Custom Coated Products

Custom Coated Products, Inc. and Leon Franklin Snow. Case 9-CA- 13099 September 19, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND PENELL.O On June 27, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Ben- jamin Schlesinger issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel and Re- spondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge except as modified herein and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2 The General Counsel has excepted to the Adminis- trative Law Judge's recommendation in paragraph I of "The Remedy" that Leon Franklin Snow's estate be made whole only for any loss of pay that he may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against him. The General Counsel contends that the estate should also be compensated for any other losses suf- fered as a result of Snow's discriminatory discharge, as for example, the proceeds from life insurance. We agree. The backpay award is designed to restore the dis- criminatee to the position he would have had but for his unlawful discharge. Where the discriminatee dies, I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad- ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. Inasmuch as Member Penenlo agrees with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that both rea- sons given by Respondent for discharging employee Snow were unlawful. Member Penello finds it unnecessary to rely on the Administrative Law Judge's alternative holding that a violation of the Act would necessarily be established even if the discharge were motivated only in part by unlawful considerations. 2 For the reasons set forth in Hickmolt Foods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979), we find that a broad injunctive order as recommended by the Administrative Law Judge is not warranted. Respondent, insofar as the record shows, has engaged in three violations of Sec. 8(aXI) and a single violation of Sec. 8(aX3). Since Respondent has not been shown to have a "proclivity to violate the Act" or to have engaged in "such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees' fundamental statutory rights," we find, under the facts of this case. that a narrow "in any like or related manner" order will effectively protect those nghts. CUSTOM COATED PRODUCTS as here, his estate is entitled to receive a sum of money equivalent to the amount of bonuses. emolu- ments. insurance, or other death benefits which the estate would have received had the discriminatee been employed by the employer at the time of his death, less any similar benefits received by the estate as a result of employment by the discriminatee subse- quent to his wrongful discharge and less any insur- ance premiums the dischargee would have paid his employer had he not been discharged. Accordingl 5. we hereby amend the Order and notice to award Snow's estate the proper amount due under estab- lished Board law, as described above. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be- low, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Custom Coated Products, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio. its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modi- fied: I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(e): "(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their union rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act." 2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(a): "(a) Pay to the estate of Leon Franklin Snow a sum of money equal to the amount Snow would have earned from the date of his discriminatory discharge to the date of his death, less net earnings, computed in the manner set forth in the section of the Adminis- trative Law Judge's Decision entitled 'The Remedy.' Also, pay to Snow's estate a sum of money equivalent to the amount of bonuses, emoluments, insurance, and other death benefits, with interest thereon com- puted as described in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977), to which such estate would have been entitled upon Snow's death, had he not been wrongfully discharged, less the amount of similar benefits heretofore paid or now payable as a result of Snow's employment elsewhere subsequent to his dis- charge, and also deducting therefrom the amount of premiums Snow would have paid Respondent from the date of his discharge to the date of his death." 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. International Typographical Union, 183 NLRB 496 (1970): Raymond Pearson, Inc., 115 NLRB 190 (1956): Glen Raven Silk dill. Inc., 101 N.RB 239 (1952). 245 NLRB No. 9 3 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELAIIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOI discharge you because you en- gage in union activities, support a union, or en- gage in concerted employee activities protesting matters concerning your wages, hour of work, working conditions, or other terms and condi- tions of employment. WE WILL NOT ask you about the reasons why you, or your fellow employees, engage in union activities. WE WILL NOT solicit your grievances in order to discourage you from engaging in union activi- ties. WE WILL NOT threaten that we will close our plant and move it to Florida, if you elect to have a union represent you. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of your right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organization, to bargain col- lectively through representatives of your own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities. Because the Board found that we unlawfully discharged employee Leon Franklin Snow, now deceased, WE WILL make his estate whole for any loss of earnings from the date of his discharge to the date of his death, with interest, less any net earnings, plus any money with interest which his estate would have received had he not been wrongfully discharged, such as insurance bene- fits, less any premiums Snow would have paid. CUSTOM COATED PRODUCTS, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard before me in Cincinnati, Ohio, on May 29, 1979. The charge herein was filed by Leon Franklin Snow on October 20, 1978.' Snow died on December 10, but prior to his death he gave an affidavit to Region 9 upon which, in part, the Regional Director based his complaint dated No- vember 30 alleging that the Respondent, Custom Coated Products, Inc., discharged Snow on October 12 because of his known or suspected union activities or because of his I Unless otherwise indicated all dates refer to the year 1978. protected concerted activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and ( I ) of the Act. In addition, the complaint alleges coer- cive interrogation, threats to close Respondent's business and relocate in Florida, and solicitation of grievances and promises to resolve the same all in violation of Section 8(a)( I) of the Act. Upon the entire record herein and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor I make the following: FININGS OF FA(CI 1. JURISDIC)('TION I find as Respondent admits that it is an Ohio corpora- tion engaged in the vinyl coating of products, primarily vi- nyl substitutes for parts of footballs, at its Cincinnati, Ohio, facility. During the 12 months preceding the issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped goods valued in excess of $50,000 from its Cincin- nati, Ohio, facility directly to points outside the State of Ohio. Accordingly, I find as Respondent admits that at all times material herein Respondent is and has been an em- ployer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act en- gaged in commerce and in operations affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I further find as Respondent admits that the following named persons were employed by Respondent and are and have been agents of Respondent acting on its behalf and supervi- sors within the meaning of Section 2(1 1) of the Act, as fol- lows: Warner Baker, plant manager, and Lawrence A. Razete, president. II. THE ALL.EGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTI(CES A. The Affidavit of Leon Franklin Snow During the course of the hearing General Counsel offered in evidence the affidavit of Snow, dated October 23, 1978. which had been taken during the course of the investigation of Snow's unfair labor practice charge by an attorney em- ployed by the Region. Over Respondent's objection I re- ceived the affidavit in evidence, despite my reluctance to give the affidavit much, if any, weight. In doing so I re- jected General Counsel's argument that the affidavit fell within the hearsay exception for dying declarations set forth in rule 804(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence or other exceptions provided in rule 804(b)(5) despite the fact that because of Snow's death the underlying conditions therein had been met, to wit, that the affidavit was offered as evidence of a material fact, that the affidavit was more probative of certain facts than other evidence available to General Counsel, and that the interests of justice might best be served by admission of the affidavit in evidence despite the fact that Respondent had no opportunity to cross-exam- ine Snow. However, I was most concerned that the affidavit did not have any circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness re- quired by rule 804(b)(5), and my concern continues unabat- ed. Snow's affidavit is not a statement against interest, the truth of which is implied by a person's normal conduct in not falsifying facts which would have exposed him to pecu- 34 CUSTOM COATED PRODUCTS niary, proprietary, or criminal liability. It is not made by a person who believes he is dying, and thus would be truthful because the statement would not make any difference to him in any event. It is not akin to a statement of personal or family history, which inherently has a ring of truth about it. And it is not testimony given at a hearing or a deposition, where the party against whom it is offered had an opportu- nity to develop the truth of such testimony by extensive cross-examination. Rather, Snow's affidavit is little more than a statement of his position during the early stages of an investigation as to whether a complaint should issue on the underlying unfair labor practice charge at a point where there may not have been full ascertainment of all the facts involved in the pro- ceeding. Clearly, Respondent had no opportunity to cross- examine Snow and to fully develop the truth of his allega- tions.2 Nonetheless, numerous Board cases instruct that the affidavit of a deceased party or witness may be admitted into evidence provided, however, that the statements therein are considered only with the utmost care and cau- tion and closest scrutiny, and that weight may be given to them only when they are wholly corroborated by clear and convincing testimony of other witnesses or documentary evidence. See, e.g., Calandra Photo, Inc. and Irvin C. Levin, its Agent and Member of its Board of Directors, 151 NLRB 660, 667 fn. 23, 671 fn. 29 (1965); Baker Manufacturing Co., Inc., 218 NLRB 1295, 1296 fn. 3 (1975); Canterbury Gar- dens and Manchester Gardens, Inc., 238 NLRB 864 (1978), slip op., JD. Page 4 (1978). In reviewing the affidavit of Snow and limiting it by General Counsel's letter to Respon- dent giving notice of the purpose for which he intended to introduce the affidavit, I find that the affidavit is of little aid in resolving the issues heard by me. Accordingly, I have not considered the same, especially because most of Snow's statements were not corroborated by the witnesses appear- ing at the hearing and because I find it unnecessary to re- solve the issues herein by reference to his affidavit. B. The Discharge of Snow That Snow was discharged on October 12, 1978, in viola- tion of the Act is not difficult to resolve. Razete testified that he discharged Snow for the following two reasons: (I) for circulating rumors about Respondent's intention to close its plant and transfer its operations to Florida; and (2) for objecting and causing other people to object to the way Respondent handled its profit-sharing plan, to wit, that there was a I-year waiting period in order to become eligi- ble to participate in the plan. In particular, Razete noted that there was unrest among those of Respondent's employ- ees who had been employed for less than I year but no unrest among the older employees. 2 The General Counsel gave Respondent notice pursuant to rule 804(bX5) that he intended to offer the affidavit in evidence to show that: lA)t the time Snow] was discharged plant manager Warner Baker said in substance that Snow was being let go because he was disrupting the smooth running of the Company and because he had been "fooling around" with the Union. Snow also stated that for several weeks prior to his discharge Respondent's employees had discussed the possibility of a union coming into the plant, the employee's union sympathies, and the working conditions and management attitude at the plant. Profit-sharing plans have long been held to be a manda- torn subject of bargaining, N.L.R.B. v. Black-Clawson Com- pan)', 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954); J. P. Stevens & Co.. Inc., 239 NLRB 738 (1978); and it is gainsaid that the qualifica- tions for Respondent's profit-sharing plan constitutes a term and condition of employment which is of vital impor- tance to Respondent's employees. Snow's objections to the eligibility qualifications of that plan, his circulation of such objections, and his attempt to gather support from his fel- low employees to make changes in that plan are patently concerted and protected activities for which he may not be disciplined in any manner. Once protected and concerted activities are found to be a basis for Respondent's actions, albeit not the sole basis for the Respondent's actions, Re- spondent shall be held to have violated Section 8(a)(l ) of the Act: and I so find.' I do not wholly credit Razete's other reason for terminat- ing Snow; but, in the circumstances of this proceeding, I find that if Snow were spreading rumors that too is pro- tected activity. There is no doubt that rumors of the sale or closing of the plant were being spread about, and that Razete complained of them on October 13, the day after Snow's discharge, and attempted to dispel them. It is al- ways difficult to isolate the origin of a rumor, but it appears that on or about September I Baker, according to the testi- mony of employee Frank Mudd, told Mudd and Snow that he had heard rumors that the employees were going to walk out over a pay raise, and that Baker said that before there was to be any dissension Razete would close the doors and let everybody go. Upon being shown the investigatory affi- davit that he had previously signed Mudd corrected his tes- timony, stating that Baker had made reference to union organization and had further stated that before Razete al- lowed a union to come into the plant he would close the doors. Mudd further testified that both he and Snow replied that they were not interested in a union and that a union wuld not help to solve their problems. Baker asked them if they had heard any complaints and what the dissension was about. Snow and Mudd said that they had not heard of any problems. to which Baker replied that if they did they should let him know. Baker denied that he had made any threat to close Respondent's premises and relocate the plant in Florida if a union represented Respondent's employees. The record is otherwise barren of any proof of how the "rumor" originated, and I find it reasonable to conclude the "rumor" started with Baker's threat to thwart and discour- age the suspected union activities, whatever they were, of Respondent's employees. By so finding I credit Mudd and discredit the denials of Baker, who as one of Respondent's principal supervisors, had an interest in the outcome of the instant proceeding, and did not deny Newton's testimony that several days before Snow was discharged Baker ac- knowledged that he had heard "something about a union" and advised employees not to select a certain local to repre- I recognize that a number of circuit courts of appeal have been critical of the Board's rule. See, e.g., N. LR.B. v. Eastern Smelting and Refining Corp., 598 F.2d 666 (Ist Cir. 1979). In view of my disposition of this case that the other reason for Snow's discharge was also in violation of the Act there is no question that. "but for" Respondent's violations Snow would not have been discharged 35 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sent them.4 On the other hand. Mudd testified at the hear- ing most reluctantly under subpena and under the threat, he stated, of his having a court order against him if he did not appear. Although his recollection needed to be re- freshed by being shown his investigatory affidavit it ap- peared that he was completely neutral and was attempting to tell the truth as best as he recalled at the time of the hearing. Indeed, if he favored anybody, he indicated his desire that the unfair labor practice complaint not be pro- cessed because Snow was dead and nobody had anything to gain. Finally, if the rumor of plant closure did not originate with Baker's threat I find it most unlikely that Snow, or any other employees, would spread a rumor about the plant closing when it obviously did no good for the employees and for Snow in particular to do so. Baker testified that he had heard rumors that if the union5 came back Razete would move to Florida. If Snow was not trying to organize the employees it is highly improbable that he would spread this rumor, for there was seemingly no cause to do so. Cer- tainly, it would not promote his complaint about the I-year eligibility provision of the profit-sharing plan. If he was try- ing to promote the union and nothing had been said by Baker the worst possible method to build support among the employees would be to scare them with the threat of a plant closure and move if he was successful in his efforts. I conclude, therefore, that Baker must have been the instiga- tor of the "rumor" if "rumor" rather than threat it be, and that if Snow spread the "rumor" he did so only to inform the employees that concerted activities through union or- ganization would be fruitless because of Baker's threat. Of course, there is no evidence herein, perhaps because of Snow's death, that Snow was in fact attempting to encour- age any employee to join a union, but that is not of particu- lar relevance. What is important is what Respondent thought Snow was attempting to do. By Baker's own admis- sion, employees seemed to be drawn to Snow for his aid, assistance, and advice. Snow became the focal point for group conversations and meetings of two or three employ- ees during work periods and lunchbreaks. Whereas before the employees were, according to Baker, "merry," the gen- eral mood of the plant changed when the meetings with Snow and Mudd commenced-the employees became "un- happy," were kept "in turmoil," and became "agitated," not only about the rumor of the sale or closing of the busi- ness but also about working conditions. The "agitation" and "turmoil" were never defined, but it seems that what ' I recognize that Newton conceded the truth of a statement contained in his investigatory affidavit that none of Respondent's officials (including Ba- ker) had said anything about a union. I also note that in his affidavit Newton stated that he did not know whether any of Respondent's officials knew about union discussions among employees during the summer and fall of 1978, yet at the hearing Newton could not recall whether this was true. Despite my reservations about these apparent contradictions and reserva- tions I nonetheless credit Newton's clear and direct testimony about Baker's meeting with members of the mixing department because of Baker's total silence on the point. 5 The union was never identified but presumably was the same one which had peitioned for an election in 1977. An election was held on September 9, 1977, and the employees rejected the union's attempt to represent them. It is unclear whether the union was the same as the local that Baker told mixing department employees would represent only truckdnvers. Baker was actually complaining about was that the employ- ees were no longer complacent about the terms and condi- tions of employment but became more serious about their lot, actually going so far as to converse about changes and resolving their problems, which Respondent's management attempted to keep in tow at monthly meetings it held with its employees, by collective action through a union. In sum, Snow was disciplined because of his attempt not only to create employee interest in the revision of the profit- sharing plan but also to engage in union activities, at least so Respondent thought. Razete attempted to conceal this latter reason when he explained to Mudd on October 13 that Snow was fired because of his misuse of a hammer to change a piece of equipment rather than using a brass pin. That reason was not stated by Razete at the hearing. The shift in Respondent's position lends strong support to a holding that Respondent was discriminatorily motivated in its discharge of Snow. See N.L.R.B. v. Tekner-Apex Com- pany, 468 F.2d 692 (Ist Cir. 1972): Central Cartage, Inc., 236 NLRB 1232 (1978): The Dalton Company, Inc., 109 NLRB 1228 (1954). As a result I find that Snow's discharge violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Assuming, arguendo, that there were no evidence of Re- spondent's discriminatory motivation herein, nonetheless, in those circumstances Snow's spreading of a "rumor" is still protected under Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The fact that the rumor may not have been true does not alter this conclusion. Snow was relating only Baker's position of what Razete would do if a union organized Respondent's em- ployees. If that threat was untrue Respondent cannot utilize its untruthfulness, which it alone created, to justify Snow's discharge. In these circumstances Snow's comments do not lose any protection afforded by the Act. Indeed, his state- ment represented a legitimate concern with what would happen to his and other employees' jobs if there were any further efforts to organize the employees and to seek the aid and protection of a labor organization to do so. Because I find that there was a primafacie ground for Snow's state- ments, that his spreading of the "rumor" was in good faith (or at least not proven to be in bad faith), and because I find that there has been no showing that his statements were deliberately or maliciously false Snow's activities are protected. Furthermore, I do not find that the statements were so "defamatory or opprobrious as to isolate the allega- tion from the related protected activity." See Ben Pekin Corporation, 181 NLRB 1025 (1970). It follows from the above findings that the General Counsel has proved certain of its allegations of violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Baker, under the impression, mistaken or otherwise, that there was union activity solic- ited from Snow and Mudd the complaints of other employ- ees in an attempt to ascertain its cause. Such probing tends to have a coercive effect upon employees and violates the Act, ITT Automotive Electrical Products Division, 231 NLRB 878 (1977);6 and impliedly promised to correct the 6 In the circumstances of this case, I fail to understand General Counsel's alternate allegation that Baker coercively interrogated Snow and Mudd about their protected concerted activities. If Baker learned that the employ- ees were going to cease working because of their complaint that they were being underpaid he would have been entitled to ask them about their com- plaints and attempt to resolve them to avert a walkout. The employees' 36 CUSTOM COATED PRODUCTS grievances in order to discourage the union activities. The threat that Razete would close the plant and move to Flor- ida if the union was designated as the representative of Re- spondent's employees was similarly violative of the Act. In- deed, it seemed highly successful in dissuading employees' support of any labor organization. However, General Counsel did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence. or indeed by any evidence at all, that Snow was informed of his discharge because of his protected and concerted or union activities. Although there is a statement that he was told by Baker at the time of his discharge that he had been "fooling around with the Union," Baker denied that state- ment, and because of my refusal to consider the affidavit lacking clear and most convincing and strong corrobora- tion, of which there is none, I refuse to credit Snow's affida- vit. III. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section II11, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed in section , above, have a close, intimate, and sub- stantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burden- ing and obstructing commerce and the free flow of com- merce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Custom Coated Products, Inc., is and has been at all material times an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By coercively interrogating employees concerning the reasons of other employees for engaging in union activities under circumstances which tend to coerce them in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act, by soliciting grievances in order to discourage union activities, and by threatening to close Respondent's plant and move to Florida if a labor organization was selected by its employ- ees to represent them Respondent has committed unfair la- bor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( 1) of the Act. 3. By discharging employee Leon Franklin Snow and failing and refusing to reinstate him to his former position of employment because Snow engaged in union activities, or supported a union, engaged in protected concerted ac- tivities and in order to discourage employees from engaging in union activities or supporting a union Respondent has committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. 4. These unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Except as otherwise found herein Respondent has not violated the Act in the respects alleged in the complaint. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of protected and concerted activities often seek the very result which the com- plaint herein seems to condemn. Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom. Because Snow is deceased I shall order that his estate' be made whole for the backpay Snow lost from October 12, 1978, to December 10, 1978, the date of his death, backpay to be computed n a quarterly basis as set forth in F. W. Woolworth Compa., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). with interest thereon computed as described in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977).8 Because Snow was discharged because of his alleged union activities I shall further order that Respondent cease and desist from in any other manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER9 The Respondent, Custom Coated Products, Inc., Cincin- nati, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning the reasons of other employees for engaging in union activities or supporting a union under circumstances which tend to coerce them in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under Section 7 of the Act. (b) Soliciting grievances of employees in order to dis- courage their union activities. (c) Threatening that Respondent's plant would close and be moved to Florida if Respondent's employees selected a union to represent them. (c) Discharging employees and refusing to reinstate them because they engage in union activities, or support a union, and because they engage in concerted activities for protest- ing matters concerning their wages, hours of work, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed under Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Make whole the estate of Leon Franklin Snow in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy" for any loss of earnings Snow may have suffered from the date of his discharge until the date of his death by reason of the discrimination against him. (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to ascertain the backpay due under the terms of this Order. ' Florida Medical Center, Inc., d/b/a Lauderdale Lakes General Hospiral, 239 NLRB 895 (1978). ' See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 9 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 37 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Post at its place of business copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'" Immediately upon receipt of said notice, on forms to be provided by the Regional Direc- tor of Region 9, Respondent shall cause the copies to be signed by one of its authorized representatives and be 10 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." posted, the posted copies to be maintained for a period of 60 consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customar- ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other than those found herein. 38