record further shows that similar requests were made by other employees not identified 11 See Matter of The American Steel Scraper Company, 29 N. L. R. B. 939, where the Board said , regarding the activities of that respondent which were similar to Estroff's: "The polling of the employees under the respondent ' s auspices at a time when the Union was maintaining that it represented a majority of them was not conducive to a free choice on the part of the employees and forcibly indicated to them the respondent 's reluc- tance to deal with the Union " ( See cases cited therein in footnotes 7 and 8.) 12 Obviously the latitude allowed in N L. R. B v Virginia Electric f Power Company, 314 U S 469, and N. L R B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F (2d) 993 , (C. C. A. 2), cert denied 320 U. S. 768, as to employer 's freedom of speech would not apply to a situation involving coercive elements as exist here. In the instant case, there were "intimations of reprisal" against those employees who favored unions. In the cited cases, as the respective Courts carefully pointed out, that element was entirely lacking 152 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD attitude toward the Union, the respondent Louisville interferred with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights ensured in Section 7 of the Act." B. The alleged refusal to bargain collectively By letter, dated June 13, the Union informed Estroff that it represented the majority of Louisville's production and maintenance employees, requested recog- nition as bargaining representative, and asked that he meet with representatives of the Union on June 20 for the purpose of discussing a collective bargaining contract." On June 15,16 Estroff telegraphed the Union as follows : . . . WILL DISCUSS DETAILS OF YOUR LETTER WITH OWNER[S] OF FACTORY OVER WEEKEND NONE OF THEM LIVE IN LOUISVILLE THEREFORE IMPOSSIBLE TO GIVE ANSWER TODAY STOP WILL AD- VISE LATER AS TO THEIR POSITION IN THIS MATTER. That same day, June 15, the Union filed with the Regional Office of the Board at Atlanta, a Petition for Certification and Investigation of Representatives.10 The Regional Director wrote Louisville that day that the petition had been filed. This letter 17 summarized the Board 's procedure pertaining to representation cases; suggested that Louisville enter into a written consent election agreement to determine the question of representation; requested certain information re- garding Louisville's interstate business transactions ; requested an alphabetical list of its employees showing the job classification of each employee ; asked for Louisville's position relative to the alleged appropriate unit ; and advised Louis- ville that Field Examiner William V. George was handling the matter. On June 21, the Union withdrew its Petition for Certification and Investigation of Representatives and filed a charge 1e which alleged, among other things, that Louisville had violated Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, in that Louisville had discriminatorily discharged Willie Kitchens, had refused to bargain collec- 11 See N. L. R B. v. M E. Blatt Co, 143 F. (2d) 268 (C C. A. 3), cert. denied 323 U S. 774, Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N. L R B, 142 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 8), cert. denied 323 U. S. 722 ; N. L. R B. V. Laister-Kau,ffmann Aircraft Corp., 144 F. (2d) 9 (C C. A. 8) ; N. L. R B. v. Trojan Powder Co ., 135 F. ( 2d) 337 (C C A. 3), cert. denied 320 U S. 768; N. L. It. B. v. Federbush, 121 F. (2d) 954, 957 (C. C. A. 2) ; N. L. R. B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co, 106 F. (2d) 713, 722 (C. C. A. 3) ; N L. R B. v. Falk Corporation, 102 F. (2d) 383, 389 (C. C. A 7), aff'd 308 U. S . 453; N. L. R. B v . Link-Belt Company, 311 U S 584, 600; Matter of A. J. Showalter Company, 64 N. L. R B. 573. Cf Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516. 14 The complaint alleged that all the Louisville employees , excluding office, clerical, and supervisory employees , constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain- ing. The respondents' answer put in issue the appropriateness of the unit for the reason, among others , "that no determination of such unit has been made by" the Board Through- out the negotiations between the respondents , the Board, and the Union , the respondents did not question the appropriateness of the alleged unit. It will be assumed for the pur- poses of this case , and the undersigned finds , that Louisville's production and maintenance employees , exclusive of office and clerical employees and supervisory employees with au- thority to hire, promote , discharge , discipline , or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees or effectively recommend such action , constitute a unit appropriate for the pur- poses of collective bargaining , within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 16 The Union's letter of June 13 was written in , and mailed from, Nashville , Tennessee, and was not received by Estroff until June 15, after he had made his speech to the employees. 16 Case No 10-R-1527. 11 Estroff's brother died on June 16. Estroff was not at the plant that day On June 17, his secretary brought the letter to Augusta , Georgia, where he was at the time . The letter stated that a copy of the Act was enclosed therein, but it is clear from the record that Estroff did not see a copy of the Act prior to June 23. Is Case No. 10-C-1742. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 153 Lively with the Union, and that Estroff had made anti-union speeches to the employees. Meanwhile on June 18, Estroff had asked A. K. Steinberg to go to the Regional Office at Atlanta to arrange for a consent election agreement. Steinberg came to the Regional Office on June 22 He was informed that the matter was in the hands of Mortimer H Freeman, an attorney on the Board's Regional staff. Freeman told him of the charge that had been filed and that there could be no election with the charge pending. Steinberg told Freeman that he had come on Estroff's behalf to discuss the question of an election and knew nothing of the matters referred to in the charge, and suggested that Freeman talk to Estroff by long distance telephone. Freeman agreed and Steinberg then called Estroff at Augusta, and after a brief explanation of the purpose of the call, handed the telephone to Freeman who suggested that Estroff come to Atlanta to discuss the situation with him. Estroff, who is of the Jewish faith, was in seclusion at the time, in observance of the ritual period of mourning for the death of his brother. He met Freeman in Atlanta by appointment on July 6. In the course of their conference Freeman sent for Albrecht, a representative of the Union, and a tentative settlement was arranged whereby the Union was to drop the charge filed and the respondent Louisville was to sign an agreement to determine the question of representation by a cross-check of union membership cards against the Louisville's pay roll. Freeman either gave to Estroff at the time or mailed to him that evening several copies of the proposed agreement for a Cross-Check. Estroff, after securing the requisite authority, signed four copies of the agreement, which he mailed to Freeman on July 9. On July 10, the agreement was signed by Albrecht on behalf of the Union and approved by the Regional Director of the Board, and the Regional Director thereupon permitted the Union to with- draw, without prejudice, the charge filed in Case No. 10-C-1742. On or about July 13, George checked the Union's membership application cards against the names appearing on Louisville's pay roll of June 13 and informed the Regional Director that the Union had submitted 103 signed cards and that the pay roll showed that there were 190 persons in the agreed unit in Louisville's employ on June 13. Later that day, the Regional Director mailed to Louisville a notice reading as follows: NOTICE The Agreement for Cross-Check appearing below has been executed in settlement of a question concerning representation arising under the Na- tional Labor Relations Act. The Cross-Check has been made pursuant to such agreement and it appears therefrom that the Union has been designated by a majority of the employees within the Unit. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that unless cause to the contrary is shown to the undersigned Regional Director on or before five (5) days from the date hereof, he will issue a Report on Cross-Check finding that the Union has been designated and selected as the exclusive representative of the employees in the Unit, which will constitute complete and final disposition of the question concerning representation.19 On July 17, Albrecht wrote to Estroff enclosing three copies of a proposed collective bargaining agreement and requesting, among other things, that Louis- ville fix a date to discuss the proposed agreement with representatives of the Union. "Pursuant to the Cross -Check Agreement , this notice was to be posted by Louisville for 5 consecutive days Estroff admitted that the notice was not posted. 154 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On or about July 18, the Regional Director sent the parties a Report on Cross- Check, dated the same day, which stated that of the 190 persons in the agreed unit, 103 of them had designated the Union as their collective bargaining rep- resentative. On July 19, Estroff wrote Albrecht acknowledging receipt of his letter of the 17th and informing Albrecht that the owners of Louisville would not return from their vacations until the middle of August at which time Estroff would take up Albrecht's letter with them. On July 21, Albrecht telegraphed Estroff demanding that the wages of the employees be raised immediately or that he arrange to meet with the Union on July 23, to discuss the matter. On July 23, Estroff replied by telegram that he had no authority to comply with Albrecht's request. The same day, Albrecht telegraphed John White, who had become Louisville's manager on July 9, as follows : AS THE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL YOUR EMPLOYEES WE REQUEST THAT WAGES BE INCREASED TEN OR FIFTEEN CENTS PER HOUR IMMEDIATELY ALSO THAT NOTICES BE POSTED IN THE PLANT WHERE EVERYBODY CAN SEE THEM STATING THE AMOUNT OF INCREASE AS BEING AGREED TO BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND THE UNION PENDING NEGOTIATION WITH THE UNION ON ITS COMPLETE DEMANDS AS CONTAINED IN ITS CON- TACT (sic) PROPOSAL AND LETTER OF JULY 17TH. ALSO SENDING US A COPY OF SUCH NOTICE. AWAITING YOUR REPLY On July 27, White replied, "Officials have not given me authority to act in [this] matter." On August 1, Albrecht again wrote Estroff demanding, in effect, that the wages of the employees be raised without further delay and that Louisville fix a date for a bargaining conference. Estroff by letter dated August 3,20 informed Albrecht that he had discussed with the owners of Louisville the various letters and telegrams Albrecht had sent him, "including the conversa- tions which we have had regarding" the Union's efforts to organize the Louisville employees ; that the owners had decided to protest the Regional Director's Report on Cross-Check and had so notified the Board ; that the owners seriously questioned the Union's majority status and for that reason Louisville would not bargain collectively with the Union until the question of representation had been determined by a Board conducted election. The letter reads in part as follows : While we were discussing the matter of an election with the Board, you filed all kinds of charges against us, apparently, in an effort to force us to recognize your Union without an election. We have been threatened and coerced at every turn, and our rights do not seem to have been given any consideration whatever . . . The same day, August 3, Estroff wrote to the Regional Office, enclosing a copy of his letter of August 3 to Albrecht. Freeman, by letter dated August 6, acknowledged receipt of Estroff's letter, which had requested, according to the recitals in Freeman's letter, "the opportunity to file a protest to the cross- check . . . and asking that [an] election be held to determine proof of the union's majority." Freeman advised Louisville that its protest to the Cross- Check was untimely, and that since the Regional Director's report conclusively showed that the Union represented the majority of the Louisville employees, no election would be necessary. Freeman's letter concludes as follows 20 A copy of this letter was sent to the Board's Atlanta office. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 155 It has reached my attention that the union is alleging that the company is refusing to recognize it as the bargaining representative of your employees and a copy of Mr. Estroff's letter, dated August 3, signifies such failure and refusal to bargain with the union. I regret that the company has seen ht to take such a stand after my personal efforts were extended to obviate the necessity of litigation. I trust that you will avail yourself of my offer once again to avoid unnecessary litigation by visiting this office and discuss- ing the matter with me in the hopes of avoiding litigation and bringing about an amicable settlement between the parties involved. On August 10, Mrs. Pomerance wrote Freeman as follows : This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 6th. We are perfectly willing to accept your offer to visit your office and discuss this matter with you further. At the present time, Mr. Max Estroff, our Manager, is out of town, but if you will suggest a convenient time for him to see you within the next week or ten days, he will arrange to do so. On August 14, the Union filed the charge in this proceeding alleging, among other things, that Louisville had discriminatorily discharged Willie Kitchens, had refused to bargain collectively with the Union, and that Estroff had made certain anti-union statements On August 17, Freeman replied to Mrs. Pomerance's letter of August 10, as follows : Mr. Estroff may confer with me at his convenience any time within the next ten days. Formal charges have been docketed in this office whereby the Union alleges the Company's failure and refusal to bargain. Unless your Company is ready and willing to recognize the Union as the collective bargaining agent, which fact was established as a result of the cross check, it is doubtful that anything could be accomplished by Mr. Estroff's visit since the matter has already progressed to the threshold of litigation. Mrs. Pomerance answered this letter on August 21 saying : I have your letter of August 17, 1945 with reference to Case No. 10-C-1768. If you have definitely made up your mind to litigate this matter, I do not see where any useful purpose could be accomplished by having Mr. Estroff talk with you. If you have not definitely made up your mind and you think a useful purpose could be accomplished by a conference, he will be glad to go to Atlanta to see you. On August 25, George wrote Mrs Pomerance as follows : Your letters of August 3 and August 21 addressed to Mr. Freeman of this office have been brought to my attention. I shall be glad to meet with Mr. Estroff or any other representative of your organization for the purpose of discussing and considering the basis for your protests of the results of the Agreement for Cross-Check in Case No. 10-R-1547 Will you please have your representative advise me when I may expect him in Atlanta. On August 30, Estroff advised George that he would call on him on Septem- ber 5. When Estroff, accompanied by Steinberg, appeared at George's office on Septem- ber 5, George asked them why they had come to Atlanta. Estroff replied, "I am 156 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD up here for just one purpose. I want an election. Miss Hayden" has told me that I was entitled to an election, and that is the only fair way I know to prove that my employees want to unionize." George then said, "something different than that brought you to Atlanta," and when Estroff insisted that he had come to Atlanta only to talk about an election George said, according to Estroff's credible testimony, "Well, that is just out." At some stage of the conference between Estroff, Steinberg, and George, they were joined by Freeman. The conference proved inconclusive and the complaint in this proceding was subsequently issued. It having been found that the unit alleged in the complaint is appropriate, there remains for consideration (1) the question whether the Union represented a majority in said unit during the times material herein and (2) whether, as the respondents contend, Estroff was induced to sign the Cross-Check agreement as a result of duress and coercion by Board Attorney Freeman. The only affirmative evidence tending to show the Union's majority status is the finding of the Regional Director on the basis of the report made to him by George as to the result of the Cross-Check. The Report of the Regional Director states that on June 13, there were 190 employees in the appropriate unit and that the Union had submitted 103 signed membership application cards. How- ever, Hayden, the Union's representative in charge of organizing the Louisville employees, testified as to the total number of application cards received during the campaign as follows : By Mr. FREEMAN : Q. Does your record show how many cards you received dated on June 11, 1945? 22 A. Yes. Q. How many? A. Sixty-six. Q. When did you receive some more cards? A. On Tuesday, June 12th Q. How many did you get on Tuesday, June 12th' A. I got 12 plus 15. Q. That is 27. Do you remember what time of the day you received them? A. I received 12 of the cards around 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon. After work-it must have been after 6: 00, Mr. Kitchens gave me 15 more. Q. Did you receive any cards after that? A. One or two. Q. You had 103 cards signed by the night of June 12th. Is that correct? A. If that is what it adds up to." Q. You said 66, 15 and 12. Is that right? A. Yes that is right. Q. Did you get any more cards after June 13th? A. Not until about a week later, I got one or two cards. I don't remember the exact dates because I don't have the record of it. Just one or two that I got signed. 21 Hayden was the Union's representative in charge of the organizational drive at Louis- ville. 22 This was the date the Union began its organizational efforts. No cards were dated prior to June 11. 23 It is to be noted that it adds up to only 93, rather than 103. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY Q. You are positive by June 13th you had 103 signed cards? A. Yes 157 Normally, of course, the figures on the Regional Director's Report on Card- Check would, oin view of the future in timely fashion to dispute them, be con- sidered conclusive?` But there are circumstances in this case which impel the undersigned to conclude that it would not be just to follow that principle here. Among these circumstances are the following : (1) Hayden was most specific in her testimony (given in rebuttal on questioning by Attorney Freeman) that 66 cards were received the first day and 27 the next, or a total of 9.3; thereafter she received but "one or two" additional cards; (2) taking these figures in their aspect most favorable to the Union there were no more than 95 cards altogether, which figure fails of a majority; (3) Freeman twice during the hearing mis- takenly assumed that 66 plus 27 was 103; (4) as a result of the nature of Free- man's questions at the hearing, Hayden was led into the same error; (5) Field Examiner George, who was present at the hearing during Hayden's testimony as to the figures, and who testified immediately following Hayden, was not interrogated by Freeman as to the terror though, he himself has made the Card- Check; (6) absent any explanation at the hearing, it must be found, under the circumstances here present, that a similar error was made in the Card-Check, and that this error was reflected in the Regional Director's report thereon. It would be grossly unfair, under the circumstances of this record, to base a finding of majority solely on this report in the face of the evidence, elicited by the questions of the Board's representative at the hearing, that the report reflects clear and unmistakable error in the figuring It must be found, therefore, that the necessary majority has not been proven. In view of this finding it is deemed unnecessary, in this proceeding, to resolve the claim that Estroff was induced to sign the Card-Check agreement by duress and coercion assertedly practiced by Attorney Freeman. The undersigned finds that the record does not establish that at the times material to the issues herein the Union had been designated and selected as the collective bargaining representative of Louisville's employees in the appropriate unit. The undersigned therefore finds that the respondent Louisville has not tailed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union as alleged in the com- plaint. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend the allegations of the com- plaint that respondent Louisville violated Section 8 (5) of the Act in refusing to bargain collectively with the Union be dismissed. C The olleg(d i iolation of Section 8 (3) of the Act The complaint alleged that the respondents failed and refused to grant wage increases to the employees constituting the appropriate unit because the said employees had joined and assisted the Union and had designated it as their col- lective bargaining representative The answer denies this allegation. The record discloses that on July 13, John White, who, as found above, had became Louisville's manager on July 9, announced to the employees that he was going to apply to the Naitonal War Labor Board fit permission to raise their wages 10 cents an hour, as he believed their wages were too low, and that the new rates would, if allowed, become effective from the beginning of the next pay-ioll period On July 17, Albrecht wrote Estroff protesting White's announce- 14 Attorney Freeman later in oral argument at the end of the hearing , again repeated the error • he assumed that 66 and 27 totalled 103 although the undersigned at this point indi- cated that the total was 93. The Report merely gives the 103 figure, with no breakdown. 158 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ment. The Union had, however, prior to White's announcement demanded that the wages be increased 10 or 15 cents per hour ' It appears from Estroff's testimony, which the undersigned credits, that White had made the announce- ment without authorization by Louisville. Nothing further was done by Louis- ville after the receipt of Albrecht's letter until the middle of September, when the wages were increased 10 cents an hour, retroactive to July 19. About a week prior to the date that the increases in pay were made effective, Freeman advised Estroff that he was preparing a complaint alleging that Louisville's failure to grant the employees the increases in pay demanded by the Union was an unfair labor practice and that if they allegation should be sustained Louisville would be already liable for some $15,000 to $18,000 in back pay from July 18, the date when the Regional Director had certified the Union as the collective bargaining repre- sentative. Upon Estroff's inquiry as to whether lie could increase wages without the consent of the National War Labor Board, Freeman declined to advise him and told him to consult a lawyer. Estroff then sought legal advice and was told that the prior restrictions on wage increases had been modified and that Louis- ville could increase wages, provided Louisville did not increase selling prices. The undersigned concludes that the entire record does not support the allega- tion that the respondents failed and refused to grant a wage increase to the Louisville employees because they had joined and assisted the Union or had desig- nated it as their representative for collective bargaining and will therefore recommend that the said allegation of the complaint be dismissed 27 D. The alleged interference, restraint, and coercion Board's counsel contended at the hearing that by permitting employee Johnson in July 1945 to circulate and obtain signatures on a petition headed We the undersigned do NOT [want] a Union We [want] our cards back that we signed on company time and property, the respondents violated Section 8 (1) of the Act. The record does not support this contention There is no evidence that the respondents, or any of them, inspired or sponsored the petition or encouraged its circulation. By permitting the circulation of the petition the respondents did not discriminate against the Union for they permitted the Union's adherents on company time and property to circulate, and obtain signatures to, the Union's membership application cards. The credible evidence, moreover, clearly shows that ever since the Louisville plant has been in existence, the employees have been permitted to circulate petitions of many kinds. Ruby Snider testified that on August 22, the first day of her employment with Louisville, she and her sister-in-law, who also started to work for Louisville that day, were called into Estroft's office and that he told them "he had the 28 Albrecht ' s protest was based on the theory that White should not have made the an- nouncement without first consulting the Union. 27 At the hearing, Board's counsel contended that the respondents had discriminatorily granted wage increases to the employees of Waynesboro Garment Company, where em- ployees were not attempting to organize and refused to grant a wage increase at Louisville because the Louisville employees had joined and assisted the Union. The record does not support this contention. The record shows that Waynesboro Garment Company, which is located in the town of Waynesboro, Georgia, and about 25 miles from Louisville, is a part- nership composed of Estroff 's wife , as trustee for their two minor children , Stanford Pomerance (son of A Pomerance ), and Steinberg's wife, as trustee for their two minor children, and that a wage increase was given to the employees sometimes prior to August 7, 1945 The record is silent , however, regarding the circumstances under which the in- creases were given , whether they were put into effect prior to or after the Union started its organizational drive at Louisville, and the amount thereof. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 159 work there to help the people around, and says his girls might not be getting what they should, but that he would see that they got it later and he said that them that fooled with the Union [might] be sorry later on." Estroff in effect denied making the above quoted statement. The undersigned credits Estroff's denial. Snider further testified that during the first week of her employment with Louisville, Forelady Fambrough asked her if she had been a member of the union at the plant where she was employed immediately prior to her employment by Louisville. Fambrough, while not specifically denying that she had asked Snider about her former union affiliations,"' testified, and the undersigned credits her testimony, that she never discussed unions with any non-supervisory employee for the reason that Estroff had instructed her the previous June to refrain from discussing unions with any employee The undersigned finds that Fambrough did not ask Snider whether she had been a member of a union at her previous place of employment. E. Southern and its relationship with Louisville Louisville Shirt Company was incorporated in 1940, and the stockholders were Max Estroff, A. Pomerance, and A K. Steinberg.' In May, 1942, the corpora- tion was dissolved and a partnership composed of Estroff, Pomerance, and Steinberg took over the assets of the corporation. On December 28, 1942, the interests held by Estroff, Pomerance, and Steinberg were transferred by them to their respective wives for a legal consideration. Southern denied that it controls the labor policies of Louisville. Estroff main- tained that only when he was the paid manager of Louisville did he control the labor policies of Louisville and that as such paid manager he was Louisville's representative and not Southern's. He admitted, however, that after the Union began its organization campaign he continued to handle the labor policies even though White was the manager of Louisville so because he considered the "union business" his "baby" and wanted to handle the matter to its conclusion. Despite the fact that the evidence also shows that when the Waynesboro Garment Com- pany's plant started operations in 1943, Steinberg and Estroff sent certain Louis- ville employees to that plant for a short period ; that these employees were returned to Louisville when Steinberg, who at that time was the paid manager of the Waynesboro plant, had no further need for their services; and that Willie Kitchens was hired by Louisville after being interviewed by Steinberg, the undersigned is convinced, and finds, that the record does not support the allega- tion of the complaint that Southern controls the labor policies of Louisville or participated in the unfair labor practices which were committed by Louisville 81 Except for the fact that Louisville acts as a contractor for Southern, the two partnerships are separate and distinct The undersigned finds that Southern Commission Company is not an employer, within the meaning of the Act, of the employees involved in this proceeding and will recommend that the complaint be dismissed as to it. zs Snider was called by the Board as a rebuttal witness. 29 These are the persons who own and operate Southern . The office and warehouse of Southern is located at Augusta , Georgia , which is about 48 miles from Louisville . Hayden, the Union 's organizer , testified, and the undersigned finds , that the Union has not attempted to organize the employees of Southern nor is it the Union 's present intention to organize them 80 White was Louisville's manager from July 9 to October 31, 1945. 31 See The Press Co, Inc., v. N. L. R. B., 118 F (2d) 937 (App. D C.) ; N. L. R. B V. Hearst, 102 F. (2d) 658 ( C C. A. 9 ) ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N L. R. B ., 120 F. (2d) 641 (App D C) , N. L. R. B. v. Condenser Corp, 128 F. (2d) 67 (C C. A. 3). 160 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent Louisville, set forth in Section III A above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent Louisville, de- scribed in Section I above, have a close, intmate and substantial relation to trade, traffic and commerce between the several States and such of them as have been found to be unfair labor practices tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondent Louisville has engaged in unfair labor practices, the undersigned will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The respondent Louisville's illegal conduct discloses a purpose to defeat self-organization among its employees. For example, as soon as the respondent Louisville learned of the union activities of its employees it sought to coerce them in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in the Act by warning them, in effect, that their adherence to the Union would result in loss of employment and by making other derogatory statements with respect to the Union. As a result the respondent Louisville was successful in inducing a number of employees to withdraw from the Union. As has been found, the respondent Louisville's conduct in these respects interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos- ing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Such conduct violated Section 8 (1) of the Act. The respondent Louisville's whole course of conduct presents a ready and effective means of destroying self-organization among its employees. Be- cause of the respondent Louisville's unlawful conduct and its underlying purpose, the undersigned is convinced that if Louisville is not restrained from committing such conduct, the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the respondent Louisville's conduct in the past. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thereby minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, the under- signed recommends that the respondent Louisville cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Since it has been found that the respondent Louisville has not refused to bar- gain collectively with the Union nor had it refused to grant wage increases to its employees because of their union activities as alleged in the complaint, the undersigned will recommend that the complaint as to these allegations be dismissed Since it has been found that Southern Commission Company is not an em- ployer, within the meaning of the Act, of the employees herein involved, as alleged in the complaint, the undersigned will recommend that the complaint be dismissed as to Southern Commission Company. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned will make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY 161 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section i of the Act, the respondent Louisville Shirt Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices , within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. All production and maintenance employees of Louisville Shirt Company, exclusive of office and clerical employees and supervisory employees with author- ity to hire, promote, discharge, discipline, or otherwise effect changes in the status of employees, or effectively recommend such action , constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining 5. The respondent Louisville Shirt Company in refusing to bargain collectively with the Union and in not granting wage increases to the employees in July 1945, did not violate Section 8 (3) of the Act. 6 Southern Commission Company is not an employer within the meaning of the Act, of the employees herein involved, as alleged in the complaint. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned recommends that the respondents Molly S. Pomerance , Sarah B Steinberg, and Naomi Estroff, a partnership, doing business as Louisville Shirt Company, Louisville , Georgia, their agents , successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing the employees of Louisville Shirt Company in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plants in Louisville, Georgia, copies of the notice attached hereth, marked Appendix "A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent Louisville Shirt Company's representative, be posted by the respondent Louisville Shirt Company immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent Louisville Shirt Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by other material. It is further recommended that unless on or before ten (10) clays from the date of the receipt of this Intermediate Report, respondent Louisville Shirt Company notify the Regional Director in writing that they will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent Louisville Shirt Company to take aforesaid action. It is further recommended that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that the respondent Louisville Shirt Company's refusal to bargain collectively with the Union was in violation of the Act and that, in violation of the Act, Louisville Shirt Company had refused to grant wage increases to its employees, be dismissed. It is further recommended that the complaint be dismissed as to Southern Commission Company. As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and R'gulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended, effective July 12. 1944, 701592-47-voi 69-12 162 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD any party or counsel for the Board may within fifteen (15) days from the date of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board, pursuant to Section 32 of Article II of said Rules and Regulations, file with the Board, Rochambeau Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as he relies upon together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. As further provided in said Section 33, should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in writing to the Board within ten (10) days from the date of the order transferring the case to the Board. HOWARD MYERS, Trial Examiner. Dated December 6, 1945 APPENDIX A NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES" Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: We will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em- ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our employees are free to become or remain members of this union, or any other labor organization. LOUISVILLE SHIRT COMPANY, Employer. Dated------------------------------ By------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.