Westclox Division, General Time Corporation

WESTCLOX DIVISION, GENERAL. TIME CORPORATION Westclox Division, General Time Corporation and United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). Case 10- CA-14181 September 28, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY Upon a charge filed on November 21, 1978, by United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Im- plement Workers of America (UAW), herein called the Union, and duly served on Westclox Division, General Time Corporation, herein called Respon- dent, the General Counsel of the National Labor Re- lations Board, by the Regional Director for Region 10, issued a complaint and notice of hearing against Respondent on December 21, 1978, alleging that Re- spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hear- ing before an administrative law judge were duly served on the parties to this proceeding. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the com- plaint alleges in substance that on July 20, 1978, fol- lowing a Board election in Case 10-RC-11322, the Union was duly certified as the exclusive collective- bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in the unit found appropriate;' and that, commencing on or about November 15, 1978, and at all times thereafter, Respondent has refused and continues to date to refuse to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative, although the Union has requested and is requesting it to do so. On January 2, 1979, Respondent filed its answer to the complaint, admitting in part, and denying in part, the allegations in the complaint. On March 12, 1979, counsel for the General Coun- sel filed directly with the Board a Motion for Sum- mary Judgment. Subsequently, on March 15, 1979, the Board issued an order transferring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice To Show Cause why the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment should not be granted. Respondent thereafter filed a response to the Notice To Show Cause, a motion for I Official notice is taken of the record in the representation proceeding, Case 10-RC-11322, as the term "record" is defined in Secs. 102.68 and 102.69(g) of the Board's Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended. See LTV Electrosysemsn, Inc., 166 NLRB 938 (1967), entd. 388 F.2d 683 (4th ('ir. 1968); Golden Age Beverage Co., 167 NLRB 151 (1967). enfd. 415 F.2d 26 (Sth Cir. 1969); Intertype Co. v. Penello, 269 F. Supp. 573 (D.C.Va.. 1967); Folletl Corp., 164 NLRB 378 (1967), enfd. 397 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1968); Sec. 9(d) of the NLRA, as amended. approval of the joint motion to withdraw cases, and a motion to respond further to the Notice To Show Cause if the joint motion to withdraw cases were de- nied. 2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, the Board makes the following: Ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment On July 29, 1978, the Regional Director for Region 10 overruled the Respondent's objections to the elec- tion in Case 10-RC 11322 and certified the Union as the collective-bargaining representative for Respon- dent's employees in the agreed-upon unit. Subse- quently, Respondent filed a request for review, which was denied, and then a motion for reconsideration. which also was denied. Thereafter, Respondent re- fused to bargain, an unfair labor practice charge was filed, and a complaint was issued by the General Counsel pursuant to his authority under Section 3(d) of the Act. On February 3, 1979. Respondent and the Union agreed that the Union would withdraw its unfair la- bor practice charge and Respondent would not "test the certification." The agreement provided, inter alia, that "any conduct by either party prior to the date of the agreement (February 3, 1979) shall not be the subject of or used as evidence in any refusal to bar- gaining proceeding." The Regional Director refused to join in the agreement because "the agreement is not limited to refusal to bargain proceedings between the parties but encompasses all such proceedings, in- cluding those which are initiated by individuals." Re- spondent argues that the Regional Director has "re- fuse[d] to exercise his discretion" by not joining in the agreement. It contends that the Board should grant the joint motion to withdraw cases, thereby placing the Board's imprimatur on the agreement. It contends that "[t]he quid pro quo for Respondent waiving its objection was the Union and Regional Director's es- toppel from using any prior conduct against Respon- dent." It is clear that the Regional Director is exercising his discretion, although not in the manner desired by Respondent.3 The Regional Director did not take part in drafting the agreement, and he believes that joining 2 We find no merit to Respondent's request for a 2-week extension to respond more completely to the Notice To Show Cause. Respondent has had ample time to respond On March 28, 1979, the Board informed Respondent it would not rule on the joint motion to withdraw cases at that time, and granted an extension o time in which to file a response to the Notice lo Show Cause until April 16, 1979. Filing a response to a Notice To Show Cause is not an eitherl/or proposition to e exercised h Respondent as and when it sees fit. Sec. 3(d) of the Act vests the final authority) to issue complaints in the General Counsel. W'inn Diri Srr. Inc, 224 NRB 1418, 1420 (1976) 245 NLRB No. 102 785 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD in the agreement would hamper the administration of the Act by impairing the protection of other parties and the public, which is not secured by the private agreement of the parties. Respondent cannot unilater- ally impose a quid pro quo on a nonconsenting party. The Regional Director has done nothing to lead Re- spondent reasonably to act to its detriment, which could form the basis for estoppel. The dissent concedes that the settlement agreement cannot be imposed on the General Counsel by the parties, but suggests that yet another "show cause no- tice" be issued to determine whether Respondent is serious in its continuing protestations that the partici- pation of the General Counsel is critical because he must be bound to Respondent's limitations on the use of presettlement evidence. In our opinion, further de- lay, with little greater purpose than pointing out to Respondent that, if it stops insisting on those limita- tions to the settlement agreement that led to the re- fusal to approve it, there will be no reason to with- hold approval, is not likely to prove economical in time or in resources. The Act does not provide the Board with province to instruct the General Counsel when to issue a complaint. The complaint is before us. and it has merit; whether or not the dissent would have issued the complaint-or if we would have-is beside the point. The choice is not ours. In its answer to the complaint and its response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent ad- mits substantially all of the factual allegations of the complaint, but denies that it refused to bargain. How- ever, attached to the General Counsel's motion is a letter dated November 15, 1978, in which Respondent refused to recognize or bargain with the Union. Nei- ther this letter, nor its import, are controverted by Respondent in its response to the Notice To Show Cause. Accordingly, we shall deem the allegation that Respondent refused to recognize or bargain with the Union to be true, and Respondent's denials thereof are stricken.4 By its assertions, and more specifically by its denials, in whole or in part, of the alllegations of the complaint and the arguments propounded in its answer and response, Respondent is attempting to re- litigate the same issues which it raised in the represen- tation proceeding, Case l0-RC- 1322.5 It is well settled that in the absence of newly dis- covered or previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances, a respondent in a proceeding alleging a violation of Section 8(a)(5) is not entitled to reliti- gate issues that were or could have been litigated in a prior representation proceeding.6 'Schwarlz Brothers, Inc., and District Records, Inc., 194 NLRB 150(1971); The May Department Stores Company, 186 NLRB 86 (1970). ' We also have considered the argument raised by Respondent in the joint motion to withdraw. ISee Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N..RB., 313 U.S. 146, 162 (1941); Rules and Regulations of the Board, Secs. 102.67(f) and 102.69(c). All issues raised by Respondent in this proceeding were or could have been litigated in the prior repre- sentation proceeding, and Respondent does not offer to adduce at a hearing any newly discovered or previ- ously unavailable evidence, nor does it allege that any special circumstances exist herein which would re- quire the Board to reexamine the decision made in the representation proceeding. We therefore find that Respondent has not raised any issue which is prop- erly litigable in this unfair labor practice proceeding. Accordingly, we grant the Motion for Summary Judgment. On the basis of the entire record, the Board makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is a Delaware corporation with an of- fice and place of business in Huntsville, Alabama. It is engaged in the manufacture of clocks. During the past calendar year, a representative period, Respon- dent sold and distributed from its Huntsville, Ala- bama, facility, products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Ala- bama. We find, on the basis of the foregoing, that Respon- dent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. IIl. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Representation Proceeding I. The unit The following employees of Respondent constitute a unit appropriate for collective-bargaining purposes within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Westclox Division, General Time Cor- poration, at its Huntsville, Alabama, facility, in- cluding electronics technicians, timekeeper, inventory audit, shop clerk, quality control tech- nician, and group leaders, but excluding all office 786 WESTCI.OX DIVISION. GENERAL TIME CORPORATION clerical employees, professional employees, the plant nurse, time study engineer, time study trainee, production planner, training instructors, maintenance technician, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. 2. The certification On May 26, 1978, a majority of the employees of Respondent in the above-named unit, in a secret-bal- lot election conducted under the supervision of the Regional Director for Region 10, designated the Union as their representative for the purpose of col- lective bargaining with Respondent. The Union was certified as the collective-bargaining representative of the employees in said unit on July 20, 1978, and the Union continues to be such exclusive representative within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. B. The Request To Bargain and Re.pondenr's Refiusal Commencing on or about July 28, November 6, and December 5, 1978, the Union requested Respon- dent to bargain collectively with it as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all the employ- ees in the above-described unit. Commencing on or about November 15, 1978, and continuing thereafter, Respondent has refused to unconditionally recognize and bargain with the Union as the duly certified ex- clusive representative for collective bargaining of all employees in said unit. Accordingly, we find that Respondent has, since November 15, 1978, and at all times thereafter, re- fused unconditionally to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employ- ees in the appropriate unit, and that, by such refusal, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Westclox Division, General Time Corporation, set forth in section 111, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in section 1, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial rela- tionship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes bur- dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the mean- ing of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act, we shall order that it cease and desist therefrom, and, upon request, bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the ap- propriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. In order to insure that the employees in the appro- priate unit will be accorded the services of their se- lected bargaining agent for the period provided by law, we shall construe the initial period of certitica- tion as beginning on the date Respondent begins to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recog- nized bargaining representative in the appropriate unit. See Mar-Jac Poultry Compar,. Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962): Commerce Company dl/h/a Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), celt. denied 379 U.S. 817: Burnett C'on- struction Company. 149 NLRB 1419, 1421 (1964), enfd. 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965). The Board, upon the basis of the foregoing facts and the entire record, makes the following: CON(CI.lSIONS OF LAW 1. Westclox Division. General Time Corporation, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. United Automobile. Aerospace, and Agricul- tural Implement Workers of America (UAW) is a la- bor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Westclox Division, General Time Corpora- tion, at its Huntsville, Alabama, facility, including electronics technicians, timekeeper, inventory audit, shop clerk, quality control technician, and group leaders, but excluding all office clerical employees. professional employees, the plant nurse, time study engineer, time study trainee, production planner, training instructors, maintenance technician, guards. and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar- gaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Since July 20, 1978. the above-named labor or- ganization has been and now is the certified and ex- clusive representative of all employees in the afore- said appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing unconditionally on or about No- vember 15, 1978. and at all times thereafter, to bar- gain collectively with the above-named labor organi- zation as the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of Respondent in the appropriate unit, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair 7R7 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid refusal unconditionally to bar- gain, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced, and is interfering with, restraining, and co- ercing, employees in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed them in Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board hereby orders that the Respondent, West- clox Division, General Time Corporation, Huntsville, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing unconditionally to bargain collec- tively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Im- plement Workers of America (UAW) as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the fiol- lowing appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by Westclox Division, General Time Cor- poration, at its Huntsville, Alabama, facility, in- cluding electronics technicians, timekeeper, inventory audit, shop clerk, quality control tech- nician, and group leaders, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, the plant nurse, time study engineer, time study trainee, production planner, training instructors, maintenance technician, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, unconditionally bargain with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive rep- resentative of all employees in the aforesaid appropri- ate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its facility in Huntsville, Alabama, cop- ies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Cop- ies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by Re- spondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 10, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. MEMBER MURPHY, dissenting: Unlike my colleagues on the majority, I would grant Respondent's request for approval of the par- ties' joint motion to withdraw cases and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. I can conceive of no valid reason to insist that the Union and the Company en- gage in continuing and protracted litigation over an issue which they already have resolved mutually, sat- isfactorily, and amicably. My colleagues' statement of the obvious-that it is for the General Counsel to decide when to issue a complaint-does not address the fact that there is presently pending before the Board itself a motion to allow the withdrawal of the case, which is made by both Respondent and the Charging Party. It is now for the Board to decide whether to reach the merits (i.e., whether continued processing will "prove an economy", to use my col- leagues' words) or to allow withdrawal and therefore dismiss the complaint. Contrary to the majority, the choice now is indeed for the Board to make. The instant proceeding arose out of Respondent's refusal to bargain following the Union's July 20, 1978, certification as exclusive bargaining representa- tive of Respondent's employees in an appropriate unit. Respondent filed objections to a May 26, 1978, election in which a majority of the employees had selected the Union as their bargaining representative. Thereafter, the Regional Director for Region 10 is- sued a Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representative in which he overruled the Employer's election objections and certified the Union. Although I dissented, for reasons which are fully discussed be- low, from the denial of Respondent's request for re- view of the Regional Director's decision, as well as from the denial of Respondent's motion for reconsid- eration of that denial, the Board majority affirmed 7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 788 WESTCLOX DIVISION. GENERAL TIME CORPORATION the Regional Director's overruling of Respondent's election objections. Subsequently, the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging Respondent's re- fusal to bargain and, on December 21, 1978, the Re- gional Director issued a complaint based thereon. On February 3, 1979, Respondent and the Union entered into a settlement agreement under the terms of which the Employer (Respondent herein) agreed to withdraw with prejudice the objections which it had filed to the election and, correlatively, the Union agreed to withdraw with prejudice its unfair labor practice charge. The parties further agreed to meet and bargain in good-faith efforts to negotiate a collec- tive-bargaining agreement at the earliest possible time. The agreement additionally provided that, in order to remove all impediments to a good-faith bar- gaining relationship, the parties agreed that any con- duct by either party prior to the date of the agree- ment would not be the subject of, or used as evidence in, any refusal-to-bargain proceeding. The motivation and incentive for entering into this agreement were, as described by the parties, avoidance of labor strife that might arise through the Union's stated intention to strike were it not recognized and the Employer's stated intention to replace striking employees. Pursu- ant to their agreement, the parties commenced bar- gaining during the week following execution of the settlement document. Thus, the parties had laid their dispute to rest and voluntarily agreed upon a path which both avoided industrial strife and protected the employees' rights to be represented by the labor organization of their choice. The Regional Director for Region 10, how- ever, refused to approve the parties' joint motion to withdraw cases, and instead filed with the Board a motion to transfer the case and continue proceedings before the Board and for Summary Judgment. On March 5, 1979, the Board issued an order transferring the proceeding to the Board, and thereafter Respon- dent filed directly with the Board a motion for ap- proval of the joint motion to withdraw cases. The General Counsel filed a response opposing Respon- dent's motion. It is the General Counsel's contention that the set- tlement is improper because the inclusion in the par- ties' agreement of the clause prohibiting evidence of conduct prior to the date of the agreement in any refusal-to-bargain proceeding would preclude the General Counsel from the use of presettlement con- duct for background purposes. The General Counsel also objects to the settlement on the grounds that the agreement is not limited to refusal-to-bargain pro- ceedings between the parties, but encompasses all such proceedings, including those initiated by individ- uals. This, asserts the General Counsel, is clearly prejudicial to the administration and enforcement of the Act. While my colleagues on the majority appear to agree with the General Counsel, and maintain in their decision that Respondent is, in effect, attempting to impose unilaterally a quidpro quo on a nonconsenting party, I cannot agree that the private agreement of these parties is properly construed as having the legal effect ascribed to it by the General Counsel and my colleagues. It is true, had the General Counsel participated in the settlement transaction and/or approved the par- ties' agreement, he might, in the proper circum- stances, be estopped from using the parties' prior con- duct in subsequent proceedings. But approving a withdrawal request does not include approval of the settlement agreements and the rights of third parties not signatory to that agreement may not be fore- closed by the parties' private contract. It is hornbook law that individual litigants, such as the parties herein, simply do not possess the power to bind third parties or to estop them from pursuing legal rights arising from the same course of conduct which is the subject of such a private settlement. Here, there is no term of the agreement providing for withdrawal only if the settlement agreement were approved by the Regional Director. While the with- drawal request to the Regional Director did state that the parties intended that the Regional Director be precluded from using the presettlement evidence, the Regional Director has not agreed to be so bound and has, in fact, refused to accept that condition. The Board may, however, issue an Order To Show Cause why the withdrawal should not be granted without giving effect to the intent of the parties in this regard on the ground that the mere intent of the parties can- not bind the General Counsel or the Board. Therefore, since I would not in any event find the parties' settlement agreement to have the capacity to affect the rights of third parties or of the General Counsel in his protection of the public interest, I would issue an Order To Show Cause why we should not grant Respondent's motion for approval of the parties' joint motion to withdraw the cases. The re- sources of this agency and the courts, as well as of the parties themselves, would thereby be preserved; and the labor policies underlying t, Act would be best effectuated by allowing the parties to continue the bargaining efforts begun by them in February 1979.9 Furthermore, even had I found Respondent's mo- See Campbell Soup Company, 152 NLRB 1645. 1648 (1965), holding that a settlement agreement may be approved only by express approval in writing of the agreement in its totality. I My general views regarding the desirability of encouraging parties to enter into settlement agreements have previously been set forth in the dis- senting opinion of Member Penello and myself in Community Medical Ser- vices of Clearfield, Inc. d/hbla Clear Haven Nursing Home, 236 NLRB 853 (1978). 789 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tion properly denied, I would nonetheless dissent from the majority's granting of the General Counsel's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is my opinion that issues requiring a hearing for their proper resolution exist in this proceeding, and I would therefore find that the Union's certification was improper and that Respondent accordingly has no duty to recognize or bargain with the Union. In the representation case underlying the unfair labor practice alleged, I dis- sented from my colleagues' denial of the Employer's request for review of the Regional Director's Supple- mental Decision and Certification of Representative. I likewise dissented from the Board's denial of the Employer's motion for reconsideration of its decision to deny review.'0 My dissent in both instances was based upon an election objection in which the Em- ployer alleged that officers and/or agents and em- ployees supporting the petitioning and two interven- ing labor organizations threatened, intimidated, and coerced employees and created an atmosphere of fear and violence, thereby denying the employees the op- portunity of a free and untrammeled election choice. The Employer presented 14 witnesses in support of this objection. Among the many statements reported by those witnesses, according to the Supplemental Decision issued by the Regional Director following an investigation of the election objections, were threats of beatings and bodily harm (including one alleged threat by an employee who held a box-cutting knife near the neck of another employee who refused to sign a union card), threats that bottles might be thrown through windshields, and threats by some em- ployees that "they would take care of people who would vote against the union." Certain of the employ- ees accused of making such threats denied having made the statements alleged. The Regional Director for Region 10 did not, however, order a hearing to resolve questions raised by the Employer's objections, but instead overruled all objections and issued a certi- fication of representative. In so doing, the Regional Director discussed and discounted each of the in- stances of misconduct alleged by the Employer's wit- nesses, finding that the cumulative alleged conduct was not sufficiently substantial to create an atmo- sphere of fear and reprisal which would warrant set- ting the election aside. In its request for review of the Regional Director's Supplemental Decision, the Employer contended both that the Regional Director's decision was erro- neous on the merits and, alternatively, that the evi- dence presented raised material issues of fact necessi- tating a hearing for resolution. The Employer also asserted that it was denied the opportunity to present 'o My dissenting position was noted in the Board's telegraphic orders de- nying the Employer's request for review and its motion for reconsideration of that decision. other evidence, consisting of the statements of super- visory and management personnel, in support of the above-described objection. I agree with the Employer that the certification herein was improper, given the substantial issues raised by the Employer's election objection which were never resolved by a hearing and which, if estab- lished, might well have been sufficient to warrant set- ting the election aside. I cannot, therefore, concur in the granting of Summary Judgment based upon that certification. Accordingly, I dissent both from my colleagues' de- nial of Respondent's motion for the Board's approval of the parties' joint motion to withdraw cases and from their granting of Summary Judgment. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse unconditionally to bar- gain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment with United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of Amer- ica (UAW) as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described be- low. WE WILL NOT, in any like or related manner, interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, unconditionally bar- gain with the above-named Union, as the exclu- sive representative of all employees in the bar- gaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees employed by Westclox Division, General Time Corporation, at our Huntsville, Ala- bama, facility, including electronics techni- cians, timekeeper, inventory audit, shop clerk, quality control technician, and group leaders, but excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, the plant nurse, time study engineer, time study trainee, production planner, training instructors, maintenance technician, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WESTCLOX DIVISION, GENERAL TIME COR- PORATION 790