Poultry Enterprises, Inc.

POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 211 All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named union or any other labor organization except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the amended Act. Dated ---------------- PARMA WATER LINTER COMPANY, Employer. By ---------------------------------- (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. and AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTIM34 & BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA , LOCAL 442, A. F. OF L. Case No. 10-CA-1!23. January 14, 1953 Decision and Order On July 9, 1952, Trial Examiner Sidney Lindner issued his Inter- mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief.' The General Counsel and the Union filed no exceptions. The Board 2 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing, and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed 3 The Board has considered the Inter- I The Respondent's request for oral argument is denied because in our opinion the record, exceptions , and brief adequately present the issues and positions of the parties. 2 Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [ Members Houston, Murdock, and Styles]. The Respondent requests the dismissal of the coinplaipt on the ground that the findings of the Trial- Examiner- are not supported, by the preponderance of the evideppe and the Trial Examiner demonstrated bias and prejudice in crediting only those witnesses whose testimony supported the complaint . It is the Board's established principle that a Trial Examiner's credibility findings are entitled to great weight, because in resolving conflicting testimony he is in a position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses . Wood Manufac- turing Company, 95 NLRB 633; Somerset Classics, Inc., 90 NLRB 1676. A careful analysis of the record reveals no bias or prejudice on the part of the Trial Examiner and persuades us that the Trial Examiner's findings in this case are supported by the preponderance of the evidence. The Respondent contends also that the complaint should be dismissed on grounds relating to the compliance status of the Local and the International . The fact of compliance by a labor organization which Is required to comply is a matter for administrative determina- tiou;;alnl is net 110e4ble4b-tho .Itles. Moreover , the Board is admidistratively satisfied that the Local and the International are, and have been, in comNia'nce *e all .material, times. See Sunbeam Corporation, 94 NLRB 844 ; Swift & Company, 94 NLRB 917 ; cf. Highland Park Manufacturing Company, 340 U. S. 929. We hereby deny the Respond- ent's motion to dismiss the complaint. 102 NLRB No. 27. 212 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD mediate Report,' the Respondent's exceptions and brief, and the en- tire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following addition : 5 Subsequent to the filing of its exceptions to the Intermediate Report, the Respondent on October 7, 1952, applied for leave to amend its answer to the complaint to the effect that it had received from its employees a statement that 145 of the 149 employees then on the pay- roll requested the Respondent not to recognize the Union. In the event the Board does not concede the accuracy of this statement, the Respondent desires the Board to reopen the record to take further evidence thereon. Where an employer has, as in the instant case, un- lawfully refused to bargain with a union which, at the time of such refusal, represented a majority of the employees, the Board finds it necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act to require the employer to bargain with the union, despite its failure thereafter to retain its majority e Consequently, further proof of such loss of majority could not affect our determination that the issuance of an order requiring the Respondent to bargain with the union is necessary to remedy its violation of Section 8 (a) (5). Accordingly, we hereby deny the application of the Respondent. Order Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, Poultry Enterprises, Inc., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Amalgamated Meat Cut- ters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., 4 We note and correct the following minor misstatements or inadvertent errors in the Intermediate Report, none of which affect the Trial Examiner's ultimate conclusions, or our concurrence therein : (1) The Trial Examiner stated that on February 23, 1951, the Union had been authorized by 73 employees of the 133 in the appropriate unit to represent them The record shows that 71 employees filed union authorization cards by the specified date (2) The Trial Examiner found that four of Respondent's witnesses remembered only that Martin had said nothing about closing the plant during the meetings called by the Respondent Although the testimony of these witnesses reveals that they could remember little else about the meetings , they did testify that Martin had said he would pay as much as the other plants in the community . Two of them also testified that Martin told the employees they could do as they pleased about joining or staying out of the Union. ( 1) Marvin Owen should read Marvin Owens. S The General Counsel contends that ( 1) Bennie Talton 's attendance at a union meeting on March 6, 1951 , and (2) a unilateral wage increase in June 1951 were violative of the Act. The Trial Examiner found it unnecessary to mule on the issue of surveillance by Talton and concluded that the wage increase was not contrary to the Act As there wer• no exceptions thereto, we shall not disturb these findings of the Trial Examiner. 6 See Geigy Company, Inc, 99 NLRB 822, and cases cited therein. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 213 as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. (b) Promising benefits to its employees to discourage self-organi- zation; threatening to close its plant if it has to deal with the Union; polling of the employees on the question of proceeding with union organization; interrogating its employees concerning their union affili- ations; preparing and distributing revocation forms to its employees which revoke authority previously given the Union to represent them in collective bargaining matters; and surveilling union meetings. (c) In any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec- tion or to refrain from any or all of such activities, as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza- tion as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., as the exclusive bargaining agent of all its employees in the afore- said unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant in Gainesville, Georgia, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report marked "Appendix A." 7 Copies of said notice to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof and main- tained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. T This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" the words "A Decision and Order" In the caption thereof. In the event this Order is enforced by a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the words, "Pursuant to a Decision and Order ," the words "Pursuant to a Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing vn Order." 250933-vol. 102-53-15 214 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. Intermediate Report and Recommended Order STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge and series of amended charges duly filed by Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., hereinafter called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the Tenth Region (Atlanta, Georgia), issued a com- plaint dated March 18, 1952, against Poultry Enterprises, Inc., hereinafter called the Respondent alleging that the latter had engaged and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 61 Stat. 136 (29 U. S. C., Supp. I, See. 141 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the Act. With respect to the unfair labor practices the complaint as amended at the hearing alleges in substance that : (1) the Respondent on or about February 28, 1951, and at all times thereafter refused and continues to refuse to bargain col- lectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment ; and (2) on different dates from March 1951 through July 1951, the Respondent through its officers, supervisors, and repre- sentatives specifically named, interrogated its employees about their union mem- berships, sympathies, activities, and desires ; spied upon and kept under surveillance the union meetings and activities of its employees ; threatened its employees with economic reprisals if they became or remained members of or assisted the Union; promised economic benefits to induce its employees to refrain from joining, assisting, or remaining members of the Union, solicited withdrawals from the Union from its employees and coerced its employees into signing such revocations. The Respondent's answer duly filed, in part admitted certain allegations of the complaint, but denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Gainesville, Georgia, on April 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1952, before the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. The General Counsel, counsel for the Respondent, and the representative of the Union participated in the hearing and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to intro- duce relevant evidence, to argue the issues orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. A brief and proposed findings and conclusions were received from the Respondent on June 2, 1952, and has been duly considered. During the course of the hearing, various motions were made by counsel for the Respondent to dismiss the complaint on procedural grounds and on the merits. These motions where not denied or granted at the hearing are disposed of by the following findings and recommendations. A motion by the General Counsel to amend paragraph 9 of the complaint to delete therefrom the names of Sales Manager Roark and Foreman Jones and the dates alongside said names was granted without objection. A motion by the General Counsel made at the end of the hearing to conform the pleadings to the proof with respect to formal mat- ters such as dates, the spelling of names and the like was granted without POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC . 215 objection. At the close of the hearing the General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent presented oral argument to the Trial Examiner. Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Poultry Enterprises, Inc., is a Georgia corporation having its principal office and place of business in Gainesville, Georgia, where it is engaged in the business of processing poultry. In the course and conduct of its business operations during a representative 12-month period, the Respondent purchased live poultry valued in excess of $2,000,000 practically all of which poultry was obtained from sources inside the State of Georgia. During the same period sales of dressed poultry were valued in excess of $2,000,000, about $1,000,000 of which amount represents the value of poultry sold and shipped to customers located outside the State of Georgia. The Respondent's answer admits and it is hereby found that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. See also Case No. 10-RC-1299 where the Board found that the Respondent is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. IT. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, admitting to membership employees of the Respondent.' III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Preliminary statement The details related hereinafter arose within the framework of these more general facts : During January, February, and March 1951, the Union held several meetings in its efforts to organize the employees of the poultry-dressing plants in the Gainesville, Georgia area. Edward Manley, a former employee of the Respondent testified that a number of Respondent's employees spoke to him about the possibility of a union organization in the plant to assist them to obtain better working conditions and more hours. Manley obtained a sup- ply of union cards from the Union's international representative Bob Ackerman at a meeting he attended early in February for the Swift & Company employees. Manley signed up several employees and additional cards were signed by em- ployees at their homes and at the plant before starting work and during their lunch hours. During the period February 16 through February 23, 73 employees signed cards authorizing the Union to represent them in collective bargaining matters with the Respondent. On February 27, 1951, William Katz, an inter- national representative of the Union, sent a letter by registered mail to the Respondent, which was received by the Respondent on February 28, advising that the Respondent's employees had selected the Union to represent their interests in the matter of collective bargaining affecting hours, wages, and work- ing conditions and requesting a meeting to negotiate a contract at Respondent's earliest convenience. Simultaneously therewith the Union filed a petition for certification of representatives with the Board. Under date of February 28, the Respondent in a letter signed by J. H. Martin, president, advised the Union ' It was so stipulated by the parties during the hearing in Case No. 10-RC-1299. 216 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that on the basis of its present information the Union 's request to be recognized as bargaining agent for Respondent's employees was denied. On March 12 the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge in this matter. On or about March 19, during the course of an investigation of the Union's representation petition, a meeting was held attended by a Board field examiner, Martin, and S. G. Stewart, Jr., Respondent's general manager. The appropriate unit was dis- cussed and the Board field examiner allegedly advised the Respondent's rep- resentatives that it could consent to an election or it could continue to refuse to bargain, in which event the Board would hold a hearing in the matter and, if sufficient showing was made by the Union regarding its representation of the employees, an election would be directed by the Board. Martin indicated that he would like a delay in the holding of the election? Shortly after the above- described meeting Martin addressed four separate groups of employees regard- ing the Union and general conditions in the plant at meetings held over a 2- week period during the latter part of March, in the showroom of his Chevrolet agency, located in another part of town. On April 6 the hearing in the repr3- sentation case was held. In the meantime, practically all of the employees who had authorized the Union to act for them in collective-bargaining matters, as well as employees who had not signed union cards, signed slips revoking the authority previously given the Union. On April 23 the Board issued its Deci- sion and Direction of Election in Case No. 10-RC-1299 setting forth that an election by secret ballot was to be conducted among the employees of a defined appropriate unit not later than 30 days after the date of the said decision. On April 30 the Union, upon information received that Respondent had engaged in other unfair labor practices, filed an amended charge with the Regional Office of the Board. On May 3, by direction of the Board, an order amending the previously issued Direction of Election was issued striking therefrom the words "as early as possible but not later than 30 days from the date of this Direction," and substituting therefor the words, "at such time as the Regional Director deems an election may appropriately be conducted." Further amended unfair labor practice charges were filed by the Union with the Board's Regional Office. During June 1951 the Respondent granted an across-the-board wage increase to its employees. On or about July 8, 1951, a foreman of the Respond- ent is alleged to have surveilled a union meeting. The Union requested permis- sion to withdraw its petition for certification of representatives previously filed in Case No. 10-RO-1299 and on March 20, 1952, an order permitting the with- drawal of the petition was granted by the Board. In the interim, on March 18, 1952, the complaint in this matter was issued. B. The refusal to bargain; interference, restraint, and coercion 1. The appropriate unit The amended complaint alleges, the Respondent's answer admits, and it is hereby found that all production and maintenance employees, including truck drivers of the Respondent's Gainesville, Georgia, plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act e 2 Stewart had Just recovered from a siege of the mumps at the time of this meeting. Since the incubation period for this disease is 9 to 21 days and the female employees in the plant had not had the disease , Martin questioned the field examiner as to whether the election could be delayed until a later date with a view to possibly preventing other em- ployees in the plant from contracting the disease. 8 The Board in its Decision and Direction of Election issued on April 23, 1951 , in Case No. 10-RC-1299 found the above -described unit appropriate. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 217 2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit At the hearing there was received in evidence Respondent's payroll for the week ending March 3, 1951, showing a total of 133 employees for that week. The parties stipulated at the hearing that 67 employees signed union authoriza- tion cards on various dates between February 16 and February 23, 1951, in- clusive.' In addition, the General Counsel adduced testimony from 6 employees who identified their signatures on union authorization cards signed on various dates between February 16 and February 21, 1951, inclusive. The Respondent attacked the validity of the signature on the card of James Graham, Jr. While Graham testified that his handwriting was poor and he was not certain that he signed the card, he stated unequivocally that at the time the card was given him by employee Ed Manley, a leading protagonist for the Union, it was his opinion that the employees needed a union and upon returning the card to Manley it was his (Graham's) intention to have the Union represent him. I find that the Graham card was valid. Thus on February 23, 1951, the Union had been authorized by 73 employees of the 133 in the appropriate unit to represent them for the purposes of collective bargaining.' I find that on February 23, 1951, and at all times material thereafter, the Union was and now is the duly designated representative of a majority of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 3. The refusal to bargain ; interference, restraint, and coercion The record does not disclose any history of collective bargaining in the Respondent's plant prior to February 1951. Manley testified, that at the time the Union was conducting its organization campaign, in several of the poultry- dressing plants in Gainesville, some of Respondent's employees indicated their desire for a union to assist them in obtaining better treatment and better working conditions. Manley obtained a batch of union-authorization cards which he distributed to Respondent's employees and also successfully solicited memberships from a number of employees. As noted hereinabove, within a period of a week from February 16 to February 23, 73 employees signed author- izations to the Union to represent them in matters of collective bargaining. William Katz, international representative of the Union, testified without contradiction, that upon receiving the signed union-authorization cards from the employees, he visited Respondent's plant on February 26 and spoke to Fred Roark, Respondent's sales manager and assistant plant manager. Katz told Roark that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees and was in a position to negotiate a collective-bargaining contract in their behalf. Roark advised Katz that he should see J. H. Martin, president of Respondent, who was located elsewhere. Katz attempted several times to + The stipulation included in addition to the 67 set forth above , the signed union- authorization cards of Louise Dean bearing date of March 7 , 1951, J. N. Farmer, Jr., and Rufus Morrison both bearing date of March 15, 1951. a The General Counsel contended that A. N. Jones and Bennie Talton whose names appear on the payroll referred to hereinabove were foremen and supervisors within the meaning of the Act. The Respondent asserted they were production and maintenance employees and should be included in the appropriate unit. As to A. N. Jones no proof was adduced by the General Counsel regarding his work status . Since there is no valid reason in the record for excluding him from the appropriate unit he will be included. There is considerable conflicting testimony regarding the duties and authority of Bennie Talton. In view of the clear majority as indicated above I find it unnecessary to resolve this issue. 218 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD contact Martin at the Respondent's plant and the Martin Chevrolet Agency' by telephone and personally without success. Under date of February 27, Katz sent the following letter to Respondent : Dear Mr. Martin : The poultry workers under your employ in the Pine Street plant, have selected our organization, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work- men of North America, A. F. of L., to represent their interests in the matter of collective bargaining affecting hours, wages and working conditions. We are in a position to meet with you to negotiate a contract at your earliest convenience. Trusting that you will give this matter your immediate attention, I remain. On the same day the Union filed a petition for certification of representatives with the Board's Regional Office, docketed under Case No. 1O-RC-1299. On February 28 Martin replied to the Union's request to bargain collectively with the following letter addressed to Katz : Dear Sir: On the basis of our present information your request to he recognized as bargaining agent for our employees is denied. The Union did nothing further in pursuit of its request to bargain with the Respondent. Nor did the Respondent make any inquiries of the Union regard- ing the alleged representation of the majority of the employees or of the appro- priateness of the unit it purported to represent. Stewart testified that he found out for the first time at the instant hearing that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees. On or about :March 19 a conference was held to discuss the Union's petition for certification of representatives, attended by Martin, Stewart, and Board Field Examiner George. Stewart testified that George advised the Respondent it could agree to a consent election or continue to refuse to bargain in which event the Board would order an election. On cross-examination, Stewart admitted that the discussion with George encompassed among other matters the appropriate unit and the Union's showing of interest and George told the Respondent's representatives that that was not a question which Respondent could resolve by checking the signed cards, but would ultimately be decided by the Board. Shortly after the above-noted conference, the Respondent held 4 separate meetings over a 2-week period with different groups of employees in the show- room of the Martin Chevrolet Agency. Wallace Nix, foreman of production, explained that the employees were in a state of confusion and could not work. Some employees inquired if the rumor was true that if they did not join the Union they would lose their jobs. Others asked him what Martin had to say about it. Nix testified that he asked Martin if he would see the employees in groups, answer their questions, and put their minds at ease Stewart testifying regarding the reason for the meetings, stated that employees inquired if they would lose their jobs if they did not join the Union and since he was at a loss to advise them, he thought Martin "could get them straight" by talking to them. Stewart was unable to recall any of the employees who talked to him. Grace Williams a former employee and member of the union organizing com- mittee, denied that she at any time requested Nix for the opportunity to talk with Martin, nor was she aware of or did she hear any employees make such a The Martin Chevrolet Agency in which J . H. Martin has an interest, is located in Gainesville about a half mile distant from Respondent 's plant. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 219 request. Umie Mae Dockery, presently employed by the Respondent, testifying as its witness, stated that Nix told the employees that Martin was going to conduct a meeting and wanted the employees to attend. I do not credit the testimony of Nix or Stewart in this regard. The employees were given transportation to the meeting place in the auto- mobiles of Nix and Stewart.' They were paid for the time spent at the meeting. In attendance at all of the meetings in addition to the employees and Martin, were Stewart, Nix, and Mrs. J. H. Martin, wife of Martin and a joint stock- holder with him in the Respondent corporation. Martin talked to the employees about the Union, and among other things, its organizational activities at the poultry-dressing plants in Gainesville. Marvin Owen, an employee of the Respondent from June 1949 until October 1951, testified that Martin told the employees that he would pay them as much as any plant paid in which the Union represented the employees. Martin also told the employees that the poultry-dressing plant gave him his smallest income and that since he "already had his living made he did not have to run it to make a living." Martin inquired of each employee individually if he would continue to work for the Respondent if the wage scale was the same as that in union- organized plants and not attempt to bring the Union into Respondent's plant, or proceed with the union organization. Owen admitted that during the course of the meeting, Martin said this was a free country and the employees could join or not join the Union as they pleased. Era Chastain, a former employee, testified that at the meeting she attended, Martin told the employees that if they did not join the Union, he would see to it that they would receive as much wages as the employees in any of the other poultry-dressing plants. In this regard, Chastain in response to a leading ques- tion, testified that Martin said he always paid as high wages as any plant in the business and he would continue his policy in order to keep his best employees. Iova Cowart, who has worked intermittently for the Respondent since the plant started operating, in substance testified similarly to Chastain. In addi- tion Cowart testified that Martin inquired of the employees if they wanted the Union to come into the plant. Nora Evans, employed by the Respondent for 3 years, corroborated Owen's testimony regarding Martin's statement about the fact that he "already had his living made." Evans testified further that during the meeting she attended, Martin said that he did not want the employees to join the Union and threatened to close down the plant before he would deal with the Union. Martin referred to the fact that the Chevrolet Agency had been the source of his livelihood before he started the poultry-dressing plant and would continue to be. Louise Dean, an employee for 2 months at the time of the Union organizing campaign, testified that while Martin told the employees at the meeting she attended that he had always paid as high wages as other plants in the industry and would continue that policy whether or not the employees joined the Union in order to hold on to the best employees, he nevertheless made it clear that Respondent did not want a union representing the employees in its plant. Dean also testified that at the opening of the meeting, Mrs. Martin read a clipping from a Miami, Florida, newspaper, describing a strike by employees in a laundry and Martin commented that Respondent did not want a union and have "anything like that happen here." Grace Williams, an employee of the Respondent from 1950 until April 1951; and a member of the union organizing committee, testified that Martin said that he would rather not have a union in Respondent's plant and he would pay as 7 Some employees used their own cars. 220 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD much as the Swift & Company, plant, if the employees abandoned their efforts toward the union organization. Martin, according to Williams, also said the employees would work more hours than they had been.' Williams further testi- fied on cross-examination that Martin told the group they had the right to join or not join the Union, but supplemented this statement with the comment that "he could close the doors to the place any time he wanted to." Lillian Hambrick testifying as a witness for the Respondent admitted on cross- examination that Martin asked some of the employees who attended the meeting with her why they wanted the Union. It is interesting to note that although the plant had been in operation since 1942, the Respondent never found it necessary to hold even one meeting with its employees previous to their union organizing efforts and the Union's request to bargain. As found hereinabove, the Respondent's explanations for the Mar- tin meetings are not credited. Wallace Nix, supervisor of production, who attended all of the Martin meet- ings, denied that he heard Martin tell the employees that if the Union was brought into the plant to represent them in collective-bargaining matters, he would close the plant down or that he was not compelled to run the plant since "he already had a living made." On the contrary, Nix testified that Martin stated that he needed the plant; that anybody in the chicken business had to have a plant in order to operate ; that if he did not have a plant he could not buy chickens from farmers in the country ; and that it would be "foolish" to remain in the chicken business in a big way without a poultry-dressing plant. Nix testified further that with respect to wages, Martin told the employees it was his policy to pay the same as the competing plants and if he did not, Respondent would lose its best help. Martin according to Nix said, "if you join [pointing to an employee], and you don't join [pointing to another employee], you both get the same money. It don't make a bit of difference. You are on your own. You don't have to join, but you can join if you want to. It won't interfere with your job one way or the other." Stewart denied that Martin mentioned closing the plant or that "he already had a living made" at any of the meetings. Regarding future wages, Stewart's testimony differed from Nix's. Martin, according to Stewart, told the employees he would pay the same as the "average plant" scale, but specifically excluded the Swift & Company plant. Martin mentioned that he paid the mechanics in his automobile agency and the employees of his feed store the same rates as competing businesses in similar lines. Mrs. J. H. Martin, in effect corroborated the testimony of Nix and Stewart. She testified also that Martin, in answer to the question, "if we have a union, will we get a bonus?" replied "that when we have a union-.-it would help set the policy, the pay and the bonuses, or anything else-so he could not give them an answer, without their say so." The testimony of Nix, Stewart, and Mrs. J. H. Martin, hereinabove set forth, was not convincing. I do not credit it. The Respondent also adduced testimony from a number of employee witnesses. William Parks, a truck driver, presently employed by Respondent, attended three meetings and helped transport other employees in his car. He was paid for the time thus spent. Parks denied that Martin said anything about clos- ing the plant. He did not observe a poll taken of employees, nor did he see Martin point his finger at each employee and ask them any questions. Parks testified that Martin did not say anything about the employees joining or not 9 There is some evidence in the record that the employees had not been working full 40-hour weeks. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 221 joining the Union. In fact Parks stated that Martin did not mention the Union at all. Parks from his demeanor on the witness stand impressed me as an un- reliable and untrustworthy witness. I do not credit his testimony. The memory and forgetfulness of employees Dessie Lee Smith, Mandy Lou Stephens, Ruby Mae Hammond, and Lottie Howell, testifying as Respondent's witnesses , as to what Martin said at the meetings they attended, were almost startling in their unanimity. All denied that Martin mentioned anything about closing the plant, but could not remember anything else he said. I do not credit their testimony. I was impressed with the credibility of Owen, Chastain, Cowart, Evans, Dean, and Williams, as reflected by the reasonableness of their overall testimony and their attitude and demeanor on the witness stand and find that the statements attributed to Martin were made substantially as testified to by the said witnesses. It was stipulated at the hearing that of the 131 employees on Respondent's payroll for the week ending April 7, 1951, 127 signed revocations of union authorization bearing date April 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7.° Stewart testified that several employees inquired how they could withdraw from the Union. Stewart con- sulted with Respondent's lawyer, Judge Wheeler, who advised Stewart that withdrawal could be accomplished, that he had previously been called on the matter by some employees and instructed them how it could be done.10 Later that day a revocation form was dictated to one of Respondent's stenographers over the telephone by Judge Wheeler. It was run off on the ditto machine at the Martin Feed & Poultry Co., (owned by Mr. and Mrs. J. H. Martin) and brought to Stewart's office. The form reads as follows : National Labor Relations Board 10th Region Peachtree-7th Building 50 Seventh Street, N. E. Atlanta, Georgia Having heretofore signed an agreement authorizing the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America to represent me and in my behalf, to negotiate and conclude all agreements as to wages, hours and all other conditions of employment, I hereby expressly revoke the authority so given and now deny to said named organization the right to represent me in any way with my employment or in any other way. This - day of -, 1951, ----------------------------- Employee of Poultry Enterprises, Ino. Stewart testified that the revocation forms were placed on the desks in the main office occupied by himself and Roark, some were placed in the employee's waiting room and in the stenographer' s office.11 Within minutes after the revo- cation forms were delivered to the plant, a number of employees who were in Stewart's office signed them and left them there. Others were signed in different *Included in this group were some employees who had not previously signed union- futhorization Cards as for example employee Dockery. 10 The parties stipulated that Judge Wheeler received a telephone call at his home one night from a female employee who sought information on withdrawing from the Union. Judge Wheeler told the caller that in his opinion if she had made up her mind to withdraw from the Union without coercion of any kind she could do it . Judge Wheeler dictated a form of revocation to the employee which in substance is the one set forth , supra. 11 Stewart also explained that the forms were not distributed around the plant but were taken from his desk by employees and placed by the latter in various parts of the plants. 222 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD parts of the plant while the employees were at work. Stewart testified that "all seemed to get back into my office someway." The forms were kept in the Re- spondent's files until the date of the hearing herein. Owen testified that while at his position on the conveyer chain he saw some employees signing forms. Owen approached Nix who was there and inquired what the men were signing. Nix asked him if he had signed a union card. Upon Owen's affirmative reply Nix asked if he wished to revoke the authoriza- tion previously given to the Union and gave him a blank form which Owen signed. Nix testifying regarding this incident stated that he had obtained a batch of revocation forms from the office and at the request of several employees brought them to the rear of the plant in the vicinity where Owen was working. While some of the employees were signing forms, Owen asked Nix for one and signed it. Nix denied that he inquired into Owen's union membership. As previously found Nix was not a convincing witness. From his demeanor he impressed me as an unreliable witness. I do not credit his denials and find that the incident with Owen regarding the signing of the revocation form took place substantially as testified to by Owen. Cowart testified that Nix asked her if she wanted to sign "a paper" revoking her union authorization. She told him she did and went to Stewart's office where she signed one and left it there. Nix did not specifically deny this incident. He unequivocally denied that he ever requested any employee to sign a revocation form. I credit Cowart's testimony regarding this incident. Dean testified that she had been asked by Nix one day as she was going to lunch if she wanted to sign a revocation form. She did not answer. On April 4, in the course of performing her work she went to Nix for something, told him it was her birthday and she "might as well sign it." Nix according to Dean said "you wouldn't sign a better thing on your birthday." Nix then brought her a form which she signed. Testifying regarding this incident, Nix denied that he gave Dean a revocation form at her work position and asked her to sign. He stated that a few days after the bulk of employees had signed the forms, Dean came to the office at lunch time and requested a revocation form which the office girl gave her. I do not credit Nix's testimony and find that Dean signed the revocation form substan- tially under the circumstances testified to by her. Clyde Hammond, a packer presently employed by Respondent testified credibly that Nix said to a number of employees "if you wanted to sign the paper to keep off the Union, do it or not as you please." Hammond obtained a form from Stewart's desk which he signed and left there. Williams testified that a few days before she signed the revocation form on April 4, she was asked by Nix if she was going to sign to which she replied that she did not know. She signed the form in the office with Nix and the office girl present. The following day Williams asked Nix if all the employees had signed. Nix said all but two or three. Williams inquired "if we signed those would that keep the Union from coming in." Nix replied that "he hoped so." Williams then asked what would happen if she had not signed the form. Nix, according to Williams, said "it could have meant whether [I] [kept my] job or not," Nix testifying in contradiction to Williams, stated that after Williams signed the form she asked what would have happened if she had not signed. Nix replied "not a thing in the world. It would not have made a bit of difference in the world if you signed it or did not sign it-it would not have made a bit of difference." I do not credit Nix's testimony. On April 6 the hearing in Case No. 10-RC-1299 took place resulting in a Decision and Direction of Election issued by the Board on April 23. The Board POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 223 found the appropriate unit to be as set forth infra and directed an election to be conducted "not later than 30 days from the date of this Direction." On April 30, amended unfair labor practice charges were filed by the Union. On May 3, the Board amended its Direction of Election by striking therefrom the words "as early as possible, but not later than 30 days from the date of this Direction" and substituting therefor the words, "at such time as the Regional Director deems an election may appropriately be conducted." During the month of June the Respondent, without consulting the Union, unilaterally increased the wages of its production and maintenance employees from 75 cents to 80 cents an hour. Stewart testified that he obtained informa- tion that a competitor, Piedmont Poultry Co., was paying 80 cents an hour and assuming that to be the general pay rate, Respondent instituted the increased pay rate. Dean testified credibly that on Sunday July 8, while she and several other employees were attending a union meeting at the home of one Eldridge Robinson" located on the Atlanta highway, she observed Nix and another person seated in an automobile parked on the side of the highway facing the home where the meeting was being held. Dean stated that the car remained in the same position for approximately 45 minutes and could be seen from the living-room window where the meeting was being conducted. According to Dean neither Nix nor the other occupant of the car left it during the entire period it was parked. Nix admitted that he was in the parked car as testified to by Dean. He denied however, that it was with the intention to spy on a union meeting. He testified that he had dinner with his brother-in-law on a Sunday afternoon. After dinner his brother-in-law who was in the trucking business asked him to take a ride down the road so that he could head off one of his trucks to give the driver a message before he reached town. They parked in a position located just before a fork in the road leading into town's Nix testified further that he was not aware that a union meeting was to take place at approximately this location before he was taken there by his brother-in-law. As previously indicated Nix's testimony was generally unconvincing and not credible. I do not credit his explanation for being in the parked car facing the Robinson home at a time when the union meeting was being held there and find that he was there inten- tionally for the purpose of surveilling the meeting.' "Robinson was an employee of the Gainesville Mill. Dean testified that the meeting was attended by Gainesville Mill employees and some of Respondent's employees were supposed to attend. U This was at the side of a grocery store opposite the Robinson home on the Atlanta highway. 14 The amended complaint alleges the attendance of Bennie Talton, claimed by the General Counsel to be a foreman, at the March 6 union meeting at the Dixie Hunt Hotel was surveillance in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. I find It unnecessary to make any further finding or conclusion with respect to this incident. Interference, re- straint, and coercion of Respondent's employees has been found hereinabove In the sur- veillance of the union meeting by Nix. This finding provides an adequate basis for an effective remedial order and a conclusion of surveillance in the Talton incident will add neither to the character of the violation nor to the scope or breadth of the remedy. Chicago Typographical, 86 NLRB 1041 ; Water Front Employer's Association of the Pacific Coast, 90 NLRB 1021. In view of this I will not resolve the conflicting testimony re- garding Talton's alleged supervisory status or rule on the motion to strike certain testi- mony of Grace Williams, a General Counsel's witness that she did not Invite Talton to attend the union meeting, because In Its Inconsistency with the testimony of Talton, another General Counsel witness, It tended Improperly to Impeach Talton's testimony. I note however, that if it were necessary to rule on the said motion It would be denied. See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III , Sec. 907 . See also Moultrie Repair Co. v. Hill, 120 Ga. 730; 48 S. E. 143 where the court said "While the rule is that a party cannot Impeach his own witness'by proof of general bad character, nor by proof of contradictory statements, unless it is shown that he has been entrapped by the witness, still It has never been held that a party is bound by the testimony of his witness to such an extent that he cannot introduce other evidence which disproves the facts testified to by the witness." See also Hollinsworth v. State, 79 Ga. 607, 4 S. E. 560; Cronan v. Roberts, 65 Ga. 678. 224 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On or about March 18, 1952, the Union requested withdrawal of its petition for certification of representatives. An order permitting withdrawal of the said petition was issued by the Board on March 20, 1952. The instant complaint was issued on March 18, 1952, as aforesaid. Concluding Findings (a) As to interference, restraint, and coercion The record reveals and it is hereby found that during the course of his talks with the employees, Martin told them, among other things, that this was a free country and the employees could join or not join the Union as they pleased and that he would pay as much as the other plants paid whether or not there was a union. These statements, however, were interspersed with his threats to close the plant before he would deal with the Union ; with his promise of benefits to the employees if they did not join the Union; and with the polling of the employees as heretofore found. Under the circumstances, Martin's openly stated neutrality toward the Union did not mitigate the interference inherent in the threats, promises of benefits, and interrogation. See Somerset Classics, Inc., 90 NLRB 1676; J. J. Newberry, 88 NLRB 1638; Kalleher and Mee, Inc., 87 NLRB 410. The Respondent also contended at the hearing and in its brief that the with- drawal of the employees from the Union was a voluntary act without coercion on the part of Respondent. While there is no evidence in the record that any employees were directed to resign from the Union with an explicit threat that they would be discharged or otherwise penalized for failure to do so, it is nevertheless established than an employer violates Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, where as here, it actually prepared the revocation forms, participated in the distribution of the same to the employees, and permitted the use of its offices for the signing and filing of the said forms. See American Bottling Company, 99 NLRB 345; Louisville Container Corporation, 99 NLRB 81; Phillips and Buttorff Manufacturing Company, 96 NLRB 1091; Southern Block and Pipe Corporation, 90 NLRB 590; Lindley Box and Paper Company, 73 NLRB 553. See also The Red Rock Company case, 84 NLRB 521, where the Board held that the handing or exhibiting by the employer to its employees of documents purporting to deny the Union's authority to represent them in bargaining with the employer was tantamount to compulsion to sign them. The General Counsel in oral argument contended that the unilateral wage in- crease which Respondent gave its employees in June 1951 was violative of the Act. The amended complaint fails to allege this act as a violation. As noted previously, testimony was adduced by the parties regarding the wage increase and it was fully litigated. The General Counsel relies on the fact that the Union had previously demanded recognition and its petition for certification of representatives was pending. He also attempted to prove that Respondent's wage scale in previous years was generally lower than other poultry-dressing plants in the area. On the other hand, Stewart testified credibly that he as- sumed that the rate paid by Piedmont Poultry Co., of 80 cents an hour was the general pay rate for all plants and therefore he instituted the wage increase. There is no evidence that the wage increase was discussed by the Union with the Respondent or that it attempted to do so. In view of the above, I find that the record does not support a finding that the wage increase in June 1951 was violative of the Act. See Kalleher and Mee, Inc., supra; Dixie Mercerizing Company, 86 NLRB 285. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 225 On the basis of the foregoing, the preponderance of the evidence, and the record as a whole, I conclude and find that by the following enumerated acts, the Respondent interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act , in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) thereof: (a) Martin's promise to the employees that he would pay them as much as any plant paid in which the Union represented the employees , if they did not join the Union. (b) Martin's threat that he did not have to run the poultry-dressing plant to make a living, and his further threat to close it down before he would deal with the Union. (c) Martin's polling of the employees on the question of proceeding with union organization or continuing to work without a union if the wage scale was the same as in unionized plants. (d) Martin's promise of more hours if the employees would abandon their efforts toward union organization. (e) Nix's questioning of Owen as to his union membership when the latter requested a revocation form. (f) The preparation of the revocation forms and distribution of same to em- ployees wherein it was stated that the particular employee who signed revoked the authority given the Union to represent him in collective-bargaining matters, and which forms as they were signed in the general manager 's office and other parts of the plant were left with the general manager and kept by the latter until the hearing herein. (g) Surveillance of a union meeting on July 8 with Nix. (b) A8 to the refusal to bargain As has been set forth hereinabove, the Union, having theretofore been desig- nated by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit as their collective- bargaining representative, wrote the Respondent on February 27, 1951, re- questing the Respondent to meet with it at its earliest convenience to negotiate a collective-bargaining contract. On February 28, 1951, Martin, acting for the Respondent, replied in writing denying the Union's request to be recognized as the bargaining agent for the Respondent's employees. The basis for this denial was "our present information." The complaint alleges that the Respondent has illegally refused to bargain with the Union since that date. When an employer acts in good faith he may, of course, without subjecting himself to an infraction of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, challenge a union's asserted majority and require proof of such majority by an election or other appropriate method. It is the Respondent's contention that at the March 19 conference on the Union's representation petition, when Martin, Stewart, and Field Examiner George were present it sought information as to whether the Union represented a majority of its employees. And it was then informed by the field examiner that it could consent to an election to determine the ques- tion or continue to refuse to bargain in which event a Board-directed election would be held. In this situation, continues the Respondent, the Board having before it a petition for certification of representatives filed by the Union with full knowledge of the number of employees who had signed union cards, the Union acquiesced in having the question determined by an election and thereby waived any right to complain. It is undisputed that the Union executed a waiver in the usual form. By the execution of the waiver, the Union agreed in effect that in the event an election were held and the result of the election were adverse to it, it would not make 226 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD use of the alleged unfair labor acts and conduct of the Respondent which pre- ceded the date of the election and which were the basis of the charge filed on March 12, 1951, as evidence that the Respondent interfered with the conduct of the election. In this case however, no election was ever conducted and as a matter of fact the amended unfair labor practice charges filed on April 30, 1951, were never waived. Furthermore, the waiver is purely an administrative process of the Board. By it the Union did no more thdn agree with the Board that it would participate in an election and take its chances that the previous conduct of the Respondent would not so seriously influence the employees as to affect their votes. The undersigned does not agree with the Respondent that the waiver extended to, or that it could extend to, the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent. For the Act, concerned as it is with the elimination of prac- tices interfering with commerce, has created public rights of enforcement of which it has entrusted to the Board. Violations of the proscriptions of the Act may not be waived or settled without the Board's approval. The Respondent's contention is without merit. See The Pickwick Company, 69 NLRB 314. Cf. Denton Sleeping Garment Mills, Inc., 93 NLRB 329. Nor is it a defense to the Respondent's refusal to bargain that it acted upon the erroneous statement of a field examiner that "it could continue to refuse to bargain" in which event the Board would direct an election to be held. Even assuming arguendo that such a statement was made by the field examiner" it appears obvious from the record that it was made during a discussion while the field examiner was attempting to get the parties to agree to a consent election in order to obviate the necessity for holding a hearing. Moreover, previous to the conference with the field examiner, the Respondent had unequivocally expressed itself in the letter of February 28 set forth hereinabove, and having refused to bargain with the Union from the date, it cannot now rely upon alleged erroneous advice of a Board agent. The task of making binding interpretations of the Act is a judicial function vested in the Board with ultimate power to re- view in the courts. The field examiner's primary function is to investigate alleged charges of unfair labor practices and representation petitions. Further- more, one who commits an unlawful act because of an honest but mistaken under- standing of the law is not absolved from responsibility for his unlawful conduct. Cf. West Texas Utilities Company, Inc., 85 NLRB 1396 and cases cited therein; enforced 184 F. 2d 233 (C. A. D. C.) ; cert. den. 341 U. S. 939. In the instant case, as found hereinabove, the Respondent at no time challenged the Union's majority and in fact made no effort to require the Union to prove its majority. In any event a challenge to a majority does not shield an employer if it is motivated not by a bona fide doubt as to the existence of the majority but rather by a rejection of the collective bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine the Union's support. See The Red Rock Com- pany, supra; Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, enforced as modified in respects not material here, 185 F. 2d 732 (C. A. D. C.). On the record of this case, there can be little doubt that despite its present protestations to the contrary the Respondent's refusal on February 28, 1951, to meet or deal with the Union was not sincerely motivated but was actuated by a purpose to avoid its statutory duty to bargain by obtaining time within which it might effectively move to dissipate the Union's strength. Shortly after receipt of the Union's demand the Respondent embarked upon a coercive course of conduct "Stewart testified that the field examiner made the above-noted statement. However, .during oral argument, Respondent's counsel said that the field examiner told the Respondent "you can sit down and bargain with the Union or if you refuse we will order an election." This statement was made as the two alternatives open to the Respondent. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 227 which revealed with unmistakeable clarity that the question with which it was, really concerned was not whether the Union in fact had a majority at the time but rather how that majority, if it existed, could be subverted or destroyed. As found hereinabove, the Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by the various acts enumerated. As a climax to a campaign to destroy the majority status of the Union the Respondent prepared revocation forms which it dis- tributed to its employees and which were signed in the general manager's office whereby the employees renounced the previous authorization given the Union to represent them as their collective-bargaining agent. Within a short time after the revocation forms were received practically all of the employees signed them (127 out of 129), including employees who had not previously signed union- authorization cards. The spirit of wholesome cooperation that is implicit in a bona fide doubt does not normally find expression in such patent interference and restraint as was evinced here by Respondent. The Respondent's objective actions clearly belie its pretense of subjective good faith. Nor are the cases cited in Respondent's brief applicable to the facts herein, The Respondent is scarcely in a position now to complain that no proof of ma- jority was offered when it not only failed to request the submission of such proof but after unequivocally stating that it would not recognize the Union as the bargaining agent for the employees "on the basis of [our] present information" it thereafter engaged in an antiunion course of conduct, thus disclosing beyond mistake that it would not have engaged in bargaining even if the proof had been presented. See Everett Van Kleeck & Co., Inc., 88 NLRB 785; M. H. Davidson Company, 94 NLRB 142; Louisville Container Corporation, supra. As has been found above, the Union enjoyed a majority status at the time the Respondent refused to bargain with it on February 28, 1951. The subsequent defection as evidenced by the revocations of union authorizations is attributable to the Respondent's intervening unfair labor practices. It is axiomatic that an employer may not by his own misconduct destroy a union's majority and then claim to be relieved of his duty to bargain with it on the ground that it no longer represents the majority of the employees. In an unbroken line of decisions the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals and the Board have held that the appro- priate means to expunge the effects of a refusal to bargain is to require the employer to bargain with the Union which before the unlawfully induced de- fection from its ranks was the majority choice. See M. H. Davidson Company, case, supra, and the cases cited therein. Upon the record as a whole, it is concluded and found that on February 28, 1951, and thereafter, the Respondent unjustifiably refused to recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit and has thereby interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) thereof. The Respondent has submitted a number of proposed findings and conclusions. Of the proposed findings 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 are accepted. The remaining requested findings and the conclusions of law are rejected either because contrary to the findings and conclusions made in the report herein, omnibus in nature, or so phrased that granting of them will confuse the findings and conclusions. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce 228 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. v. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirma- tive action which will effectuate the policies of the Act. It has been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, the statutory representative in the appropriate unit. It will be recommended that the Respondent bargain collectively with the Union and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement. It has also been found that the Respondent has engaged in certain acts of interference, restraint, and coercion, by promising benefits to its employees ; by threatening to close the plant; by the polling of employees; by interrogation ; by preparing and distributing revocation forms to the employees, whereby they revoked the authority given the Union to represent them in collective bargaining matters ; and by surveillance of a union meeting. It will therefore be recommended that the Respondent cease and desist therefrom. The Respondent's infraction of the Act herein found discloses a fixed purpose to defeat self-organization and its objectives. Because of the Respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying purposes, I am persuaded that the unfair labor practices found are related to the other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act and that the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventative purposes of the Act will be thwarted unless the remedial order is coextensive with the threat. In order, therefore, to make effective the inter- dependent guarantees of Section 7 to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices and to minimize strife which burdens and obstructs commerce and thus to effectuate the policies of the Act, it will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from infringing in any manner upon the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees, including truck drivers, of the Respondent's Gainesville, Georgia, plant, excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and all supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. At all times since February 23, 1951, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., has been and now is the representative of the majority of the employees of the Respondent in the unit above-described, for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 4. By refusing on February 28, 1951 , and at all times thereafter to bargain collectively with Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America, Local 442, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all its POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC. 229 employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 5. By interfering with , restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] Appendix A NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, we hereby notify our employees that : WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with AMALGAMATED MEAT CUR TEES & BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, LocAL 442, A. F. of L., as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit described below. WE WILL Nor in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS & BUTCHER WORKMEN OF NORTH AMERICA, LoCAL 442, A. F. of L., or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above-named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment , and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is : All production and maintenance employees including truck drivers, at our plant in Gainesville, Georgia, excluding office clerical employees, guards, and all supervisors as defined in the Act. All our employees are free to become or remain members of this union, or any other labor organization. POULTRY ENTERPRISES, INC., Employer. Dated-------------------- By ------------------------------ (Representative ) ( Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 250983-vol. 102-53-16