Standard Oil Co. of Ohio

In the Matter of STANDARD OII. COMPANY OF OFi ►o (I!a1 ^ V 1.RICAN FEDERATION OF LA BOR Case No. 8-R-213?.Decided JOy 11, 11)4a Messrs. T. G. Shirreffs and J. R. Tr,t.,chlei , of Cleveland, Ohio, for the Company. Mr. Isadore Kohler, of Toledo , Ohio, for the A. F. L. Mr. C. J. Ossege. of Toledo. Ohio, for the C. I. O. Mr. Conrad A. Wi(-khanz , Jr'., of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a petition duly filed by American Federation of Labor, herein 'called the A. F. L., alleging that a question affecting commerce had arisen concerning the representation of employees of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, Cleveland. Ohio, herein called the Company, the National Labor Relations Board provided for an appropriate hearing upon due notice before Richard 1). Swander, Trial Examiner. The hearing was held at Toledo, Ohio, on May 16, 1946. The Company, the A. F. L., and the Oil Workers International Union, L')cat 346, C. 1. 0., herein called the C. I. O., appeared and participated. All parties were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues. The C. I. O. was permitted to intervene upon written motion, over objection of the A. F. L., upon admission into evidence of i Memo- randum of Agreement between the C. I. O. and the Company, dated February 12, 1946, and the Articles of Agreement between these par- ties, dated February 18, 1946. The objections to intervention are hereby overruled for the reasons set forth in Section III, infra. The C. I. O. moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the agreement between it and the Company constituted a bar to the present proceedings. This motion is granted for the reasons set forth in Sec- tion III, infra. 69 N. L. R. B., No. 43. 388 STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF OHIO 389 The Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. All parties were afforded opportunity to file briefs with the Board. lpon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE COMPANY The Standard Oil Company of Ohio is an Ohio corporation having its principal offices in Cleveland, Ohio. It is engaged in all branches of the Oil industry including producing. transporting, refining and marketing of gasoline, oil, kerosene, motor oils and industrial lubri- cants, asphalt, road and fuel oil. It operates refineries in Cleveland, Lima, and Toledo, Ohio. In the year 1941 the Company produced and marketed refinery products of a value in excess of $76,740,000. Ap- proximately 85 percent of the finished products was shipped outside the State of Ohio. These proceedings are concerned only with the refinery at Toledo, Ohio. The Company admits, and we find, that it is engaged in-commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. It. THE ORGANIZ.jL'r[ONS INVOLVED American Federation of Labor is a labor organization, admitting to membership employees of the Company. Oil Workers International Union, Local 346, is a labor organiza- tion, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, admit- ting to meilibership employees of the Company. III. THE QUESTION CONCERNING REPRESENTATION The Company has refused to grant recognition to the A. F. L. as the exclusive bargaining representative of its production and main- tenance employees until the A. F. L. has been certified by the Board in an appropriate unit. The C. I. 0., after having been certified as the bargaining agent for the Company's production and maintenance employees in May, 1943,1 entered into a maintenance of membership contract with the Company in July of that year. The agreement contained a yearly automatic renewal clause to be effective in the absence of thirty days' notice to terminate from either party. Being unable to arrive at re- newal terms a year later, the parties agreed to be bound by the terms of the previous contract pending referral of the disputed items to 11lattti of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, 4S N L R B 1291 390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the War Labor Board and until such time as a new contract could be consummated. The War Labor Board issued its final recommenda- tion in August of 1945. Thereafter, as the result of a deadlock on all effective contract date and on wages and hours following V-J Day, a work stoppage ensued. The plant was thereupon taken over by the United States Navy on the same hour, wage, and working con- dition basis as had prevailed under the contract of July 1943. During the period of Navy seizure the parties continued to negotiate, and by February 12, 1946, all of the principal issues between the Com- pany and the locals of its three Ohio plants were resolved- and in- corporated into a "Memorandum of Agreement." The preparation of a "final agreement" awaited the negotiation of several minor local issues between the respective locals and local managements and the ratification of the agreement by the local memberships. Negotiation of these local issues at the Toledo plant were commenced and com- pleted on February 14, 1946. The Toledo local of the C. I. O. tool its ratification action on the same date, advising the Company of this action on February 15, 1946. On the latter date the Company and the C. I. O. sent a joint wire to the Navy advising that an agree- ment had been reached and requesting termination of Government possession. The Navy replied that possession would be withdrawn as of 12: 01 a. in., Sunday, February 17, 1946. The Toledo plant of the Company had received, either on February 15 or 16, 1946 (the date is uncertain), a written request for recognition from the A. F. L. Meanwhile, the Company's Cleveland office had prepared the required number of copies of the final articles of agree- ment, and on February 16th, furnished them, already signed by the Company, to its Toledo plant for signature by the Union. February 16 being a Saturday, signing by the C. I. O. signatories did not take place until Monday, February 18. On February 22nd, the Company replied to the A. F. L.'s letter that it could not recognize it as the bargaining agent of its employees because of its contract with the C. I. O. The A. F. L. thereafter filed its petition on March 4, 1946. The C. I. O. contends that a binding contract was consummated on February 18, 1946; that under the 10-day rule enunciated in our deci- sion in Matter of General Electric X-Ray Corporation '2 it is a bar to the present petition, which was not filed until 17 days after the A. F. L.'s request for recognition from the Company. The A. F. L. argues, however, that the execution of a contract between the Com- pany and the C. I. O. was not proved; 3 and that the case cited cannot z 67 N L R 13. 997 * It appears that at the signing of the contract on February 18, there were two deletions and one addition made thereto in order to properly set forth the agreement arrived at by the parties during the course of their negotiations The A F L contended at the heaiing that these alterations of the printed contract by the C I. 0. negotiating committee and STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF OHIO 391 justifiably control the present situation in view of the fact that it was decided only three days before the present hearing, thus making it impossible for the A. F, L. to comply therewith. We are of the opinion that the General Electric X-Ray case squarely controls the present situation, despite the proximity of its issuance to the hearing in this case. For us now to hold otherwise would be to accord the A. F. L. a favored position over the petitioning union in the case cited, and to hold directly contrary to the rule so recently enunciated therein. We find that the agreement of February 18, 1946, in view of the A. F. L.'s failure to file its petition before that date, or within 10 days from its prior notice to the Company, constitutes a bar to a de- termination of representatives until its expiration date approaches.4 Accordingly, we shall dismiss the A. F. L.'s petition. ORDER Upon the basis of the above finding of facts, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the petition for investigation of representatives of employees of Standard Oil Company of Ohio, Toledo, Ohio, filed by American Federation of Labor, be, and hereby is, dismissed. Mrt. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. the company prevented the consummation of a contract, on the ground that the corrections were made without prior authority from the members of the C I O , who had previously ratified the memorandum of agreement on February 14 In its brief, the A. F. L advanced the further argument that the contract should not have been admitted into evidence because the signatures thereon were not properly authenticated at the hearing We find no merit in either of these contentions In view of the strong presumption of legality and regularity which attaches to collective bargaining agreements offered in evi- dence in representation cases, the relevancy of any question concerning a union negotiating committee's prior authority to execute a proffered contract in the union's name, as repre- sentative of the employees in the bargaining unit, is doubtful, where, as here, the union relies upon the contract as a bar to an election We need not decide that issue in this case, however, for, whether or not the C I. O. signatories had specific prior authorization to make the changes in question (which appear to have been in the nature of corrections of clerical errors), the evidence shows affirmatively that they were authorized to sign a docu- ment embodying the extensive and detailed provisions relating to wages, hours, and work- ing conditions which are contained in the contract of February 18, and which are unaf- fected by the corrected matter There is, moreover, nothing to refute the inference that the C I O. and the Company acknowledged the document signed on February 18 as a binding contract between them, and immediately put its provisions into effect As to the authenticity of the signatures to the contract, no objection of this nature was raised by the A F L at the hearing In view of the same presumption of legality men- tioned above, we will not now entertain this belated attack on the document, the authen. ticity of which, in our opinion, has been firmly established I By its terms, the agreement is to continue in force for one year from its date of execu- tion, and if not terminated at the end of that period by thiry days' prior written notice by either of the parties, is to continue thereafter until terminated by either party on thirty days' written notice. We reject the A F. L.'s argument that the contract in question Is of Indefinite duration.