Davis Motor Co., Inc.

DAVIS MOTOR COMPANY, INC. 125 September 28 were seen from about 10: 30 in the morning to 3 in the afternoon. At this store the picket line was out in front of the ship- ping entrance "a good 20 feet." Delivery, which normally makes pickups from the stores at regularly scheduled intervals, picked up some packages although its service was definitely curtailed during the period of the dispute. At Meigs the sign carried by the picket at first charged Meigs with having been unfair to the Respondent; about 1 hour later this sign was revised to conform to the placards borne at the other stores which indicated that Delivery Company was unfair to the Respondent. In our opinion, the foregoing uncontroverted evidence in the record in this case reasonably leads to the inference, and we find, that the picketing at the three stores involved was not picketing of the primary employer under the criteria of the Sailors' Union case. The Board concludes that the picketing was not strictly limited to times when the trucks of Delivery were located on the store premises nor to times when the primary employer, Delivery, was engaged in its normal business at the stores. The picketing, although irregular, did occur for relatively long periods of time and was not related or limited to the arrival and departure of Delivery's trucks which ran on a defi- nitely curtailed schedule during the period of the dispute. Nor was the picketing limited to places reasonably close to the location of Delivery's trucks-the pickets patrolled along the sidewalk curb on two sides of one of the stores and at another were at least 20 feet out in front of the entrance. Furthermore, at least in one instance, the placard borne by a picket stated that the Respondent's dispute was with the secondary employer. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the Decision and Order of August 31, 1949, without modification. MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above Supplemental Decision. DAVIS MOTOR COMPANY, INC. and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, LOCAL LODGE No. 778, AFL, AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, OVER-TIIE-ROAD AND CITY TRANSFER DRIVERS, HELPERS, DOCKMEN AND WAREHOUSEMEN, LOCAL No. 41, AFL, JOINTLY, PETITIONER . Case No. 17-RC-1093. November 27, 1951 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Margaret L. Fassig, 97 NLRB No. 22. 126 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Employer at present has a contract-apparently identical to those of other individual motor car dealers in the Kansas City area- with the International Union, United Automobile Workers of Amer- ica, AFL, covering "service and parts department employees, includ- ing any full-time garage employees, and excluding office clerical em- ployees, automobile and truck salesmen, outside parts salesmen, serv- ice salesmen, control tower operators, testers, supervisors, and any part-time garage employees." This contract is dated June 30, 1950,- at a time when the contracting union was in compliance-has a 2-year term, and contains the following union-security provision under which, at the time of the hearing, no union-authorization election had been held pursuant to Section 9 (e) of the Act :1 Membership in the Union shall be a condition of employment of each employee thirty (30) days after the date of his first employ- ment or thirty (30) days after the effective date of this clause, whichever is the later, provided, however, that this clause shall not take effect until such time as the appropriate provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, have been fully com- plied with. The UAW-AFL was allowed to intervene at the hearing on the basis of this contract. It urges the contract as a bar to the petition herein, which was filed July 2, 1951, and requests the employees in the con- tract unit. The Petitioners, on the other hand, urge that the contract is not a bar because of the presence of the "unauthorized" union- security provision quoted above, which they contend has been enforced. In view of the congressional policy expressed by the recent amend- ment to the Act 2 deleting those portions of Section 9 (e) which for- merly required Board-conducted elections authorizing unions to enter 1 It was stipulated by the parties that, in a unit of somewhat different description, the UAW had previously been certified on July 2, 1948, as authorized to enter into a union- security agreement with this Employer (Case No. 17-UA-965 ). Evidence -was conflicting as to whether the union-security provision of the current contract was being enforced. 2 Public Law No 189, 82nd Congress , 1st Sess., Sec. ( c) (Oct. 22, 1951). KIMEL SHOE COMPANY 127 into union-security agreements with employers, the Petitioners' con- tract bar contention has become without merit.' We find that the existing contract between the Employer and UAW-AFL is a bar to the petition herein. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition' Order IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed by the International As- sociation of Machinists, Local Lodge No. 778, AFL, and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Over-the-Road and City Transfer Drivers, Helpers, Dockmen and Warehousemen, Local No. 41, AFL, jointly, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 3 We distinguish those cases where we have held that contracts with unauthorized union-security provisions which the parties sought to correct or suspend after the filing of a representation petition are no bar to a determination of representatives . BrodAead- Garrett Co , 96 NLRB 669 ; Allen Wales Adding Machine Dii.tision of the National Cash Register Company, 94 NLRB 1288 ; Wettlauffer Manufacturing Corporation, 89 NLRB 696. 4 In view of the fact that the proviso contained in the union-security clause effectively defers application of the clause , Member Reynolds finds that the existing contract between the Employer and the UAW-AFL constitutes a bar to this proceeding. He therefore considers it unnecessary to pass upon the effect of the recent amendment to the Act upon the contract bar issue KIMEL SHOE COMPANY, PETITIONER and UNITED SHOE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO. Case No. f1-RM-178. November 97, 1951 Decision and Direction of Election Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before George H. O'Brien, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent employees of the Employer. 3. The Employer, the Petitioner herein, seeks a determination of the bargaining representative of production and maintenance em- ployees at its Los Angeles, California, shoe manufacturing plant. The Union moves to dismiss the petition, contending that it has ex- pressly disclaimed all interest in the employees covered by the petition and that a question concerning representation therefore does not exist. The pertinent facts relative to the instant petition and the Union's alleged disclaimer are as follows : 97 NLRB No. 14.