Avco Manufacturing Corp.

AVCO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION 645 Avco MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, NEW IDEA DIVISION 1 and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER . Case No. 8-RC-136. December 27,1951 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Phillip Fusco, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from preju- dicial error and are hereby affirmed. -Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reason : The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of all production and main- tenance employees at the Employer's Coldwater, Ohio, plant, where, with approximately 1,250 employees, the Employer manufactures farm implements. The Employer and Federal Labor Union No. 24395, AFL, herein called the Intervenor, oppose the petition on the ground of contract bar. Collective bargaining at this plant dates back to 1943. For several years the Intervenor has represented all the employees now sought by the Petitioner. Following a Board election, the Intervenor was certi- fied as exclusive representative on August 4,1950; it also won a union- security election on October 27, 1950. The current contract between the Intervenor and the Employer, here urged as a bar, was executed on November 16, 1950, for a 2-year period, effective from September 16,1950. It contained a union-security clause which made union mem- bership a condition of employment, but did not allow any of the old employees the 30-day period within which to join the Intervenor, re- quired by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. On June 28, 1951, the Inter- venor and the Employer executed a supplement to this contract, in which the union-security clause was rewritten to extend the grace period to all employees. On behalf of the Intervenor, the supplement was signed by its international representative and 3 members of its 10-man bargaining committee. The petition was thereafter filed on July 20, 1951. i The Employer's name appears as amended at the hearing. 97 NLRB No. 91. 986209-52-vol. 97-42 646 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The Petitioner's attack upon the contract as a bar to this proceeding is twofold. It argues that, as the original union-security clause was unlawful, the contract could not be cured-for representation proceed- ing purposes-by any subsequent modification. It then contends that in any event the supplement never became an effective part of the con- tract, because not all the members of the bargaining committee negoti- ated and signed it and because it was never ratified by the membership. - We agree with the Petitioner's assertion that the original union- security clause exceeded the limitations contained in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act and was therefore unlawful? We do not agree, however, that a contract admittedly lawful on -its face cannot operate as a bar merely because of the ineffectiveness for bar purposes of a preceding contract between the same parties.3 In effect, the Petitioner is asking the Board to find, in an investigation of representatives, that the earlier contract illegally coerced the employees and thereby tainted the current agreement .4 But, in the absence of any charges and a consequent complaint issued by the General Counsel, the Board may not make any unfair labor practice findings. Indeed, the Board has consistently ruled that-evidence of unfair labor practices is inadmis- sible in representation proceedings.5 In contending that the supplement was invalidly executed, the Petitioner relies on the fact that, whereas the original agreement was signed by a bargaining committee of 10 employees, the supplement was negotiated and signed by only 3 .11 It also points out that there was no ratification by the union members. Neither the contract nor the Intervenor's constitution or bylaws makes the signatures of any or all members of any bargaining committee a requirement for effective execution of the agreement. Similarly, the record contains no evi- dence of any requirement, that the contract be ratified by union mem- bership. In these circumstances, we assume, in accordance with established Board policy, that the signatures affixed on the June 28 supplement were sufficient for the valid execution of the contract and that all essential requirements were met to render the contract binding upon the parties.7 a Cf Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 97 NLRB 536. Pullman-Standard Car Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB No. 2. * Salant & Salant, Incorporated, 87, NLRB 215 c Petitioner also introduced evidence that the employees were not notified of the amend- ment until after the petdtion was filed, contending that the employees were not actually given a 30-day grace period. We view this evidence as irrelevant in determining the single issue here before us. e We also note that three of the six committeemen present at the execution of the supple- mental agreement did not sign because the parties in attendance felt that three signatures were sufficient , and that two other members of the committee had already become members of the Petitioner. 4 Electro Metallurgical Company, 72 NLRB 1396; Montgomery Ward d Go, Incorporated, 68 NLRB 369. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY 647 - We find therefore that the current contract between the Intervenor and the Employer was, at the time of the filing of the petition, entirely lawful on its face. As the petition was filed long before expiration of the contract, the agreement is a bar to this proceeding. Accord- ingly, we shall dismiss the petition. Order IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND COMPANY and Louis J. STANISLOWSE_I, ET AL., PETITIONERS and LOCAL 182, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GRAIN MILLERS, AFL. Case No. 18-RD-59. December 27, 1951 Decision and Direction of Election Upon a decertification petition duly filed, a hearing was held before Clarence A. Meter, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Reynolds, and Styles]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. The Petitioners, employees of the Employer,' assert that the Union is no longer the bargaining representative, as defined in Section 9 (a) of the Act, of the employees designated in the petition.' The Union is a labor organization currently recognized by the Em- ployer as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of the Employer designated in the petition. 3. The Union contends that its existing contract with the Employer, which extends from July 1, 1950, to July 1, 1952, and for yearly periods thereafter, subject to a 60-day automatic renewal clause, constitutes a bar. We do not agree. ' In addition to Stanlslowski , employees Charles O . Anderson and Frank Dolney are Petitioners herein. s At the hearing, a question was raised as to whether the Petitioners are "fronting" for the United Mine Workers, a labor organization not in compliance with the Act . However, Petitioner Stanislowski testified , without contradiction , that he himself secured the signatures on the documents submitted to authorize the petition in this case, and that he had no conversation with any representative of the Mine Workers concerning rep- resentation of employees of the Employer, or the filing of the instant petition . As there is no persuasive evidence to the contrary, we find, on the record now before us, that the Petitioners are not acting as a "front" for a noncomplying union. See Knife River Coal Mining Company, 96 NLRB 1. 97 NLRB No. 94.