070 NLRB 178

Lake Superior Lumber Corp.

Last amended: 1946Year: 1946Length: 16,002 wordsOfficial source
_In the Matter of LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION and INTER- NATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. 0., LOCAL 15 Case No. 18-C-1160.-Decided August 21, 1946 Mr. Stanley D. Kane, for the Board. Mr. John B. Bennett, of Ontonagon, Mich., for the respondent. Mr.-Harold.Arnold, of Ironwood, Mich., for the Union. .Mr. Oscar Geltman, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER On November 19, 1945, Trial Examiner Charles E. Persons issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that -the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the -Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief ; the Union also filed a brief. Pursuant to notice and at the request of the respondent, all parties were afforded an opportunity to present oral argument at a hearing before the. Board on June 27, 1946, in Washington, D. C. The respondent appeared and waived argument; the Union did not appear. The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudical error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom- mendations of the Trial Examiner, except as hereinafter modified. We agree with the Trial Examiner that the 1938 settlement agree- ment, set forth in the Intermediate Report, is not a bar, as a matter either of law or of policy, to the instant proceedings. However, we deem it unnecessary to predicate our concurrence on the Trial Exam- iner's finding that the respondent unlawfully restricted the union -activity of John Haney on company property during non-working 70 N. L. R. B., No 20. 178 'LAKE SUPERIOR- LUMBER CORPORATION 179 hours and thereby breached the agreement,' because we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that the pertinent provisions of the settlement- , agreement are no longer effective. Thus, the agreement expressly states that the provisions relating to access of union organizers to company property were to become inoperative when-"the matter shall have been determined by decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States." In our opinion, the Republic Aviation Corporation and Le Tourneau Company cases, decided by the Supreme Court on April 23, 1945,2 satisfied the conditional terminal date of the settlement agreement. In those cases, the Supreme Court of the United States• clearly established applicable law as to a union's right of access to an employer's premises, and in so doing expressly stated, inter alia, that in a lumber camp, like the respondents, where the employees live as well as work, "Union organization must proceed upon the em- ployer's premises or be seriously handicapped." 3 ORDER Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondent, Lake Superior Lumber Cor- poration, Ontonagon, Michigan, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall : 1. Cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing- its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, or to join or assist International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local 15, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protec- tion, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, by prohibiting its employees from engaging in union activity in bunk- houses during their non-working time and by denying union repro- sentatives reasonable access to its camps and bunkhouses. 1 We agree with the Trial Examiner 's finding that the restrictions imposed upon Haney were violative of Section 8 (1) of the Act In excepting to this finding , the respondent contends that the issue is not within the scope of the complaint We find no merit in this exception The record shows that the issue was fully litigated at the hearing, and no showing was made that the respondent was in any way prejudiced in the presentation of its defense . Indeed, the respondent conceded that it prevented Haney from soliciting in the bunkhouse , during non -working time , as found by the Trial Examiner , but sought to justify its action under an established rule prohibiting all forms of solicitation in the bunkhouses. We, like the Trial Examiner , find this rule illegal insofar as it is applicable to union activity during non -working hours. 2 324 U. S. 793. 3 This does not mean, however , that an employer may not establish reasonable rules and regulations governing the use of its premises , and we agree with the Trial Examiner that the respondent's 8 p in. "light out" rule is one such reasonable regulation. 712344-47-vol 70-13 180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the' Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Rescind immediately its rules restricting the right of its employees to engage in union activity on company property during their free time, or to have any person call upon them at its camps during their free time for the purpose of consulting, advising, meeting, or assisting its employees in regard to'their right under the Act to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or production; - (b) Subject to lawful and reasonable conditions, admit representa- tives of labor organizations to its camps and bunkhouses for the pur- pose of consulting, advising, meeting, or assisting, its employees, or any of them, in regard to their right under the Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; (c) Post immediately at its plant and camps near Ontonagon, Michigan, copies of the notice attached hereto marked Appendix A. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director of the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respond- ent's representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; • (d) Notify the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region in writing, within ten (10), days from the date of this Order, what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. MR. GERARD D. REILLY took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. APPENDIX A NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a,Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise 'of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Wood-' workers of America, C. I. 0., Local 15, or any other labor organ- I LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER - CORPORATION 181 ization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur- poses of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, by prohibiting our employees from engaging in union activity in camp bunkhouses and by denying union representatives reasonable access to our camps and bunkhouses. All our employees are free to become or remain members of this union, or any other labor organization. EVE HEREBY RESCIND our rules restricting the right of our em- ployees to engage in union activity on company property during ,heir free time, or to have any person call upon them at our camps luring their free time for the purpose of consulting, advising, neeting, or assisting our employees in regard to their right under ,he Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or pro-- ^ection. WE WILL, subject to lawful and reasonable conditions, admit representatives of labor organizations to our camps and bunk- houses for the purpose of consulting, advising, meeting, or assist- ing, our employees, or any of them, in regard to their right under the Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi- zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the pur- pose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection.. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION, By-------------------- -------------------- (Representative) (Title) Dated ------------------------------------ This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,. and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any,other material. INTERMEDIATE REPORT Stanley D. Kane, Esq., for the Board. John B. Bennett, Esq., of Ontonagon, Mich, for the respondent. Harold Arnold, Esq., of Ironwood, Mich., for the Union. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed on August 25, 1945, by International Woodworkers- of America, C. I. 0., Local 15, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Director for the, Eighteenth Region (Minneapolis, Minnesota), issued its complaint dated Sep- tember 18, 1945, against the Lake Superior Lumber Corporation, herein called! 182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the respondent, alleging that , the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of hearing thereon were duly served upon the respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint, as amended at the hearing, alleges in substance that the respondent, by its officers, agents, and employees did on or about October 3, 1938, "promulgate rules prohibiting entry to and presence at the Camps, which are its property, of representatives of the Union, except on unreasonable and restrictive terms and conditions, and has ever since enforced, and does now enforce, said rules, and has ever since denied, and does now deny, access, to the Camps of representatives of the Union for the purpose of frustrating and preventing self-organization of its employees ; did, on or about August 2, 1945, eject and evict 'from one of the Camps Melvin Hagstrom, secretary-treasurer of the Union and did thereby prevent his conferring and meeting with members of the Union and other employees and engaging in union activities with them ; did, on or about August 24, 1945, eject and evict Melvin Hagstrom and Harold E. Arnold, president of the Union, from one of the Camps and did thereby prevent their conferring and meeting with members of the Union and other employees at the Camps and engaging , in union activities with them, and did thereby prevent and' dissuade its employees at the Camps from engaging in union activities or other concerted activity for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." The complaint alleges that by these acts the respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of, rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On or about September 26, 1945, the respondent -filed its answer in which it admits the allegations of the complaint as to its corporate organization, the nature of its business, and that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. However, the answer denies that the respondent has engaged in any unfair labor practices and contends that the complaint should be dis- missed because, tinter, alia, the charges upon which the complaint is based "seeks an unfair and unreasonable use of respondent's private property" and that such use amounts to "confiscation and expropriation thereof in derogation" of respondent's property rights under Article V of the Constitution of the United States and the due process clause thereof. Further, the answer contends that both the Union and the Board are bound by the provisions of an agreement' entered into on September 14, 1938. The answer states affirmatively that the respondent "has at all times given the Union, its officers and agents, reason- able access to its camps and private property ; that it has given the Union, its officers and agents, greater access and use of its private property and camps than it has to any other person, firm or organization, except its own employees ; that it has constructed at its own expense, in accordance with its agreement with the Union, Recreation Halls where union officials have freely met and associated with respondent's employees ; that the Union is not entitled to any use of Respondent's property except upon reasonable terms and condi- tions; that Respondent has been exceedingly fair and liberal in such terms and conditions and has been and still is willing to further liberalize the condi- tions upon which the Union and its agents may use the Recreation Halls situ- ated on Respondent's private property for the further convenience and benefit of said Union and in the interest of peace and harmony ; but it cannot and will not voluntarily submit to the complete and unrestricted use expropriation of its property demanded by said Union." LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 183 Furthermore, Respondent alleges that its agreements with the Union, re- ferred to above, "are valid, binding and in full force and effect; that Re- spondent has abided by all of its provisions ; that the Union has abided by the terms of said Agreements for more than six (0) consecutive years follow- ing their execution and approval by the [Board] ; that its [the Union's] pres- ent attempt to repudiate said Agreements is wrongful, ineffective and nuga- tory."' Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at Ontonagon, Michigan, on October 2, •1945, before the undersigned, Charles E. Persons, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and the respondent were represented by counsel and the Union by one of its officials. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence was afforded all parties. At the close of the hearing the Board moved to con- form the pleadings to the proof as to technical and formal matters. This mo- tion was granted without objection. The respondent moved that the complaint be dismissed for reasons set forth in its answer. This motion was taken un- der advisement and is now denied, to the extent indicated by the findings, con- clusions, and recommendations set forth in this Intermediate Report. At the conclusion of the presentation of testimony, the Board and the respondent argued orally before the undersigned. The parties were duly advised that they had the privilege of presenting briefs for the consideration of the Trial Examiner. Briefs have been received from the Board, the respondent, and the Union. Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF 11HE RESPONDENT 1 The Lake Superior Lumber Corporation was incorporated in 1934 under the laws of the State of Michigan 3 and has its principal office and plant at Ontona- gon, Michigan. It operates two lumber camps in the vicinity of that city where it produces hardwood and hemlock logs and lumber. During the calendar year 1944, repair and operating parts, provisions for employees, feed for horses, gasoline and coal valued in excess of $150,000 were purchased outside the State of Michigan and shipped in interstate commerce to the respondent's plant and camps. During the same period large quantities of products from the re- spondent's plant and camps were shipped in interstate commerce to users in States other than the State of Michigan. The respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Woodworkers of America and its Local 15 are labor organiza- tions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations which admit to membership employees of the respondent. 1 Numerous other averments in the respondent's answer, chiefly alleging procedural defects, have been considered by the undersigned and found without merit. 2 These findings are based on a stipulation between the parties made a part of the record, on allegations in the complaint admitted by the respondent in its answer and on testimony which is uncontroverted 8 The Corporation was first incorporated as the Northern Logging Company. Its present name was adopted in 1936. '184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Interference, restraint, and coercion 1. The camps and the employees This proceeding is primarily concerned with the woodsmen employed in respondent's two lumbering camps. These are temporary installations at con- venient locations in its timber tract. After the immediately accessible area has been worked over the camp buildings are either moved, torn down, or abandoned' The respondent's camps are planned to house approximately 80 woodsmen . Each camp has 3 or 4 bunkhouses, a combined kitchen and mess hall, with quarters for the kitchen force, buildings for ice, meat and root storage, a washhouse with provision for bathing, toilet and laundry facilities, an office which houses the foreman, camp clerk, and scaler, tractor sheds, a .barn for ,the horses with a shack for the barn boss nearby, a shop, warehouse, pump house, and a recreation hall. Because of the conflicting contentions of the parties the arrangements of the bunkhouses have special significance. These buildings house from 32 to 40 men There-are no interior partitions. The men sleep in double decked cots arranged in two rows along either side of the bunk- house. The only additional furnishings consist of benches at the foot of the cots. The respondent has maintained strict rules forbidding salesmen or other visitors transacting business in the bunkhouses. It has regularly enforced a "lights out at 8: 00 p. m." rule. The recreation halls were added to the camps in 1938 primarily to furnish facilities for the visits of union representatives and the transaction of their business with the employees. Such provision was a part of the settlement agreement reached at that time. The camp buildings are situ- ated on land controlled by the respondent. Access is over the respondent's log- ging railroads or by roads connecting with the main highways built as aids to the logging operations. The woodsmen work a 6-day week with hours in the woods from 7: 00 a in. to 4:00 p. m. They customarily spend all their time, including Sundays, in the camps. W. T. Gorman, respondent's president and general manager, gave credited testimony that, except for "probably ten or twelve" men having homes in town who went back and forth each day, the men spent the full week in camp. The employees do not receive their meals and lodging as a part of their remu- neration. On each pay day deductions are made on the basis of a daily charge for these items. Lodging, because of provisions in the' tax laws, is separately _accounted for.5 Gorman also gave testimony, credited by the undersigned, showing a very heavy rate of turn-over among the employees In the 6 months ending August 25, 1945, the average length of service of an employee in the woods was 916 weeks. The average number of employees in this period was 163 while the total of names on the pay roll was 562. This is a turn-over rate of nearly 345 percent. Of the total number of employees, 100 worked a 2 weeks' pay period or less. Of 198 employed at the beginning of the 6 months' period, only 37 were still on the pay I oll at its close. Gorman explained that some part of this turn-over was due to war conditions. The draft took away many young men who were steadier in .employment than the older woodsmen, while the ease with which new employment was secured caused employees to quit freely. The attraction of high wages and premium pay for overtime in war plants lured others away. • The frequency of change in location is indicated by the fact that in 1938 camps 6 and 7 were in use. At the time of the hearing the camp numbers had risen to 17 and 18. These findings are based on uncontroverted testimony by Gorman credited by the undersigned. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 185 At the time of the hearing the respondent's camps were 17 or 18 miles from Ontonagon, the nearest city. Camp 14 had been recently dismantled and the employees moved to a new location-camp 18. This proceeding is more im- mediately concerned.with happenings at'camps 14 and 17. The camps and the operations of the woodsmen are under the supervision of the camp foreman. He takes orders from the woods superintendent who in turn receives instructions from respondent's president and general manager, W. T. Gorman. The camp foremen have authority to discharge and discipline the woodsmen. Before the advent of wartime controls the foremen made recom- mendations as to increases in pay. This official, however, has never controlled Wrings which are made at respondent's central office. The record clearly shows that the camp foremen are officials for whose acts and utterances the respondent is responsible. The undersigned so finds. 2. Proceedings and settlement in 1938 On August 12, 1937, the Union filed charges against the respondent.- There- after, with the participation of the Board's agents attached to its Twelfth Regional office, the Union and the respondent met for a series of conferences.` On September 14, 1938, the Union, by its financial secretary, Herbert Norris, and the respondent by its then vice-president, W. T. Gorman, executed a stipu- lation. This instrument, with other requirements not material here, provided that the respondent would not interfere with, restrain, or coerce its camp em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by the Act. It was provided that "until the matter shall have been determined by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States" the respondent would grant permission to the or- ganizers of the Union, or any other legal labor organizaton, "to visit their members and other employees on the camp sites . . . upon conditions to be posted by the [respondent] in.conspicuous places for the advice and regulation of such organizers in making such visits." It was further provided that on the consummation of the agreement the Union would "withdraw. all charges of unfair labor practices heretofore filed with [the Board] and will not file any further or additional charges against the Corporation, alleging any unfair labor practice or discrimination against its members for any and all actions of the Corporation up to and including the date of this stipulation." The respondent agreed to post notices for 90 days in the usual form notifying its employees that it would comply with the provisions of the Act.8 The conditions under which union representatives would be permitted to visit the respondent's camps were set forth in Rules and Regulations embodied in a Stipulation signed on October 3, 1938 by Gorman, representing the respondent, and by Norris and President Matt Savola of Local 15, for the Union. This instrument provided that only one representative of the Union might visit a camp each week. His visit to Camp 6 was to be on Friday night, to Camp 7 on Monday night. The rules state that the representative must arrive "not earlier than 6 No complaint was issued in this case-XII-C-126 The Board's records show that it was opened August 12, 1937 and closed January 17, 1939, after the conclusion of the 90- day period during which the Corporation had posted notices. 4 The parties agree that the union filing charges in 1937 was the same organization as the charging union in the instant case. However, the caption of the case carries the name : Michigan Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local #15, International Wood- workers of America (C. I. 0.). The Board's Twelfth Regional Office has been discontinued and the upper peninsula of Michigan is now within the jurisdiction of the Board's Eighteenth Regional Office 6 The Stipulation in eatenso is attached hereto as "Appendix A" ; the notice, as "Ap- pendix C " 186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5 :30 of the afternoon of the day of such visit and . . . leave not later than half an hour after breakfast has been served the following morning." Meals and lodging were to be furnished to the union representative by the respondent at a stated charge. The union agents were "to visit and discuss union problems with the [respondent's] employees at the recreation hall exclusively and at no other place and [were not] to enter the sleeping quarters of the men at any time or for any purpose." Other sections stated in general terms that union agents would observe the rights of employees to free choice of union representatives; would not interfere with the "peace of the camp or with the harmonious and peaceful relation exist- ing between this Company and the employees" and would not "incite a riot or call a strike" while on the respondent's property In case the respondent was of the opinion that an agent of the Union had violated these provisions it might notify - the Union in writing that the "privileges granted" had been revoked specifying the nature of the violation. The respondent-was to notify the Board also of the nature of the violation. Thereafter, the Union, if it was not satisfied, might request the Board to intercede. Determination made by the Board after in- vestigation was to be binding on the Union and the respondent ° It was expressly stated in the Stipulation entered into on September 14, 1938, that the, agreement was subject to the approval of the Board. By a telegram dated September 27, confirmed in a letter of September 28, 1938, the Board's Regional Director notified the respondent that the Board had approved the stipulation of settlement. The Board's approval was further stated in a tele- gram dated September 27, 1938 and signed by Beatrice M. Stern, who, at the time, was assistant secretary of the Board. The telegram reads as follows : RE LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION TWELVE C 126 STIPU- LATION APPROVED I AM SURE COMPANY WILL CONSIDER A COPY OF THIS WIRE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF BOARD'S APPROVAL FOR ALL PURPOSES THEREFORE PLEASE ADVISE THEM OF THIS. A copy of this telegram was transmitted to the respondent on September 29, 1938. On its receipt the respondent posted the required notice at each of its camps "in the men's washroom, in the Recreation Hall and in front of the Camp Clerk's desk in Wanagan." On October 3, 1938 the Regional Director approved the respondent's action and stated that "the settlement, insofar as it relates to organizers' visits to your camp sites, is governed by the rules aqd regulations heretofore agreed to by both the Company and the Union." He further stated that the results "embodied in the draft of the rules forwarded to Washington would be controlling," and "It is the understanding of this office that the rules ,and regulations will be put into effect immediately ...s 10 3. The, Union's protest in 1941 On July 18, 1941; President Earl Johnson of Local 15 wrote to Gorman calling attention to a recent decision of the Board" which, in Johnson's opinion, covered the matters contained in the stipulation entered into on September 14, 1938. He requested a conference to discuss the terms of the stipulation. John B. Bennett, as attorney for the corporation, replied on July 22, 1941, stating that' both he and Gorman felt "that the [case referred to] has no bearing on the Stipu- lation which your Union and the Company agreed to in 1938." Bennett expressed 0 The Stipulation of October 3, 1938 is attached hereto as "Appendix B " In view of these explicit statements of the Board's Regional Director the under- signed finds no merit in the contention of the Board expressed in oral argument and a brief that the Board did not approve the "Rules and Regulations " "Matter of Weyerhaeuser Lumber Company, 31 N. L. R. B. 258, decided April 23, 1941. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 187 willingness to discuss any "particular matters" and suggested that Johnson write more fully concerning them. - No further action was taken at that time. 4. Interference, restraint, and coercion, 1943 John Haney, "a woodsman," gave uncontroverted testimony, credited by the undersigned, to the effect that on or about July 23, 1943, he was employed by the respondent as a builder of railroad grades and lived in Camp 14. On the date stated in a bunkhouse of Camp 14 he solicited employees to join the Union. This occurred in the evening after working hours and in Haney's free time. The Camp Foreman, Charles Schlief, observed this action and directed Haney to desist. Haney's testimony as to Schief's action reads : - He asked me if I did not think I was doing the wrong thing ; he asked me if I had credentials' and so on, and so he called me over to the office the fol- lowing day in the morning and he told me that I was doing wrong and I should not organize according to orders, if I did any organizing they got a recreation room there and we could organize there one at a time in place of going into the bunkhouses and organizing. The Board has recently defined its policy regarding union activity in work time and in the employee's free time as follows : 12 The Act, of course, does not prevent an employer from making and en- forcing reasonable rules covering the conduct of employees on company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that it was-adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is no less true that time outside working hours, whether before or after 'work, or during luncheon or rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreason- able restraint, although the employee is on company property. It is there- fore not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule, prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours, although on company property. - Such a rule must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances make the rule necessary in order to maintain production or discipline. The undersigned finds that the respondent by the action of Camp Foreman Schlief in restraining employee Haney when soliciting union memberships in his free time has interfered wth, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 5. The events in 1945 which initiated the instant proceeding On June 7, 1945, the Union, by its president, Harold H. Arnold, notified the respondent of its intention to withdraw from the Stipulation made October 3, 1938, for the stated reason : "because this stipulation restricts us and our members from taking advantage of our organizational rights under the [Act]." The respondent replied promptly requesting a specific statement as to the Union's criticism of the existing arrangements and expressing willingness to give further consideration to matters thought unfair by the Union. In a further exchange "Haney later testified that Schlief asked, "if he had credentials , or if I had rights from the company to go in and organize." "Matter of Peyton Packing Company, Inc., 49 N. L. R . B. 828, 843-4. This statement by the Board was quoted with approval by the United States Supreme Court in Le Tourneau Company of Georgia v. N L. it. B., 324 U. S. 793. 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 'BOARD of letters extending to July 17, 1945, the parties made their position clear. The Union on July 11, 1945, reviewed the clauses of the Rules and Regulations. It objected to the limitation of visiting union agents to one representative and to the requirement that permission be secured before entering the camps. The recreation halls were said to be too small for conducting union meetings. Since it states the Union's general position, its discussion of Rule 2, is quoted in full : The Company does not have authority'under the NLRA to designate the time and place that is to be used to conduct Union business as long as it does not interfere with production. By doing so, it causes an undue hardship on an arganizatiow which has such an agreement when other organizations have their rights under the NLRA. 4 In its,final letter of July 17, 1945, the respondent offered to modify the rules and permit the weekly visit to its camps to be made by two union representatives. It also' proposed to enlarge its recreation halls on proof that they would not accommodate the meetings conducted by the Union. The respondent further was willing to change the nights of the week and "to consider such other modification" as the Union cared to suggest. Three paragraphs from this letter state the respondent's general position and are therefore quoted in full : We think you recognize the fact that in reconsidering this whole matter ,we are dealing with the regulation and use of private property. Moreover, it was recognition of-this fact that gave rise to our original negotiations which resulted in the Stipulation and the rules now in force. We remind you again that it is the use of our property which is involved in these dis- cussions, and while we have granted you the privilege of using this property for the purpose of furthering the interests of your union, we must insist that such use be reasonable and that you observe the conditions under which we have granted this privilege. While we have thus far had no requests from other labor organizations to use our premises, if any such were made, we think you will agree they would have to be accorded on the same basis as that extended to your organization. Consequently it is quite necessary that particular nights in the week be designated and reserved for your use so that any other indi- vidual or organization to whom we might feel obliged to give a like privi- lege, would not interfere with your visits to the camp and you would not interfere with theirs. If some other nights of the week other than the ones which are now reserved for your visits to our camps would be more convenient or desirable from your standpoint, we shall be glad to change the nights by agreement with you. * * * * * * Our logging camps are built for the convenience and comfort of our employees. Special buildings are constructed for specific purposes,-the kitchens and dining halls are built exclusively for serving meals ; wash houses for washing, baths and laundry ; sleeping camps exclusively for rest, relaxation and sleep, and the recreation halls where the men may write letters, read, play cards or other games, and visit. We have accorded you the use of the recreation hall as, a place where you may hold your union meetings and visit with those men who are interested in your activi- ties. This recreation hall is constructed on the same grounds with all the other buildings and is conveniently located for your use. The sleeping quarters are made to be used exclusively for sleeping purposes. We have LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 189 never permitted- their use by. anyonei for- any other purpose. We can not- see our way clear- to do so now. We think the use of such quarters for social gatherings or meetings of other types would be a grave injustice to the men occupying them. It is agreed that the union agents regularly met the requirements of the Rules and Regulations until early in July 1945. At that time, Melvin Hagstrom, financial secretary of the Union, and Harold E. Arnold, president of Local 15 of the Union, visited each of the camps on other nights of the week than those set forth in the rules and regulations. Hagstrom testified that he made his visits on other nights than those designated because of the Union's claim that the Act gave him that privilege On the visits in early July, Hagstrom con- ducted his union business without being interfered with by respondent's super- visors. When he returned to camp 17, on July 26,- 1945, however, the Camp Foreman, Felix Petka, accosted him a few moments after his arrival. Hag- strom's uncontroverted and credited testimony as to Petka's statement to him reads as follows : I can't admit you, we have got orders not to admit you unless it is your special clay according to the stipulation, you will have to leave immediately. Hagstrom stopped only long enough to collect 3 months' dues from an employee and to receive a receipt for money to pay this employee's income tax before leaving. This business, as Hagstrom testified, took "a couple of minutes." On August- 24, Friday, Hagstrom, accompanied by President Harold E. Arnold, of Local 15, went to Camp 14 to conduct routine union business." Both Hagstrom and Arnold admitted knowing that the established day for the visit of union representatives was not Friday They arrived just at supper time and ate with the employees in the mess hall. When they left the mess hall, Camp Foreman Charles Schlief came to them and said that they would have to leave immedi- ately. Hagstrom testified that Schief said : "I have got my orders it is not up to me, but if you want to question that you will have to see some higher authority, I can't admit you." Arnold's testimony fully corroborates Hagstrom. Arnold stated further that he had asked Schlief if they could conduct this busi- ness outside and was told by Schlief that they could not, but must leave immedi- ately At the hearing Hagstrom and Arnold described the varied business transacted with the employees at respondent's camps The Union's nearest office is at Ironwood, Michigan, which is approximately 80 miles from the camps. Many of the woodsmen use this local office as a mailing address. The union representa- tives deliver any mail received and distribute current union literature. They also cash checks, write letters for the employees, aid them in computing their income taxes, accept money and pay income taxes, tavern. boarding, insurance, Blue Cross Hospitalization and other bills. These services are in addition to their strictly union business of soliciting memberships, collecting clues and con- ducting union meetings. Arnold. in his testimony, stated the content of a typical union meeting as follows : We explain various cases that we have before the War Labor Board ; if we were to go into a camp and had a case on this order we would also explain that to the members, or any financial statements or whatever-like during this time I think we were advertising fora picnic, the annual lumberjack picnic as we call it. "Arnold is also financial secretary of District 12 of the Union which includes Michigan and Wisconsin and an International Representative of the Organizational Department of the Union. 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Other matters discussed, as Arnold testified, were membership gains, union Board meetings -and individual employee grievances. It was Arnold's uncon- troverted and credited testimony that membership in the Union at each camp varied between 40 and 50 percent of the employees. The Union presented no claim to majority membership. Gorman gave the following testimony relative to the basis for the respondent's restricting the union representatives to one night a week : Well, I think perhaps we had several reasons for that ; in the first place, there are other unions, and as I remember at that time there was one other union that was interested in organizing at least part of our organization. Obviously if we gave one union every night in the week we could not do that with the other unions and we would be in violation of the Wagner Act ; in the second place, we all finally agreed that one night a week was satis- factory to the union theirselves, and to the [Board], and it seemed often enough. Further 'testimony by Gorman relative to the respondent's rule forbidding the use of the bunkhouse by outsiders reads as follows : Well in my long experience in logging, I have seen camps where they allowed all kinds of solicitors and salesmen ; I feel that they interfere with the regular harmony of the camps ; the regular routine of the work, and induce the men to stay up beyond the time they usually go to bed ; but [by] the very nature of the sleeping camps a man can't go in to sell goods without talking to everybody in the camp and therefore disturbs those that don't care to listen. As to the lights out rule Gorman testified : Yes, we have always had a time when lights would have to be out-since- when that time comes they are turned out and the camp must be quiet after that so that those in there can sleep. s : e a • s » That is just to keep a few men who might want to sit up and keep the lights on from disturbing all the other men. Our men in the woods by nature go to bed early, and if they are disturbed and don't get their night's rest it does interfere with their work the next day, therefore it interferes with production, and if a man is annoyed that way enough he will just quit and go'some place where he can get rest. The record shows and the undersigned finds that these camp rules have been consistently enforced in the respondent's camps. The Union has been under no severer restriction than have other outside agencies Gorman's credited testi- mony was that he had refused the only request received from a religious organiza- tion to hold a meeting in the camps. In the interest of the war effort a film intended to stimulate patriotism and production, with an accompanying address, was shown at the camps. War bonds were sold in the mess halls and Red Cross funds were collected by the camp clerks. Individuals visiting relatives may be admitted. These rules are of long standing. They have not been modified or made more stringent under war conditions. It should be stated that the re- spondent had established these camp rules regarding the admission of visitors to,its camps and their exclusion from the bunkhouses before the Union began its organizational efforts among the respondent's employees. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 191 Concluding findings The respondent bases its defense against the allegations of the complaint on three main contentions: its rights as a property owner; that the provisions of the settlement reached in 1938 gave union representatives reasonable access to the camps ; and that the settlement agreement is valid and constitutes a bar to this proceeding. These contentions of.the respondent will be considered seriatim. 1. Little need be said of respondent's contention that its property rights would be violated in contravention of Article V of the Constitution of the United States if the Board sustains the Union's contentions. In one of the earliest cases under the Act to reach the United States Supreme Court, the Court in dealing with questions raised under the due process clause and constitutional. restrictions said : Employees have their correlative rights to organize for the purpose of securing the redress of grievances and to promote agreements with em- ployers relative to rates of pay--and conditions of work. Restraint for the purpose of preventing an unjust interference with that right cannot be considered arbitrary or capricious 16 More recently the Board ordered the issuance of passes to union representatives in order that they might board oil tankers for the purpose of transacting business with their members. This order was resisted by the company involved as an unlawful interference with its property rights. In sustaining the Board's order the Second Circuit Court said: The respondents make the further contention that the order of the Board is invalid because it unlawfully interferes with their property rights in contravention of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States by compelling them to part with the complete control of their vessels. Such an argument, if applied generally, would invalidate the Multiple Dwellings Law of New York, the statutes securing tenants in times of financial depression against disturbance in the possession of their leaseholds when the terms have expired. It is not every interference with property rights that is within the Fifth Amendment and we see no basis for invoking the-Constitution in the present situation. The National Labor Relations Act is based largely upon a conception of the right to collective bargaining as the solvent of all industrial ills. Inconvenience, or'even some dislocation of property rights, may be necessary in order to safeguard the right'to collective bargaining.18 The Board quoted this,passage'as a justification for its decision in Matter of Le Tournea'u Company of Georgia." The decision of the United States Supreme Court, with reference to this quotation together with the Board's pronouncement in Peyton Packing. Company, set forth above, said: "The Board has fairly, we think, explicated in these cases the theory which moved it to its conclusions In fully sustaining these conclusions the Supreme Court stamped with, its approval both the Board's findings and the theory on which the findings were based. N. L. R. B. v. Jones d Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1. 'ON. L. R. B. V. Cities Service bit Company, et at., 122 F. (2d) 149, at 152, (C. C A. 2).. 17 54 N. L. R. B. 1253, at 1259-60. 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR . RELATIONS BOARD Accordingly, the undersigned finds no merit in this contention of the respond- ent. 2 The Union's right of access. The Board had occasion early in the administration of the Act to make findings and issue orders concerning the right of union representatives to-have freedom of access to employees. In the third volume of its reports the Board in a repre- sentation proceeding involving over 50 steamship companies, ordered that the agents of a rival organization to the petitioning union be granted passes by the steamship companies under the same condition as they were issued the peti- tioning union.18 In the following year one of the companies involved in the earlier case was ordered, in a complaint proceeding, to cease and desist from refusing to issue passes to a rival union of the organization with which it had a preferential contract, "in equal numbers and under the. same conditions" as it granted passes to the contracting union." This case reached the United States Supreme Court in 1940: That tribunal sustained The authority of the Board to require the steamship company to permit access to its vessels by representatives .of the unions on equal terms2° Under like conditions but with reference to a closed-shop contract, the Board later issued a similar order Y1 Again the Board vindicated the right of employees to receive union literature mailed to them on a dredge where they both worked and lived 22 In two cases closely similar as to the factual situation existing the Board ordered steamship companies to allow union "shore delegates" or "patrolmen" access to its ships while in port in order that the union agents might effectively transact union business with members of their union. In so ordering, the Board overruled contentions of the respondents that such access of union agents con- stituted a violation of wartime regulations and that there were adequate oppor- tunities for meeting the employees and transacting union business without boarding the vessels On appeal the Board's rulingsr in both cases were sus- tained in the United States Courts of Appeal.21 The cases heretofore cited arose in the water transportation industry and are affected by the principles of Admiralty Law Cases affecting land based indus- tries were of early origin. In the Harlan Fuel Company case24 the Board laid down principles prima facie controlling in the instant proceeding. The Company had ejected union agents from its "company town," Yancey, urging "in justifi- cation of its exclusion of the Union organizers, that its property interests in the land where Yancey is situated, and in all improvements appurtenant thereto, entitled it to prohibit the organizers from entering Yancey and forcefully to remove them as trespassers." In dealing with the issues thus posed the Board said: The evidence shows that substantially all of the dwellings located in Yancey are occupied by employees of, the respondent. These houses are leased by the respondent, as landlbrd, to the employees, as tenants. The premises so ie Matter of American France Line, et at, 3 N. L. R. B. 64. The decision issued July 16, 1937 1° Matter of Waterman Steamship Corporation, 7 N. L. R. B. 237. 20 N. L R B. v Waterman -Steamship Corporation, 309 U. S 206 ; cf. South Atlantio Steamship Company of Delaware v. N, L. R. B , 416 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 5), 313 U. S. 582, cert denied , and 314 U S 705, rehearing denied. 21 Matter of American-West African Line, Inc., 21 N. L. R. B. 691. 22 Matter of United Dredging Company, 30 N. L. R. B. 739. 23 Matter .of Cities Service Oal Company, et al, 25 N. L. R. B. 36, enf 'd 122 F. (2d) 149 (C C. A. 2) ; Richfield Oil Corporation, 49 N. L. R. B. 593 , enf'd 142 F. ( 2d) 860 (C. C. A. 9). 218 N. L. R. B.,25 (July 5, 1938). LAKE, SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 193 demised are, as heretofore mentioned, completely surrounded by other lands in which the respondent has its property interest, and access to any of the houses necessarily can be had only over such other lands. The respondent maintains for purposes ofingress and egress to the homes of its tenants, vari- ous private and customary ways, roads, streets, and paths traversing Yancey and the adjacent land. It is established doctrine in such cases that rights of ingress and egress over the, private and customary ways, roads, streets, and paths, essential- to the enjoyment of the demised premises, pass to the tenant as annexed to his leasehold; and the use of such rights free from interference by the land- lord is not limited,.to,the tenant but extends to all third persons visiting the tenant under express or implied invitation for any lawful purpose. Persons transacting matters of interest with tenants in company towns have a right to use the private ways in doing so. , In entering and passing through Yancey on their visits to the employees there residing, the union organizers were engaged in a transaction of mutual interest, the exercise by the employees of their right under the Act to form and join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. The use made by the organizers of the customary passways, roads, and streets to reach the employees was accorded by law and could not be defeated through the simple assertion by the respond- ent of a landlord's interest. By forcibly preventing the organizers from coming to or remaining in Yancey, the respondent not only violated this right but engaged in an unfair labor practice Interference by an employer with the lawful conduct of organizational activities among employees by labor organizers is in derogation: of rights secured employees under Section 7- of the Act ; and constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (1). The rights guaranteed to employees by the Act include full freedom to receive aid, advice, and information from others, concerning those rights and their enjoyment. The respondent also contends that it ejected the organizers from Yancey because they abused a license it had granted them to visit the employees at their homes. The normal right of use in the organizers, however, did not arise from nor depend upon such license. Within the same year the Board was called upon to dispose of similar questions in a proceeding concerned with conditions in another coal mining company's wholly owned town 26 The Board's order was explicit and covered the rights of employees to be visited in their homes by union representatives. It was sub- sequently fully enforced by the Sixth United States Circuit Court and provided that the respondent cease and desist from : Denying to its employees who reside in houses owned by the respondent the right to have any persons call at their homes for the purpose of consulting, conferring or advising with, talking to, meeting, or assisting, the respond- ent's employees or any of.them, -in regard to the rights of said employees under- the Act to self-orgamzation,,,to form, join, or assist labor 'organiza- tions, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargain- ing or other mutual aid or protection ; Following or trailing any person, or in any other manner intimidating or interfering with the right of any person, in his use of the thoroughfares in 2a Matter of West Kentucky Coal Company, 10 N L it. B 88, enforced with modifica- tion not material here in 116 F. (2d) 816 (C. C. A. 6). 194 DECISIONS. OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the towns and camps located within the counties of Union, Webster, and Hopkins, Kentucky, for the purpose of consulting, conferring or advising with, talking to, meeting, or assisting, the respondent's employees or any of them, in regard to the rights of said employees under the Act to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The Board has more recently held that company regulations which segregate colored employees living in company houses from free access to white employees and agents of the union constitute "severe interference with the exercise of employees rights guaranteed in the Act." 26 The case most nearly "on all fours" with the instant proceeding is Matter of Weyerhaeuser Lumber Company." This company maintained and operated eight camps on its Longview Branch in the State of Washington. Only one of these was reached by a public highway. With one exception all the camps were accessible by the company's railroad. The employees lived in the camps during a 5-day week. They customarily dispersed to their homes on Friday evening and returned to the camps on Sunday evening. The Board found that : On or before December 1, 1928 the respondent promulgated a rule with respect to entry upon its premises to the effect that no person not an em- ployee of the respondent would be permitted upon its property unless in possession of a pass issued by the logging superintendent or other mana- gerial officer and accompanied by the superintendent or by someone desig- nated by him. The rule had its foundation in the existence of a fire hazard in the respondent's woods, and in the existence of danger to the unaware stranger from the logging operations. Because of the desire of the employees to reach their homes, the Union found -its Friday night meetings poorly attended. In the fall of -1939 the Union decided to hold such local meetings at the various camps during the week. On application to the company's officials for the necessary passes, the Union repre- sentative met refusal. A union officer who entered a camp without a pass to transact union business, was ejected. The Board announced its conclusions in part, as follows : The respondent, in this case by not permitting union representatives to enter the camps at the request of employees is exercising "domination and con- trol" over the efforts of its employees to 'engage in collective organization- and activity, thereby infringing Section 8 (1). To hold otherwise would be, in effect, to exempt the respondent from the prohibitions of the Act merely because the respondent operates a "closed'shop." But Congress did not exclude the respondent or employers similarly situated from the opera- tion of the Act, by implication or otherwise. Congress had declared that "the policy of the United States" shall be to remove obstructions to the free flow of commerce "by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi- tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection." If the policy of the Act is to be applied effectively to the respondent, we must, as - 26 See Matter of American Cyanamid Co., 37 N. L R. B. 578 ( Dec. 13, 1941), and Matter of Ozan Lumber Company, 42 N. L. R. B . 1073 (July 30, 1942). 27 31 N. L. R. B. 258 (April 23, 1941). LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 195 we do, find that the respondent, by refusing to permit outside representa- tives to enter its camps at the request of employees, has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 3 (1). The Board recently has applied its, doctrine of the Union's right of access under somewhat different circumstances and has received the definitive approval of the Supreme Court. In Matter of Le Tourneau Company of Georgia,28 the Board had under consideration the acts of the company in disciplining its employees for distributing union literature on the company's private parking lots. Such distribution had been forbidden since 1940 by duly publicized rules. The rules were based on the company's desire to prevent littering of its prop- erty and to guard against theft of automobiles or articles therein. The Board restated its rulings that it was "not within the province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of working hours," and said in conclusion : In view of the foregoing well established principles, the sole question confronting us is whether, under the circumstances of the instant case, to the extent that the rule prohibits distribution of union literature by employees on the parking lots, it constitutes such a serious impediment to the freedom of communication, which is essential to the exercise-of the right to self-organization, that the right to self-organization must be held paramount, and the rule give way. It is clear that employees cannot realize the benefits of the right to self-organization guaranteed them by the Act, unless there are adequate avenues of communication open to them whereby they may be informed or advised as to the precise nature of their rights under the Act and of the advantages of self-organization, and may have opportunities for the interchange of ideas necessary to the exercise of their right to self-organization. It must also be noted that speech is not the only mode of communication by which self-organization is effected, nor is it sufficient that this channel alone be free. Effective organization re- quires the use of printed literature and of application and membership cards, and these modes of communication are also protected by the Act. * t * s x s s Upon all the above considerations, we are convinced, and find, that the respondent, in applying its "no-distributing" rule to the distribution of union literature by its employees on its parking lots has placed an unrea- sonable impediment on the freedom of communication essential to the exercise of its employees' right to self-organization .. . Accordingly the Board ordered the company to take affirmative action as follows : Rescind immediately the rule against distribution of literature insofar as it prohibits distribution of union literature by employees outside the gates of the plant and in the parking lots. On review in the Fifth Circuit Court the Board's decision was set aside .R The Court found that the company's rule was legitimate. The Supreme Court, however, sustained the Board's findings and order in the Le Tourneau case. The case was joined with the Republic Aviation case. The Court said: These cases bring here for review the action of the National Labor Rela- tions Board in working out an adjustment between the undisputed right = 54 N L R . B. 1253 22143 F. (2d) 67 (C. C. A. 5). 712344-47-vol. 70-14 196 DECISIONS- OF NATIONAI:' LABOR- RELATIONS BOARD, of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their estab- -lishments . Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty which_the existence of rights in ' others may place upon employer or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential elements in a balanced society. The Wagner Act did not undertake the impossible task of, specifying in precise and unmistakable language each incident which would consti- tute an unfair labor practice. On the contrary that Act left to the Board the work of applying the Act's general prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations-of events which might be charged as violative of its terms. Thus a "rigid scheme of remedies" is avoided and adminis- trative flexibility within appropriate statutory limitations obtained to accomplish the dominant purpose of the legislation So far as we are here concerned that purpose is the right of employees to organize for mutual aid without employer interference. This is the principle of labor rela- tions which the Board is to foster.30 This decision has exceptional significance because the Court found no evi- dence "that any unusual condition existed in labor relations, the plant loca- tion or otherwise to support any contention that conditions at this plant dif- fered from those occurring normally at any other large establishment." The Court expressly stated : Neither of these [plants] is like a mining or lumber camp where the employees pass their rest as well as their work time on the employers premises ,- so that union organization must proceed upon the employer's premises or be seriously handicapped Nevertheless, under these conditions most favorable to the employer's conten- tions the Supreme Court fully sustained the Board's findings, conclusions and orders. When the limitations enforced by the respondent on the access of union repre- sentatives to its employees are appraised in'the light of these pronouncements by the Board they must be adjudged to be in derogation of rights guaranteed by the Act. These findings of the Board are of long standing. They have never been successfully challenged in the United States Courts They have received the definitive approval of the United States Supreme Court. The respondent's employees are tenants in its camps. For most of them the camps are their only homes. As tenants the employees have the established right to receive any person in their home with whom they have legitimate business. Their visitors are entitled to use the customary ways and roads giving ingress and egress to the employees' place of abode. Under the Act, the employees and union representa- tives alike have "full freedom" to engage in a transaction of mutual interest, the joining or forming of a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection., These are,the principles declared by -the Board in its Harlan Fuel Company decision. Under the rules enforced by the respondent, these rights of employees and union representatives are severely circumscribed and limited. Such exercise of these rights by the employees as are now, and since October 1938 have been exercised, are enjoyed'only as "privi- leges" granted by the respondent. It should be noted that the respondent's Rules and Regulations allow but one union representative to make a weekly visit ° 324 U. S. 793. LAKE, SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION'S 197 to each camp. He may enter at 5: 30 p m. Lights go out at 8: 00 p. M. and he must leave one half hour after breakfast next morning. Under these limitations he has access to the employees for 21/2 hours each week as a maximum limit. The respondent's policy of limiting access by union representatives to its employees to 21/2 hours per week and of forbidding union solicitation altogether in its mess hall and bunkhouses, is a much greater limitation than that of the Le Tourneau Company in forbidding the distribution of union literature on its parking lots. In the instant case the right of free discussion of union matters is restricted in the place where such discussion is most effective-in the homes of the employees. The respondent not only stringently limits the access of union representatives but forbids its own employees to concertedly discuss organiza- tion in their free time. As the Board has stated : _ - It is elementary that a single employee cannot fully enjoy or exercise his right of self 'organization without like exercise of such rights by his fellow employees. Because of the interdependent nature of the right, full and free access to fellow employees outside of working hours is an indispensable part of such right The employer who restricts this right of access curtails the right of self-organization.' The limitations imposed by the respondent are most damaging as to the hours after work at 4: 00 p. in. to "lights out" at 8: 00 p. in. and as to Sunday when most of the employees are not working. At these times the employees are clearly entitled under the Board's findings and orders to receive visits from union repre- sentatives and to confer with one another for self-organization or other concerted activities. Such freedom by them and by union representatives cannot interfere with production. The United States Supreme Court validated the Board's orders to the Le Tourneau Company, where,the conditions were very much more favor- able to the employer's contentions. The undersigned concludes and finds that, absent a bar in the settlement agreements, the facts -here proven show that the limitations imposed by the respondent amount to interference, restraint, and coercion with the rights of its employees as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 3. The settlement agreements The Board's policy on the weight to a given settlement agreements in which its agents participated was established at an early date. In the earliest case, in point here, the Board said: Although we do not agree that the compromise agreement estops the Board from proceeding herein, we believe that effective administration of the Act requires that the Board's agents have the respect and confidence of labor organizations and employers with whom their work brings them in contact. Repudiation of agreements entered into and relied on in good faith neces- sarily impairs such respect and confidence. In the exercise of its discretion the Board has since effectuated many agreements in which its agents have participated. However, the Board early laid down the doctrine that it would not do so in cases where the respondent is shown to' have engaged subsequently -in conduct like in, character to the unfair labor practices settled by the' agreement.' The Board's decisions in a long line of cases are based on these principles of "established policy." 34 There can be no question a4 Matter of Ozan Lumber Company, 42 N L. R. B. 1073, at 1079. as Matter of Shenandoah-Dives Mining Company, 11 N. L. R. B. 885. Cf Matter of Godchaux Sugars, Inc, 12 N. L R B. 568. as See Matter of Picker X-Ray Corporation, 12 N L. R. B 1384 34 See e g. Matter of Taylor-Colquitt Company, 47 N. L R. B. 225, Matter of American NeedlecraIts, Inc, 59 N L R B 1384 Matter of The General Fireproofing Company, 59 N. L. R. B. 375, at 378-9. 198 DECISIONS OF "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that the instant proceeding falls within the boundaries of these doctrines. The agreement made September 14, 1938, was written in the Board's Regional office and presented by the Board's Regional Director to the respondent and the Union for signatures. It received not only his approval but the weighty assent of the Board itself. The Board's approval applied both to the Stipulation of September 14, 1938, and to the Rules and Regulations incorporated into a stipulation agreed to by the respondent and the Union on October 3, 1938. There can be no question that each of these documents, under the circumstances set forth above, comes within the limits of these "established policies" and consequently would be effect- uated by the Board, according to the provisions therein, unless the respondent has been guilty of subsequent unfair labor practices. Such an act is proven by the record in the interference by Camp Foreman Schlief with legitimate union activities by Woodsman Haney. Haney solicited memberships in his free time in respondent's bunkhouse after work hours. There is no showing that he solicited respondent's employees in work time or after "lights out" had sounded. Nothing that Haney did could have limited the "orderly processes of ,production." Nevertheless, he was stopped and ordered to refrain from such acts in the future. Schlief applied respondent's rule that such solicitation could only take place in the recreation hall and could only be performed by a recognized union representative after permission was granted by the respondent. Seemingly, also, it could only be done on the prescribed night in each camp. The record makes clear that Schlief- was acting under respondent's orders and that his interference, restraint, and coercion, as applied to Haney, exemplified similar restraint the respondent proposed to bring to bear on any other employee who solicited union memberships in its bunkhouse at any- time. Such restraint plainly- interferes with the rights of the employees. It also unduly restrained Haney in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. On each count Schlief's action falls within the acts prescribed by Section 8 (1) of the Act. Finally, it breaches the express terms of the agree- ment made in 1938 in that it violates the promise posted by the respondent as a part of the settlement agreement. This reads in part: It [the respondent] will not in any manner interfere with, restrain or coerce its camp employees in the exercise of their rights to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through- representatives of their own choosing and to engage in any concerted activi- ties for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion as guaranteed by Section 7 of the [Act.] The undersigned finds that the settlement 'agreements of September 14 and October 3, 1938, in view of this subsequent conduct do not, under the Board's established policies, constitute a bar to this proceeding. - It remains to examine the-evidence and answer the question whether the con- dition stated in the agreement of September 14, 1938 has been fulfilled, that it should stand until the Supreme Court of the United States had passed on the right of the employer to deny access to its camps to representatives of the Union. As set forth above, this Court, on February 12, 1940, sustained the Board's order requiring the Waterman Steamship Company to permit access to its vessels-by all union representatives on equal conditions. In the following year the Court 11 The Board contends that the agreements made in 1938 are of "indeterminate or indefinite duration" and hence subject to termination on notice by any party after a reasonable period of operation. Since, as set forth below, the contractual provision that the settlement remains effective until the United States Supreme Court has passed on the essential matters in issue has now been fulfilled, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to make findings on this contention. " - , , LAKE SUPERIOR ' LUMBER CORPORATION 199 by refusing certiorari validated similar orders issued by the Board in the South Atlantic Steamship Company case. On April 23, 1945, the Supreme Court in its decision sustaining the Board in the Le Tourneau Company of Georgia and the Republic Aviation Corporation cases ruled that the union's right of access cov- ered the distribution of union literature on the premises of an employer and free discussion of union matters in intervals of employment while in the employer's plant. All these matters are at issue here. All these findings of the Board are violated by the limitation - on union activity which the respondent is presently enforcing. Under these circumstances the undersigned concludes and finds that since this condition of the agreements has been fulfilled, the parties and the Board are no longer bound thereby. Since it is clear that the respondent has fulfilled the terms of the settlement agreement, as approved by the Board, relative to permitting access to its camps by union representatives , from October 1938 until the matter was reopened in July 1945, the undersigned makes no finding imputing unfair labor practices to the respondent for limiting the access of union agents to its camps during that period. The undersigned finds that the respondent by the limitation imposed on its employees, and on union representatives since July 1945, relative to their opportunities for consultation on organization ; by the action of Camp Fore- man-Schlief in restraining employee Haney when soliciting union memberships in his free time and by the expulsion of Financial Secretary Hagstrom and President Arnold of Local 15 from its camps by Camp Foremen Petka and Schlief while Hagstrom and Arnold were engaged in legitimate union activity the respondent has .Interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III, above , occurring in connection with its operations described in Section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and-commerce among the sev- eral States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing coin- merce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY 0 Having found that the respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, the undersigned will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom , and that it take certain affirmative action found necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the respondent enforced -unlawful limitations upon the access of union representatives to its camps and on legitimate union activi- ties of its employees on their own time. In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act it will be recommended that the Board order, the respondent to rescind immediately its rules which place limitations on the right of the em- ployees who reside in buildings owned by it to engage in activities during their free time, or to have any person call on them at the camps during their free time, for the purpose of consulting, conferring or advising with, talking to, meeting, or assisting, the respondent's employees, or any of them, in regard to their .rights udder the Act to self-organization , to form, join , or assist'labor organizations , to bargain -collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 200 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the basis of the above findings of fact, and upon the entire record` in the case, the undersigned makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local 15, is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing Its employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the respondent has en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 (1) of the Act. 3. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. RECOMMENDATIONS Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the undersigned recommends that the respondent, Lake Superior Lumber Corpora- tion, Ontonagon, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Rescind immediately all rules which place limitations on the right of its employees who reside in buildings owned by it to engage in activities during their free time, or to have any person call on them at the camps during their free time, for the purpose of consulting, conferring or advising with, talking to, meeting, or assisting, the respondent's employees, or any of them, in regard to their rights under the Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist, labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar- gaining or other mutual aid or protection ae (b) Post immediately at its plant and camps near Ontonagon, Michigan, copies of the notice attached hereto marked Appendix D. Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director of the Eighteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to em- ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (c) File with the Regional Director for the Eighteenth Region on or before ten (10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report, a report in writing setting forth in detail the manner and form in which the respondent has complied with the foregoing recommendations. ^ It is not intended here to recommend rescission of the respondent's rule requiring lights in its bunkhouses to go out at 8 : 00 p in. Under the conditions there existent and with the rescission of rules limiting the Union's right of access here proposed-the under- signed finds the "lights out" rule to be a reasonable regulation conducive to the orderly processes of production. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 201 It is further recommended that unless on or before ten ( 10) days from the receipt of this Intermediate Report, the respondent notifies the Regional Director in writing that it will comply with the foregoing recommendations, the National Labor Relations Board issue an order requiring the respondent to take the action aforesaid. -As provided in Section 33 of Article II of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, Series 3, as amended , effective July 12, 1944, any party or counsel for the Board may within fifteen ( 15) days from the date of the entry of the order transferring the case to the Board , pursuant to Section 32 of Article II of said Rules and Regulations file with the Board, Rochambeau, Building, Washington 25, D. C., an original and four copies of a statement in writing setting forth such exceptions to the Intermediate Report or to any other part of the record or proceeding (including rulings upon all motions or objections) as lie relies upon, together with the original and four copies of a brief in support thereof. Immediately upon the filing of such statement of exceptions and/or brief, the party or counsel for the Board filing the same shall serve a copy thereof upon each of the other parties and shall file a copy with the Regional Director. As further provided in said Section 33 , should any party desire permission to argue orally before the Board, request therefor must be made in,writing within ten (10 ) days from the date of the order transferring the case to the Board. CHARLES E . PERSONS, Trial Eaarrimer. Dated November 19, 1945. APPENDIX A STIPULATION It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the Lake Superior Lumber Corp. ( hereinafter referred to as the Corporation ), its officers , agents, successors and assigns, the Michigan Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union , Local #15, Inter- national Woodworkers of America , affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Organizations (hereinafter called the Union ), that the Corporation: 1. Shall not presently , nor at any future date , in any - mariner interfere with, restrain , or coerce its camp employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization , to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing , and to engage in any concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid- or protection, as guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act; 2. Shall not presently, nor at any future date , urge, persuade, warn, threaten , or intimidate its camp employees from joining or assisting the Union ; 3. Shall not presently , nor at any future date, in any manner whatsoever, interfere with any and all collective activities of its Michigan camp and mill employees and of the Union; 4. Shall not in any manner whatsoever, dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organization of its Michigan camp employees and will not in any manner dominate or interfere with the formation and/or administration of any labor organization of the Corporation 's Michigan camp employees ; 5. Without admitting that denial or refusal of permission constitutes an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, the Corpo- ration none-the-less herewith grants permission until the matter shall have been determined by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the organizers of the Union, the organizers of the International Wood- 202 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD workers of America (C. I. 0.), or the organizers of any other labor organiza- tions, not established in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, to visit their members, and other employees on-its camp sites located in various places in the State of Michigan, upon conditions to be posted by the Corpora- tion in conspicuous places for the advice and regulation of such organizers, in making such visits ; 6. That if and when the National Labor Relations Board certifies Michigan Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, Local #15, International Woodworkers of America (C. I. 0 ), as the exclusive representative of all its Michigan camp employees for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, it will recognize Local #15, International Wood- workers of America, as the exclusive representative of all its Michigan camp employees for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, and will, upon request, bargain collectively with the Michigan Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union. Local #15, International Woodworkers of America (C. I. 0.), as the exclusive representative of its Michigan camp employees in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employ- ment, and other conditions of employment ; 7. That it is undertaking this affirmative action at the direction of the Regional Director of the Twelfth Region of the National Labor Relations Board ; 8. Will post immediately to its Michigan camp employees in conspicuous places in and about its camps in the County of Ontonagon, Michigan, notices embodying the terms of this stipulation ; (a) Such notices will remain posted for a period of at least ninety (90) consecutive days from the date of the posting; 9. Will notify the Regional Director of the Twelfth Region of the National Labor Relations Board, in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of the approval of this stipulation that the notices herein referred to have been posted. It is further stipulated and agreed by and between the Corporation and the Union that upon approval of this Stipulation by the National Labor Relations Board and submission of a letter by the Corporation to the Regional Director of the Twelfth Region of said Board stating that notices have been posted as afore- said, the Union will withdraw all charges of unfair labor practices heretofore filed with the afore-mentioned Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board against the Corporation and will not file any further or additional charges against the Corporation, alleging any unfair labor practice or discrimination against its members for any and all actions of the Corporation up to and includ- ing the date of this Stipulation. It is understood by the parties hereto that this Stipulation is subject to the express approval of the National Labor Relations Board. If and when such approval is granted, and upon receipt by the Regional Director of the Twelfth Region of the National Labor Relations Board of a letter stating that notices have been posted as aforesaid, by the Corporation, all matters in difference between the Corporation and the Union, insofar as such differences relate to alleged unfair labor practices or discriminations up to and including the date of this Stipulation, shall be settled and discharged. Dated at Ontonagon, Michigan, this 14th day of September A. D. 1938. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION, By (Signed) W. T. GORMAN, Vice President. MICHIGAN LUMBER & 'SAWMILL WORKERS UNION, LOCAL #15, INTERNATIONAL WoonwouKERs of AMERICA (C. I O) , By (Signed) HERBERT NORRIS, Fin. Secy. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 203 APPENDIX B STIPULATION It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the Lake Superior Lumber Corp. and the Michigan Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union, Local # 15, Inter- national Woodworkers of America ( C. I. 0), that the Rules and Regulations appended hereto and expressly made a part hereof, shall govern the conduct of Union agents , organizers, or representatives property. Dated this 3d day of October, entering upon the Company's_ 1938. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORP., W. T. GORMAN MICHIGAN LUMBER AND SAWMILL WORKERS UNION, LOCAL #15, INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS OF AMERICA ( C. 1. 0.), MATT SAVOLA, President. HERBERT NoRRIS , Secy. Treas. [SEAL] By (Signed) By (Signed) (Signed) RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF UNION AGENTS, ORGANIZERS AND REPRESENTATIVES ENTERING UPON COMPANY PROPERTY 1. Only one representative of a union will be allowed to visit the Corporation's property at one time . Express approval must be obtained from the Corporation's Main Offices in Ontonagon, Michigan, if permission is desired for more than one such representative to visit any camp at the same time. 2. The time and place for such a visit of the union representative is hereby designated by the Corporation but it is understood that such visits shall be re- stricted to one night per week in each camp as follows : At Camp Six, Tuesday night ; at Camp Seven, Monday night. If and when new camps are put into operation special visiting days will be designated , as herein provided for Camps Six and Seven. 3. While at the camp the Union representative will visit and discuss union problems with the Corporation 's employees at the recreation hall exclusively and at no other place and shall not enter the sleeping quarters of the men at any time or for any purpose. Such representative shall arrive at the camp not earlier than 5: 30 of the afternoon of the day of such visit and shall leave not later than half an hour after breakfast has been served the following morning. The Company will furnish a night's lodging at 50¢ per night and meals at the rate of 500 per meal. 4. The union recognizes the right of each individual employee to his own free choice in the matter of joining or refusing to join any labor union and no attempt shall be made by the union representative to coerce, intimidate or force any employee - of the camp to join a union or to visit with the union representative while he is on this corporation's property nor shall such union representative annoy or make threats against any of the employees of the cor- poration for refusing to visit with him or to join his union. 5. No such visit by any union representative, as contemplated herein, shall in any way interfere with the peace of the camp or with the harmonious and peaceful 'relations existing between this company and the employees and each representative of the union while on the Company's property, as herein provided, shall conduct himself in a gentlemanly and orderly manner, having due regard for the rights and privileges of the employees of the Company. 6. In consideration of the granting of the foregoing privileges the union agrees to be responsible for the acts of its agents , organizers and representa- 204 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tives, who may from time to time visit the Company's camps, by virtue of this agreement, and all such agents, organizers and representatives shall be subject to and bound by these rules, regulations and restrictions. 7. No such union representative shall incite a riot or,call a'strike while upon', the Company's property and in case of a strike at any of the camp or camps of the Company all of the rights and priveleges granted hereunder to union representatives shall be abrogated during the continuance of such strike. 8. If in the opinion of the Company the Union's agents, organizers or repre- sentatives violate these rules and regulations, or any of them, while on Com- pany property, then and in such case the Company may elect to do the follow- ing: 1. To notify the union in writing that the privileges herein granted have been cancelled and revoked stating at the same time the nature of the viola- tion and the time and place of its occurrence. 2. To notify the National Labor Relations Board, through the Twelfth Region in Milwaukee, of the nature of the violation. 3. If the union is dissatisfied with the decision of the Company it may ask the National Labor Relations Board to intercede to investigate and hear the matters in dispute with reference to the alleged violation of the rules and regulations herein specified. After an investigation of the matters in dispute in connection with the alleged violation of the rules and regulations and a determination rendered by the Regional Director of the 12th Region of the National Labor Relations Board on the question of whether a violation oc- curred, such determination shall be final and binding upon the union and the Company. And if such determination is adverse to the Company, the Com- pany shall immediately reinstate to the union the rights and privileges granted hereunder. APPENDIX C NOTICE Pursuant to a stipulation heretofore entered into by and between the Lake Superior Lumber Corp. and the Michigan Lumber and Sawmill Workers Union, Local #15, International Woodworkers of America, affiliated with the Com- mittee on Industrial Organizations, and in order to comply with the provi- sions of the National Labor Relations Act, the Corporation hereby gives notice to its employees that: i 1. It will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its camp employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 'choosing, and to engage in any concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. Will not in any manner urge, persuade, warn, threaten, or intimidate its camp employees from joining or assisting the Union. 3. Will not in any manner whatsoever, interfere with any and all col- lective activities of its Michigan camp and mill employees and of the Union. 4. Will not in any manner whatsoever, dominate or interfere with the administration of any labor organization of its Michigan camp employees and will not in any manner dominate or interfere with the formation and/or administration of any labor organization of the Corporation's Michigan -camp employees. , LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION 205 5. Without admitting that denial or refusal of permission constitutes an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations-Act, the Corporation nonetheless herewith grants permission until the matter-shall, have been determined by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the organizers-of the Union, the organizers of the Interna- tional Woodworkers of America (C. I. 0 ), or the organizers of any other labor organizations, not established in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, to visit their members and other employees on its camp sites located in various places in the State of Michigan, upon conditions to be posted by the Corporation in conspicuous places for the advice and regulation of such organizers, in making such visits. LAKE ,SUPERIOR LUMBER CORP. By --------------------------- Stamped on the Back showing Receipt by 12th Region NLRB at 8: 30 Sept. 15, 1938. APPENDIX D NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner, of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : - WE WILL NOT in any manner interefere with, restrain, or coerce our em- ployees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or- ganizations, to join or assist International Woodworkers of America, C. I. 0., Local 15, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. All our employees are free to become or remain members of, this union, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT henceforth interfere with the rights of employees residing in our camps to engage in activities during their free time, or to have any person call on them at .the camps during such free time, for the purpose of consulting, conferring, or advising with, talking to, meeting, or assisting, our employees, or any of them, in regard to their rights under the National Labor Relations Act to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. LAKE SUPERIOR LUMBER CORPORATION, Dated------------------------ By-------------------- -------------- (Representative ) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. -
070 NLRB 178: Lake Superior Lumber Corp. | Justis AI