Stowe Spinning Co.

0 l In the Matter Of STOWE SPINNING COMP,cNY, ACME SPINNING COM- PANY, PERFECTION SPINNING COMPANY, LINFORD MILLS, INC. and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, C. I. O. Case No. 5-C-1887.-Decided August .26, 1946 Mr. John H. Garver, for the Board. Mr. P. C. Whitlock, of Charlotte, N. C., for the respondent Stowe Spinning Company. Mr. George B. Mason, of Gastonia, N. C., for the respondent Acme Spinning-Company.- Mr. Hardy B. Gaston, bf Gelniont, N. C., for the respondent Perfec- tion Spinning Company. Mr. L. B. Hollowell, of Gastonia, N. C., for the respondent Linford Mills, Inc. Mr.. R. H. Harris, of Durham, N., C., and Miss Nancy Blaine, of Charlotte, N. C., for the Union. Miss Frances Lopinsky, of counsel to the Board. DECISION . AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE et. Upon an amended charge filed on October 1, 1945, by Textile Work- ers Union of America, C. I. 0., herein calle tt the Union , the National Labor Relations Board , herein called the Board, by its Regional Di- rector for the Fifth Region (Baltimore, Maryland ), issued its com- plaint, dated October 3 , 1945, against Stowe Spinning Company, Acme Spinning Company, Perfection Spinning Company, and Linford Mills, Inc., herein called the respondents, alleging that the respondent Stowe Spinning Company had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce , within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3), and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act, and that x,11 the respond- ents had engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 ( 1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. Copies of the complaint and notice of hear- ing thereon were duly served upon the respondents and the Union. 70 N. L. R. B., No. 45. 614 STOI' E SPINNING COMPANY 615 With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint, as amended during the hearing, alleged in substance : (1) that on February 10,1945, the respondent Stowe Spinning Company discriminatorily discharged John R. Hall and Lillie E. Hall, and on February 24, 1945, discrimina- torily discharged George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey because they joined or assisted the Union; (2) that in January 1945, and thereafter, the respondents denied the use of a building in North Belmont, North Carolina, owned by them, to the employees of the respondent Stowe Spinning Company and to the Union, for the purposes of self-organization; (3) that since November 1944,,the re- spondent Stowe Spinning Company, through its officers and agents, vilified and expressed disapproval of the Union, interrogated its em- ployees as to their union affiliations, and urged and warned its em- ployees not to join or remain members of the Union; and (4) that by these acts the respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. In their answers, each of them verified on October 12, 1945, the re- spondents denied that they engaged in the alleged unfair labor prac- tices. As to the discharges, the answer of the respondent Stowe Spin- ning Company contains certain affirmative allegations which will be set forth and considered hereinafter. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Gastonia, North Carolina, on October 15, 16, and 17, 1945, before C. W. Whittemore, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The Board and'the respondents were represented by counsel; and the Union, by its representatives. All parties participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. During the hearing a motion made by counsel for the Board, with- out objection, to strike from the complaint certain allegations relating to John R. Hall, was granted. Also during the hearing, a motion of the respondents to dismiss from the complaint allegations relating to the use of the building above referred to was.denied. At the close of the hearing, counsel for the respondents moved to dismiss the coin- plaint in its entirety. The Trial Examiner reserved ruling,, and de- nied the motion in his Intermediate Report. A joint motion, by all counsel, was granted to conform the pleadings to the proof as to minor matters. During the course of the hearing and in his Intermediate Report, the Trial Examiner made rulings on other motions and on objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. O k 1 The complaint originally alleged that, after his discharge by the respondent Stowe Spinning Company, John R Hall was discriminatorily refused employment by the re- spondent Acme Spinning Company . This was the portion stricken. 616 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On November 13, 1945, the Trial Examiner issued his Intermediate Report, copies of which were duly served upon the respondents and the Union. He found that the respondent Stowe Spinning Com- pany had engaged in and was engaging in unfair practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act„and that all the respondents had.engaged in and were engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. He recom- mended that the respondents cease-and desist from the unfair labor practices found and take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. Thereafter, on December 14, 1945, the respondents filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and support- ing briefs. Upon consideration of the record, the Board, on its owl' motion, reopened the record and received by stipulation of the parties evidence concerning the business of two of the respondents. The stipulations are hereby made part of the record. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the respond- ent's exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and insofar as the exceptions are inconsistent with the findings, con- clusions, and order set forth below, finds them to be without merit, and insofar as the exceptions are consistent therewith, finds them to have merit. Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following,: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENTS The respondents Stowe Spinning Company, Acme Spinning Com- pany, Perfection Spinning Company, and Linford Mills, Inc., some- times hereinafter referred to as the respondents Stowe, Acme, Per-' fection, and Linford, respectively, are North Carolina corporations, each of them having its principal office and place of business in Belmont, North Carolina. All are engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of cotton yarn. In the course and conduct of their business, each of the respondents causes a substantial amount of materials, consisting principally of raw cotton, valued at more than $500,000 annually, to be transported in interstate commerce to and through States of the United States, other than North Carolina, to its Belmont plant, and causes a substantial amount of products manufactured at its Belmont plant, consisting principally of cotton yarn, valued at more than $500,000 annually, to be transported in - interstate commerce to and through. States of the United States, other than the State of North Carolina, from its -Belmont plant. The four respondents concede that they are separately engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 617 II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated' with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization admitting to mem- bership-employees of the respondents. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The setting in which the relevant events occurred 1. The respondents' plants and'mill village's Each of the four respondents operates a mill in North Belmont, North Carolina, an unincorporated village located about 21/2 miles from the town of Belmont. Each of the respondents owns a large number of houses 2 which are rented to employees and which, col- lectively, are known' as "mill villages." The mill villages are policed by a deputy sheriff who is paid by the four respondents. At a point centrally located in relation to the mill villages are: (1) a*branch post office, located in a building erected and owned by the four respondents; (2) a theatre, which-is owned by the four respondents; and (3) a public school building. The three members of the School Board are J. W. Miller, superintendent of the respondent Perfection, Oyerseer John Thower of the respondent Acme, and Superintendent John Starnes of the respondent Linford. 2. The interrelationship between the respondents A. C. Lineberger is -president of the respondents Perfection, Acme, and Linford; J. Harold Lineberger is vice president of the respond- ents Perfection and Linford, and secretary-treasurer of the- respond- ent Acme ;- D. P. Stowe is vice president of the respondent Acme and secretary-treasurer of the respondent Perfection. The officers of the respondent Stowe are C. T. Stowe, president; C. P. Stowe, vice presi- dent; and R. L. Stowe, secretary-treasurer, all-of whom are cousins of D. P. Stowe. 3. The ownership of the P. O. S. of 'A. Building As noted heretofore, the four respondents jointly own the building which houses the North Belmont -Post Office. The building is known as the P. O. S. of A. building,-the initials denoting the name of a fraternal organization called the Patriotic Order Sons of America, in which employees of each of the respondents are members. Mem- bership dues are deducted from the employees' pay by the respondents and remitted to this organization. s Acme has about 158 such -houses, Stowe about 100 , and Linford and Perfection about 75 each. 618 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The post'office and a grocery store occupy the first floor of the build- ing. On the second floor is a large hall, furnished with. chairs sup- plied by, the respondents and used rent-free for 'meetings of the P. O. S. of A. D. P. Stowe, identified above as an officer of the respondents Acme and Perfection, acts as the agent` of the four respondents in the con- trol and rental of the P. O: S. of A. Building. 4. The self-organization of the respondents' employees After the general textile strike of 1934, no union organizational activity existed among the employees at any of the North Belmont Mills until late in- 1944. On a Sunday in December 1944, two union representatives met with three employees of the respondent Stowe at the home of one of the latter group. One of the employees present, George W. Gainey, whose discharge is an issue in this proceeding, thereafter assumed leadership in obtaining signatures to union membership application blanks. For a time Gainey was aided in his union solicitation by another em- ployee of the respondent Stowe, but this employee left the respond- ent's employment early in February 1945 to join the armed services. Shortly after the December meeting, Gainey, in, company with John R: Hall, another employee of the respondent- Stowe, attended a union organization gathering of employees of .another mill, a few miles from North Belmont. At this meeting Gainey asked the union organizer to arrange for a mass meeting of Stowe employees at North Belmont. Hall-and his wife joined the Union in mid-January of-1945, and about a week later Hall began `actively assisting Gainey in soliciting union membership applications among fellow employees. The sub- sequent discharge of Hall and the alleged discharge of his wife are also issues in this proceeding. B. The events relevant to the issues in this proceeding 1. The respondents' refusal to permit use of the P. 'O., S. of A. Building for self-organization of the employees J a) The refusal, Pursuant to the request of Gainey that the Union arrange a mass meeting of Stowe employees, Robert H. Harris, a national representa- tive of the Union, came to North Belmont to seek a suitable meeting place. Upon .being informed that O. R. Stewart, a second hand at the respondent Acme's plant, had charge of the P. O. S. of A. hall, Harris approached Stewart on Monday, January 22, 1945. Stewart informed Harris that Harris would have- to, see Baxter Black, an employee of the same mill, who was president of the P. O. S. of A. STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 619 Harris went to Black, identified himself as a representative of the Union, and asked permission to use the P. O. S. of A. hall on the following Sunday afternoon in order that employees of Stowe -might complete their union organizing campaign. Black informed Harris that the Union -could•have the use of the hall, and requested in payment therefor the sum of $1.00 as a jani- tor's fee. Harris promised to pay more for the use` of the hall, the exact amount to be paid over and above the janitor's fee being left to Harris. In making arrangements for the use.of the hall with Black, Harris stressed the fact that he must, have a definite commit- ment that the hall would be available because leaflets announcing the meeting place must be prepared and distributed. Harris was assured by Black that his word was final, Black explaining that he was head of the "lodge." 3 , Harris thereupon proceeded to have leaflets mime- ographed. On the next day Second' Hand Stewart asked Black what he had done about Harris' request. When Black replied that he had given Harris permission to -use the hall, Stewart stated : "You shouldn't have done it for he ain't nothing but a Textile organizer." Black thereupon reported his,,actioii to Superintendent Cauble of the re- spondent Acme's mill. Cauble instructed Black to do nothing fur- ther until he, Cauble, had seen the "officials" at Belmont. Later on' the same day, Cauble told Black that D. P. Stowe, the agent for all the respondents in control of the P. O. S. of A. Building, would communi- cate with Stewart that evening .4 Later on the same day Stewart, who also was an officer of'the P. O. S. of A., was summoned to D. P. Stowe's office. Agent Stowe asked Stewart, according to Stewart's testimony, "if we were not overstep- ping our bounds," told him that the respondents had built the P. O. S. of A. structure for the organization's meetings and "meetings of that type,"and demanded to know why permission had been given to, Harris. Stewart replied : .. . Brother Black had told me that he didn't understand what the man was representing and therefore he didn't know him being a union organizer and he had told him he could use the hall at that time .. . 3 The findings as to the conversation between Harris and Black is based on the testi- mony of Harris, which we credit Black testified that he told Harris, on this occasion, that a meeting of the P.10 S. of A. would have to be held before permission could be granted We agree with the Trial Examiner that Black's recollection of the' interview in this respect was inaccurate. In addition to testimony that he knew of no reason why the employees-could not use the hall for organizational purposes, Black also testified that he told Stewart, the day after he had talked to Harris, that he had given Harris authority to use the hall the next Sunday. Furthermore, there is no evidence that any-question as to permitting the Union to use the hall was ever submitted to a P. O. S. of A. meeting. * These findings-are based upon'the uncontradicted testimony of Black, which we credit, as did the Trial Examiner. 620 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stowe instructed Stewart to inform Harris that lie could not use the hall.r, On Friday, after leaflets had been distributed to • Stowe employees announcing that the union meeting was to be held at the hall on the following Sunday, January 28, Harris was told by Black' that he had received orders, through Stewart, that Stowe had refused to permit the Unibn to use the Ball "under any circumstances." 8 The employees did not use the hall on January 28, but met in the street outside the building. Before the °street meeting, however, and after Black had trans- mitted Sto e's refusal to Harris, Harris tried to obtain the use of the schoolhouse or the theatre in North' Belmont. J. W. Miller, the chairman of the School Board and the superintendent of the re- spondent Perfection's mill, at first told Harris that a shortage of coal made the use of fire for heating purposes impossible. When -Harris said that no fire would be necessary, Miller stated that D: P. Stowe had said that the Union could not use the school building for the meeting. Harris then interviewed the manager of- the movie theatre, who stated that he permitted no one to use the theatre build- ing for any purpose.7 (b) Conclusions as to the refusal According to D. P. Stowe's uncontradicted testimony, which we credit, the P. O. S. of A. Building was constructed in 1937 for the dual purpose of providing store space for the convenience of employees, and a meeting place for members -of the P. O. S. of A., who for some years had been using the schoolhouse auditorium. He "further testi- S The foregoing is based upon the uncontradicted testimony of Stewart which we credit. Stewart also testified that he had been told by Stowe that Harris was to be notified that he could not use the hall "unless he did see Mr. Stowe " However, Stewart's testimony that Stowe's instruction contained. such qualification' is refuted by Stowe's definite testi- mony that he refused to permit the use of the hall, and by Black's testimony that, after seeing Stowe, Stewart had told Black that Stowe had refused to permit Harris to use the hall. - Harris so testified without contradiction, and we credit his testimony as did the Trial- Examiner. This testimony was coi roberated by Black who credibly testified that Black informed Harris that the building would not be available for Harris' use because "the mill officials would not let us do it." 7 Harris so testified. Miller denied that he had refused Harris the use of the school building, stating that he had no such authority. He further denied that the name of D. P. Stowe was mentioned in his interview with Harris. He admitted, however, having informed Harris that the schoolhouse could not be used because of the coal shortage. We credit Harris, as did the Trial Examiner. Although the complaint contains no allegation as to the refusals to permit the use of the theatre or the public school for a union meeting, the findings are relevant to the question of availability of meeting places, other than the P. 0 S. of A. hall, near the respondents' mill villages Miller's statement to Harris, more- over, is further indication of Stowe's intent, as an officer and agent of the respondents, Ito interfere with the employees' efforts to self-organize by refusing to permit them the use of a suitable meeting place. It is undisputed that the schoolhouse had been used for many years for meetings of the P. 0 S. of A. before a special building was erected in 1937, as hereinafter stated. STOVE SPINNING COMPANY 621 fled credibly that the only direct interest of the' respondents in the P. 0. S. of A. was : just the fact that we were trying to help the people out who were members of it and did not have a place to meet in. He added : ".. . 'we have always got a special interest in- being patriotic." As to the arrangements under which the P. 0. S. of A. was per- mitted use of this company-owned property, Stowe credibly testified without contradiction that "it was built especially for the Patriotic Sons of America to hold their meetings in and was not to be rented to anybody else." He also testified : . . . we told the Patriotic Sons of America that we were going to let them use the building free of rent, but were not going to allow it to be rented for any [other] purposes. No lease, however, is in effect containing this or any other provision. Whatever may have been the respondents' purpose in erecting the building, or whatever may have been the respondents' statement of policy at the time that the P. 0. S. of A. was first granted the use of the hall, such purpose and policy are not material to the issues herein involved. As a matter of practice, since 1937, the hall has been used, according to the credible testimony of Black, on numerous occasions for community and employee meetings. Various churches have used the hall for banquets; "Ladies Aid" societies have gathered there; the North Belmont School had the use of the hall for at least one Christ- mas party; and for several weeks employees of the respondents attended a "Safety school" held in the halls That no other fraternal order met there is explained by the fact, established by Stowe's testi- mony, that the P. 0. S. of A. is the only such organization in North Belmont. Furthermore, Black's credible testimony is undisputed that it was the practice, when any other organization wanted to use the hall, for the P. 0. S. of A. "lodge" itself to pass upon the request. There is no evidence' that any other organization, except the Union, was ever refused use of the hall, either by the P. 0. S. of A. or by the respondents. The evidence is clear, and we find, that Stowe's refusal, on behalf of all four respondents, to,permit use of the hall for purposes of self- organization in a labor union under the circumstances, constituted 8 The respondents admit in their brief that churches and other civic groups have used the hall with the permipsion of the P. O. S. of - A., but argue that granting the hall for church suppers is unlike granting it for a union meeting, church suppers being a P. 0 S. of A activity because members of the lodge made up the membership of the churches. Inas- much as employees of the respondents made up the membership of the lodge , a union meeting, by the respondents' own standard , likewise constitutes a P. O. S. of A. activity. i 622 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unlawful disparity of treatment and discrimination against the Union.9 The respondents contend that their refusal to permit the use of their- private property was within their constitutional rights. The contention has no merit. We have held, and the Supreme Court of the United States has confirmed the view, that when-an employer's right to regulate the use of his own property comes into conflict with' the employees' right to receive information to enable them to exer cise their right to self-organization, which it is the policy of the Act to encourage, the conflicting rights must be balanced to deter- mine which right, in a given situation, is paramount.lo The "right to self-organization" is more than 'an intangible con- cept. The history of labor organization has established a pattern of methods almost universally utilized by employees in self-organiza- tion, deprivation of any one- of which makes inroads upon the "right." 11 Foremost among these methods is the general meetings,12 the sine qua non of all true collective action, the basic constitutional right of peaceable assembly.'8 'The respondents do not deny the ex- istence of the abstract right of their' employees to meet for purposes of self-organization. - However, by refusing to permit the Union to use the only available meeting place in the community, a hall erected and used by the respondents for the benefit of 'citizens isolated from other public facilities by virtue of their employment' in the commu- nity, the respondents in fact deprived their employees of this basic right. The respondents do not claim that "inconvenience" or "dislo- cation of property rights" would result from the Union's use of its property.'' Indeed, no reason at all was offered by the respondents' See, for example, Matter of Weyerhauser Timber Co:, 31 N. L R. B 258 , 266-267; Matter of Gallup American Coal Company , 32 N. L R B 823, enf'd 131 F. ( 2d) 665, (C C. A. 10) ; Matter of Ozon Lumber Company, 42 N L R B 1073 10 Matter of LeTourneau Company of Georgia, 54 N L. R. B. 1253 , 1259 , enf'd 324 U. S. 793 , - 0 11 " . . The right of self-organization and collective bargaining is a complex whole, embi acing the various elements of meetings, speeches , peaceful picketing, the printing and distribution of pamphlets , news and argument , all of which , however, are tiaceable to the fundamental liberties of expression and assembly . So compounded , the right to self-organ- ization and collective bargaining is fundamental, being one phase of the process of free association essential to the democratic way of life." Violations/of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Report No. 1150, Part 1, pp 4-5. See also Matter of LeTourneau Company of Georgia, cited supra 11 "Your Union's affairs are carried on by the membership in membership meetings . . . It is important if the Union is to do the job you want it to do that you attend these meet- ings and-be ready to take na1 t in working out the answers to our common problems . . International Union, UAW-CIO,'How to Conduct a Union Meeting . ' Education Depart- ment Publication No. 4, p 2. "Usually the goveinmentof the local union rests with the mass meeting, the nlembers gathering together ever so often to-transact their business." Cummins, E C , The Labor Problem an the United States, New York 1935, p 167. . . . A meeting of the workers is usually called to agree upon their demands and to select their spokesmen . 11 International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, Handbook of Trade Union Methods, New York, 1937, p 13. 11 See Hague v. C. 1. 0., 307 U. S. 496 14 Cf. Matter of LeTourneau Company of Georgia, supra, and cases cited therein. O 0 STOWE SPINNING COMPANY ET AL. 623 agent Stowe for countermanding Black's grant of permission to Har- ris to use _ the hall. Against the bare property right urged by the respondents, the necessity of the employees for a place to hold an organizational meeting clearly preponderates 15 - - The dissenting opinion suggests that, had the respondents not pre- vented the Union, from using'company. property for its organization meeting, we would, under Board precedents, be compelled to find the. respondents guilty of activity violative of Section 8 (2) of the Act. The dissent states, in part, that "... the Board for years has construed the statute . . . as forbidding even the most minute kind o'f financial support to labor organizations," -and cites a number' of cases in support of the statement. The cited cases are illustrative only `of the Board's consistent policy, of taking into account, in any given situation, peach of a number of facts and circumstances tending to establish domination or-support of a labor organization, even though any one of them, standing alone, might perhaps be regarded as trivial is In each of the cited cases, the Board considered a certain kind of aid rendered to a labor organization as part of many facts and circum- stances which, taken together, established that the respondent had dominated or supported that organization. And this approach has been accepted by the courts 17 Under ordinary circumstances, where facilities other than company property, ale available to employees for the purposes of holding *union meetings, 'we would view with suspicion an employer's conduct in supplying a meeting place. However, in a company town, where all meeting facilities are owned by the employer, the use of such facilities ,by a labor organization is'necessai'y if the employees are really to be free to exercise their rights under the Act. The mere granting of a meeting place to a union by an employer under the conditions present 1S See N. L. R. B. v. LeTourneau Company of Georgia , 324 U. S. 793. Cf. Marsh v. State of Alabama, 66 S. Ct. 276 , in which the Court stated The more an owner for his advantage , opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti- tutional rights of those who use it 10 For examples of-',cases wherein the Board, because of surrounding circumstances, has refused to characterize mere financial aid to a union as violative 'of Section 8 (2) of the, Act, see Matter of 'Mallinckro'lt Chemical Works , 63 N. L R B 373 , Matter of Mohawk Carpet Mills, Inc, 12 N. L. R. B. 1265. N 17 See e. g., N. L. R. B. V. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co ., 135 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 3) ; X. L R B v Christian Board of Publication, 113 F (2d ) 678,(C. C. A. 8), wherein the court said, at p 683 . "The respondent cdmplains that the Board has seized upon trivialities in finding that respondent lent support to the Employees Committee Reference is made to the fact in the preparation of the petition and that respondent granted the Committee the use of its assembly room for the meeting of June 19, 1937 . Little need be said on ' this point These acts of respondent were but part of the general background upon which the Board reached its conclusion that the respondent desired to encourage the Employees Committee. As isolated instances of support,' they are not particularly important but when.considered with all other circumstances they form an'entirely adequate basis for the Board's con- clusion. I ' O 624 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD here would not, therefore, in and of itself constitute unlawful as- sistance to that union, as the dissent -suggests. This is particularly true in view of-the fact that the Union offered to pay for the hall .18 Moreover, one of the respondents evidenced a clear-cut anti-union bias in-the discharge' of leaders of the very same union, as hereinafter set forth. Upon the foregoing considerations, including the arbitrariness of D. P. Stowe's decision which resulted in the discriminatory treatment of the Union in the use of the respondent's property, we find that the sole purpose of D. P. Stowe's action, for which all the respondents are accountable, was to' impede, prevent, and discourage self organization and collective bargaining by the respondents' employees within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. Moreover, irrespective of the r'e- spondents' motive, we are convinced, and find upon the considerations stated above, that by refusing to permit their employees to exercise the. right to meet on company-owned, property for the purpose of holding a union meeting, when no other suitable property' in the community was available for the, purpose, -under the circumstances set forth above, the respondents have placed an unreasonabletimpedi- ment on freedom of communication and of assembly essential to the exercise of employees' rights guaranteed by Section i of the Act. By their conduct in revoking the'grant of -privilege to use the hall and thus denying the use of the hall to the Union, the respondents Stowe, Acme, Perfection, and Linford interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8 (1) thereof;l° 2. The respondent Stowe's discharge of-the Hall and Gainey families (a) Events antedating the discharge Of John R. Hall and Lillie E. Hall As noted above, during the latter part of January 1945, John R. Hall began openly and actively to assist Gainey in organizing eui- ploypes at the Stowe mill. i _ - 'Hall and his wife, Lillie E. Hall, were, employed by the respondent Stowe in October 1944.- As employees, they were, permitted to occupy. one of,-the company-owned houses. Before his employment by the respondent Stowe, Hall had had many years' experience in textile mills, and in the preceding 10 years had served as a spinning room 18 See Matter of Standard Oil Company of California , 61 N. L. R. B 1251 , wherein the Board , by dictum , approved an independent union 's meeting on company -owned property for which it paid a small yearly rental 1° Although the complaint alleges that only the rights of the employees of the respondent Stowe were thus interfered with, in view of the closely knit nature of the community of four mill villages , it is reasonable to infer, ands we find , that knowledge of the respondents' - refusal was shared by employees of the other respondents as well. The refusal served not only as a deterrent to self -organization among the respondent Stowe's employees , but also to such organization among employees of the other respondents. • STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 625 doffer,, as a section hand, and as a second hand, both of the latter positions. being supervisory.. For a few weeks at the Stowe mill, Hall worked as a doffer-on the second shift. He then was also assigned to the first shift, as head doffer, with supervision over three doffers.20 Thereafter, until his discharge in February 1945, Hall worked two 8-hour shifts a day, 6 days a week. From the beginning of December, except during Christmas week, Hall worked from 80 to 96 hours each week until his discharge. As head doffer on the first shift, he received 51 cents an hour, and as doffer on the following shift, he was paid at the rate of 50 cents an hour. Mrs. Hall was employed as a spinner. No regular lunch periods are given to employees at this mill; they eat during their working time. Throughout the period during which Hall worked two shifts a day, he was accustomed to go to his company- owned home, about 100 yards from the mill, twice each day for meals, in the morning for breakfast, and later in the clay for lunch.21 Mrs. Hall worked on the third shaft,, from 11 at night until 7, the next morning. On the morning. of February 10, 1945, Mr. Hall arrived at work at 6:45. About half an hour later, having completed doffing. several frames, Hall went home for breakfast as'usual. When he returned, about half or three-quarters of an hour thereafter, Second Hand Floyd Childers told Hall that he would have to stay°on his job and "run it better." This was the first time Childers had.reprimanded Hall 22 A few minutes later, Overseer John A. McCarn approached Hall and also told- him that he would have to stay on the job. Hall became angry, and raised a question concerning the nature of the work he was required to do on the second shift, stating, according to his own testimony, that "before I would be around piecing up behind the doffers, I would quit." McCann testified that Hall said merely, "I quit," that McCarn then said, "All right," whereupon Hall declared that he would not quit. McCarn said, according to his own testimony, "You done quit," and added, according to Hall's unrefuted testimony: "Well, you empty my house and I will call'it not running your job." 23 20 Hall directed the work of three doffers and worked along with them. He was not a supervisory employee within the Board's usual definition of the term . However, -assuming that he was a supervisor , the respondent does not take the position that his supervisory position affected the case in any way. We find, therefore, that Hall 's discharge was not effected to Protect the respondent's position of neutrality. ° _ 2i That Hall had followed this practice is established by his testimony , which we credit. Second Hand Floyd Childers , Hall's immediate supervisor , denied that it was customary for Hall to go to his house for breakfast "unless he got permission from me." Childers admitted ,, however, that the three doffers under Hall could leave without obtain- ing permission . We do not credit such testimony of Childers insofar as it conflicts with that of Hall 12 Hall's testimony on this point, which we credit, is uncontradicted 28 In most major respects, McCarn corroborated or did not deny Hall 's testimony con- cerning the incident described above The incident is reconstructed . hereinafter. 626 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ° Hall left the mill and went to see Gainey, the leader among the employees in their efforts to organize. Gainey and Hall went to the office of Superintendent C. W. Kale, where Gainey informed the superintendent that Hall, "one of our Union members," had been laid off, and asked to have him put back to work. Kale said that he would "look into" the matter. 'Neither Hall nor Gainey heard anything further from' Kale, and on or about February "19, 1945, Hall and his wife vacated their company-owned dwelling. Neither has been recalled to work by the respondent Stowe. . A few days after Mr. Hall's employment ceased, Mrs. Pearl Caven- dar, a spinner who had worked on frames of which Hall had charge as 'lead •doffer, asked McCarii whether Hall had left the mill. McCarn replied that Hall had, and that he, McCarn believed that Hall .was a union organizer and had been "signing up" employees in the Union.24 (b) The respondent-Stowe's contention as,to Mr., and Mrs. Hall The respondent Stowe contends that Mr. and Mrs. Hall voluntarily quit their employment. The Trial Exaliliner found that both were discharged because of their union membership and Mr. Hall's union" activity. Throughout his, testimony McCarn insisted, despite the fact that his version `of the conversation with Hall on February 10 did not differ materially oil the point from that of Hall, 'that Hall was not discharged but quit voluntarily. Asked at the hearing why he did not accept Hall's immediate change of mind as to quitting, McCarn - replied: "I felt like that the, way he was doing, I would be better off without him."- - His only. explanation of his reference to "the way he was doing" was to assert at the hearing that Hall "had his frames down." By the context McCarn thus apparently meant that some frames had not been doffed during Hall's absence at breakfast.25 Later in his testimony McCarn in-effect contradicted his previous assertion that Hall's work that morning was unsatisfactory by_stating without qualification-that he had been 'ready and willing to continue Hall on the job.jand would have done, so except for the fact that he quit. i 21 Cavendar 's testimonv as to this incident, which we credit, is uncontradicted. 25 The record contains a good deal of confused and conflicting testimony as to the actual number , of flames" which became ready for doffing, during Hall's absence . In view of McCarn's testimony, noted hereinafter , to the effect that nothing Hall had done or not done was oI sufficient cause to discharge him, and that he would have remained at work had he not quit, we consider it unnecessary to resolve the conflicting testimony on this point. Whatever may have been the number of idle franles , Second Hand Childers' test!- ,mono established the facts that one or more of the three doffers under Hall were late that morning, that he had had to go and look for all three and that he "had to send for them quite a lot.", There is no evidence that he had ever had to send for Hall. McCarn testified that, until that morning, Hall's work "had been very satisfactory." STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 627 Thereafter, he testified that he "didn 't want him back." When the inconsistency in his claims was called to his attention and he was asked at the hearing t9 clarify his position , McCarn .replied: "Well, his work was not satisfactory by doing the way he was doing and he quit, holding up my production." We do not credit McCarn's testimony that Hall's work was unsatis- factory or that he effectively quit. It is also significant, as Superintendent Kale and McCarn testified in effect, that, although employees frequently quit, they "very often" called them in to "straighten them out"; however, no such effort was made in the case of Hall, although the mill was short of doffers at the time. In quick reconstruction of the events on the morning of February 10, credible evidence shows in substance : (1) that, when for the first time Hall was reprimanded for going to breakfast he became irri- tated, a not unreasonable state of mind for a man who for months had been working 80 to 96 hours each week; (2) that he threatened to quit and quickly withdrew the threat; and (3) that McCarn ignored the withdrawal , terminated Hall's employment , and ordered him to vacate his company-owned dwelling. Under the circumstances, we find that Hall was discharged, and that there is no merit in the respondent Stowe's contention that Hall voluntarily quit. The reason for his discharge is discussed hereinafter. As to Mrs. Hall , the record is practically barren of evidence. The respondent Stowe contends that she quit its employ sometime before her husband did. The record indicates that she had not worked, because of illness, for a week or two before February 10, but there is no evidence that her name had been removed from the pay roll or that she had informed the respondent that she would not return to work upon recovery from her illness. On the other hand, although the Was evicted from the respondent Stowe's house, we do not agree with the Trial Examiner that she was discharged thereby. Inasmuch as the respondent Stowe did not require its employees to live in Stowe-owned houses, so far as appears , Mrs. Hall could have con- tinued to work for ,Stowe after her eviction while living elsewhere. Up to the time of the hearing she had not returned to the respondent's plant and had not reported for work or otherwise requested employ- ment. Although a suspicion arises from the circumstances under which her husband was ordered to vacate his house that, had she returned , she would have been denied work , we cannot find, on the basis of the record, that Mrs. Hall was discharged . We shall, there- fore, dismiss the complaint insofar as it alleges that Lillie E. Hall was discriminatorily discharged. 712344-47-vol 70-41 628 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Events antedating the, discharge of George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma 'Louise Gainey George W. Gainey, his wife, Mabel, his daughter, Emma Louise; and a son, Alfred, began to work for the respondent Stowe in Febru- ary 1943. Gainey had worked in textile mills for 27 years, his wife for 25 years. As noted heretofore, Gainey was the leader among the respondent 'Stowe's employees in their efforts to organize in the Union. In that capacity he unsuccessfully interceded for Hall with Superintendent Kale after Hall's discharge on February 10. A week or two before February 24, 1945, Gainey had a conversation with McCarn in the mill. In the conversation McCarn stated, "They tell me the Union is going pretty hot around here." Gainey answered that it was getting along pretty well. McCarn then stated that a union was unnecessary because the Government set both prices and wages, and then asked Gainey, "who all belong to it?" Gainey replied that a good many belonged. McCarn named specific individuals and asked if each was a member. Finally, McCarn asked if Gainey himself belonged, and Gainey admitted that he and his family had joined.21, On the morning of February 24, 1945, when McCarn discharged a boy for not doing his work properly, 18-year-old Alfred Gainey, in protest against the boy's discharge, quit his job as doffer for the re- spondent Stowe. McCarn made no effort to see Alfred's father or mother, but at once gave instructions to Overseer James H. Ballard to discharge all others in the family when they came td work on the next shift. Ballard carried out these instructions.27 Thus, George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey were discharged on -February 24, 1945. (d) The respondent's contentions as to the discharge of the Gaineys The respondent Stowe contends that Gainey, his wife, and his slaughter were discharged because Alfred Gainey quit; and as a result, the respondent needed their dwelling in order to house another doffer to take Alfred's place. Of relevance to a determination of the merit of this contention are the following facts : (1) Mrs. Gainey's production record was above average; (2) there had never been any complaint about George Gainey's workmanship; (3) the only comment Superintendent Kale had received as to Gainey's daughter was that "she was rather young"; and (4) no doffer had applied for work or was awaiting employment at 26 McCarn was not specifically questioned concerning the above -described conversation with Gainey , upon whose ciedihle testimony the findings as to the conversation rest At the hearing counsel for the respondent Stowe read to McCarn several allegations in the complaint, and McCarn denied each of them. We do not consider his general denials to be sufficient to negate the specific and detailed testimony of Gainey. 21 The findings as to these events rest upon the testimony of McCarn and Ballard. STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 629 the time that Alfred Gainey quit on February 24. Although Kale asserted at the hearing that it was a "practice" to discharge an entire family when one member quit, if they were living in a company-owned house, no credible evidence was offered to support this assertion. Furthermore, Kale testified that not all employees lived in company- owned homes, some lived in town or in the country nearby, and he admitted at the hearing that there was no reason why he did not sug- gest to Gainey that he continue to work and seek a dwelling not on com- pany property. Under the circumstances, we are convinced and find that there is no merit in the respondent's contentions that it was the respondent Stowe's practice to evict all members of a family from a company- owned house whenever one member ceased working for the respondent, or that the Gainey dwelling was needed to house another doter. It is clear and we further find, that the respondent Stowe seized upon Alfred's quitting as a pretext and that the reason for discharging the other members of the Gainey family lay elsewhere. (e) Conclusions as to the discriminatory discharges of Hall and the Gaineys It has been found that the respondent Stowe's contentions as to its reasons for terminating the employment of the Gainey family are without merit and that Hall did not voluntarily quit, as the re- spondent Stowe contends but rather was discharged. It has also been found that George Gainey and John Hall were, before being discharged, the two leaders of the union movement among the respondent Stowe's employees. McCarn admitted in his testimony that he knew of Gainey's union membership and, as found above, McCarn told employee Cavendar, after Hall's discharge, in dis- cussing the termination of his employment, that he, McCarn, believed that Hall was a union organizer who had enrolled employees in the Union. Kale testified that he had seen literature distributed by Hall and Gainey and that he, Kale, knew of "some activity around there." We conclude and find that management representatives responsible for the discharges of Hall and the three Gaineys were aware of their union activity. The respondent Stowe's antipathy toward the Union and the dis- parity of treatment accorded to it have been found in Section III, B, 1, (b), above. From its anti-union conduct, and from the lack of merit in the re- spondent Stowe's explanation of the termination of employment of one union leader, and in the reasons it advanced for terminating the employment of another union leader and his family, it is reasonable 630 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to infer,28 and' we find, that the respondent discharged Hall and the Gainey family because of their union membership and activity, thereby discouraging membership in the Union.29 Upon the entire record, we find'that, by discharging John R. Hall, George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey, the re- spondent Stowe discriminated with respect to their hire and tenure of employment, thereby' discouraging membership in the Union, and interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (3) and (1) thereof. We further find, that, by the anti- union statements of McCarn and by his interrogation of employees as to their union membership, as set -forth above, the respondent Stowe further interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (1) thereof. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondents, set forth in Section III, above, occurring in connection with the operation of the business of the re- spondents described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to ]labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices, we shall order that, they cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the respondent' Stowe discriminated as to the hire and tenure of employment of John R. Hall on February 10, 1945, and of George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey, on February 2A, 1945. In order to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act, we shall order that the respondent Stowe offer the above- named employees immediate reinstatement to their former orsub- stantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, including the privilege of immediate occupancy of a company-owned house, if available, and if not im- 28 See N. L. R B. v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S 584, in which the court, at 602, states : The evidence as to inefficiency is quite inconclusive. The Board was justified in relying on circumstantial evidence of discrimination and was not required to deny relief because there was no direct evidence that the employer knew these men who had joined Amalgam- ated and was displeased or wanted to make an example of them." 2a During the hearing counsel for the respondent Stowe elicited testimony showing that sometime after being discharged from the Stowe mill, Hall was employed by a company in Belmont, North Carolina, of which the president of the respondent Stowe is secretary- treasurer, and that sometime after his discharge, Gainey was employed by the respondent Linford. It is argued that such evidence refutes the contention that the -respondent Stowe had discriminated against either Hall or Gainey We have considered such testi- mony but deem it not controlling here. STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 631 mediately available, then as soon as vacancies occur. We shall also order that the respondent Stowe make each of the above-named em- ployees whole for any loss of pay that they have suffered by reason of the respondent Stowe's discrimination, by payment to each of them of a suns of money equal to the amount each normally would have earned as wages from the date of the discriminatory discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less the net earnings of each during such period 30 Having found that the respondents interfered with, restrained, and coerced their employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization and collective bargaining by denying the use of the only suitable meet- ing place in the community to them, and to an organization which sought to inform them of their rights and to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining if the employees so desired, we shall order the respondents to cease and desist from denying to their em- ployees and to labor organizations the right to meet for purposes of self-organization and collective bargaining in the P. O. S. of A. hall, and, upon request, to grant to all employees of the respondents, and to Textile Workers of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor orgaliiza- tion, the use of the P. O. S. of A. hall for the purpose of holding meet- ings pertaining to self-organization or collective bargaining. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., is a labor organiza- tion, within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employ- ment of John R. Hall, George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey, thereby discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., the respondent Stowe Spinning-Company has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing their employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the re- spondents Stowe Spinning Company, Acme Spinning Company, Per- fection Spinning Company, and Linford Mills, Inc., have engaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. $' By "net earnings " is meant earnings less expenses such as for transportation, loom, and board, incurred by an employee in connection with ,obtaining work and working else- where than for the respondent Stowe, which would not have been incurred but for his or her unlawful discharge, and the subsequent necessity for seeking employment elsewhere See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company , 8 N. L. It. B 440. Monies received for work performed upon Federal , State , county , municipal, or other work-relief projects shall be considered as earnings . See Republic Steel Corporation v N L R B, 311 U 8 7 632 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. - 5. The respondent Stowe Spinning Company has not engaged in unfair labor practices, within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act, as to Lillie E. Hall. ORDER Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the re- spondent, Stowe Spinning Company, North Belmont, -North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in Textile Workers Union of Amer- ica, C. I. O., by discriminatorily discharging any of its employees or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment; (b) Refusing to permit the use of the Patriotic Order Sons of America hall by its employees or employees of Acme Spinning Com- pany, Perfection Spinning Company or Linford Mills, Inc., or by Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organ- ization, for the purpose of 'self-organization or collective bargaining; (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of Amer- ica, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in con- certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu- tual aid or protection, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: - (a) Offer to John R. Hall, George W. Gainey, Mabel Gainey, and Emma Louise Gainey immediate and full reinstatement to their for- mer or substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges; (b) Make whole the employees named in paragraph 2 (a), above, for any loss of earnings that they may have suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination against them, by payment to each of them, of a sum of money equal to the amount which each normally would have earned as wages from,the date of the discriminatory discharge to the date of the respondent's offer of reinstatement, less his or her net earnings during said period; (c) Upon request, grant to its employees and employees of Acme- Spinning Company, Perfection Spinning Company, or Linford Mills, Inc., and to Textile Workers of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 633 organization, the use of the Patriotic Order Sons of America hall for the purposes of self-organization or collective bargaining; (d) Post at its mill in North Belmont, North Carolina, copies of the notice attached hereto, marked "Appendix A." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respondent's representative, be posted by the respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and main- tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material; (e) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the re- spondent has taken to comply herewith. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respondents Acme Spinning Company, Perfection Spinning Company, and Lin- ford Mills, Inc., and their officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall : 1. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing their employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, by refusing to permit the use of the Patriotic Order Sons of America hall by employees of any of the respondents' mills, including the em- ployees of the respondent Stowe Spinning Company, or by Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, for the Purposes of self-organization or collective bargaining. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, grant to all persons employed in the said re- spondents' mills, and to employees of Stowe Spinning Company, and to Textile Workers Union of America, C. I.O., or any other labor organi- zation, the use of the Patriotic Order Sons of America, hall for the purposes of self-organization or collective bargaining; (b) Post at each of their mills in North Belmont, North Carolina, copies of the notice attached hereto, marked "Appendix B." Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Fifth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the respective representative of each respondent be posted by the respondents immediately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days 634 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the respondents to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material ; ° (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifth Region in writing within ten ('10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the re- spondents have taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint, insofar as it alleges that the respondent Stowe, Spinning Company discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Lillie E. Hall, within the mean- ing of Section 8 (3) of the Act, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MR. GERARD'D. REILLY, concurring in part, dissenting in Daft`: While I agree with the conclusions of my colleagues with respect to findings of discrimination in violation of Subsection 8 (3), the holding that the Company was under a duty to supply the Union with the use of its hall for organizational purposes is such an abrupt reversal of the position that this Board has taken in scores of cases that I am constrained to disagree. Subsection 8 (2) of the Act, which makes it unlawful for an em- ployer to contribute financial support to a labor organization, contains only one exception, namely; a proviso that an employer may have conferences with representatives of his employees on union matters during working hours without deducting the loss of time from their wages. Since this exception is so narrow, the Board for years has construed the statute (to my mind, correctly) as forbidding even the most minute kind of financial support to labor organizations. It has frowned, for example, upon letting a union organization have the profits from vending machines, even though patronized exclusively by members of the bargaining unit; 31 on the use of company office machines for preparing pamphlets; 32 the use of vacant office space for the transaction of union business; 33 and mere permission to hold union meetings on factory premises 34 Indeed, this principle has been enunciated in so many cases that any employer who consulted counsel "'Wilson & Co. V. N L R. B., 126 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 7).' , sa N L. R B. v. General Motors Corp., 116 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A 7) ; Bethlehem Shipbuild- ing Cot p . v N L. R B., 114 F ( 2d) 930 (C. C. A. 1) ; N. L R B. v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C C A 9) , N 1 R B v Christian Board of Publication, 113 F (2d) 678 (C C A 8) ; N. L R B. v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Coipoi ntion, 109 F (C C A 4), enf. as mod. 12 N L R. B 886. (2d) 128 ai N. L R. B. v American Manufacturing Company, 106 F ( 2d) 61 ( C. C. A 2 ), enf. as mod. 5 N. L R B 443 , aff'g as mod 306 U. S. 629 ; N. L. R B v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 116 F. (2d) 350 (C C. A. 7 ) (dictum ) ; N. L. R. B. v . Brown Paper Mill Co., 108 F. ( 2d) 867 ( C C. A. 5 ) ; N. L. R. B v. Carlisle Lumber Co, 94 F. (2d) 138 (c, C A. 9 ) , N L R B v Christian Board of Publication , footnote 2, supra, N L R. B v. Friedrich, Inc, Ed , 116 F (2d) 888 (C C A. 5) N L R B v Moore-Lowry Flour Mills Company, 122 F (2d) 419 (C' C A 10), mod. 21 N. L R B 1040, New Idea, Inc v. N. L. R B, 117 F. (2d) 517 (C C A 7) u See Matter of Virginia Electric & Power Company, 44 N L . R. B 404, and Matter of Berkshire Knitting Mills, 46 N . L. R. B. 955. C STOWE SPINNING COMPANY 635 would be loath to let a labor organization conduct a meeting in a building owned by him for fear of incurring the risk of being cited for violation of Subsections 8 (1) or (2) of the Act. Yet, in this case, we are holding it a violation of the Act for a corporation to refuse to permit an affiliated union to use a hall which was built to afford recreational facilities for its employees. It seems to me that such a decision assumes a duty on the part of the employer to give affirmative support to labor organizations-a premise contrary to the specific language in the Act and the converse of the doctrines developed by this Board with respect to employer attitudes toward independent unions. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : We will not in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. We will offer to the employees named below immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination, John R. Hall Mabel Gainey George W. Gainey Emma Louise Gainey We will not refuse to permit the use of the Patriotic Sons of America hall by our employees and other employees of the North Belmont, North Carolina, Mills, or by Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, for the pur- poses of self-organization or collective bargaining. Upon request we will grant to our employees and to other employees of the North Belmont mills, and to Textile Woi:kers Union of America, C. 1. 0., or any other labor organization, the use of Patriotic Order Sons of America hall for the purposes of self-organization or collective bargaining. All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named union or any labor organization. We will not discrimi- 636 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4ate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against any employee because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization. STOWE SPINNING COMPANY, Employer. Dated ----------------- By ---------------------------------- (Representative ) (Title) NoTE.-Any of the above-named employees presently serving in the armed forces of the United States will be offered full reinstate- ment upon application in accordance with the Selective Service Act after discharge from the armed forces. This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. APPENDIX B NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : We will not interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor or- ganizatioiis,. to join or assist Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other,labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection by refusing to permit the use of the Patriotic Order Sons'of America hall by our employees or other employees of the North Belmont, North. Carolina, mills, or by Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. 0., or any other labor organization, for the purposes of self-organization or col- lective bargaining. Upon request, we will grant to our employees and to other em- ployees of the North Belmont mills, and to Textile Workers Union of America, C., I. 0., or any other labor organization, the use of Patriotic Order Sons of America hall for the purposes of self- organization or collective bargaining. (Employer) Dated ----------------- By ------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.