Crown Products Co.

602 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONCLUSIONS of LAW 1. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Evelyn D. Hawkins and James A. Davis, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organization, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 3. By refusing to reinstate Evelyn D. Hawkins, thereby discriminating against her because she had caused charges to be filed against Respondent and refused to withdraw said charges, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 6. Respondent had reasonable cause for the discharge of W. B. McGraw, W. Edd Hendren, and J. D. Ervin, and did not discriminatorily discharge said employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. 7. Respondent did not prevent and interfere with the distribution of union literature by causing the arrest of a union agent engaged in distributing such literature, in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] CROWN PRODUCTS COMPANY and UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM AND PLASTIC WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. 0., PETITIONER. Case No. 17-RC-1260. Jvne 10,1952 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Martin Sacks, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prej- udicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em- ployees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the.following reasons: On March 21, 1948, the Employer and the Intervenor, Federal Labor Union, Rubber Workers' Local No. 23021, AFL, executed a 99 NLRB No. 99. CROWN PRODUCTS COMPANY 603 contract, effective to March 21, 1949, and annually renewed thereafter in the absence of 60 days' notice. The contract contained the follow- ing checkoff clause: (a) On each pay day the dues, assessments and fines owing by each employee covered by this contract shall be deducted from the pay of the employee by the employer, and turned over to the Secretary-Treasurer or other duly authorized representative of the Union, provided the employee in order to have the above deductions made shall furnish the company with individually signed authorizations in which the employee authorizes the deduction. The contract was automatically renewed in 1949, 1950, and 1951. On November 26, 1951, pursuant to a request to reopen the contract, the parties orally agreed upon an incentive plan, a cost-of-living increase, and an extension of the contract for an additional year, to March 21, 1953. This understanding was incorporated in an unsigned memo- randum on December 4, 1951. The petition herein was filed on Janu- ary 23, 1952, shortly after the automatic renewal date of the contract signed in 19481 The Petitioner asserts that the contract is not a bar because the checkoff provision is unlawful under Section 302 of the amended Act, which makes certain types of checkoff agreements unlawful.2 We find no merit in the Petitioner's contention. In our recent Salant 3 case, the Board construed Section 302 as not creating a new unfair labor prac- tice. In reaching our conclusion, we noted that Section 302 is a criminal statute and appears in Title III of the Act, and that Congress charged the attorney-general and the courts, but not this Board, with its enforcement. Our basic concern is with the preventive provisions of Title I of the Act. As the administration of Section 302 was not delegated to the Board, we believe that Congress did not intend that we should examine into the checkoff provisions of the collective bar- gaining contracts in order to ascertain their legality under another section. The resolution of questions concerning checkoff is appro- priately left to the agencies charged with the administration and inter- pretation of Section 302, lest the same Government issue a multiplicity of interpretations. Therefore, we find that considerations as to the legality of the checkoff provisions herein under Section 302 are irrelevant and immaterial on the contract bar issue. It follows that the current contract between the Employer and the Intervenor must be i Thereafter, on February 1, 1952, the Employer and the Intervenor signed an "Extension Agreement," embodying the terms of the oral understanding of November 26, 1951. This agreement does not raise the bar. Western Electric Company, Incorporated, 94 NLRB 54. % Although the union-security clause in the contract is illegal on its face, it is concededly inoperative by its terms. Accordingly, the Petitioner does not contend that this clause prevents the contract from being a bar. 4 Salant & Salant, Inc., 88 NLRB 816. 604 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD regarded as a bar to a present determination of representatives .4 Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition. Order IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. d See Hamilton v. N. L. R. B., 160 F. 2d 465, 471 ( C. A. 6), cert. den. 332 U. S. 762. See also American Seating Company, 85 NLRB 269 . Our decisions in C. Hager & Sons Hinge Manufacturing Company, 80 NLRB 163 ; Decker Clothes, Inc, 83 NLRB 484; The Brod- erick Company, 85 NLRB 708 ; and Saginaw Furniture Shops, Inc , 97 NLRB 1488, are hereby modified insofar as they may have implied to the contrary. MAINE FISHERIES CORPORATION and SEA FOOD WORKERS' UNION, ILA, LOCAL No. 2, SERIES 1572, AFL, PETITIONER. Case No. 1-RC-2635. June 10, 1952 Decision, Order, and Direction of Election On March 14, 1952, pursuant to a stipulation for certification upon consent election, an election by secret ballot was conducted among the Employer's production and maintenance employees at Holyoke Wharf, Portland, Maine, to determine whether or not the said employees wished the Petitioner to represent them in collective bargaining. Upon the conclusion of the election, a tally of ballots was furnished the parties in conformity with the stipulation. The tally shows that of approximately 41 eligible voters, 15 votes were cast in favor of the Petitioner and 23 against it, and 1 ballot was challenged. On March 20, 1952, the Petitioner filed objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, alleging that certain officers of the Employer had promised economic benefits to the employees immediately before the election for the purpose of influencing their votes. On April 16, 1952, after investigating the objections, the Regional Director issued his report on objections, in which he recommended that the objections be sustained and the election set aside. On April 22, 1952, the Employer filed exceptions to the Regional Director's report and recommendation. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this proceeding to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. Findings of Fact 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 99 NLRB No. 98.