Whitinsville Spinning Ring Co.

WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY 801 Local 123 argues that I gave no effect to the International's closed-shop con- tract with NEMI. No effect was needed to be given. Its validity may be con- ceded, but because Dunfield was already affiliated with the international and because the discrimination arose not out of his affiliation therewith but only out of his belonging to Local 85 rather than Local 123, the closed-shop provision of the master agreement does not affect the issues here. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY and UNITED STEELWORKERS or AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 1-CA-9. 8. December 99, 1951 Decision and Order On July 26, 1951, Trial Examiner Reeves R. Hilton issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Interme- diate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommen- dations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and modifications : 2 1. We find, in agreement with the Trial Examiner, that the Respond- ent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. As found by the Trial Examiner, the Board, on January 30, 1951, conducted an election among the Respondent's production and maintenance employees. The results of that election, as determined by the Board, were 39 ballots cast for the Union, 38 ballots cast against the Union, and 1 ballot void. The latter ballot was marked with an "X" in the "No" square and a single diagonal line, partially erased, in the "Yes" square. On April 4, 1951, the Board certified the Union as the exclu- sive representative of the Respondent's employees. Thereafter, on April 16, 1951, the Respondent refused to recognize, or bargain with, the Union. Its position, as stated at that time and at the hearing, is 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [ Members Houston , Reynolds , and Styles]. I The Intermediate Report contains two misstatements of fact or inadvertences , neither of which affects the Trial Examiner 's ultimate conclusions or our concurrence therein. However, we note the following corrections : ( 1) During 1950, the Respondent purchased raw materials valued in excess of $200 ,000, rathef than in excess of $2,000 ,000 ; and (2) the Respondent filed its exceptions to the Regional Director's report on challenges on February 15, not on February 18. 97 NLRB No. 118. 802 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that the void ballot should have been declared valid and counted as a vote against the Union; that the Union therefore failed to receive a majority of the valid votes cast in the election; and that the Board's decision and certification was arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous. In the representation proceeding,, the Board concluded, on the authority of the Palmetto Cotton Mills case,4 that the ballot in question was void. The Board was there of the opinion that, because of the erasure in the "Yes" square, the ballot was clearly spoiled and muti- lated. We perceive no reason for holding differently at this time. Accordingly, we conclude that the disputed ballot was spoiled and mutilated 5 and, like the Trial Examiner, find that the ballot was void .6 Accordingly, as the disputed ballot is void, we conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that the Union is, and at all times material herein has been, the exclusive representative of the Respondent's production and maintenance employees. Further, by refusing to recognize or bargain with the Union as such representative on April 16, 1951, and thereafter, the Respondent has refused to bargain with the Union in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 2. We also find, in accord with the conclusion of the Trial Exam- iner, that the Respondent further violated Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act by unilaterally granting a wage increase and other benefits to its employees. Such disregard of the Union as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees was per se an unlawful refusal to bargain.' Order Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Whitinsville Spinning Ring Com- pany, Whitinsville, Massachusetts, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to recognize or to bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as the exclusive bargaining represent- ative of all production and maintenance employees and shipping room employees employed at is Whitinsville, Massachusetts, plant, exclu- 8 93 NLRB 1201. 4 Palmetto Cotton Mills, Inc., 63 NLRB 421. 8 Contrary to the Respondent's contention , we find it unnecessary to determine whether the ballot clearly revealed the intent of the voter. Therefore, we do not pass upon the Trial Examiner's conclusions with respect to the impact upon this case of prior Board cases dealing with the intent of the voter. 6 Like the Trial Examiner, we find no merit in the Respondent's further contention that the law of the Commonwealth. of Massachusetts, where this election was conducted, should be followed in determining the validity of the ballot in question . Burlington Mills Corporation, 56 NLRB 365. ' United States Gypsum Company, 94 NLRB 112. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY 803 sive of executives, office employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, working foremen, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Unilaterally granting wage increases, vacation or holiday bene- fits, or any other benefits to its employees. (c) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of United Steelworkers of America, CIO, to negotiate for or to represent the employees in the aforesaid bargaining unit as their exclusive bargain- ing agent. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em- ployees in the aforesaid bargaining unit, and, if an understanding is reached,, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant at Whitinsville, Massachusetts, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report and marked "Appendix A." s Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the First Region, shall, after being duly signed by the,Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent immediately upon re- ceipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region, in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 8 This notice, however, shall be, and it hereby is, amended by striking from line 3 thereof the words, "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner," and substituting in lieu thereof the words, "A Decision and Order." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, there shall be inserted before the words, "A Decision and Order," the words, "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing." Intermediate Report and Recommended Order STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed by United Steelworkers of America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director for the First Region, (Boston. Massachusetts), issued a complaint dated June 11, 1951, against Whitinsville Spinning Ring Company, herein called the Respondent or the Company, alleging that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec- tion 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the com- plaint, with copies of the charge and notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union. The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are herein referred to as the General Counsel ; the National Labor Relations Board as the Board. 804 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The complaint alleges in substance that the Respondent on and after April 16, 1951, refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representa- tive of its employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargain- ing, although the Union, pursuant to an election conducted by the Regional Director, had been duly certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of the employees, and on or about April 23, 1951, bargained directly and indi- vidually with the employees in the appropriate unit and granted wage increases and other benefits to these employees. By reason of these acts the Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. The Respondent on June 21, 1951, duly filed its answer wherein it admitted certain allegations of the complaint but denied the commission. of any unfair labor practices. Affirmatively, the Respondent denies that the Union received a majority of the valid votes cast in, the election and urges that the Board's certification of the Union is arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous, and that by refusing to bargain, with the Union it did not engage in any unfair labor practice. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held at Boston, Massachusetts, on July 2, 1951, before the undersigned duly designated Trial Examiner. All parties were represented by counsel and afforded an opportunity to present evidence upon the issues herein. However, the parties entered into a stipulation with respect to the record and no oral testimony was adduced at the hearing. At the con- clusion of the hearing counsel for the Respondent presented oral argument to the undersigned. The parties were advised of their right to file briefs in this matter and thereafter counsel for the Respondent submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and a brief in support thereof. Upon the entire record in the case, which consists of the pleadings, exhibits, and stipulations of the parties, the undersigned makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The parties stipulated that the Respondent is a Massachusetts corporation and maintains its office and plant at Whitinsville, Massachusetts, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of spinning rings, holders, and other accessories for the textile trade. In its manufacturing operations the Respondent during the year 1950 purchased raw materials, principally steel, valued in excess of $2,000,000, of which approximately 60 percent represents shipments to the Respondent's plant from place outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. During the same period the Respondent manufactured and sold products valued in excess of $500,000, of which about 80 percent represents shipments to customers outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The Respondent does not deny that its operations affect commerce as defined in the Act, and the undersigned finds that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION United Steelworkers of America, CIO, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of the Respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The proceedings and events leading to the refusal to bargain On January 10, 1951,2 the Union filed a petition for certification with the Board' and on January 19, the Company and the Union entered into a written 2 All subsequent dates refer to 1951. 1 Case No. I-BC-2006. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY 805 stipulation , in customary form, providing that an election be conducted under the supervision of the Regional Director among the employees in a unit described as: All production and maintenance and shipping room employees of the Company at its Whitinsville, Massachusetts plant, but excluding executives, office employees , professional employees , watchmen , guards, working foremen and supervisors as defined in the Act. The stipulation further provided for certification of representatives , if appro- priate, by the Board. On January 30 an election by secret ballot was duly held. After the polls had been closed and during the course of the counting of the ballots, the Board agent conducting the election came upon a ballot which he was unable to decide as being either for or against the Union . The Company contended that the ballot should be counted as a vote against the Union , while the latter urged that it was ambiguous and void. The Board agent considered the ballot as a "chal- lenged ballot," although the voter had not in fact been challenged , and impounded the same for future determination , if necessary , by the Regional Director. At the conclusion of the election the Board agent issued a tally of ballots which disclosed that 82 employees were eligible to vote in the election , and that 39 cast ballots in favor of the Union, 38 against it, and 1 challenged ballot. As the challenged ballot was sufficient to affect the result of the election the Regional Director, in accordance with Rules and Regulations of the Board,4 issued his report on challenges, dated February 7, wherein he concluded that the ballot had not been challenged in the course of the election but recommended that it be considered as a void ballot and issued a revised tally of ballots identical to the original tally, except that this ballot was tallied as void rather than challenged. Thereafter, the Company , on February 18, filed exceptions to the report, and the Board , on April 4, entered its decision sustaining the recommendations of the Regional Director and certified the Union as the bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit 6 B. The refusal to bargain The complaint alleges that since April 16, the Company has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of the employees in the unit set forth above. Following the decision and certification issued by the Board , the Union, by letter dated April 12, advised the Company of its certification and requested that a meeting be held on April 17, for the purpose of negotiating an agreement, covering the employees in the bargaining unit, in respect to hours, wages, and conditions of employment. On April 16, the Company informed the Union in writing that it believed the certification to be erroneous and therefore refused to grant recognition until the question had been determined by the courts. The Union thereupon filed the instant charges. C. The Company's contentions The Company contends that the ballot in question should have been considered a valid one and as having been cast against the Union, therefore , the Union failed to receive a majority of the valid votes cast in the election , and that the decision and certification of the Board is arbitrary, capricious, and erroneous. 4 Section 203 61, Series 5, then in effect. 6 93 NLRB 1201. 986209-52-vol 97--52 HOG DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Conclusions in Respect to the Ballot As appears above, there is no question concerning the eligibility of the person casting the ballot to vote in the election, nor the manner in which the issue arose. The ballot used in the election was furnished by the Board and is the standard printed form used in this type of Board-conducted election. The top portion of the ballot contains in large type the full designation of the Board and that the ballot is a secret one to be used by the employees of the Company. The purpose of the election is also set forth thereon. Immediately below the voter is warned : "If you spoil this ballot return it to the Board Agent for a new one." Continuing downward and about the center of the ballot is printed in large type : "Mark an 'X' in the square of your choice." This is followed by the question to be voted upon, namely, "Do you wish to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining by-United Steelworkers of America, CIO?" Below this question are two blank squares, at the top of one the word "Yes" is printed and above the other the word "No." At the bottom of the ballot the voter is cautioned not to sign his name and to fold and drop the ballot in the ballot box. The ballot in question has a clear "X" marked in the "No" square and a diagonal single line, with plain evidence of an erasure, in the "Yes" square. The Company urges that the Board's decision that an erasure in a material part of the ballot constitutes mutilation and renders the ballot void is too broad, if not wholly inapplicable, in this case since the intention of the voter is unmistakably expressed by the clear and appropriate marking in the "No" box. Moreover, the Company argues that this case is distinguishable from Palmetto Cotton Malls, Inc.,' cited by the Board, for there the voter originally marked his ballot for the union but erased the same and placed a mark against the union, while here the voter never completed the mark for the Union and properly marked his choice against it. Further, the Company points out that the Board in previous decisions has established the basic principle that the clear intent of the voter is to be followed in resolving controversies of this character. While the authorities cited by counsel for the Company support the broad principle that under given circumstances the intent of the voter, as reflected on the ballot, is to be accorded weight and consideration, those decisions, discussed below, by reason of factual situations are readily differentiated from the instant case. Thus, in National Kaolin Products Company,' a ballot with an "X" mark slightly above the "Yes" box was held valid and counted as in favor of the union; in Garod Radio Corporation,' a ballot on which was written "C. I. 0." under that union's designation on the ballot instead of the conventional "X" was held valid even though a rival union also appeared on the ballot, and in Marshall, Meadows d Stewart, Inc.,' four ballots were held to be valid and unambiguous where two voters instead of using the "X" mark wrote "Yes" and "No," respec- tively, beside the appropriate squares, another in addition to marking "X" in the "No" square wrote out the word "no" alongside the same square, and one marked his ballot with a triple "X" on the negative side thereof. Again, in Van Raalte Company, Inc.," the Board found a ballot with "no" written in the negative square with a check mark in the same place to be valid. However, on another 6 63 NLRB 421. 173 NLRB 1161. s 32 NLRB 1010. ' 59 NLRB 1286. 10 49 NLRB 985. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY 807 ballot it appeared that the voter made a circular scribbling in the "No" square without any other marking thereon, which ballot the company contended was valid since the intent of the voter to designate "no" was obvious. The Board re- jected this contention and held the ballot invalid since "the ballot suggests that the voter may have started to mark an X on the square and then scratched it out." Of course, it is fundamental that under the Act the Board may determine the question of employee representation by conducting a secret election among the employees involved. However, as the Act is silent as to procedure, the manner in which the election is to be conducted and the rules and regulations for the conduct of the election are within the sound discretion of the Board. (Southern Steamship Co v. N. L. R. B., 316 U. S. 31, 37.) In the light of this power and the Board's policy as expressed in its decisions discussed above, the undersigned concludes that the disputed ballot herein must be considered to be mutilated and void. The Palmetto case, supra, in the opinion of the undersigned, stands for the principle that any erasure upon a material part of the ballot constitutes mutilation and is controlling herein. The other cases, National Kaolin Prod- ucts; Garod Radio; Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, and Van Raalte, supra, lend no support to the Company's contentions in respect to the intention of the in- dividual casting the disputed ballot, for it is significant that in all instances in those cases where intent was inferred from markings on the. ballot the voter has placed his mark or writing on or about one square exclusively, but even so, in the Van Raalte case the voter's scribbling or scratching on only one box was held to render the ballot ambiguous and void. To hold that the circumstances of this case warrant a different conclusion merely because a proper mark placed in one square might reflect the intent of the voter to such a degree so as to require the overlooking of a partially erased line in the other square would- be in direct conflict with the foregoing decisions. Moreover, the Company's argument is bottomed upon the assumption that the voter intended to cast a valid ballot against the Union and, presumably, simply made an honest mistake in marking the same. It can also be argued with equal force that the voter deliberately marked both boxes on the ballot to be facetious or to express his indifference to the result of the election. As evidence of the voter's intention is unavailable the question of his true intent cannot be determined. But apart from the problem of motive or intent it is impractical and unrealistic to say that the mark in the "Yes" box should simply be ignored for such a decision would open the door to all manner of argument, speculation, and conjecture in the counting of the election ballots. Thus, if one erased line can be ignored there is no reason why two or three similar lines, or any other unauthorized mark- ings or hieroglyphics should not be disregarded, provided that one box on the ballot is properly marked. To hold that a voter contrary to specific instructions .and warnings may nevertheless mark his ballot in the manner of his own choos- ing would be to disrupt the orderly method of conducting elections and allow the individual voter to substitute his own rules for the rules of the Board. Obviously, elections could not be effectively held under such conditions. The assertion.that the disputed ballot would have been interpreted as a vote against the Union under various Massachusetts decisions pertaining to political elections is not persuasive. Here the question to be voted upon and the method of voting were plainly stated on the ballot and the voter simply failed or re- fused to follow the instructions. It seems unlikely that the particular voter labored under the misapprehension that the election was being conducted in ac- cordance with State laws or decisions governing local election, especially when it is considered that of the 78 votes cast only 1 was, questioned. This contention is rejected. 808 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The undersigned therefore concludes and finds the disputed ballot to be mu- tilated and void. D. Conclusions as to the appropriate unit, the majority status of the Union, and the refusal to bargain As set forth above, the Company refused to recognize or meet with the Union as the representative of its employees because it contested the validity of the certification issued by the Board. In view of the foregoing conclusions and findings and upon the entire record, the undersigned finds that (1) all production and maintenance employees and shipping ro im employees of the Company employed at its Whitinsville plant, exclusive of executives, office employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, working foremen, and all supervisors as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9.(b) of the Act; (2) on and after April 4, 1951, the Union was and now is, by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment; (3) on April 16, 1951, and at all times there- after, the Respondent refused to recognize or bargain with the Union as the duly designated representative of its employees in an appropriate unit in viola- tion of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act. E. The granting of economic benefits to the employees The complaint alleges, and the Company admits, that on or about April 26, the Company, without consulting or conferring with the Union, addressed individual letters to its employees advising them that it was granting an increase in wages, increasing holiday and vacation benefits, and was considering an in- crease in overtime rates. The Company contends that since it was under no, obligation to recognize or bargain with the Union its action was not in viola- tion of the Act. In view of the foregoing findings of fact to the contrary, the undersigned finds that the Company, by ignoring the Union as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative and by dealing with its employees concern- ing wages and conditions of employment at a time when the Union was attempt-, ing to negotiate with it, thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the Act- (Medo Photo Supply v. N L. R. B., 321 U. S. 678, 683-684; Great Southern Truck- mg Company v. N. L. R. B., 127 F. 2d 180, 186 (C. A. 4).) IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in Section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which the undersigned finds will effectuate the policies of the Act. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY 809 Having found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, the undersigned will recommend that the Respondent upon request bargain collectively with the Union . Having also found that the Company unilaterally granted economic benefits directly to its employees , without consulting with the Union, the undersigned will recommend that the Company in the future refrain from acting unilaterally in connection with rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment, and other conditions of employment. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. United Steelworkers of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees and shipping room employees of the Company employed at its Whitinsville plant, exclusive of executives, office employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, working foremen, and all supervisors as defined in Section 2 (11) of the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. The disputed ballot cast in the election conducted by the Board on January 30, 1951, among the employees in the above unit, is mutilated, therefore void, and excluded from the computation of the valid ballots cast in said election. 4. On April 4, 1951, United Steelworkers of America, CIO, was, and at all times since has been, and now is, the representative of a majority of the Respondent's employees it the appropriate unit described above for the purposes of collective bargaining "within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 5. By refusing on April 16, 1951, and at all times thereafter, to bargain col- lectively with United Steelworkers of America, CIO, as the exclusive representa- tive of all its employees in the appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 6. By unilaterally granting, about April 26, 1951, economic benefits directly to its employees the Respondent has failed and refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appro- priate unit and has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 7. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. The Respondent's Proposed Findings and Conclusions The Respondent submitted to the undersigned proposed findings of fact and conclusions of-law to the effect that the disputed ballot was a valid "No" vote and as the Union failed to receive a majority of the votes cast in the election it is not the representative of the employees in the unit, hence by refusing to recognize or bargain collectively with it the Company has not engaged in any unfair labor practices. These findings and conclusions, being contrary to those set forth above, are rejected. The Company also proposed a finding and con- 810 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD elusion to the effect that its position in respect to the disputed ballot was first raised at the time of the counting of the ballots and that it has maintained that position at all times thereafter. The Company's contentions are detailed above, so it is unnecessary to make the specific finding or conclusion requested. [Recommended Order omitted from publication in this volume.] Appendix A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bar- gaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees and shipping room em- ployees at our Whitinsville plant, exclusive of executives, office em- ployees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, working foremen and all supervisors as defined in the Act. We WILL NOT in the future unilaterally act on wage increases, vacation or, holiday benefits, or overtime rates, or any other terms or conditions of employment affecting our employees in the bargaining unit described herein, without prior consultation with the above named union. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above-named union to bargain with us, or refuse to bargain collectively with said union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit set forth above. WHITINSVILLE SPINNING RING COMPANY, Employer. By ------------------------------------------- Dated -------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF A1lfER- ICA1 CIO. Case No. 10-CA-1042 . December 99,1951 Decision and Order On August 9, 1951, Trial Examiner Allen MacCulleh issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, a copy of which is attached, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint and recommending that the 97 NLRB No. 112. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY 811 complaint be dismissed in its entirety. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report together with a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, with the following additions and modifications : Unlike the Trial Examiner, we find that the incident involving the interrogation of Campbell by his supervisor, Blackledge, concern- ing employee Tweed's attitude toward the Union, and the subsequent interrogation of Tweed by Campbell at Blackledge's request, violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.2 However, we do not deem this isolated incident, standing alone and unrelated to any other antiunion conduct of the Respondent, enough to warrant the issuance of a remedial order. We will therefore as recommended by the Trial Examiner, dismiss the complaint in its entirety. Order Upon the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that complaint issued herein against American Thread Company, Bristol, Tennessee, be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its' entirety. 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [ Chairman Herzog and Members Reynolds and Styles]. 2 See Syracuse Foundry, Inc., 97 NLRB 402. Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge filed May 16, 1950, by Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the,National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director of the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued a complaint dated May 29, 1951, against American Thread Company, Bristol, Tennessee, herein called Respondent, alleging that Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hearing were duly served upon the Respondent and the Union. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleged in substance that in the months of January, February, and March 1950, Respondent kept under surveillance union meetings and activities of employees, interrogated its 1 The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are referred to herein as the General Counsel . The National Labor Relations Board is herein called the Board. 0 812 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD employees concerning their union-membership activities and sympathies, and threatened to effect economic and other reprisals against its employees if they joined or supported the Union. The complaint charged that by the above con- duct Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. In its duly filed answer, Respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce rs defined by the Act, but denies that it has committed any unfair labor practices as alleged in the complaint. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on June 21 and 22, 1951, at Bristol, Tennessee, before Allen MacCullen, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly desig- nated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel and the Union was represented by its agent, and all parties participated in the hearing. Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded to all parties. At the conclusion of General Counsel's case, Respondent moved to strike from paragraph IV of the complaint, alleging surveillance of union meetings, the name of J. C. Collins, for the reason that General Counsel had failed to establish that Collins was an officer, agent, or supervisor of the Respondent. General Counsel consented to the motion, and it was granted. Rulings were reserved on Respondent's motions made at the conclusion of the hearing to dismiss the charges of surveillance of union meetings and to-dismiss the entire complaint. These motions are disposed of by the findings hereinafter made. The Trial Examiner granted a motion by General Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof as to dates, spelling, and minor variances. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were afforded an opportunity to make oral arguments and to file briefs, proposed findings of fact, and conclusions of law. Oral arguments were made by the General Counsel and by Respondent. Briefs have been filed by General Counsel and by Respondent and have been care- fully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF'THE RESPONDENT The American Thread Company is now, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, a corporation organized under, and existing by virtue of, the laws of the State of New Jersey, with its principal office and place of business in the State of New Jersey, and is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribu- tion of cotton thread and combed cotton yarns. Respondent owns and operates plants in the States of Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, including a plant at Bristol, Tennessee, herein called"the Bristol plant, which is operated as a finishing plant for industrial sew- ing threads and knitting yarns. Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations during the past year, which period is representative of all times material herein, purchased materials for the Bristol plant valued in excess of $1,000,000, 100 percent of which, in value, originated outside the State of Tennessee. During the same period, Respondent, at the Bristol plant, manufactured and sold finished products valued in excess of $1,000,000, more than 90 percent of which, in value, was sold and shipped to customers outside the State of Tennessee The Trial Examiner finds that Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY 813 II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America, CIO is a labor organization as defined by Section 2 ( 5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 1. Alleged surveillance of union meetings Angus Glenn Jones testified credibly that he attended the first meeting held by the Union in its offices in the King Building ; that on his way to the meeting about 6 p. in . he. saw Harold Blackledge, overseer of dyeing and bleaching at Respondent's mill , and Dean Derey , supervisor of packing , shipping, and rug yarn =department in the mill , standing talking with several , other employees of Respondent at the corner of Fifth and State Streets , on the opposite side of the street from the Union's offices ; that he went into the meeting and came out later and saw the same group in Nidiffer's sporting goods store across the street from the Union hall. Ray J. Simerly testified credibly that while on the way to one - of the Union meetings, he could not recall which meeting, he saw Derey, together with Charles Eyler and Max Poore, supervisors employed by Respondent , standing at the corner of Fifth and State Streets , on the opposite side of the street from the Union's offices . This was about 6 p. in. On cross-examination , Simerly was asked if he had ever seen any of the supervisors in the same vicinity, at other times and replied , "I imagine you can see them most any time after they get off'." Blackledge testified credibly that he had seen circulars distributed by the Union at the mill, which circulars, among other things, stated that union meetings would be held every Wednesday at 12: 30 and 6 p. in. Blackledge further testified credibly as follows : N He could not recall any particular occasion when he, with other supervisors, were gathered at the corner of Fifth and State Streets as testified by Jones and Simerly, but that possibly they were there as they frequently went to a sporting goods store, which was owned and operated by Fred Nidiffer , assistant superintendent for Respondent, and his brother, to talk about fishing, in which he and some of the other supervisors were interested ; that he also went to the barber shop in the same block , and that he frequently parked his automobile in this block when he attended the theater across from the King Building. Derey, Eyler, and Poore all testified credibly that they were frequently in this same vicinity, with other supervisors ; that Nidiffer's store was the usual Iheeting place of the supervisors when they were off duty ; that when walking in this vicinity they would frequently see some of Respondent's employees on the street. There also was testimony that the supervisors . patronized the barber shop, the drug store, the Y. M. C. A. Building, and the Elks Club all in this immediate vicinity. The Union's office in Bristol, where the meetings were held, was located in the King Building on Fifth Street, about half way between State and Shelby Streets. Fifth Street is a one way street and considerable traffic moves over this street. Automobile parking is permitted on one side of the street immedi- ately in front of the King Building. In the same block is located the Y. M. C. A. building, a restaurant, a motion picture theater , two laundries , a real estate and finance office, a barber shop, the Masonic Building, a drug store, and Nidiffer's sporting goods store. , The testimony, clearly establishes - and the 814 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Trial Examiner finds that this was a very busy block and was frequented by Respondent's employees , including the supervisors. Blackledge and the other supervisors all denied that they had ever observed any of Respondent's employees going in and out of the Union 's office, and also denied that they ever went to this location to observe the employees who at- tended the union meetings. The testimony of Blackledge and the supervisors was convincing and is credited. General Counsel contends that the questioning of employees by Blackledge after they attended union meetings is persuasive evidence of illegal surveillance, and cites Macon Textile, Inc, 80 NLRB 1525. The weakness of General Counsel's position, however, lies in the fact that the evidence does not -support his state- ment that Respondent questioned the employees immediately after they at- tended the meeting , as General Counsel contends . Of the 12 or 15 employees who attended the first meeting of the Union, which General Counsel contends was observed by Respondent's supervisors, General Counsel called only 4 of these employees to the witness stand, and their testimony was not that they were questioned by Blackledge immediately after the meeting, as General Counsel contends, but that it was several days to 2 weeks after the meeting they attended. The other 8 to 11 employees who attended the first meeting were not called as witnesses. Blackledge testified credibly that it was his practice to talk with his em- ployees from time to time as to their work, and although there were approxi- mately 70 employees working under the supervision of Blackledge, none of these employees were called to rebut the testimony of Blackledge. Assuming arguendo that Blackledge did talk to the four employees who testified because Blackledge had knowledge they attended union meetings, as General Counsel contends, this does not prove that Blackledge obtained such information by surveillance of the union meeting. From all of the testimony , it is•more reasonable to assume that Blackledge obtained his knowledge , if in fact he had any, from conversations of the employees . General Counsel produced J. C. Collins, maintenance man employed by Respondent , who testified credibly that he parked his automobile on Fifth Street, near the King Building, on the occasion of at least 2 union meetings , and that he saw the eniployees going to the meeting ; and that the next day at the mill he said to these employees that he had seen them going into the meeting. Collins denied that he ever informed any of the supervisors the names of the employees who attended the meetings, but that the supervisors were in the vicinity at the times he talked to the other employees and may have heard his remarks to them. The evidence offered by General Counsel is not convincing that Respondent's supervisors went to Fifth Street on the night of the first union meeting for the purpose of surveillance. In the first place there is no evidence that Respondent had any knowledge at this time that there was to be a union meeting that night; and in the second place the evidence does not tend to show .that the supervisors on the night in question acted in such a manner as to raise even a suspicion of surveillance. Blackledge admitted that he had knowledge of the union activities , and that the employees were meeting on Wednesdays . He said be obtained this informa- tion from circulars distributed at the mill by representatives of the Unien. Blackledge was not asked when he obtained this information , before or after the first meeting. Jones was asked how the first meeting of the employees was called, and replied that letters were sent to the employees, or employees were contacted by the Union's representatives . Jones was then asked if leaflets were distributed at the mill, and replied : "After the first meeting they did , I know. AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY 815 I don't remember. I believe they give some before. I am not certain about that." [Emphasis supplied ] Such evidence does not establish that Blackledge had knowledge prior to the first meeting that the employees were having a union meeting. It is somewhat significant that if, as General Counsel contends, Respondent was interested in obtaining information as to the employees attending union meetings, that it was only at the first meeting that any of Respondent's super- visors were observed on Fifth Street. The testimony of the witnesses placed some of the supervisors at the corner of Fifth and State Street engaged in conversation. This was just prior to 6 o'clock when the meeting was to start. They were on the other side of the street from the King Building and about half a- block away. If the supervisors were there for the purpose of surveillance, it is strange that some of them did not go to the other corner of the block to observe employees coming from that direction. Jones, who apparently was somewhat suspicious of the presence of the super- visors, testified that after observing the supervisors at the corner, he went into the meeting, and then left and returned to the street, and that the supervisors were then in Nidiffer's store. Simerly, the only other witness who observed the supervisors, said they were standing at the corner of Fifth and State Streets, on the opposite side of the street from the King Building, and that they were talking. Jones' testimony corroborates the testimony of the supervisors that they frequently gathered at Nidiffer's store after work, and fully explains their presence on Fifth Street that night. There is nothing in the Act which requires Respondent's supervisors or agents to avoid public streets or places where they customarily go which may be con- tiguous to the meeting place selected by the Union or the employees to hold meetings.' General Counsel has cited the case of N. L. R. B. v. Vermont Ameri- can Furniture Corporation, 182 F. 2d (C. A. 2) enforcing 82 NLRB 408, where the Court said "Their simultaneous presence in the neighborhood of the Union meeting seems to have had no real excuse and we think was justifiably held to have constituted an unfair labor practice. It is hard to imagine that these men just happened to meet at that place at the same time and that their object was not to discover what employees were active in the Union, rather than to enjoy each other's society." This case is not in point. The supervisors did not just happen to meet at this place, but their presence there was fully and satisfactorily explained. The Trial Examiner finds that General Counsel has failed to sustain the burden of proving that Respondent engaged in any act of surveillance of the union meeting3 and activities of the employees as alleged in the complaint, and it will be recommended that the allegations of Paragraph IV of the complaint be dismissed 3 2. Alleged interference, restraint, and coercion Paragraph V of the complaint alleges that Blackledge interrogated employees concerning their union membership, activities and sympathies. In support of this charge, General Counsel offered the following testimony : Charles Gentry, one of the employees, testified credibly that 3 or 4 weeks after he attended the first union meeting, he went to Blackledge's office and asked Blackledge some questions about the Union; Gentry could not recall the exact conversation, but testified he asked Blackledge "how it would be under 2 General Motors Corp., 73 NLRB 76, 87. Stokely Foods, Inc., 91 NLRB 1267; Salant d Salant, Inc., 92 NLRB 417. 816 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a union" ; that he could not recall Blackledge's reply. General Counsel then asked Gentry : Q. Did he say it would be good or bad or indifferent? A. I would say. indifferent. Dana Campbell testified that sometime in 1950, he could not recall the day or month, he went to Blackledge's office and asked Blackledge "did he think the Union would come in there." Blackledge replied "personally I don't think it will." Campbell was uncertain as to the conversation he had with Blackledge after htat. He gave the following testimony : Q. What did you say? A. Well, I don't know; I don't know just what I talked about from there but I went in to see, just asked him that. Q. Was anyone else in the office? A. No, sir. Q. Did you tell Mr. Blackledge anything at all about how you felt about about a union? A. I told him I was again a union. Q. Did Mr. Blackledge ask you about anybody else? A. No, sir. Q. How long did this conversation last? A. Well I don't know exactly ; about 15 or 20 minutes, something like that ; I don't know positively. Q. What all did you talk about? A. I don't know ; that's been so long ; I just can't say 4ecause I don't know ; I mean I walked over and I just went in his office and talked to him a little bit ; I can't say for I don't recall. Q. What? A. I don't recall just what was said after that and I can't say. Q. Do you recall whether Mr. Blackledge asked you if you knew whether many were not joining the union or who were not for the union? A. Yes, he asked me if many had went down to the union or not or along that line ; I can't say exactly because it has been so long, I don't know for sure. Q. During this conservation did Mr. Blackledge ask you to find out about any particular persons? A. I don't know it has been so long; yes, he asked we to see if Harley Tweed, how he felt about the union, something like that ; that's been a long time; I don't know just the exact words. Campbell was then asked by the Trial Examiner if he talked to Tweed, and he replied : When he come into work I went back and talked to him and asked what he thought ; he said he wasn't aiming or said he didn't think he would fool with the union ; that is what he told. On cross-examination, Campbell said that he had heard about the union meetings, but that he did not go to any of them ; that when he asked Blackledge if he thought the mill would be organized, Blackledge replied "Personally him- self he didn't think it would but he didn't know." Campbell also testified that Blackledge did not ask him if he had attended any of the union meetings. When asked as to what Blackledge said about Tweed, Campbell replied `lie asked if I didn't care to talk to him and see how he felt about it and I did." Harley Tweed testified that he attended one union meeting; that he was never called into Blackledge's office either before or after he attended the meeting ; AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY 817 that Campbell came to him sometime after he attended the meeting and said:- "Mr. Blackledge said for me to ask you if you joined the union." That he asked Campbell "What did he want to know that for," but he did not tell Campbell that he had or had not joined the Union. Blackledge gave the following credible testimony : That Campbell came to his office one day and asked him if he thought the Union would get into the plant, and he replied "in my opinion I did not think a union would." Campbell then said there was a "lot of talk, disturbance and a ailed up feeling in the dye house" and he-told Campbell "well, you do not have to worry about a union" ; that Campbell then told him, Blackledge, that he would not work under a union, that he had worked somewhere else under a union and did not like it, and that if the union came in he would not work there ; that he then said to Campbell "I believe that's what is bothering Harley Tweed too," and he asked Campbell if he would talk to Tweed and see if that was what was "bothering him" ; that a week or two later Campbell told Blackledge "that Harley Tweed wasn't worried about the union." The testimony of both Gentry and Campbell make it clear that they sought out and questioned Blackledge, and that Blackledge did not interrogate them. There was nothing in the conversation between Gentry and Blackledge that warrants any finding of interrogation by Blackledge. General Counsel in his brief has apparently abandoned this testimony. There is little, if any, conflict in the testimony of Campbell and Blackledge as to the conversation concerning Tweed. It is clear from Campbell's testimony that he was worried about the Union organizing the employees. After assuring Campbell that in Blackledge's opinion, Campbell had no reason to worry about the organization, Blackledge asked Campbell, according to Campbell's testimony, to talk to Tweed and see "how he felt about the Union." Campbell was rather uncertain as to just what Blackledge did say. Blackledge testified that after talking to Campbell, he said to Campbell "I believe that's what is bothering Harley Tweed too," and then asked Campbell to talk to Tweed. It is not clear just how Tweed's name came to Blackledge's mind, but if Union organization was bothering Tweed, and Blackledge had observed that something was wrong with Tweed, Blackledge's request to Campbell to talk to Tweed, and in effect reassure Tweed was not interrogation, and Blackledge was clearly acting within his rights. Campbell's testimony that Blackledge asked him "if any had went down to the union or not," which statement was not denied by Blackledge, might well have been part of the general conversation as to the extent of the organizational activities. Blackledge did not ask Campbell the names of the employees attending meetings, but merely how many employees attended the meetings." In his brief, General Counsel urges that the questioning by Blackledge of the four employees after the employees had attended union meetings "was clearly calculated to imply that union activities were considered by management as dissatisfaction with employment " The Trial Examiner cannot agree with this conclusion. In the first place, this questioning by Blackledge did not occur ima edicatelp after the meetings were held as urged by General Counsel, but from several days to 2 weeks thereafter. In the next place, Blackledge testified, * The testimony discloses that there were 12 to 15 employees Present at the first meeting, and thereafter the attendance gradually fell off until the fifth meeting attended by Jones, when Jones and 3 women employees were all that were present. If Blackledee had any knowledge of this, and it is reasonable to assume that he did, his remark to Campbell may well have been not an inquiry as to the number attending, but rather to direct Campbell's attention to the apparent lack of interest of the employees as evidenced by the number attending the meeting, and in support of Blackledge's assumption that the Union would not succeed in organizing the employees. 818 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD .without contradiction, that he made it a general practice to question all of the employees from time to time as to their work, etc., and finally there was nothing in any of the questions from which the employee could reasonably infer that Blackledge had any knowledge that the employee had attended a union meeting. The fact that the employee may have recently attended a union meeting and therefore had a guilty conscience at the time, is not sufficient to warrant a finding that such questioning by Blackledge was improper. There was nothing threatening or coercive in any of Blackledge's statements to the employees. General Counsel has also argued in his brief that supervisor Shaw inter- rogated Jones concerning the latter's union affiliation and activities. As there is no charge in the complaint that Shaw interrogated any of the employees, it is unnecessary to give further consideration to General Counsel's contention that Shaw interrogated any of the employees. Paragraph VI of the complaint alleged that Blackledge and Shaw threatened to effect economic and other reprisals against Respondent's employees if they joined or supported the Union. In support of this charge, General Counsel offered the following testimony : Ray J. Simerly, employed by Respondent from July 1949 to February 1950, when he resigned, testified that about a week after he attented a union meeting, Blackledge called him into the office and said "I had made some mistakes and my work was unsatisfactory and he was putting me on trial and the next mistakes was made he was going to let me go and he said the work was coming from union mills, that was why we was having plenty of work and if the union was organized at this plant our work would leave this plant." On cross-examination, Simerly was asked to repeat the latter part of the alleged statement by Black- ledge, and testified : "He said if this mill organized the work would leave this plant and go back to union mills." Blackledge testified that he was in the office when Simerly came in with a. sample of material he was dyeing to match the color with the standard ; that he, Blackledge found that something was wrong with the color and sent Simerly back to get the formula and the chart from the machine ; that the chart disclosed Simerly had not run the set according to the way the formula instructed ; after questioning Simerly, the latter admitted that he had run the set wrong and said it would not happen again. Blackledge denied that in the above conversation, or in any other conversation with Simerly, he made any mention of the Union organizing the Bristol mill. Simerly did not deny that he was careless or negligent in his work, or that the reprimand by Blackledge was not fully warranted. It is clear from the testimony that Blackledge did not call Simerly to his office, as Simerly testified. Simerly- went to Blackledge's office in the usual routine of his work to check a sample of the work he was dyeing with the standard kept in the office. It appears very improbable that while reprimanding an employee and warning him that if there was a repetition of the mistake he would be discharged, Blackledge would make the statement attributed to him by Simerly. Simerly's testimony was not im- pressive The statement which he attributes to Blackledge was not reasonable- if the Bristol mill was organized, why would work be taken from that mill and; sent to another union mill? Blackledge's denial of any such conversation ap- pears to be reasonable and logical, and is credited. Jones testified that sometime after he had attended either the second or the third union meeting, Supervisor D. C. Shaw came to him and said that Black- ledge had heard that he had been in other departments talking to the em- ployees about the Union; that he denied being in the other departments but told Shaw he had met other employees in the hall while they were smoking AMERICAN THREAD COMPANY 819, and had asked their opinion about the Union ; that Shaw then said that someone had informed Blackledge that Jones would lie on a truck in front of his machine. Jones admitted that he did lie on a truck in front of his machine after he got the machine, running, that he could watch the steam gauge and take care of the machine. Jones further testified that Shaw continued the conversation further and asked Jones what he thought about the Union, and he told Shaw that the reason he wanted a Union was job security ; and that Shaw then left him with the statement "this may mean your job." Shaw testified that he had three separate conversations with Jones con- cerning the above matters The first was sometime early in 1950 when Jones came to him and asked him what he thought about the Union , and he told Jones that he had nothing against the Union but he did not think they needed it in their department . Shaw said that Jones continued the conversation and seemed to think the Union would give him job security ; but that he, Shaw, had nothing further to say as he knew nothing about the Union . The con- versation then ended . Shaw denied that he ever asked Jones for his opinion of the Union. Shaw further testified that at some other time supervisors from other depart- ments complained to Blackledge that Jones was going into their departments; that Blackledge directed Shaw to tell all employees under him they were not to leave their work and go to other departments unless directed to do so by the supervisor , and that he gave this order to all of the employees under him, including Jones. Shaw also testified that in another conversation with Jones, he reprimanded him for lying down on a truck in front of his machine while at work , and told Jones it was not right and had to be stopped . Shaw could not recollect the exact time or the order of the conversations , but testified that they were all separate. Shaw denied that any mention was made of the Union in either of the conversations he had with Jones about leaving the department or lying on a truck. Shaw denied he made the statement to Jones "this may mean your job" in any conversation he ever had with Jones. Blackledge testified he received complaints from two of his supervisors that employees from other departments were coming in to their departments and interfering with the work of their employees , and he gave Shaw instructions that none of the employees working under Shaw were to leave the department during working hours unless given permission by Shaw. Blackledge further testified that at another time Eastman , the superintendent of the mill, reported to him that he, Eastman , had seen Jones lying on a truck in front of his machine , and that he directed Shaw to tell Jones that he was not to lie down on a truck while he was supposed to be working , and that if Shaw found Jones or any other employee lying down on a truck during working hours, he, Shaw, was to discharge that employee. - Jones' testimony that in one long conversation, Shaw reprimanded him for visiting with employees in other departments, reprimanded him for lying on a truck , and in the same conversation discussed the union with him seems to be somewhat improbable Had Jones testified that following the conversation about visiting other departments to discuss the Union , Shaw had questioned him about the Union, it would have been more logical . Although Shaw denied making the statement to Jones "this may mean your job," it seems probable, in view of Blackledge 's instructions to Shaw, that after reprimanding Jones for lying on a truck , Shaw may have made some statement that if it happened again it would mean his job. In an effort to connect that statement up with the conversation concerning the Union , Jones made the mistake of trying to 820 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD connect all three conversations. Jones' testimony in this respect is not con- vincing and is not credited . The testimony of Shaw and Blackledge appears to be more probable and is , credited. For the reasons stated, the Trial Examiner finds that General Counsel has not sustained the burden of proving, first, that Respondent, acting through Blackledge, interrogated its employees concerning union membership , activities, and sympathies ; and second, that Respondent, acting through Blackledge and Shaw, threatened to effect economic and other reprisals against its employees if they joined or supported the Union, all as alleged in paragraphs _V and VI of the complaint. Based on the above findings, it will be recommended that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. American Thread Company has not and is not engaging in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. Recommendations Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the complaint against American Thread Company be dismissed in its entirety. WEST COAST CASKET COMPANY, INC. and UPHOLSTERER'S INTER- NATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, LOCAL 15, A. F. L. Case No. . 1-CA-955. December 09, 1951 Decision and Order On June 26, 1951, Trial Examiner Howard Myers issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respond- ent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following addi- tions and modifications. ' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [ Chairman Herzog and Members Reynolds and Styles]. 97 NLRB No. 108.