Stoughton Trailers, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stoughton Trailers, Inc. and Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors, Cannery, Dairy Employees and Helpers Union Local No. 695, affili- ated with the International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Eugene Foster. Cases 30-CA-4031 and 30-CA-4803 September 24, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND TRUESDALE On June 20, 1979, Administrative Law Judge J. Pargen Robertson issued the attached Decision and Supplemental Decision in this proceeding. There- after, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief in opposition to Respondent's exceptions and in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision and Supplemental Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision and Supplemental Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Admin- istrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. The Administrative Law Judge recommended, in- ter alia, that Respondent be ordered to pay hospital and medical expenses incurred by Foster covered un- der the employee group hospital insurance policy maintained by Respondent since February 28, 1977. Respondent contends that these expenses have been paid by its workmen's compensation carrier. While the record indicates that some payments concerning Foster's job-related injury have been made by Re- spondent's carrier, it is not clear whether these pay- ments include all relevant hospital and medical ex- penses. Accordingly, we shall modify the I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad- ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 The Administrative Law Judge properly discredited Plant Engineer Ingles' testimony that his remarks regarding discriminatee Foster's setback of Ingles' career referred to Foster's claim for workmen's compensation and not to Foster's union activities. Accordingly. we find it unnecessary to rely upon the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of protected nature of an employee's pursuit of workmen's compensation claims. Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order to require payment of these expenses to the extent they have not been paid previously by Respondent's work- men's compensation carrier.' In his notice the Administrative Law Judge uses the broad cease-and-desist language, "in any other manner" but inadvertently omits this language from his recommended Order. We have considered this case in light of the standards set forth in Hickmott Foods, Inc.,4 and we conclude, in agreement with the Administrative Law Judge, that a broad remedial or- der is appropriate. We shall modify the recommended Order accordingly. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified be- low, and hereby orders that Respondent, Stoughton Trailers, Inc., Stoughton, Wisconsin, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modi- fied: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph I: "I. Pay to dischargee Eugene Foster, as net back- pay, $6,665.64, with interest computed thereon in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) (see, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962)); plus hospital and medical expenses incurred by Foster covered un- der the employee group hospital insurance policy maintained by Respondent since February 28, 1977, to the extent that said expenses have not been paid previously by Respondent's workmen's compensation carrier, minus employee contributions Foster should have made if he had continued under the policy; plus Foster's entitlement under Respondent's profit-shar- ing and pension plans in the amounts of $703.55 and $458.17, respectively. The computations of the back- pay findings are included on Appendix A, attached." 2. Add the following as paragraph 2(c): "(c) In any other manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act." I In his recommended Order the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently misstated the total amount of backpay, which was computed correctly in the Appendix attached to his Decision. The correct amount is $6,665.64. '242 NLRB 1357 (1979). DECISION AND SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE J. PARGEN ROBERTSON, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me on March 12, 1979, in Madison, 245 NLRB No. 10 190 STOUGHTON TRAILERS, INC. Wisconsin. The issues were raised in a backpay specifica- tion which issued on November 9. 1978 (Case 30-CA 4031), a complaint which issued on September 20, 1978 (Case 30-CA-4803), and an order consolidating cases which issued on November 9, 1978. The backpay specifica- tion followed the Board's Decision on March 7, 1978, find- ing that Stoughton Trailers, Inc. (herein called Respon- dent), violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging employee Eugene Foster.' The Board directed Respondent to reinstate Foster with backpay and interest for lost earnings since his discharge. Foster was discharged on February 28, 1977. On Decem- ber 23, 1977, Respondent offered Foster reinstatement. Fos- ter returned to work for Respondent on January 3, 1978. General Counsel contends Foster was not properly reinstat- ed in accordance with the Board Order. The complaint (Case 30-CA-4803) stems from a charge filed by Foster on July 26, 1978, and alleges that Foster was constructively discharged on May 30, 1978, in violation of Section 8(aX1), (3), and (4) of the Act. The complaint also alleges Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by telling Fos- ter to seek employment elsewhere. General Counsel contends that since Foster was never properly reinstated, his backpay should run from February 28, 1977, to August 7, 1978,2 but that the action alleged in Case 30-CA-4803 warrants additional remedy for the 8(a)(l), (3), and (4) violations. General Counsel contends, in the alternative, that should I find that Foster was properly reinstated, the subsequent constructive discharge allegation would justify a remedy including backpay from May 30, 1978, to August 7, 1978. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to file briefs. Briefs, which have been care- fully considered, were filed on behalf of General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record' and from my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 1. COMMERCE Respondent admitted and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors, Cannery, Dairy Employees and Helpers Union Local No. 695, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. is a labor organization as defined in the Act. 1 234 NLRB 1203, enfd. (7th Cir.) October 16, 1978. 2 General Counsel does not contend Foster is entitled to backpay beyond August 7, 1978. Foster declined an August 7 offer of reinstatement. 'Including amendments to the backpay specifications made at the hear- ing. ill. BACKGROUND On November 10, 1977, Administrative Law Judge George Norman issued his Decision' in Case 30-CA-4031. By that decision Respondent was required, inter alia, to: Offer to Eugene Foster immediate and full reinstate- ment to his former job, or if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without preju- dice to his seniority or other rights and privileges and make him whole in the manner set forth in the Section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." Pursuant to a December 23, 1977, letter offering rein- statement, Eugene Foster reported for work on January 3, 1978. Foster was approached by his supervisor, Gordy Hubred. Hubred told Foster there were some ill feelings and "that if anything would come up to where it would be in reference to dirty jobs or messy jobs, that they would be handed to [Foster]."' Later that day Foster was called into Plant Engineer Thomas Ingels' office. According to Foster. Ingles told him "that any jobs or any projects to go on or to be done, I would have to come and see him prior to going out and doing it and when I was finished with it that I was to report to him that I had completed said job." Foster testified that from January 3, during his remaining tenure at Respondent, he followed Ingels' directions and reported upon the completion of each job. Foster said that procedure differed from the supervision he received prior to his Febru- ary 28, 1977, discharge, when he simply worked from a posted list of jobs without reporting the completion of one job and receiving the assignment of another directly from a supervisor. According to Foster, the new (January 3) proce- dure resulted in his reporting to Ingels or Hubred on a daily basis.6 Prior to his February 28 discharge Foster was covered by Respondent's employees health insurance policy. Upon his return, no one mentioned health insurance to Foster, and he was not reinstated to coverage under the policy. Addi- tionally, General Counsel contends Foster was not properly reinstated, since he was not afforded the wage increase specified under the contract for maintenance beginning February 1978. Foster was injured at work on March 6, 1978. The injury resulted in surgery in mid-April. Foster was fully released by his physician on May 26, and he reported back to work on May 30, 1978. Due to a letter form their workmen's compensation insurance carrier Respondent mistakenly be- lieved Foster was returning to work on light-duty release. Shortly after Foster appeared for work on May 30, he was called into Plant Manager Gietzel's office, where he was confronted with Ingels, Hubred, and Gietzel. According to Foster, the meeting started with Ingels telling him that he ' Affirmed by the Board on March 7, 1978 (234 NLRB 1203), end. (7th Cir.) October 16, 1978. I1 discredit Hubred's denial of this conversation. Hubred's testimony clearly demonstrated that he could not distinguish the January 3 conversa- tion from a conversation with Foster when Foster returned to work on May 30 following an injury. 6 Ingles denied giving Foster specific directions on January 3. However, he did not deny that Foster reported directly to him or Hubred on each occa- sion a job was completed. Foster impressed me as the more candid and straightforward witness. Ingles was evasive on cross, and I was not impressed with his demeanor. To the extent Ingles' testimony conflicts with Foster's, I credit Foster 191 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (Ingels) was very annoyed with Foster, upset and disgusted with Foster as a person. Ingels referred to Foster's union activities and discharge and said Foster had set his (Ingels') career back 3 years. Ingels admitted at the hearing that he told Foster that because of "these problems" with Foster, Ingels' career had been set back 2 or 3 years. Foster was shown an employee appraisal. Ingels commented on several of the poor-performance items reflected on the appraisal and said that as far as he was concerned, "Foster could go out and sit on his tool box with his finger up his ass; sit there 8 hours a day and so absoutely nothing," and if Fos- ter moved from the area, he could not leave without being accompanied by Ingels or Hubred.7 The employee appraisal included the following comment: From the period of his return to the day of injury, Foster was careful to appear interested and busy. From the time before his dismissal he seemed to have lost much of what he had learned. Jobs that in the past were easy seem to have been forgotten. He was unable to wire a 3 phase elec motor. He had considerable time installing a tail pipe and muffler. It later fell off. Other minor poor jobs were attempted and completed less less [sic] than satisfactory manner. Foster testified that Ingles told him, "I wished, Gene, that you would seek other employment at this time." Foster resigned near the conclusion of the meeting, stating that because of the pressures and restrictions, he felt Respon- dent was not living up to the requirement of the law to be fully reinstated without restrictions, and he could not work under those conditions.' IV. CONCLUSIONS A. Foster's Reinstatement Based upon the entire record, I am convinced that Foster was not properly reinstated in accordance with the Board's Order. I find that upon his return on January 3, 1978, Fos- ter was told that he could expect the dirtiest jobs and that he would work under direct supervision. Thereafter, unlike the working conditions prior to his unlawful discharge, Fos- ter was required to, and did in fact, report to supervision upon the completion of each job. I find that Foster was not paid in accordance with his status as a maintenance man from February 1978, when he was not granted a 13-cent increase to $5.25 per hour under the collective-bargaining agreements Also, Foster was not afforded an opportunity to resume coverage under Respondent's health insurance program for its employees even though he was covered by the program prior to his February 28, 1977, discharge. Re- spondent's treatment of Foster following his return demon- strated noncompliance with the Board Order. For example, 7 Plant Manager Gietzel admitted that Ingles told Foster that he wanted to know of Foster's activities all of the time. I credit Foster's version of the May 30 meeting in Gietzel's office. Giet- zel's tetinony regarding that meeting was limited to answers to leading questions. Gietzel did not testify as to his general recollection of what oc- cured. As stated above, I do not credit Ingles or Hubred. ' Respondent stipulated that Foster continued to earn $5.12 per hour after February. the employee appraisal given Foster on May 30 stated that 'from the time before his dismissal he seemed to have lost much of what he had learned," even though Foster was considered a valuable employee by Respondent prior to his discharge.'0 Also, Respondent opposed Foster's receipt of workmen's compensation benefits even though it is uncon- tested that he was injured on the job. Respondent offered no evidence that it contested the benefits for nondiscrimina- tory reasons. Plant Manager Gietzel admitted that Ingels told Foster on May 30 that he wanted to know Foster's activities all of the time.' Therefore, I find that Foster's reemployment does not constitute full reinstatement within the meaning of the Act or the Board's Order.' 2 B. The Constructive Discharge Foster told Respondent he was resigning because of the pressures and restrictions imposed following his reinstate- ment. In view of my finding above that those pressures and restrictions violated the Board's Order, Foster's resignation for that reason constitutes a constructive discharge in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act. Further, in view of Re- spondent's continued animus toward Foster as expressed in Ingles' conversations of January 3 and May 30 and Hub- red's conversation of January 3, plus the unexplained oppo- sition Respondent offered to Foster's receipt of workmen's compensation benefits.'3 I find that Respondent pursued its discriminatory practices against Foster because of his union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3). I also find that Ingles' May 30 request that Foster find other employment violates Section 8(a)(1) in view of the total context of the conversation. C. Backpay Specifications In view of my conclusions above, I have determined that Foster's backpay was not tolled by his January 3, 1978, reemployment. Therefore, I shall now consider General Counsel's backpay specification for the entire February 28, 1977-August 7, 1978, period. In its backpay specification, General Counsel alleged: 1. An appropriate measure of the hours the discrim- inatee would have worked is the average weekly hours worked by the discriminating during the course of his employment by Respondent during the months imme- diately prior to his discharge, all as computed and set forth in Appendix A, attached hereto and made a part thereof. o 234 NLRB 1203. supra. " Respondent offered no explanation of why Ingels found it necessary to be aware of Foster's activities all of the time after Foster returned from injury. "Padre Dodge, 189 NLRB 378, 388 fn. 1 (1971); Ace Tank and Heater, Co., 167 NLRB 663 (1967); Cone Brothers Contracting Company, 158 NLRB 186 (1966); Luhr Jensen & Sons, 177 NLRB 475 (1969). 'l Ingels testified that when he commented to Foster on May 30 that "these problems with [Foster] had set his llngels'] career back two or three years," he was referring to Foster's claim for workmen's compensation and not to Foster's union activities. I do not credit Ingels. However, if he did scold Foster for pursuing his workmen's compensation, that too would be a violation, since Foster's action would be protected concerted activity. A Ilelu- ia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 NLRB 999 (1975); Self Cycle & Marine Disributor Co., Inc., 237 NLRB 75 (1978). 192 STOUGHTON TRAILERS, INC. 2. The quarterly gross backpay for the discriminatee was determined by multiplying the average weekly wage times the number of applicable weeks during the quarter in which the discriminatee is entitled to back- pay, all as computed and set forth in Appendix A. attached hereto, and made a part hereof. 3. Calendar quarter net backpay due the discrimi- natee is the difference between calendar quarter gross backpay and calendar quarter net interim earnings, all as computed and set forth in Appendix A. 4. Total net backpay due the discriminatee is the sum of the calendar quarter amounts of net backpay due him, plus accrued contributions to the profit shar- ing trust and the pension plan for the periods Decem- ber 31, 1974, through August. 1978. 5. (a) Eugene Foster's backpay period runs from February 28, 1977, through August 7, 1978. (b) Excepted Periods: (i) September 13 to November 2. 1977, strike activity (ii) January 20-23, 1978, injured (iii) May 18 to 30, 1978, medical reasons (c) Expenses: Interim expenses deducted from interim earnings: (i) Travel by automobile while seeking interim em- ployment and commuting to and from interim em- ployment in the Madison, Wisconsin metropolitan area during 1977. at 10 cents per mile: Quarter 11 (amended at the hearing from $10.50 for 105 miles to $90.50); Quarter III, 748 miles: and Quarter IV, 100 miles. (ii) Unreimbursed medical expenses, $24. 6. Summarizing the facts and conclusions specified above, the obligation of the Respondent to make whole Eugene Foster under the Board Order will be dis- charged by payment to him in the amount of $6,318.36 '4 plus interest accrued to the date of payment pursuant to such Order, including any and all accruals to the profit sharing and pension fund from 1974 through August, 1978, minus the tax withholding re- quired by Federal and State laws. APPENDIX "A"' STOUGHTON TRAILERS, INC. Case No. 30-CA- 4031 COMPUTA TION OF A VERA GE HOURS. 36 regu- lar hours plus 1.5 hours overtime equals 37.5 average hours per week. COMPUTA TION OFA VERA GE WEEKL Y WAGE. The average weekly wage was determined by multi- plying the hourly contract rates times the average weekly hours as follows: Contract rate $4.92 at termination through 9/30/77 times Average Hours (37.5) equals $184.50, average weekly wage. 14 As reflected in backpay specifications prior to amendment at the hearing General Counsel, in its brief, computed the total figure to be 6.424.25. However. I compute the total figure to he $6.665.64. i As amended at the hearing. Contract rate $5.12 effective October, 1977, times Average Hours (37.5) equals $192, average weekly wage. Contract rae $5.25 effective February, 1978, times Average Hours (37.5) equals $196.88. average weekly wage. Contract rate $5.38 effective June, 1978, times Aver- age Hours (37.5) equals $201.75. average weekly wage. (COMPUTA TIOV OF BA CKPA Y ElICF GC. FXcER Yr.'/ rlo. Gross Qtt. Wks. tlackpay 1977 1 4.0 $ 738 II 13.0 2,398.5 III 11.0 2,029.5 IV 8.0 1,536 1978 1 II III Adjusted Interim Gross Otrly. Earrn n s Fxjenss Eackpay Ttals ,620 mil. $ 90.50* 598 med. 24.00 rml. 138.60 300 10.00 5 738 869* 1,594.10- 1,246 $44,447.10' 243.34** 966.45 1,008.75 2,218.54'* TrAL [lIE $6,665.64** 50 $, 50 3.6 691.20 5.0 984.38** 1,432.24 0.4 78.75 4.4 887.70 5.0 1,008.75 * As per ,y camutations following the General Counsel's aendments at the hearing, changing mileage expenses for 1977, quarter II, from $10.50 to $90.50. *As per my coirputations following the General Counsel's amencdments at the hearing, changing the nunmer of weeks from 7.0 to 5.0 under 1978, quarter I (wage rate of $5.12 per hour, multiplied by 37.5 hours, per week for weeks. Respondent filed an answer and an amended answer to backpay specifications. Respondent answered allegations in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the backpay specification as follows: Admits the manner of computation, but denies the amounts set forth in Appendix A and all other allega- tions of paragraphs 2 & 3 As to paragraph I, Respondent admitted "that the method of computation is appropriate, but [denied] the hours computed and set forth in Appendix A and all other allegations of paragraph I." As to paragraphs 4, 5, and 6. Respondent answered with a simple denial. At the hearing the parties stipulated to the following: 1. Foster's wages were $4.91 per hour on February 28. 1977. 2. Foster's wages were $5.12 per hour from January 3 to May 30, 1978. 3. At material times Foster was employed in the unit included in the collective-bargaining contract in the job classification "maintenance." 4. Foster declined Respondent's August 7. 1978. re- instatement offer. 5. Foster's March 6. 1978, injury on the job resulted in the following medical bills: Madison General Hos- pital. $853.45; Bone & Joint Surgery Associates, $45; Carter & Logan, $7: Madison Anesthesiologists, $1 17; Drs. Schammel & Hill, $56. 193 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6. The period September 13 November 2. 1977, is an excepted period. 7. Appendix "A" figures for 1977 are accurate, com- plete, and correct. 8. Foster's timecards in evidence show the weeks he actually worked in 1978. 9. Foster's total interim earnings (excluding work- men's compensation benefits) for the January 1-May 30. 1978, period were his earnings from Respondent in the amount of $1.432.24. I find that the specifications for the year 1977 are correct in view of the pleadings and the parties' stipulation that the 1977 figures on appendix A of the backpay specification are correct. Also, I find that General Counsel's "computation of average hours" of 37.5 average hours per week is correct in view of Respondent's answer and amended answer to backpay specifications and the stipulations." On the basis of the collective-bargaining agreement and the parties' stipulation that Foster was covered by that agreement under the classification "maintenance," I find Foster's backpay entitlement for 1978 should be based on the following wage rates per hour: January 1-31, 1978 February -May 31, 1978 June I-August 7, 1978 $5.12 $5.25 $5.38 I find, in accord with the parties' stipulation, that Foster actually earned $5.12 per hour during the January 3-May 30, 1978, employment with Respondent. I have determined from an examination of Foster's timecards that he worked 3 weeks 3 days (3.6 weeks) during January 1978 and 5 weeks during February and March 1978. 1 find Foster was avail- able to work 2 days (0.4 weeks) in May and 4 weeks 2 days (4.4 weeks) in June 1978 and available to work 4 weeks I day (4.2 weeks) in July and 4 days (0.8 weeks) in August 1978, until he declined reinstatement following Respon- dent's August 7 offer. By failing to reinstate Foster to its employee group health insurance policy upon his reemployment on January 3, 1978, Respondent failed to comply with the Board's Or- der.7 I find Respondent must reimburse Foster to the ex- tent he would have been entitled to recover medical ex- penses under the policy minus the total premium contributions he would have made if covered.s Addition- ally, I find on the basis of the pleadings and the entire record that Foster is entitled to reimbursement of $703.55 under Respondent's profit-sharing plan and $458.17 under Respondent's pension plan. Respondent has failed to establish any errors in the com- putations of the specifications. Consequently, Respondent is ' Respondent argued that Foster's backpay entitlement should not be based on the computed average hours per week if that average exceeded the time actually worked while employed by Respondent, but should instead be based on time actually worked. Since Respondent did not raise this conten- tion in its answer or amended answer, I am precluded by Sec. 102.54(b) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended, from considering the contention. Airports Service Lines, Inc., 231 NLRB 1272 (1977). 7 Ace Tank and Heater Co.. 167 NLRB 663 (1967). 5t Employee contributions to the health insurance premiums were. at times material, $23.74 per month. liable for the amount of backpay specifications' including hospital and medical expenses and pension and profit-shar- ing funds. CON(ClUSIO)NS OFI LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2). (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen, Milk Processors. Cannery. Dairy Employees and Helpers Union Local No. 695, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By asking its employee to seek employment elsewhere atter placing restrictions on his work and expressing annoy- ance with his past practices, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)( ) of the Act. 4. By constructively discharging its employee Eugene Foster, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(i). (3). and (4) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. TIlE REMt:I)Y Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair la- bor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (4) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative actions de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER20 The Respondent, Stoughton Trailers, Inc.. Stoughton. Wisconsin. its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Pay to dischargee Eugene Foster, as net backpay. $6,666.64, with interest computed thereupon in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977); plus hospital and medical expenses incurred by Fos- ter covered under the employee group hospital insurance v9 Although the General Counsel amended the backpay specifications at the hearing. he did not amend the computations which necessarily flowed from his amendments, noting, however, that the amendments would affect those final computations. My findings are derived from my own calculations based upon the amended specifications, and they differ somewhat from the calculations expressed in General Counsel's brief. 20 In the event no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the findings, conclusions. and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted bE the Board and become its findings. conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 194 STOlUGHTON TRAILERS INC policy maintained by Respondent since February 28, 1977, minus employee contributions Foster should have made if he had continued under the policy; plus Foster's entitle- ment under Respondent's profit-sharing and pension plans in the amounts of $703.55 and $458.17. respectively. The computations of the backpay findings are included on Ap- pendix A. 2. Cease and desist from: (a) Constructively discharging its employees because of the employees' union activities or concerted activities or because the employees gave testimony under the National Labor Relations Act. (b) Interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employ- ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by telling them to seek employment elsewhere after imposing working conditions on its employee in violation of a Board Order. 3. Take the following affirmative action-' which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Madison, Wisconsin, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix B."2 Copies of said no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 30. after being duly signed by Respondent's represent- ative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said no- tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate- rial. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 30. in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 21 In view of the parties' stipulation that Foster declined Respondent's August 7 1978. offer of reinstatement I have not included a directive that Foster be offered reinstatement. n In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX A Wks. Total Wage Gross Interin Yr. Qtr. Avail. trs. Rate tack±al Earnins 1977 1 4.0 150 $4.92 S 738 2 13.0 487.5 4.92 2,398.50 $1,620 3 11.0 412.5 4.92 2,029.50 598 4 8.0 300 5.12 1,536 300 1978 1 3.6 135 5.12 691.20 5.0 187.5 5.25 984.38 1,432.24 2 0.4 15 5.25 78.75 4.4 165 5.38 887.70 3 5.0 187.5 5.38 1,008.75 £x- Net penses Ba ckpay $ 738 $90.50 869 162.60 1,594.10 10.00 1,246.00 243.34 966.45 1,008.75 71TAL NPT7 BAQ<PAY $6,665.64 APPENDIX B NOTI(E It) EMPI.OYEFS POSTED) BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAI. LABOR REI.ATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL. NO] interfere with, restrain. or coerce our employees by telling them to seek employment else- where after attempting to force their resignation by imposing working conditions in violation of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board. WE WVLI.. NOT attempt to force our employees to re- sign their employment because our employees engage in union activities on behalf of Drivers, Salesmen, Warehousemen. Milk Processors, Cannery. Dairy Em- ployees and Helpers Union Local No. 695. affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. or any' other labor organization, or because they give testimony under the National Labor Relations Act or because they' engage in concerted, protected activities. WE HAVE offered full reinstatement to Eugene Foster to his former job. and WE wi.t. pay Eugene Foster the amount of his loss of earnings, with appropriate inter- est, which resulted from our discriminatory action against him. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of' the National Labor Relations Act. SrouGlT-oN TRAILIERS, IN(C. 195