Murray Corp. of America

MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA 313 'ent and by operation of law is bound to cooperate in dissipating its predecessor's unfair labor practices by recognizing and bargaining with the Union. Johnson is a successor to the Respondent within the meaning of the Alexander Milburn Company case, because he continued, without interruption, the business of his predecessor as a franchised Pontiac dealer, on substantially the same premises as his predecessor, and because the Respondent's employees became his employees immediately upon his accession to the business, with no substan- tial change in the nature of their duties, supervision, or the conditions under which they worked. As I understand the Alexander Milburn Company case this is all that is required to constitute Johnson a successor within the meaning of that decision. In its own summation of the case, the Board has stated that it therein "held a bona fide successor to be responsible for remedying the unfair labor practices of its predecessor, even though there was no showing that the successor was, in any sense, an alter ego or disguised continuance of the pred- ecessor, or that it participated with the predecessor in its violations of the Act." (Autopart Manufacturing Company, 91 NLRB 80, 81).' There is no such showing in the case at bar. The rationale in this line of cases appears to stem largely from the court's decision in N. L. R. B. v. Cotten, 105 F. 2d 179, 183 (C. A. 6, 1939), in which the court said, "It is the employing industry that is sought to be regulated and brought within the corrective and remedial provisions of the Act in the interest of industrial peace." I had not thought it clear, until I read the Autopart Manufacturing Company case (cited supra), that knowledge of the successor on acquiring the business of his predecessor of the pendency of unfair labor practice proceedings against the predecessor, was necessarily essential for holding a bona fide successor responsi- ble for remedying the unfair labor practices of his predecessor, but, in any event, Johnson had knowledge before he acquired the Respondent' s business of the pendency of unfair labor practice proceedings against the Respondent , and it is immaterial if in his mistaken belief that as new owner of the business he would nowise be bound to assume unfulfilled bargaining obligations of the Respondent, he failed to inform himself fully as to the nature and scope of those obligations'" Accordingly, it is held that the Respondent and Johnson are jointly and severally responsible for compliance with the terms of the Board's Decision and Order. 0 See also, Charles R. Krimm Lumber company, et al., 97 NLRB 1574; Indianapolis Wire-Bound Box Company, 93 NLRB 875; L. B. Hosiery Co., Incorporated, 88 NLRB 1000; Union Products Company, 75 NLRB 591; McCarron Co., 100 NLRB 1537. "The finding of knowledge is based on the testimony of Frank H. ' Stockdale, an officer of Respondent, that in January preceding the sale of the business to Johnson in February, he told Johnson that "there was a National Labor Relations Board order standing," and Johnson's admission that Stockdale told him that there had been an order requiring Respondent to bargain with the Union. MURRAY CORPORATION OF AMERICA-E CORSE PLANT and INTERNA• TIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW-CIO ) , PETITIONER. Case No. 7-RC-1722. November 14, 1952 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Emil C. Farkas, hear- 101 NLRB No. 75. 314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed.' Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. Upon the entire record in this case,2 the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of office and clerical em- ployees at the Employer's Ecorse, Michigan, plant. The Employer contends that only a unit including employees at both its Michigan plants is appropriate. The Employer, a manufacturer of aircraft and auto-truck parts, metal stampings, and household appliances, has plants located at Detroit and Ecorse, Michigan, and Scranton, Pennsylvania. The Detroit plant (known as the Main plant) and the Ecorse plant con- stitute the automotive division of the Employer's operations; the Scranton plant is the home appliance division. The general admin- istrative and executive offices of the Company are located at the Main plant. The Ecorse plant, the only plant involved in this proceeding, is located 14 miles from the Main plant. The two plants manufacture different products 3 and have different plant managers. Both, how- ever, are under the jurisdiction of the vice president in charge of the automotive division. Purchasing and general accounting for both are handled at the Main plant, and labor relations policies for both are established there. The Ecorse plant hires its own office and clerical employees. How- ever, the evaluation, administration, and control of salaries for both plants are determined at the Main plant, and all salaried payrolls are prepared there 4 Classifications, with one exception, are the same at both plants; and employees in the same classifications have similar 1 At the hearing, the Employer moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the unit requested by the Petitioner is inappropriate. The hearing officer referred the motion to the Board. For the reasons set forth Infra, the motion is hereby granted. 2 The Petitioner' s request for oral argument is hereby denied, as the record and the briefs, in our opinion , adequately set forth the issues and the positions of the parties. ' The Main plant manufactures automobile bodies, aircraft parts, airplane wing assemb- lies, and jet engines ; the Ecorse plant manufactures frames for passenger automobiles and civilian and military trucks. 4 The office and clerical employees are all salaried employee., MURRAY CORPORATION OF AN4^RICA 315 duties, skills, and rates of pay. Transfers from one plant to the other - re mead fro' time to time. All salaried employees have the same rights and privileges. Although there is no settled grievance pro- cedure for these employees, problems relating to them, if not settled at the plant level, ultimately clear through the director of industrial relations, located at the Main plant. There has been no history of bargaining for the Employer's office and clerical employees. In 1942, however, the Petitioner's Amalga- mated Local 889 petitioned for separate units of clerical employees at the Main and Ecorse plants. The Board found that the employees at both plants constituted a single appropriate unit, and directed an election therein.' Local 889 lost the election. Although the present petition covers only office and clerical employees at the Ecorse plant, the record shows that the Petitioner is also attempting to organize such employees at the Main plant. Since 1937, production and main- tenance employees at the Main and Ecorse plants have been repre- sented by the Petitioner's Local No. 2 under contracts covering both plants. The Petitioner contends that changes in the Employer's operations since the Board's decision in 1942 warrant a finding that the office and clerical employees at the Ecorse plant now constitute an appropriate unit. The record fails to show, however, that there have been any substantial changes. Because of the proximity of the two plants, the centralized control of labor, relations, and the similarity in the duties, skills, and working conditions of the office and clerical employees at both plants, we are convinced, as the Board previously found, that a multiplant unit would be appropriate. Furthermore, the history of bargaining for the production and maintenance employees demon- strates that multiplant bargaining is practicable c The only apparent reason for the Petitioner's request for a single-plant unit is the extent of its organization of the Employer's employees. Section 9 (c) (5), of the Act precludes a unit finding on that basis alone.7 We therefore find that the unit requested by the Petitioner is not appropriate. Accordingly, we shall dismiss the petition. Order IT 1S HEREBY ORDERED that the petition filed herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 5 The Murray Corporation of America, 45 NLRB 854. " The Board has recently indicated that it will no longer , in every instance, follow its former practice of requiring one group of employees to organize on a multiplant basis wherever other types of employees had previously organized themselves on that basis, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc , 101 NLRB 101. The history of bargaining of other employees of the same employer is, however , one of the factors to be considered in determining the appropriateness of a proposed unit. * Montgomery Ward d Co ., Incorporated, 90 NLRB 009.