Titan Metal Manufacturing Co.

872 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD criminatory action-in the case of Sturdivant , November 7, 1950; in the case of Archer, from that date which, had he been notified , would have resulted in his successful bidding on a posted vacancy-to the date when each is offered rein- statement . The quarterly periods, herein called quarters, shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which these employees normally would have earned for each quarter or portion thereof their net earnings." if any, in other employment during those periods . Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter. It will also be recommended that the Association be ordered to make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the calculation of the amounts of back pay due. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 266-B , AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Leo Sturdivant and A. E. Archer, thereby discouraging membership in a labor organ- ization, Salt River Valley Water Users Association has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, that Association has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 5. The Union has not engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (A ) and (2 ) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] 18 Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440. TITAN METAL MANUFAOrURINO COMPANY and FEDERAL LABOR UNION No. 19981, AFL. Case No. 6-CA.-880. June 24,1952 Decision and Order On October 29, 1951, Trial Examiner Bertram G. Eadie issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. 99 NLRB No. 139. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 873 The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rul- ings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and finds merit in the Respondent's exceptions for the reasons hereinafter set forth. The Trial Examiner found that Fred Hartswick was unlawfully dis- charged about July 1, 1950, and that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. We do not agree. The Respondent contends, in effect, that the precipitating cause for its disciplinary action against Hartswick was the notice posted by him on the plant bulletin board on June 30, 1950, concerning Sunday work, and that, "in fixing the penalty of discharge," it con- sidered as "background" and "reviewed" certain past incidents in- volving Hartswick. The vice of the June 30 incident, as stated by the Respondent at the time of the discharge, was that Hartswick, in post- ing the notice (1) issued false information to the employees, (2) vio- lated the contract between the Respondent and the Union, and (3) overstepped his authority as chief union steward.' The Trial Examiner, however, found that Hartswick's union activities since 1945 were the "compelling influences" behind the discharge, and that the reasons assigned at the time of the discharge were without sub- stance and "in fact were an excuse and subterfuge" to cover the real motivation for the discharge. The operative facts in the case established by the credible and largely uncontradicted testimony are as follows : The contracts between the Respondent and the Union in effect be- tween August 1946 and August 1948 provided, inter alia, that The regular work week shall be forty (40) hours per week, pro- vided that [except for certain necessary maintenance work, etc.] no work shall be performed on Sundays after January 1, 1947. . . . In 1948, the Respondent and union representatives met to negotiate a new contract. In the course of these negotiations the question of Sunday work was raised, the Union wanting to "spell the work week out" and provide for double time for Sunday work. Business was poor at the time, and the Respondent took the position, "You're not going to get any of it anyway . . . let's forget it and let it out." The contract finally agreed to, covering the period from August 1948 to August 1949, contained the following wage and hour provisions : 1 The Trial Examiner has viewed reason (3) as embracing reasons (1) and (2). This treatment is warranted by the record, and we have accorded to reason (3) the same com- prehensiveness as the Trial Examiner. 874 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The regular workweek shall be from 7: 00 A. M. Monday to 7: 00 A. M. Saturday. Time and one-half shall be paid for all work performed over forty (40) hours per week and for Armis- tice Day . . . Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. Where work is scheduled for any Saturday and an employee is so notified, it is the duty of the employee to work on Saturday unless he shall first have notified his foreman that he will not be available for work on such Saturday. No employee shall be laid off during the period of any regular workweek when any department or branch of a department is operating for the sole purpose of preventing an accumulation of overtime and thereby compelling such employee to work on a, Saturday or Sunday in order to acquire his minimum of forty hours. [Emphasis added.] Virtually the same provisions were included in the 2-year contract executed by the parties in August 1949, which contract was in effect during the critical period in this case. From the date of the execution of the 1948 contract until the early part of 1950, there was no occasion for Sunday work at the Respond- ent's plant. However, business conditions then improved and Sunday work was necessary in certain departments. It was performed in the automatics department on May 14, 21, and 28, and on June 4, 11, 18, and 25. During this period many employees questioned Hartswick, who was then chief department steward in the automatics depart- ment,2 about the matter of Sunday work. Hartswick told them that there was nothing in the contract to prohibit them from working on Sunday and that "it was entirely up to them . . . but if they worked on Sunday, they were not covered by our contract." At a union meeting on May 1, Hartswick made substantially the same observation to the assembled members. Twice during this same period, about 2 or 3 weeks before the posting incident, Hartswick complained to Hinds, the foreman of the automatics department, about Sunday work and produced a copy of the 1947-1948 contract which, as appears above, prohibited Sunday work. When Hinds told him that the prohibition was not included in the 1949 contract which was then operative, Hartswick remarked that "it should have been." According to Hartswick, Hinds also told him that "this Sun- day work would only be for maybe two or three weeks, something like that." ' Hartswick served as chief steward of the automatics department from 1946 to the date of his discharge. In 1947 he also served as vice president of the Union , and in 1948, as president and a member of the grievance committee. He was returned to the presidency in 1950, from which office he resigned the early part of June , before his discharge. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 875 On Friday, June 30, at about 2 p. in., Hinds posted a notice an- nouncing that work would be available for certain named employees on the following Saturday and Sunday . A few minutes after post- ing this announcement Hinds met Hartswick as the latter was com- ing out of Hinds' office. At this meeting, Hartswick told Hinds : "I'm going to put up a god -damn notice and stop this Saturday work." Shortly thereafter, Hartswick posted the following notice on a tool box in the cribroom where he worked : JUNE 30, 1950 To All Union Members in Automatic Dept.: Anyone working in production on Sundays , which is against the contract, do not ask for any help from your department steward or your Local Union , 19981 in case you get in any trouble. FRED HARTSWICK, Chief Dept. Steward. When Hinds observed the notice a few minutes later , he told Harts- wick to remove it from the tool box and place it on the bulletin board. Later the same day, Hartswick 's notice was brought to the atten- tion of Philip B. Ray, the Respondent's manager of industrial re- lations, and at approximately 4 p. m._it was removed from the bulletin board. On the next day, the Respondent 's penalty committee, consist- ing of Ray, Works Manager Tressler, and Superintendent Crispen, met and decided to discharge Hartswick. On Monday, July 3, Harts- wick was advised that he was being discharged because, in posting the above notice, he had issued false information to the employees, violated the contract, and overstepped his authority as a department steward. On July 5, the Respondent and the Union 's grievance com- mittee met concerning Hartswick . The union representatives did not challenge Respondent's decision to discipline Hartswick ; they argued only that the penalty imposed was too severe . The Respondent ad- hered to its original position and, in support thereof, pointed to certain prior incidents involving Hartswick. Those incidents are as follows: 1. In 1945, 14 employees, including Hartswick, were discharged (but later reinstated) allegedly because they punched out before the 3 o'clock whistle blew, in violation of a company rule. The Respondent charged Hartswick with being the instigator of the incident. 2. Sometime in 1948 or early in 1949 , the Respondent eliminated the 15-minute rest and eating period theretofore allowed the employees in the morning. Hartswick, acting as president of the Union, there- upon ordered the Union's secretary to prepare and post notices advis- ing the employees that an article in the Union 's contract with the Respondent permitted them to "go to ... [their] lunch pail at any time during the working hours and eat a sandwich or equivalent as 876 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD long as ... [they] didn't abuse the time." 8 However, the notice pre- pared and posted by the Union's secretary told the employees that they were free to eat their lunch during any part of the working day. 3. Shortly after Hartswick again became president of the Union in 1950, he insisted upon participating in the grievance meetings with the Respondent as a sixth member of the Union's grievance committee. The contract between the Union and the Respondent provided for a union grievance committee of only five members. 4. In May 1950, the Respondent was using its employees to construct, an addition to its plant. On May 2 the regional director for the AFL sent the following telegram to Hartswick, with instructions that he deliver it to Ray : Director of Organization request that members of Federal Labor Union 19981 comply with my wire of April 26, that Federal Labor Union members refrain immediately from doing new con- struction work at Titan Metal Manufacturing Company ... as per our contract covering only production and maintenance workers. Early the next morning Hartswick delivered the telegram to Ramish, the foreman supervising the construction job, and not to Ray. At the same time he told Ramish not to assign any more employees to the construction work, and notified him that he had appointed the plant janitor "to see that no one would work on this job." 5. In 1946, the Union and the Respondent jointly agreed to the formation of the Titan welfare committee. The purpose of the com- mittee was to raise funds, by way of employee contributions, to be used for making donations on behalf of the employees to worthy causes approved by the committee, such as the Red Cross, the Infantile Paralysis Fund, and the Community Welfare Association, and to provide for sick and personal disaster benefits. It was the hope of the Union and the Respondent thus to eliminate individual soliciting in the plant. The committee is composed of three union members and Ray, who' is its treasurer. When it was first formed, union and nonunion em- ployees and "Company personnel" made contributions to the fund. After the Respondent agreed to a union shop, the "Company per- sonnel" formed a welfare committee of their own. The Respondent 8 The precise date of the incident under discussion is not fixed in the record. Nothing in the 1947-48 contract, which was effective between April 14, 1947, and August 11, 1948, or in the 1948-49 contract, which was effective between August 11, 1948 , and August 11, 1949, gave employees the right claimed by Hartswick on this occasion . An appendage to the 1947-48 contract entitled "Company Policies," which was not made part of the con- tract, provided: Most departments work a regular eight -hour shift which includes a fifteen-minute rest period and a thirty-minute lunch period. Employees should consult foreman for detailed schedule in any particular department. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 877 has undertaken at its own expense to deduct the employees' contribu- tions from their pay and to keep records thereof. In the latter part of 1949, the committee pledged $1,200 to the Centre County Hospital, payable in monthly installments of $100. Payments on this pledge were made for the period covering October, November, and December 1949, and January 1950. When Hartswick again took over as president of the Union in January 1950, he took steps to stop payments on the pledge. Thus, in February he appointed Claude Poorman to the committee in place of Daniel Richmond, who had honored the commitment made to the hospital. When the com- mittee next met, Poorman notified Ray that "by orders of Mr. Harts- wick the committee was not allowed to issue any more checks to the ... Hospital." Still not satisfied with the way the committee was functioning, Hartswick removed Poorman from the committee and appointed himself to that office. Thereafter, at a meeting of the committee held on June 23, Hartswick made it plain that he would not sign any checks payable to the hospital -4 The Trial Examiner concluded from all the foregoing that the reasons assigned on July 3 for the discharge lacked substance and were mere pretexts, and that prior incidents dating back to 1945 were the "compelling influences" behind the discharge. He found, inter alia, that Sunday work on June 30 was "against the contract" and that the notice posted by Hartswick did not, therefore, contain false informa- tion. He also found that the posted information was, in any event, "conscientiously advanced by Hartswick in an endeavor to carry out his prescribed duties as chief shop steward for the Union." We do not agree with either of these subsidiary findings. As to the propriety of Sunday work under the contract, it is quite clear that the 1949 contract contains no express probihition against Sunday work. The proscription against such work contained in the earlier contracts was deliberately omitted from the 1949 contract. Nor do we find any implied prohibition against Sunday work in that the contract fixes the regular workweek as being from "7 : 00 A. M. Mon- day to 7: 00 A. M. Saturday," and fails to provide the rate of pay for Sunday work, as the Trial Examiner rationalizes. For, we note that the contract does recognize the possibility of Sunday work in those cases, at least, where an employee has not averaged 40 hours during the regular workweek.5 Nor is there any basis for exculpating Hartswick's conduct on the ground that the conduct misrepresenting the contract in the matter of Sunday work was conscientiously advanced in pursuit of his duties 4 After Hartswick left the Respondent's employ in July, payments on the pledge were completed by the committee. 6 Significantly , so far as the record discloses, no union representative other than Harts- wick protested the Respondent 's inauguration of Sunday work. 878 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as chief steward. The events surrounding the posting convince us that the notice did not reflect Hartswick's honest opinion about the validity under the contract of Sunday work and that it was not posted by Hartswick in a good faith endeavor to carry out his union duties. Thus, as detailed above, the record shows that (a) Hartswick was op- posed to Sunday work after it was started by the Respondent; (b) Foreman Hinds made it plain to Hartswick before June 30 that the 1949 contract did not contain the prohibition against Sunday work which was included in the 1947-48 contract, and Hartswick himself advised employees on many occasions before June 30 that Sunday work was not forbidden by the 1949 contract; (c) after learning about Hinds' announcement of Sunday work on June 30, Hartswick told Hinds that he was "going to put up a god-damn notice and stop this Sunday work"; 6 and (d) following his threat to put a stop to Sunday work, Hartswick posted the notice in question telling the employees that Sunday work was "against the contract" and not to expect help from the Union if they got into trouble by working on Sundays. Moreover, Hartswick's attempted explanation at the hearing is clearly vulnerable and therefore unacceptable. Thus, although Harts- wick testified on the one hand that in his opinion Sunday work was an infraction or violation of the contract, he also testified that Sunday work was not illegal and that there was nothing in the contract to prohibit it. Also, his testimony that the notice was posted for the purpose of answering the many questions being asked by employees about Sunday work is virtually impossible to reconcile with his state- ment to Hinds, before posting the notice, that he was going to "put up a god-damn notice and stop this Sunday work." 7 On the basis of all the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and find, that Sunday work was not "against the contract," that the notice posted by Hartswick misrepresented the contract in this respect, and that this 6 It is noteworthy that June 30 was about the time when , according to Hinds' earlier statement to Hartswick , Sunday work was to have been discontinued. In this connection , the record contains the following testimony by Hartswick Q. I think I understood you to say , in response to a question . . . asking why you posted notice .. . . that you wanted the employees to know about Sunday work so that they would know whether they might be penalized relative to Sunday work , and also you told them that it was up to the individuals whether he would work on Sunday. Those are the reasons why you posted the notice? A. That is right. Q. Well now, you don't say anything in your notice at all about it being up to the individual whether he wanted to work, did you? A. They were told that. Q. They were told that , but you didn't put it in the notice A. No, sir. Q Why didn't you put it in the notice? A. I thought that that was all that m as necessary. Q And did you tell them in the notice they would not be penalized if they worked on Sunday? A. I did not. ' Q. And why didn 't you do that? A. I thought the notice was sufficient, what I had written on it. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 879 -was a deliberate misrepresentation on the part of Hartswick, who posted the notice for the purpose of putting a stop to work which was objectionable to him. Accordingly, to the extent that the Re- spondent is found to have been motivated by this conduct," which it viewed as an overstepping of Hartswick's authority as a shop steward, there was no violation of the Act. Nor was there any violation of the Act in the Respondent's admitted reliance in part, in arriving at its decision to discharge Hartswick, on Hartswick's conduct in the several incidents described above. With respect to the 1945 incident involving the discharge of Hartswick and 13 other employees, there is no basis whatever for finding that Hartswick's participation in that incident was in any way related to union or concerted activity which is protected by the Act. As for the other incidents, even assuming arguendo that Hartswick's involvement in each of them was related to the discharge of his duties as an officer of the Union, the totality of the evidence persuades us that in all of them Hartswick gave the Respondent good reason to be annoyed with his behavior and that it was the Respondent's annoyance with this aspect of Hartswick's activity, rather than with any legitimate pro- tected activity by him that may also have been involved, that influenced the Respondent in its decision to terminate Hartswick s Thus, the notice posted concerning eating time, whose accuracy was Hartswick's responsibility, admittedly misrepresented whatever contract was in effect at the time; Hartswick's attempts in 1950 to impose himself as a sixth member of the Union's grievance committee was in conflict with the provisions of the contract calling for a five-man grievance committee; although Hartswick was instructed merely to deliver the May 1950 telegram to Ray, he delivered it to the foreman on the con- struction job, ordered that person not to use the Respondent's employ- ees on the job, and indicated that he had appointed the Respondent's janitor to see that none of the Respondent's employees worked on the job; and Hartswick was responsible for dishonoring the pledge to the hospital theretofore made, and lived up to, by representatives of the Respondent and the Union. Furthermore, there is no evidence at 8 Although , like the Trial Examiner, we are not persuaded by the Respondent 's conten- tion that Hartswick violated the contract by posting the notice without prior clearance from the personnel office , we find, on the basis of the entire record , including the absence therein of any evidence of union animus on the Respondent 's part, as appears more fully hereinafter , that this does not impair our finding as to the validity of the other reasons assigned for the discharge However, in agreeing that the Respondent cannot properly rely on the failure of Hartswick to obtain prior clearance , we do not adopt the Trial Examiner 's finding that , in view of the attending circumstances , the posting "became the act of the Respondent through the agency of Hinds." The record evidence in this con- nection satisfies us that Hinds was doing no more than giving consent to the mere act of posting, and not approving the contents of, the notice. 8 The Board has found discharges under similar circumstances not to be unfair labor practices : Fred A. Snow Company, 53 NLRB 977 ; Converse Bridge & Steel Company, 49 NLRB 374; Briggs Manufacturing Company, 75 NLRB 569. 880 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD all in the record of any union animus on the part of the Respondent, or any other evidence tending to show that as of June 30 the Respond- ent was determined, or even anxious, to rid itself of Hartswick. In addition, the relationship between the Respondent and the Union appears always to have been harmonious and, apart from the alleged discriminatory discharge of Hartswick, no other unfair labor practices have either been charged or alleged in the complaint. On the basis of all the foregoing, and the entire record, we there- fore find that the preponderance of the evidence fails to establish that Hartswick was discriminatorily discharged. We shall dismiss the complaint. Order Upon the entire record in the case, and pusuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint issued herein against the Respondent, Titan Metal Manufacturing Company, be, and it hereby is, dismissed. Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge duly filed November 2, 1950, by Federal Labor Union No. 19981, AFL, herein referred to as the Union, the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as the Board, by the Regional Director for the Sixth Region (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania), issued a complaint dated July 3, 1951, against Titan Metal Manufacturing Company, herein referred to as the Respondent. The complaint alleged that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein referred to as the Act. Copies of the charge, complaint, and notice of hearing were duly served on the Respondent. With respect to the unfair labor practices, the complaint alleges in substance that the Respondent, on or about July 1, 1950, discharged Fred Hartswick from its employ, and has since failed and refused to reinstate or reemploy him to his former or substantially equivalent position or employment, because of his mem- bership and activities in the Union, and that he engaged in concerted activities with other employees of Respondent for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protection, and in order to discourage membership in the Union ; and that Respondent did discriminate and is now discriminating in regard to hire, tenure, and conditions of employment in order to discourage membership in the Union, and by all of said acts has engaged in and is now engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The Respondent filed its answer in which it admitted the jurisdictional allega- tions in the complaint but denied the commission of unfair labor practices. It pleaded in its answer that Fred Hartswick was discharged by the Company for posting false information, violating an existing contract between the Com- pany and the Union, and exceeding his authority as a steward. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 881 Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held August 13 to 15, 1951, at Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, before Bertram G. Eadie, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and Respondent were repre- sented by counsel, the Union by its regional director. All parties participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross- examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues. At the close of the hearing, the General Counsel moved to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to names, dates, and other formal and nonsubstantive matters. A similar motion was made by counsel for Respondent relative to the answer ; without objections from either counsel both motions were granted. The General Counsel presented oral argument at the close of the whole case. Motions were made by counsel for Respondent for dismissal of the complaint both at the close of the General Counsel's case and again at the close of the whole case. The determination of the motions was reserved and is now denied. A brief has been received from the Respondent and has been duly considered. Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINLSS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, at all times material herein, owned, operated, and maintained a manufacturing plant at Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, employing approximately 1,200 employees and was and is engaged in the manufacture; sale, and distribu- tion of brass rods, screw machine products, forgings, and brass die castings. In the course and conduct of its business during the 12-month period ending June 30, 1951, the Company purchased for use at its Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, plant, raw materials and supplies valued in excess of $15,600,000, of which all were, shipped to the Company's plant from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ; that during the 12-month period ending June 30, 1951, the Company manufactured and sold finished products valued in excess of $24,000,000, of which approximately 75 percent was sold and shipped to points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Respondent admits in its answer the jurisdictional allegations contained in the complaint and at the hearing stipulated that Respondent, at all material times herein mentioned, was engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and the Trial Examiner so finds. H. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Federal Labor Union No. 19981, AFL is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2 (5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Summary of uncontroverted facts The Respondent operated 6 plants in the manufacture of machine parts all located within the city of Bellefonte but all considerable distances from each other. The automatics department, employing approximately 40 employees, was housed in building No. 1, together with the die casting department. A bulletin board was located in that building in close proximity to the time clock and was used jointly by the 2 departments. 882 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD During World War II and for a short period of time thereafter , the Respondent operated its plants on a schedule of three shifts a day, 7 days a week. The 7-day week was inaugurated during the war by authority of an Executive Order of the President of the United States. While the order was in effect , its terms were carried out and the employees were compensated at a double-time rate for their Sunday services. The agreement executed by the Respondent and the Union , dated September 1946, for the period of 1 year from August 11, 1946, contained a clause to the effect, to wit : (a) The regular work week shall be forty (40) hours per week, provided that no work shall be performed on Sundays after January 1, 1947, except such work as may be necessary to the repair, maintenance, safety and preservation of the plant and its facilities... . A subsequent agreement, dated April 14, 1947, contained the same paragraph covering the period terminating August 11, 1948. In the succeeding agreement between the Respondent and the Union covering the period terminating August 11 , 1949, that paragraph was omitted , and the following paragraphs were inserted in its place , to wit : (a) The regular work week shall be from 7: 00 A. M. Monday to 7: 00 A. M. Saturday . Time and one-half shall be paid for all work performed over ( 40) hours per week and for Armistice Day (November 11), Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas Day. Where work is scheduled for any Saturday and an employee is so notified, it is the duty of the employee to work on Saturday unless he shall first have notified his foreman that he will not be available for work on such Saturday. 11 (b) No employee shall be laid off during the period of any regular work week when any department or branch of a department is operating , for the sole purpose of preventing an accumulation of overtime and thereby com- pelling such employee to work on a Saturday or Sunday in order to acquire his minimum of forty hours . In the event that economic conditions necessi- tate the use of the "Swing Shift," this paragraph shall be subject to rene- gotiation upon notice by the Company to the Union. The foregoing paragraph was contained in the subsequent agreement covering the period of operation from August 11, 1949, to August 11, 1951 . It will be noted that Hartswick was discharged during this period. Hartswick had been an employee of Respondent since September 20, 1939. He entered Respondent's employ in its forge shop, worked in that shop for approximately 1 year, was then transferred to the automatics department where he was engaged as a machine operator and continued as such for approximately 10 years. In 1949 he became tool crib attendant in that department. He was engaged during his employment with Respondent in the following union activities : In 1946, he was elected chief department steward for the automatics depart- ment, and held that position continuously until after his discharge by Respondent. In 1947, he was vice president of the Union ; and during 1948-49, he was president of the Union and a member of the grievance committee . In 1950, he again was president of the Union and resigned as such in May 1950. The question of Sunday work was discussed by employees at a union meeting. No formal action was taken by it, however , in regard thereto except on one TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 883 occasion at the end of 1947, when Arthur R. Auman, the chairman of the grievance committee, in the presence of and at the request of Respondent and the members of that committee, called the Pittsburgh office of the Union and informed the parent union of Respondent's desire to work on a particular Sunday. Arthur R. Auman, the then chairman of that committee, testified credibly as to that transaction as follows : That the Company had one customer who was willing to pay the premium price of time and one half if they could get a certain forging out. And I think they used the argument that they only had one die, and they would have to work over a weekend to get it out. And they wanted to know whether we would violate the contract and work that Sunday. Mr. Tressler knows about that. Phil Ray stepped out of his office and turned the office over to me to call Pittsburgh. The entire Grievance Committee was there. I called them and asked for advice on what to do in cases like that. It was a violation of the contract, according to what was accepted by the member- ship. And the advice to me was that it was close to negotiation time and that it would put us in better relationship with the Company, and don't force anybody to do it. If they can get men, let them go themselves, if they can get men from the Forge Shop to work on Sunday, okay, we are willing to violate it, decide the contract on that. And that was the informa- tion that I gave to Mr. Ray when he came back in the room. Q. Well, the Company. .. . A. And we got plenty of hell over that. The Respondent operated on the Sunday for which permission was granted to it regardless of the terms of the contract for that period . The question of Sunday work was always present and again was raised in the negotiation of the 1049-51 contract. The provision of the previous contract forbidding it was eliminated in the newly executed contract. Hartswick was elected to the presidency of the Union for the year 1950, after the contract went into effect. Although the members of the grievance committee had been elected to membership on that committee by the members of the Union, Hartswick insisted that he had a right to membership thereon as president of the Union. In protesting on behalf of the Respondent to Hartswick's participation in the meetings of the committee , Philip B. Ray, manager of industrial relations for the Respondent , urged that Hartswick 's presence at the committee meetings was unauthorized by the contract between the Union and the Company, which provided for a grievance committee of five and not six in membership . Harts- wick, as president of the Union , dismissed the chairman of the welfare committee and appointed a new chairman , and in a space of weeks substituted himself as chairman of that committee. Ray was one of the members of that committee. Although he was not a member of the Union , he took exception to Hartswick's criticism of the actions of the committee and in his actions in dismissing , or dis- charging, the chairman on the two occasions and substituting himself. From the inception of the welfare committee, Ray had acted as its treasurer and Respond- ent's representative in transferring the employees' contributions from the Re- spondent into the hands of the committee . With the approval of the committee a commitment had been made to the Bellefonte Hospital . Hartswick, when he became president of the Union, opposed the payment of the contributions to the hospital contrary to Ray 's support of it. The divergence of the opinions of Ray and Hartswick culminated in his action in appointing himself as chairman of the committee. 884 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In May of 1950, Hartswick received a telegram' from Peter M. McGavin, regional director for the Union for the Western District of Pennsylvania, which he delivered to John Ramish, foreman of the general factory department. It had been received the previous evening by Hartswick at his home and was delivered the following morning, a few minutes before 7 a. in. Ramish at the time had assembled a crew to start the erection of a building that morning on the premises of Respondent. Upon receipt of the telegram, Ramish decided not to proceed with the construction and put his crew at other tasks. When higher officials arrived at the plant at approximately 8 a. in., Ramish reported to them the reason he had not proceeded with the work was that Hartswick had delivered the telegram and warned him not to proceed. Ray thereupon contacted the union officials at Pittsburgh, and the matter was amicably adjusted and the work was then commenced. Hartswick had previously caused a notice to be posted on the bulletin board in regard to the luncheon period. That notice was prepared by the then secretary of the Union at Hartswick's direction. It was signed by him and posted upon the bulletin board. Almost immediately thereafter Hartswick was called to the office of the plant superintendent. The notice and the manner of posting it was objected to by Ray. A new notice was drafted by Ray and Hartswick, more in conformity with the terms of the contract, and placed upon the bulletin board in its place and stead. Hartswick admitted that the first notice was in error and was not in accordance with his instructions to the secretary of the Union who had prepared it. On the afternoon of June 30, 1950, at approximately 2 o'clocky John E. Hinds, a foreman of the automatics department, posted a notice on the joint bulletin board for the die casting and the automatics departments, to the effect that there would be work for certain men, naming them, in the automatics department on the following Saturday and Sunday. It was not the first time that such a notice relating to Saturday or Sunday work had been posted on the bulletin board by him. He did not know when the custom had been first established but he thought that it had been commenced sometime in May 1950. Before posting the notice, he had had two previous conversations with Hartswick on the subject matter of Sun- day work. On each of these occasions Hartswick produced and referred to a printed copy of the 1947-48 contract which prohibited Sunday work. Hinds pointed out to him that under the 1949-51 contract there was no such prohibition. Hartswick, however, contended that the provisions contained in the previous con- tracts negotiated for the years 1947-48 and 1948-49 should have been incorporated in the 1949-51 current contract, and further that the 1948-49 contract did not au- thorize Sunday work. Hartswick had been one of the negotiators for the Union leading to the execution of the contracts for the years 1947-48 and 1948-49. He was not, however, one of the negotiators for the contract under which the Respondent and Union were then operating, although at the time It became effective he was president of the Union. The Respondent distributed to each of its employees printed copies of the contracts which it had entered into with the Union, shortly after their execution by the parties. 1 Fred Hartswlck, 109 Hartswick Ave., State College, Penn. : Director of Organization Request That Members of Federal Labor Union 19981 Comply With My Wire of April 26, That Federal Labor Union Members Refrain Im- mediately From Doing New Construction Work at Titan Metal Manufacturing Com- pany Bellefonte Pa as per Our Contract Covering Only Production and Maintenance Workers. PETER McG&vig. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 885 Hartswick had many discussions, at least 50, with employees relative to Sunday work in May and June, continuing up until he was discharged. Em- ployees of other departments sought his advice, as president, ex-president, ex- member of the grievance committee, and chief department shop steward, as to their rights in engaging in Sunday work under the terms of the 1949-51 contract. He advised them if they worked on Sundays they were on their own initiative and that if they did so, they would not be covered by the contract. Ninety per- cent of the employees inquiring of him were not in favor of Sunday work. Hartswick saw the notice which had been posted by Hinds and upon meeting with him a few minutes thereafter said, "I'm going to put up a god-damn notice and stop this Sunday work." He then prepared a notice 2 and attached it to a tool box in the tool crib room where he worked. The notice was as follows : JUNE 30, 1950. To All Union Members in Automatics Dept.: Anyone working in production work, on Sundays which is against the contract, do not ask for any help from your dept Steward or your Local Union, 19981 in case you get in any trouble. CHIEF DEPARTMENT STEWARD FRED HARTSWICK. The notice was observable to any one using the tool crib room. It was placed about 5 feet from the floor . Hinds, in passing through the room a few minutes after the notice had been tacked to the tool box, observed it and told Hartswick "to take it down off that little box and put it up on the bulletin board ." Hartswick took it down and posted it as directed by Hinds. Hinds and Hartswick both clocked out within a few minutes after the change was made and left the plant for the day. At about 2 : 45 p. m. that same afternoon Fred B. Yorks , the foreman of the die casting department, had his attention directed to the notice by two employees of his department. They had read both notices and consulted him as to their employment for the Sunday work. They were confused by the notice. He immediately brought the matter to the attention of the superintendent and the works manager of Respondent and after consulting with Ray, he was in- structed to remove the Hartswick notice from the bulletin board and bring it to the office of Ray. The notice was removed from the bulletin board between 4and4 : 15p.m. B. The discharge of Fred W. Hartswick Hinds left the plant after Hartswick had placed the notice on the bulletin board. He arrived home at about 6 p. m. and received a phone message from Ray to the effect that he should meet him at the plant the next morning. Ray, the personnel officer, Nessler , the superintendent, and Crispen, the plant man- ager, were there when Hinds arrived . Hinds signed the complaint 8 commonly known as a foreman's complaint, which had been prepared the preceding evening by the penalty committee, consisting of Ray, Tresser, and Crispen. Phillip B. Ray testified credibly in regard to the actions of the penalty committee pre- ceding the signing of the complaint by Hinds, as follows : Q. At the Saturday morning meeting, or the previous day, whichever it may have been? A. Well, we reviewed the discussion which we had had the previous eve- ning. At the same time several other matters were discussed , which had 2 G. C. Exhibit 3. 8 G. C. Exhibit 5. 215233-53-57 886 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a direct bearing in showing the attitude and past actions of the employee. And, on the basis of his posting this notice, the four of us decided, agreed that a penalty of discharge would be imposed. Q. And what was done with respect to this action? A. A foreman's complaint was prepared, signed by Mr. Hinds, and an original and three copies. Q. Can you tell us whether you were following the customary procedure in all respects with respect to the preparation of such a foreman's complaint. A. To the best of my knowledge yes. s • s s s s s Q. And what happened to these copies, if you know? A. Two of the copies were given to Mr. Hinds, one was mailed to the Union, and I kept one in my office for filing. On the following Wednesday morning, July 5, a meeting of the grievance committee of the Union was held at which Hartswick and the Respondent's representatives, Ray and Crispers, were present. Hinds was not in attendance, but was only called to the meeting when the conferees were informed that Hinds had instructed Hartswick to take down the notice which he had pinned up on his tool box and to put it up on the bulletin board. When Hinds appeared at the meeting he corroborated Hartswick's recital as to his acts in directing him to take the notice down and put it up on the bulletin board. Hinds testified credibly as follows: A. When I come back out I walked to the tool crib and Mr. Hartswick had the notice up on his tool box, which sat on top of another small cup- board, and I asked Mr. Hartswick if he wouldn't remove that and put it on the bulletin board where all notices belong, that the Company provided for company use or for Union use. O Q. What did you tell Mr. Hartswick if anything, when you saw the notice in the tool crib room? A. Yes, Sir, I asked him to remove that notice and to take it and put it up on the bulletin board. At the conference held in Ray's office by the members of the penalty committee at the time the complaint was formulated for the discharge of Hartswick, the previous actions of Hartswick as chief shop steward, president, member of the grievance committee, and chairman of the welfare committee were discussed. The subjects were again discussed the next morning in the presence of Hinds, prior to his signing the foremen's complaint. At the meeting of the grievance committee on July 5, 1950, the same subjects weie again brought into the dis- cussion by Ray who claimed Hartswick had exceeded his authority while presi- dent of the Union in attending a meeting of the grievance committee as an ex- oficio member of that committee ; that he also exceeded his authority in accept- ing the resignations of the chairmen of the welfare committee and appointing himself to that position. As chairman, Hartswick had questioned, on the part of the Union, certain contributions being made monthly to the Bellefonte Hospital. Ray was a member of that committee although he was not a union member. Ray also accused Hartswick of exceeding his authority in delivering to Ramish, a foreman, a telegram which he had received from union head- quarters advising the Respondent to forego the commencement of certain build- ing operations on company property, and then ordering Ramish to stop any further yvork thereon. Ray maintained that Hartswick, as chief shop steward, TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 887 was the cause of the layoff of 14 employees in 1945-46, and that he, as chief shop steward, had caused a notice several years ago to be placed on the bulletin board relating to a luncheon period provided for in the then contract, which had been improperly drawn and which did not follow the terms of the contract. The notice had been immediately called to the attention of Hartswick ; he admitted that the notice was improperly drawn. It was removed from the bulletin board and a notice was drafted by Ray in collaboration with him and substituted in its place. At the conferences among the members of the penalty committee, and at the meeting of the grievance committee at which the members of the penalty com- mittee were present, the above-mentioned subjects concerning Hartswick's ac- tivities were introduced for discussion by Ray. Respondent's contention is that these matters were background only and that the discharge of Hartswick was based solely on his actions in posting the notice on the bulletin board and that his prior actions as chief shop steward were not considered by it in discharging him. Conclusions Summarizing the facts of record it is found that there is a preponderance of substantial evidence that Hartswick at the request, order, or direction of his foreman during working hours took down and removed from his tool chest in the tool crib room the questioned notice and placed it upon the bulletin board, where it remained for less than 30 minutes. It was addressed "To all Union members in Automatics Dept." He had consistently opposed Sunday work, under the contract, at the union meetings and in his individual talks with employees in the automatics and other departments. His actions in drafting and posting the notice in the tool crib room were clearly in the performance of his duties as chief shop steward. He had been questioned by employees in regard to Sunday work. He steadfastly and honestly maintained that for the employees to work on Sundays was against the terms of the contract as there was no provision in it for Sunday work. He pointed out that the workweek began at 8 a. in. on Monday and closed at 8 a. in. on Saturday, according to the provisions of the contract. Whether his construction of the contract was proper or otherwise, it was not the premise of the Respondent to penalize him for his opinion in relation thereto, if that opinion was advanced or publicized under proper auspices. Certainly he had the right to advance his opinion to his fellow employees at their union meetings or when his advice was requested. The following paragraph is to be found in the foreman's complain, to wit : We contend that in posting this notice, Hartswick violated the contract and in doing so issued false information to employees of that department. Article XII of the contract provides as follows : The Company shall permit the use of bulletin boards in departments for posting notices concerning the meeting and functions of the Union. Before posting any such notices, the Union shall deliver a copy of the same to the personnel office of the company. The notice in question was placed on the bulletin board by Hartswick, acting in the capacity of chief shop steward of his department, under the authoriza- tion, direction, or order of Hinds, his foreman. Furthermore, Arthur R. Auman, chief department steward of plant No. 4, had posted a notice which was his opinion of a question that had arisen under a previous contract without pre- 888 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD viously filing it with the personnel office before posting and to which Respondent made no objection. The various foremen of the Respondent used the bulletin boards of their respective departments in posting notices to their employees without previous notices being filed with the personnel office. The notice relating to the luncheon period in a previous contract which Hartswick had posted on the bulletin board and which was found to be inaccurate was removed forthwith by the Respondent's official and the inaccuracy corrected. The Respondent had the right to place its notices on the bulletin board, if such notices were not in violation of the terms of its contract with the Union 4or did not constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. When Hinds, as Hartswick's foreman, authorized, consented to, ordered, or directed the post- ing of the notice on the bulletin board, it became the act of the Respondent through the agency of Hinds, and not the independent act of Hartswick for which he could be reasonably charged as violating the provisions of the contract. Did the notice contain false information? Hartswick's phraseology is as follows : Anyone working on production work on Sundays, which is against the contract, do not ask for any help from your department steward of your local Union 19981 in case you get in any trouble. Reiterating the foregoing facts, it has been found that the Respondent operated during World War II on Sundays at a double-time rate of pay for the employees, such operation took place by authority granted in an Executive Order of the President. At the termination of the war or shortly thereafter, the order was withdrawn, recalled, or rescinded, as it applied to future work. Thereupon the Union and Respondent entered into contracts between them which forbade Sunday work after January 1, 1947. On drafting the contract between the parties for the term 1949-51, which is the material period under which the questions herein arise, the contract was silent as to all mention of Sunday work. The contract contains the following provisions : The regular work week shall be from 7: 00 A. M. Monday to 7: 00 A. M. Saturday. Time and one half shall be paid for all work performed over (40) hours per week and for Armistice Day (November 11), Memorial Day, Fourth of July, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day. Where work is scheduled for any Saturday and an employee is so notified, either personally or by a bulletin being placed on the department bulletin board, not later than Friday, it shall be the duty of the employee to work on the Saturday specified, unless he shall have first notified his foreman not later than Friday, that he will not be available for work on such Saturday. If an employee fails to notify his foreman by Friday that he will not be available for work Saturday, such absence shall be covered with a fore- man's complaint. No employee shall be laid off during the period of any regular work week when any department or branch of a department is operating, for the sole purpose of preventing an accumulation of overtime and thereby compelling such employee to work on a Saturday or Sunday. In the event that economic conditions hereafter necessitate the use of the swing shift, this paragraph shall be subject to renegotiation upon notice by the company to the Union, except that the swing shift shall be permissable without negotiation when applied to jobs on continuous operation, such as plant firemen and guards. There are many forceable arguments in support of Hartswick's contention that Sunday work was "against the contract." (a) Was it outside of the contractual period, between 8 a. in. Monday and 8 a. in. Saturday? (b) Was any pay pro- TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY 889 vided for Sunday work? (c) If there was, did it fall under the overtime pro- visions of the contract, of time and a half for the employee who had completed 40 hours previously or straight pay if he had not completed 40 hours? The Trial Examiner is of the opinion and concludes that the notice does not contain false information ; if, however, he should accept the contention of the Respondent that it is false, it was conscientiously advanced by Hartswick in an endeavor to carry out his prescribed duties as chief shop steward for the Union. The foreman's complaint charges Hartswick under specification (3) with over- stepping his authority. If such charge applies to the posting of the notice on the bulletin board without the permission of the personnel office, it must fail, for the reason stated above that it was placed there at the direction of his foreman. If, however, it is directed at the contents of the notice, it is clearly a complaint against him for expressing his opinion as chief shop steward concerning the meaning of certain clauses contained in the contract which became his duty as such to advise his fellow employees. The Trial Examiner reaches the conclusion that the reasons given by Respond- ent for Hartswick's discharge were not the actual bona fide reasons for its action in so doing, but in fact were an excuse and subterfuge to cover its real purpose in ridding itself of an obnoxious employee to it, who had acquired lead- ership in the Union and had not followed the lines of least resistance. The Trial Examiner finds that Hartswick's actions as chief shop steward in the several instances hereinbefore set forth were the compelling influences which brought about and caused his discharge. In each of those instances he was acting clearly within his rights as chief shop steward, and while his actions clashed with the Respondent's desires they in no respect offered sufficient cause for discharge under the Act. The Trial Examiner reaches the conclusion that the Respondent discrimina- torily discharged Fred W. Hartswick from its employ on July 1, 1950, contrary to the provisions of the Act. The Trial Examiner finds on substantial creditable evidence which has not been rebutted that Fred W. Hartswick was discriminatorily discharged by Respondent from its employ on July 1, 1950, because of his activity on behalf of the Union ; that by his discharge Respondent discouraged membership in and activity on behalf of a labor organization and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Respondent thereby violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in Section III, above, occurring in connection with its operations described in Section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Since it has been found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent discriminated with respect to the hire and tenure of employment of Fred W. Hartwick by discharging him because of his union and concerted activities, it will therefore be recommended that Respondent 890 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD offer Fred W. Hartswick immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position , without prejudice to his seniority and other rights and privileges , and make him whole for any loss of pay he may have suf- fered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against him , consistent with the Board's policy of computing back pay. It will be recommended also that the loss of pay be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter, or portion thereof, during the period from the discriminatory action to the date of a proper offer of reinstatement to said employee . The quarterly periods, herein- after called "quarters," shall begin with the first day of January, April, July, and October . Loss of pay shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which he would normally have earned for each quarter , or portion thereof, his net 4 earnings, if any, in other employment during that period. Earnings in one particular quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability for any other quarter. It will also be recommended that Respondent make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the checking of the back pay due.` In the opinion of the Trial Examiner, Respondent's conduct discloses a fixed purpose to defeat self-organization and its objectives . Because of Respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying purpose the Trial Examiner is convinced that the unfair labor practices found are persuasively related to the other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act and that the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted un- less the recommendations are coextensive with the threat . In order , therefore, to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recur- rence of unfair labor practices , and to minimize strife which burdens and ob- structs commerce, and thus to effectuate the policies of the Act, it will be recom- mended that Respondent cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Trial Examiner makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Federal Labor Union No. 19981, AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Fred W. Hartswick , Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 3. By such discrimination and by interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] 4 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses, such as for transportation , room, and board, incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working elsewhere, which would not have been incurred but for the unlawful discrimination, and the conse- quent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere . Crossett Lumber Company, 8 NLRB 440 Monies received for work performed upon Federal , State, county , municipal, or other work-relief projects shall be considered earnings Republic Steel Corporation v N. L. R. B„ 311 U. S 7. 5 F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. HOWARD-COOPER CORPORATION Appendix A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 891 Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT discourage membership of our employees in FEDERAL LABOR UNION No. 19981, AFL, or in any other labor organization, by discriminating in regard to their .hire and tenure of employment, or in any other manner discriminating in regard to any other terms or conditions of employment. WE WILL offer Fred W. Hartswick immediate and full reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position without prejudice to any senior- ity or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. WE WILL NOT because of their union membership, affiliation, and activities, or in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist FEDERAL LABOR UNION No. 19981, AFL, or any other labor organi- zation, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be permitted by the pro- visions of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming or remaining members of the above-named union or any other labor organization except to the extent permitted by the provisions of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. We will not discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against any employees because of membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization. TITAN METAL MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Employer. By -------------------------------------------- Dated -------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. I-JOWARD-COOPER CORPORATION and INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS, LOCAL LODGE 1468, AFL. Case No. X6-CA-217. Jwiw 25,1952 Decision and Order On December 19, 1951, Trial Examiner A. Bruce Hunt issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the ;Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed ex- ceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief. 99 NLRB' No. 141.