099 NLRB 830
Roegelein Provision Co.
830
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ROEGELEIN
PROVISION
COMPANY
and
NATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF
PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS, CUA.
Case No. 39-CA-183. June 20,
1952
Decision and Order
On December 4, 1951, Trial Examiner Reeves R. Hilton issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that
the Respondent had not engaged in unfair labor practices, and recom-
mending that the complaint be dismissed, as set forth in the copy of
the Intermediate Report attached hereto.
Thereafter, the Union filed
exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.
No
exceptions were received from the General Counsel.
The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter-
mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the
case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommenda-
tions of the Trial Examiner with the modifications noted below.
We agree with the Trial Examiner's conclusion that the Respondent
did not commit an unfair labor practice by entering into a contract
with the AFL Meat Cutters while the representation petition of the
Packinghouse Workers, CUA, was under investigation. For the rea-
sons stated in William Penn Broadcasting Company 2 we hold, as did
the Trial Examiner, that the same criteria normally applied by the
Board in a representation proceeding determine the appropriateness
of the unit sought by a union seeking to displace an incumbent as the
bargaining representative, and that, absent an affirmative showing of
the appropriateness of the new unit sought, an employer does not
violate the Act by continuing to recognize the incumbent union. In
this case, not only has the General Counsel failed to prove the appro-
priateness of the unit sought by the Packinghouse Workers, but the
evidence affirmatively establishes, as the Trial Examiner properly
found, the appropriateness of the existing multiemployer unit repre-
sented by the Meat Cutters.
As the William Penn decision is decisive
of the issues presented here, we find it unnecessary to pass upon, and
therefore do not adopt, those portions of the Intermediate Report that
discuss the history of the "Midwest Piping doctrine" 3 and comment
upon other Board and court decisions concerning that doctrine.
1 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel
[ Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock].
93 NLRB 1104.
Midwest Piping and Supply Company, Inc., 63 NLRB 1060.
99 NLRB No. 130.
ROEGELEIN PROVISION COMPANY
Order
831
Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, .as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein against
Roegelein Provision Company, San Antonio, Texas, be, and it hereby
is, dismissed.
Intermediate Report
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Upon a charge, as amended, duly filed by National Brotherhood of Packing-
house Workers, CUA, herein called the Packinghouse' Workers, the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board,' by the Regional Director for the
Sixteenth Region (Fort Worth, Texas), issued a complaint dated April 20,4951,
against Roegelein Provision Company, herein called the Respondent or the Com-
pany, alleging that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) and Section 2
(6) and ('7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136,
herein called the Act.
Copies of the complaint, with copies of the charges and
notice of hearing, as rescheduled,, were duly served upon the Respondent and
Packinghouse Workers.
In substance, the complaint alleges that on or about October 30, 1950, the
Packinghouse Workers filed a petition with the Board for certification as the
exclusive bargaining representative of all production and maintenance employees
of the Company, excluding office and clerical employees, guards, watchmen, pro-
fessional employees, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, as amended, and
while the petition was pending the Company about December 7, 1950, entered
into an agreement with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen
of North America and Local No. 171, AFL, herein called the Meat Cutters, cover-
ing the above-mentioned employees.
The complaint further alleges the foregoing
unit to be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, that a question
of representation concerning the employees existed, that the Meat Cutters did not
represent an uncoerced majority of, the employees and, therefore, the Company
by executing the contract with the Meat Cutters under these circumstances con-
tributed support to a labor organization and interfered with, restrained, and
coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under the Act, in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) thereof.
About April 26, 1951, the Company filed'a motion to strike and dismiss the
complaint, which is discussed below.
On the same date the Company filed its
answer to the complaint wherein it admitted certain allegations of the com-
plaint but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Affirmatively,
the Company avers that the unit set forth in the complaint is inappropriate since
the Company for years has conducted its bargaining negotiations with the Meat
Cutters oil the basis of a multiemployer unit, and in any event the Meat Cutters
duly represented a majority of its employees in either a single or multi-
employer unit.
' The General Counsel and his representative at the hearing are herein referred to as the
General Counsel ; the National Labor Relations Board as the Board.
832
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held at San Antonio, Texas, September 5
and 6, 1951, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief
Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and the Respondent were represented by
counsel and the Packinghouse Workers by its president and regional director.
At the commencement of the hearing counsel for the Respondent moved to
strike and dismiss'the complaint principally on the grounds that the Meat Cutters,
being a party to the contract, is a necessary and indispensable part to the
proceeding and that the unit set forth in the complaint is inappropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining.
The motion was denied by the undersigned.
However, it is noted that it was not necessary for the undersigned to specifically
rule upon the first ground since the Meat Cutters moved for leave to intervene
which was granted, and thereafter participated fully in the hearing.
All parties
participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to
examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence pertinent to the
issues involved.
At the conclusion of the case counsel presented oral argument
to the undersigned and were advised of their right to file briefs in the matter.
Thereafter, the Respondent and Packinghouse Workers filed briefs which have
been duly considered by the undersigned.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses,
the undersigned makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The parties stipulated that the Respondent is a Texas corporation and main-
tains its office and place of business at San Antonio, Texas, where it is engaged
in the business of slaughtering, processing, packing, and distributing meat and
meat products. Its annual sales are in excess of $1,000,000, of which a substantial
amount represents shipments to customers outside the State of Texas.
The
Respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce as defined in the Act, and the
undersigned so finds.
H. THE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, CUA, and Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, and Local Union No.
171, AFL, respectively, are labor organizations admitting to membership em-
ployees of the Respondent.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The history of collective bargaining at the Company's plant,
William M. Roegelein, president of the company, testified that during 1941 the
Meat Cutters, after organizing the employees of the Company as well as those
of Mission Provision Company of San Antonio (herein called Mission), made
simultaneous demands for recognition upon both the Company and Mission.'
Roegelein and his attorney thereupon conferred with officials of Mission, "dis-
cussed the problem jointly," and then met in joint conference with the Meat
Cutters.
Each of the companies recognized the Meat Cutters as the exclusive
representative of all of the production and maintenance employees of both
2 On August 12, 1941, the Meat Cutters filed separate representation petitions against
the Company and Mission, cases numbered 16-R-303 and 304, respectively
The petitions
were withdrawn on August 18, 1941, because the companies voluntarily granted recognition.
ROEGELEIN PROV ION COMPANY
833
companies , excluding office employees, guards, salesmen, and supervisory em-
ployees.
In the course of the meetings the Meat Cutters submitted a proposed
agreement the terms of which were discussed and considered by representatives
of the companies, who thereafter engaged in joint negotiations with the Meat
Cutters.
ltoegelein stated that during the negotiations tht Meat Cutters resorted
to strike action at the plants of the respective companies which extended over
a period of several months and terminated upon the companies executing sepa-
rate, but identical, collective bargaining agreements with it.
From 1941 to 1946,
the Company and' 1llission have had successive and continuous agreements with
the Meat Cutters, each of which was negotiated and executed in the manner
set forth above
In December 1946, the Company and Mission executed identical agreements
with the Meat Cutters effective to December 15, 1948, and thereafter from
year to year, subject to the right of either party to terminate the same upon
the giving of a 30-day notice prior to the expiration date thereof.
During the summer of 1048, the Meat Cutters had separate agreements with
two other packing firms in San Antonio, Berry Packing Company and Alamo
Dressed Beef Company (herein called Berry and Alamo, respectively), which had
expired, or were about to expire.
At the same time, the 1946 agreements be-
tween the Meat Cutters and the Company and Mission , which were then in effect,
were reopened for further negotiations.
Representatives of the four packers,
namely, the Company, Mission, Berry, and Alamo, thereupon participated in
joint negotiations with the Meat Cutters and as a consequence the parties
reached agreement on identical terms and conditions of employment covering
the production and maintenance employees at all of the plants.
On July 14,
1948, the Company and Mission executed separate supplemental agreements
to the 1946 contracts and Berry and Alamo signed separate new agreements.
Each of the above agreements was to remain in effect until December 15, 1949,
and thereafter from year to year, subject to the right of either party to ter-
minate the same upon 30 days' notice in writing prior to the expiration date.
Neither the companies nor the Meat Cutters exercised their right to terminate
the agreement in 1949, so the contract was automatically renewed for a period
of 1 year.
However, in 1950, the Meat Cutters served timely notice of their
intention to terminate the agreements.
George G. Clifton, attorney, testified that he has represented Mission since its
inception and that in the late summer or fall of 1941, the Meat Cutters conducted
a successful organizational campaign among the employees of the Company and
Mission and subsequently requested recognition by the companies.
Clifton and
Theo. F. Weiss, attorney for the Company, from the beginning met jointly with
representatives of the Meat Cutters and after several meetings recogmz2d it as
the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of the companies.
Clifton and
Weiss engaged in joint negotiations with the Meat Cutters and while these nego-
tiations were in progress the Meat Cutters simultaneously struck the plants of
each company.
The strike lasted about 6 weeks and was terminated when the
companies executed separate but identical agreements with the Meat Cutters.
During the period 1942 to 1945, Weiss was serving with the Armed Forces and, in
his absence, Clifton represented both the Company and Mission in their negotia-
tions and dealings with the Meat Cutters.
In the spring of 1948, the contracts between Berry and Alamo and the ?seat
Cutters expired and the attorneys representing those companies requested advice
from Clifton and Weiss in respect to their contracts. At the same time the Meat
Cutters asked that its contracts with the Company and Mission be reopened, which.
was acceptable to these companies.
Representatives of the four companies orally
agreed "to bargain together as a unit and sign identical contracts," whereupon
834
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
joint negotiations were conducted with the Meat Cutters and thereafter on July
14, 1948, each of the companies executed separate but identical contracts with
the Union.
C. D. Berry, president of Berry Packing Company , stated that his Company had
an agreement with the Meat Cutters which it alone negotiated , and which expired
in 1948.
Upon the expiration thereof Berry met with the other packers "because
we were mutually discussing our problem and I wanted to get in there with
them and negotiate jointly where we could all be on a comparable basis." Berry
was a party to the joint negotiations that terminated in the agreement signed in
July 1948, and since that date the company has had continuous agreements which
were negotiated on the same basis.
Russell I. Oppenheim, president of Alamo, said that about April 1946 his
,company, as a result of separate negotiations , entered into an agreement with the
Meat Cutters which agreement remained in effect until 1948, In the latter period,
Alamo with the Company, Mission, and Berry engaged in joint collective bargain-
ing negotiations with the Meat Cutters and on July 16, 1948, each of the com-
panies signed separate but identical agreements with the Union .
Since that
date the Alamo has conducted its negotiations with Meat Cutters in like
manner.
Allen Williams, international representative of the Meat Cutters , stated that
he first came to San Antonio in 1943, at which time his union had agreements
with only two plants in the city , namely, the Company and Mission.
Williams
further stated that he had been informed that these companies had been organ-
ized simultaneously in 1941, and had jointly negotiated agreements with his
organization.
From 1943 to 1948, Williams conducted joint negotiations with
the companies except for a period of several years, when he was out of the area.
Williams also engaged in separate negotiations with Berry and Alamo, appar-
ently in 1946, and had agreements with these companies which expired in the
summer or fall of 1948.
About the time of the expiration of these agreements,
Williams notified the Company and Mission that he desired to reopen the current
contracts with them in order to obtain a uniform agreement with all four of the
companies.
Representatives of the companies conferred jointly with Williams
and in July 1948, the Meat Cutters signed supplementary agreements with the
Company and Mission, and executed new agreements with Berry and Alamo.
While separate contracts were executed the terms thereof were identical.
Admittedly , no formal association or organization has ever existed among the
companies .
At the commencement of bargaining negotiations in 1941. represent
atives of the Company and Mission , according to Clifton, orally agreed to
"bargain together as a unit" and "upon their positions with reference to the
various elements of the contract ."
In the spring of 1948, representatives of
Berry and Alamo "agreed that they would stand by the joint agreement of the
four packers as to terms " of any contract with the Meat Cutters. Clifton de-
clared that the oral understanding , while "a firm binding agreement," embraced
no penalties for failure to abide by the same and that the individual companies
were free to accept or reject the contract as negotiated with the Meat Cutters.
The four companies are all located in San Antonio and are the principal inde-
pendent packers in the area .
Together they employ approximately 700 employees
who apparently confine their work activities to these particular employers,
altliough there is no real "interchange" of employees in that the companies
maintain or operate any transfer system.
There are several other plants engaged
in the processing or distributing of meat products in the area , whose operations
are substantially different, according to the companies , but they have not partici-
pated in the joint negotiations , nor is any attempt made to include them in the
ROEGELEIN PROVISION COMPANY
835
group unit.
The four companies as well as the Meat Cutters expressly declared
they desired to continue their bargaining negotiations on the basis of a multi-
employer unit.
B. The demand for recognition by the Packinghouse Workers
On October 20, 1950,' Thomas Lillard, regional director for the Packinghouse
Workers, sent a letter to the Company stating that it had been designated by
a majority of the Company's production and maintenance employees as their
bargaining representative and requested that an early meeting be held for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement.
Lillard also advised the Company that
the execution of an agreement with any other labor organization pending the
resolution of the question concerning representation would be considered an
unfair labor practice.
The letter was acknowledged by Weiss, who said that
the Company was willing to meet with the Packinghouse Workers, and asked
Lillard to submit a proposed date, or dates, for such a meeting.
On October 30, Lillard, prior to responding to Weiss' communication, filed a
petition for certification with the Board,4 alleging that the Company had
declined to grant recognition to the Packinghouse Workers on October 26, in a
unit composed of production and maintenance employees exclusive of office and
clerical employees, guards, watchmen, professional employees, and all super-
visors as defined in the Act. The petition further discloses that another labor
organization, the Meat Cutters, was recognized by the Company on "December
15, 1950."
The Regional Director promptly notified the Company and the Meat
Cutters, in writing, of the filing of the petition. In turn both the Company
and the Meat Cutters acknowledged receipt of the notice on November 3 and 4,
respectively.
In addition, the Meat Cutters moved for leave to intervene in the
proceeding and submitted proof of interest therein.
The request for interven-
tion was granted on November 6.
Lillard, by letter dated November 5, informed Weiss that he could meet with
the Company, on 48 hours' notice, at any time within the next 2 weeks.
How-
ever, Lillard declared that it was "necessary" that the Company grant written
recognition to the Packinghouse Workers as the exclusive representative of its
production and maintenance employees, otherwise he would "go through with
the petition," which had already been filed.
On November 8, Weiss wrote Lillard to the effect that the Company was
willing to meet with the Packinghouse Workers but refused to grant recognition
in view of the Company's existing contract with the Meat Cutters as well as its
doubt concerning the appropriateness of the bargaining unit.
C. The Company's renewal of its agreement with the Meat Cutters
As appears above, the Company, and the three other packers, had separate
agreements with the Meat Cutters, which expired on December 15. Prior to
that date Williams had given timely notice of the Union 's intention to terminate
these agreements.5
Williams said that before the expiration date of the agreements , apparently
about October , he learned that the Packinghouse Workers had signed up some
3 All dates refer to 1950, unless otherwise stated.
Case No. 39-RC-260.
° Williams did not state precisely when the notice was given, nor was a copy of the
same introduced at the hearing.
However, he stated that in 1949 he gave the com-
panies a 60-day notice to reopen the agreements.
The companies did not question the
validity of the notice at the hearing
836
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of the employees of the Company, so he contacted his members and, over a period
of approximately 2 weeks, obtained signed authorization cards from about 125
employees. In order to convince the Company that he represented a majority of
the employees Williams, during October, presented the authorization cards to
Roegeleinv and. G. L. Childress, vice president and general manager of the Com-
pany.
Childress said the cards were voluntarily presented about the middle of
October and he recognized the signatures of many of the employees thereon.
Childress-hastily checked the cards and, while he did not count the same, esti-
mated that Williams had between 125 and 130 cards. At that time the Company
had bei;ween 150 and 175 production and maintenance employees, so the Company
determined to continue to recognize the Meat Cutters as the exclusive repre-
sentative 'of all such employees.
In November Cliton, acting on behalf of all four companies, negotiated with
Williams•over•a period of 2 or 3 weeks and on December 7 each of the companies
signed identical contracts.
These agreements, which provided for wage increases
and checkoff of union dues, are effective until December 15, 1952, and thereafter
from year to year, unless terminated on 60-day notice by either party and subject
to the right of either party to reopen the agreements in respect to wages on
December 15, 1951, on 60-day notice.
On January 16, 1951, the Packinghouse Workers filed a charge against the
Company alleging violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act, which was
amended on February 2, 1951, to include a violation of Section 8 (a) (2) thereof.
Contentions of the Parties
•q
The General Counsel asserts that at least on November 8, as evidenced by
Weiss' letter of that date, a question concerning representation had arisen and
that thek Company was fully aware of the demands made by the Packinghouse
Workers and the fact that it had filed a petition for certification with the Board.
Accordingly, the Company by executing the renewal agreement with the Meat
Cutters, covering the employees in the bargaining unit sought by the Packing-
house Workers, while the petition was pending thereby engaged in a violation
of the Act under the Midwest Piping doctrine.'
The General Counsel further
asserts that when the contract was executed the Meat Cutters did not represent
an uncoerced majority of the employees in the bargaining unit.
The Company contends that the petition raised no real question of representa-
tion since the single-employer unit described therein was inappropriate in the
light of the prior history of collective bargaining with the Meat Cutters on the
basis of a multiemployer unit.
The Company also contends that the General
Counsel failed to adduce any evidence in support of the allegations in his com-
plaint as to the appropriateness of the single-employer unit and that the Meat
Cutters did not represent an uncoerced majority of the employees therein.
Under
the circumstances, the Company argues that, in accordance with the principles
established in the Willwam Peon Bi oadcastrng G'oinpany case,' the mere filing of
the petition did not preclude the Company from renewing its agreement with
the Meat Cutters.
Conclusions
Primarily, then, the question involved is whether the Midwest Piping rule,
properly interpreted and applied, requires the conclusion that the Company in
pursuing the course of action set forth above thereby committed unfair labor
practices as alleged in the complaint.
e Midwest Piping and Supply Company, lime., 63 NLRB 1060.
a 93 NLRB 1104.
ROEGELEIN PROVISION COMPANY
837
In the llttdwcest Piping case, supra, the Board held that an employer by exe-
cuting a "union shop" agreement with a union in the face of representation
proceedings initiated by a rival organization which was pending before the
Board constituted unlawful assistance to the contracting union in violation of
the rights guaranteed to his employees under the Act. Essentially , the rule is
simply a specific application of the principle requiring employer neutrality in
situations where one of the rival unions files a petition with the Board, which
action establishes the existence of a question concerning representation and puts
the employer on notice thereof
Subsequently , the rule was extended to include
within the prohibition the signing of nonclosed -sl1op contracts with unassisted
labor organizations
( Radio Corporation of America, 74 NLRB,1729 ; National
Labor Relations Board, Twelfth Annual Repoit
( 1947), p 26 )
However, in Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom , Inc,' the Board decided that where
the company executed an agreement with an affiliate of the AFL shortly after it
had defeated a rival independent union in a Board -conducted election , and the
independent union became defunct, "in actual fact no real question concerning
representation " was involved .
The Board also pointed out that the company's
bargaining history with the AFL had been continuous for approximately 5 years
and under the circumstances the execution of the contract should not be re-
garded as unlawful, "even though it be technically true that the representation
proceeding was still pending before the Board ."
In holding that the contract
did not come within the condemnation of the Midwest Piping case, the Board
stated : "That doctrine , necessary through it is to protect freedom of choice in
certain situations, can easily operate in derogation of the practice of continuous
collective bargaining , and should , therefore , be strictly construed and sparingly
applied."
Further limitations upon the rule have been recognized by the Board.
Thus, when the union filing the petition prevented a prompt determination of the
representation question by submitting groundless and frivolous unfair labor
pi actice charges , the Board ruled that the execution of a contract between
the employer and the rival union prior to the resolution of the representation
question was not an unfair labor practice .
( Eaton Manufacturing Company,
76 NLRB 261 ; Thirteenth Annual Report
( 1948 ) pp. 52-53 )
Similarly, a rival
claim, made during the certification years, does not raise a question of representa-
tion within the meaning of the rule.
( Lift Trucks, Inc., 75 NLRB 998.)
On December 7, 1948, the Board entered its decision in The Standard Steel
Spring Company case
( 80 NLRB 1082 ).
There the company constructed or
remodeled its plant and in the course of this operation various unions of the
AFL and CIO agreed to refrain from raiding one another so that the former
were to have a free hand in representing the employees engaged in the con-
structing work and when this work was completed and production commenced
the latter would be free to organize the production and maintenance workers.
About April 1, 1947, the company hired its full complement of nine employees for
its powerhouse, but at that time it was not ready for production and had not
commenced hiring production employees .
Shortly after the above date the Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers , AFL, requested recognition for the power-
house employees , which request was refused by the company because it preferred
a single plant-wide unit of all production and maintenance workers.
The Engi-
neers thereupon filed a petition for certification , upon which a hearing was held
on May 28, 1947 , and on December 11, 1947, the Board issued its decision wherein
it found the unit claimed to be appropriate and directed that an election be held.
In the meantime , the company commenced production during July 1947, and the
United Steelworkers of America , CIO, after conducting an organizational drive,
8 74 NLRB 1443.
215233-53--54
838
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
requested recognition , about August 8, as the exclusive representative of all the
production and maintenance employees including those in the powerhouse. The
Steelworkers, at the company 's demand, presented signed authorization cards
showing that it represented a substantial majority of the employees in the pro-
posed unit including the nine powerhouse employees , each of whom signed cards
subsequent to the date of their designation of the Engineers as their bargaining
representative.
The company checked the cards against its payroll and there-
after recognized the Steelworkers as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the
production and maintenance employees including powerhouse workers and on
August 19 signed an agreement with the union covering all the employees in that
unit.
The Board held that the case was governed by the Midwest Piping rule and
ordered the company to cease recognizing the Steelworkers as the representatives
of any of the powerhouse employees and from giving effect to the agreement of
August 19; affirmatively it directed the company to withdraw and withhold recog-
nition from the Steelworkers until certified by the Board.
The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in denying the Board's petition for enforcement of its order,
N. L. R. B. v. Standard Steel Spring Company, 180 F. 2d 942, 945-946, stated :
Whatever may have been the situation six months before the company
recognized the Steelworkers union as the bargaining representative of its
employees, is here irrelevant.
There can be no question, from the record,
that at the time respondent company recognized the Steelworkers, that union
represented the great majority of all respondent's employees, as well as all
of the powerhouse employees
.
.
. The mere circumstance that there
is pending an undisposed proceeding before the Board for the determination
of the employees' choice of representative, based on a petition brought by
one union, does not convict an employer of unfair labor practices for recog-
nizing another union as the employees' representative on clear proof of such
majority representation, submitted several months after the inception of
the representation proceedings.
In August 1950, the Board issued its decision in the Hoover Company case
(90 NLRB 1614). There the company upon the expiration of its agreement with-
drew recognition from the union because of its failure to comply with the non-
Communist affidavit provisions of the Act and on June 10, 1948, the union re-
sorted to strike action and also instituted a boycott of the company's products.
On July 30, the strike was abandoned and the union took no further overt action
in support of its boycott after August 2.
While the strike and boycott were in
effect, a rival independent union, on July 7, filed a representation petition with
the Board and on August 24, the union was certified following an election held
pursuant to a consent-election agreement. In support of its action in dis-
charging union members for failure to terminate the boycott, the company argued
that the objective of the boycott was illegal because it was instituted after the
rival union had filed a representation petition and under the Midwest Piping
doctrine the company was precluded from recognizing and bargaining with the
union.
The Board stated that under the rule the employer 's exclusive recogni-
tion of one of two rival organizations violates the Act only if at the time recog-
nition is granted the question concerning representation raised by the petition
is still pending.
However, the Board declared that circumstances might occur
which would remove the representation question such as withdrawal of the
petition or dismissal by the Board, or the granting of recognition to each of the
claimants on a members-only basis.
The Board refused to apply the Midwest
Piping rule and held that the boycott to compel recognition, during the period
ROEGELEIN PROVISION COMPANY
839
prior to August 24, was protected under Section 7 of the Act a
Chairman Herzog
pointed out that he was reluctant to apply the Midwest Piping doctrine for the
further reason that recent decisions in N. L. R. B. v. Flotill Products, Inc. (180
F. 2d (C. A. 9)) and Standard Steel Spring Company, supra, indicate that the
doctrine "is far from being accepted as unimpeachable authority," and in the
Flotill case the court cautioned against the "indiscriminate application" of the
rule.
In the William Penn Broadcasting Company case, supra, the charging union,
International Brotherhood 'ofElectrical Workers, filed a representation petition
with the Board for certification as the bargaining representative of the com-
pany's "broadcast technicians and engineers."
On February 13, 1950, while the
petition was pending, the company renewed its contractual relations with an-
other union which for 12 years had been representing a unit of the company's
production employees that included the technicians claimed in the petition.
The Trial Examiner found that by entering into the agreement in the face of the
pending petition the employer violated the Act under the Midwest Piping rule.
He did not, however pass upon the company's contention that at the time of the
execution of the agreement no valid question concerning representation existed
because the unit sought in the petition was inappropriate.
The Board in revers-
ing the Trial Examiner said :
The construction placed upon the Midwest Piping doctrine by the Trial
Examiner tinder the circumstances of this case, would,
in our opinion,
operate in derogation of the practice of continuous collective bargaining
which the Act was designed to encourage in the interest of industrial stability.
Moreover, such a broad application of the doctrine as here proposed by the
Trial Examiner would serve only to deprive employees of the benefits of
an uninterrupted bargaining relationship whenever a clearly unsupportable
or specious rival claim is made upon an employer. In conformity with these
views, we conclude that the pendency of a petition for certification imposes
no duty upon an employer, to refrain from continuing exclusively to
recognize and deal with an incumbent bargaining representative, such as we
have here, unless the petition has a character and timeliness which create
it real question concerning representation.
The Board further stated that the existence of a representation question is
determinable by the same criteria normally applied by the Board in finding such
.a question to be present before proceeding to an election and one of the essential
elements is that the petitioning union , seeking to displace an incumbent, must
assert its claim as to an appropriate unit of employees.
Concluding, the Board
stated that it was the duty of the General Counsel to prove that a real question
concerning representation existed when the contract was executed and to pro-
^duce evidence as to the appropriateness of the unit sought in the petition.
Since the General Counsel failed to carry this burden of proof, the complaint
was dismissed by the Board.
This case «as subsequently reviewed by the Sixth Circuit in The Hoover Company v.
N L R B., 191 F 2d 380 The court held that the objective of the boycott was illegal,
-therefore the company had the right to discharge certain employees who had engaged in
such action while in the employ of the company
However, it seems clear that the decision
-does not conflict with the court's prior decision in the Standard Steel Spring case, Supra,
where it held that the mere pendency of a representation petition did not render recogni-
tion of at rival union unlawtul
While the Standard Steel Spring case was extensively
considered in the briefs before the court, in the Hooter case the court in no way limited or
restricted its holding in the prior case
It follows therefore that the court simply held
that the critical determination in a Midwest Piping situation is not the pendency of a
petition but the existence of a real question concerning representation.
840
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In consideration of the foregoing authorities the undersigned has no difficulty
reaching the conclusion that the mere filing of a representation petition by the
Packinghouse Workers did not preclude the company from continuing to recog-
nize and negotiate with the Meat Cutters as the exclusive representative of the
employees in question.
As plainly stated in the William Penn Broadcasting case, supra, the petition,
in an incumbent union situation, must raise a real question concerning repre-
sentation and one of the factors to be established by the General Counsel is the
appropriateness of the unit sought by the petitioning union.
Here, neither the
General Counsel nor the Packinghouse Workers adduced any evidence in sup-
port of the unit allegation in the complaint.
On the other hand, the Respondent
and the Intervenor produced evidence, which is uncontradicted and credited by
the undersigned, showing that since 1941 the Company and Mission have en-
gaged in joint negotiations with the Meat Cutters and have continuously had,
separate, but identical, contracts with the Union. In 1948, at a time when these
companies were under current agreements, contracts between Berry and Alamo-
and the Meat Cutters expired or were about to expire. Thereupon officials of
Berry and Alamo met with those of the Company and Mission to discuss their
"mutual problems" and for the purpose of engaging in joint negotiations in re-
spect to contract terms.
Williams likewise was anxious to conduct negotiations
in this manner so he served notice upon the Company and Mission to reopen their-
contracts.
Joint conferences were then held between the parties with Williams
representing the Meat Cutters and Clifton acting as principal representative
for the four companies.
As a consequence of these negotiations the Company
and Mission signed supplemental agreements, while Berry and Alamo executed
new contracts, each of which was identical in terms and effective until Decem-
ber 15, 1949, subject to the provisions of an automatic renewal clause. Although
Williams gave notice of his intention to reopen the agreements in 1949," appar-
ently no negotiations were conducted, but in any event the agreements, in ac-
cordance with the automatic renewal clause, were extended to December 15, 1950.
As appears above, the Packinghouse Workers filed a representation petition
against the Company on October 30, and while the petition was pending, the-
Company together with the other three packers renewed its agreement with the-
Meat Cutters.
Of course, the Board has for many years recognized the right of independent
employers to engage in joint collective bargaining negotiations, either as mem-
bers of an association or by individual designations of a joint bargaining agent
and where requested will establish a multiemployer unit. Speaking upon this-
subject the Board, in its Fourteenth Annual Report (1949) (pp. 35-37) stated:
The Board has continued to protect multiplant and multiemployer units
which have stood the test of time... .
In determining whether or not a proposed unit consisting of several inde-
pendent and competing employers is appropriate the Board gives special
weight to the history of collective bargaining. It has been the Board's policy
for several years to find a multiemployer unit appropriate where all the
employers in the group, either as members of an association or otherwise,-
Williams conceded be filed separate petitions against the companies in order to expedite-
the resolution of the question that the companies, in addition to the 60-day notice given,
by him, were also entitled to 30 days under the provisions of the agreements
The records
of the Board disclose that petitions, numbered 39-RC-150, 151, 152, 153, were filed
against the respective companies on December 12, 1949, and were withdrawn on January-
12, 1950, for the reason that no question concerning representation, existed.
ROEGELEIN PROVISION COMPANY
841
have jointly engaged in collective bargaining with a single union repre-
senting all their employees.
In accordance with this policy the Board in Johnson Optical Company, at al.,ll
found a multiemployer unit appropriate despite the fact that the employers
concurred in the petitioning union's request for separate units, where the em-
ployers had bargained for 13 years as a group and their agreement with the
union for separate units was unaccompanied by any indication they intended
to abandon their concerted course of action on labor relations.
Further, in
Associated Shoe Industries of Southeastern Mass., Inc., at al.,12 the Board held
that the "essential element" for establishing a multiemployer unit "is partici-
pation by a group of employers whether members or nonmembers of an associ-
ation, either personally or through an authorized representative, in joint negoti-
ations."
However, the Board cautioned that participation in joint negotiations
resulting in the employers signing "significantly divergent contracts" would
not support a finding of an appropriate multiemployer unit.
The foregoing principles were plainly restated by the Board in Bunker Hill and
Sullivan Mining and Concentrating Company, et al. (89 NLRB 243). In this
case the electricians petitioned for a craft unit on a multiemployer basis em-
bracing about 22 employers .
Prior thereto the companies had separate agree-
ments with a rival industrial union which included the electricians, and the
employers urged that the unit sought by the electricians was inappropriate as
to the particular craft as well as the scope thereof.
The Board found the elec-
trical employees to be "a readily identifiable group" and a proper unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining.
The Board further found that the unit should
be on a multiemployer basis in the light of the prior history of collective bar-
gaining between the employers and the rival union. The history reveals that
"no Employer association as such" existed, but for 7 years representatives of
the employers and the rival union met at the same time and place and engaged
in negotiations which resulted in the signing of separate but identical contracts
between the various employers and the union. The companies contended these
negotiations were "concurrent" rather than "joint" since no employer authorized
anyone to bind him, except his own representative; each employer reserved the
right to insist on different provisions during the negotiations, and to determine
whether he would sign any agreement reached. Similarly, after the execution
of the contracts, all grievances arising thereunder were processed on an indi-
vidual-employer rather than a multiemployer basis.
The Board, after rejecting
the contention that the employers had engaged in "concurrent" as distinguished
from "joint" bargaining stated held that the essential element for establishing
n nmltiemployer unit is participation by a group of employers in joint bargain-
ing negotiations.
Under all the circumstances the Board stated that the par-
ticipating employers,13 "manifested a desire to be bound in collective bargaining
by group rather than by individual action" and, without combining into a
formal association, conducted negotiations on a joint basis "accordingly, we
find therefore that there exits an established pattern of multiemployer bargaining
which controls the type of unit appropriate. . . .
The facts in this case clearly establish, and the undersigned finds, that the
Company and Mission, for approximately 10 years, have conducted their collec-
tive bargaining relations with the Meat Cutters on the basis of joint negotiations.
1185 NLRB 895. See also, Fifteenth Annual Report
( 1950), pp. 47-48.
12 81 NLRB 224
13 The case was dismissed as to one employer who did not participate in the joint nego-
tiations
842
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
About 2 years ago Berry and Alamo abandoned individual bargaining with the
Meat Cutters and joined with the Company and Mission in negotiations with
the union.
Obviously these negotiations have been successful for the latter
companies have had continuous identical agreements with the Union since 1941,
and all four companies have had like agreements from 1948 to the present time.
Further, not only is there a complete absence of any evidence indicating a desire
on the part of the companies , or the union , to discontinue group bargaining but,
on the contrary , their representatives uniformly expressed their preference to
continue negotiations on that basis.
Under all the circumstances , the under-
signed finds that a multiemployer unit consisting of all production and mainte-
nance employees of the four companies, with the customary and statutory
exclusions, is, and was at all times material herein, appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining and, therefore , the single-employer unit alleged in the
representation petition and the complaint is inappropriate for such purposes.
Consequently, at the time the Company and the Meat Cutters renewed their
contract no real question concerning representation existed, hence the Company
in executing the same did not engage in any unfair labor practice.
The General Counsel also argues that the Meat Cutters did not represent an
uncoerced majority of the employees and much time was devoted at the hearing
to the fact that Williams presented authorization cards to the Company prior
to the signing of the contract .
It is undisputed that when Williams learned
some of his members had signed authorizations for the Packinghouse Workers
he contacted the members and obtained current authorizations and these cards
he exhibited to the Company in order to demonstrate his present majority. There
is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that the Company gave any assistance
to Williams in this respect or that the Union resorted to any coercive tactics in
obtaining the same.
The evidence therefore not only fails to support the con-
tention of the General Counsel but , on the contrary , convinces the undersigned
that the Meat Cutters did in fact represent a majority of the employees at
that time.
Finally, the General Counsel seemingly urges that the Company by granting
an increase in wages and a checkoff of union dues thereby rendered illegal support
to the Meat Cutters .
Under the circumstances the bare granting of these benefits
to the Meat Cutters is wholly insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the
Company in doing so was prompted by any ulterior motives.
(Of. The William
Penn Broadcasting case, supra.)
Upon the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case,
the undersigned makes the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The operations of the Respondent , Roegelein Provision Company, at its
plant located in San Antonio, Texas, occur in commerce , within the meaning
of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
2. National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, CUA, and Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America and Local Union No. 171,
AFL, are labor organizations within the meaning of'Section 2 (5) of the Act.
3. The Respondent , Roegelein Provision Company, has not engaged in unfair
labor practices as alleged in the complaint, within the meaning of Section 8
( a) (1) and (2) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]