Crowley's Milk Co., Inc.

996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CROWI.EY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. (PATERSON DIVISION) and MILK DRIVERS AND DAIRY EMPLOYEES LOCAL UNION No. 680, INTERNA- TIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS, A. F. OF L. and UNITED DAIRY WORKERS ASSOCIATION, PARTY TO THE CONTRACT. Cabe No. 2-CA-327. February 4, 1953 Supplemental Decision and Order On March 13,1950, the Board issued its original Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding,' finding in part that the Respondent had violated Section 8 (a) (1) and (2) of the Act, and that the strike at the Respondent's plant became an unfair labor practice strike on May 11, 1948. Accordingly, the Board ordered that the Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found, and reinstate the strikers upon application, if necessary dismissing all replacements hired since May 11, 1948. After the Board's Decision issued, the Union made application for reinstatement of 14 of the strikers. The Respondent has complied with certain provisions of the Board's origi- nal Order, but has refused to reinstate any of the strikers. Upon a review of the record the Board concluded that certain facts concerning the reinstatement rights of the strikers had not been fully developed at the original hearing, because no application for reinstate- ment had been made up to the time of that hearing and the Trial Examiner believed that reinstatement was not in issue. Accordingly, on August 8, 1951, the Board remanded the proceeding to the Division of Trial Examiners and directed that the record be reopened to permit the Respondent and the other parties an opportunity to adduce rele- vant testimony concerning the strikers' rights to reinstatement.' On June 12, 1952, a supplemental hearing was held before Trial Examiner David London. On August 20, 1952, the Trial Examiner issued his Supplemental Intermediate Report, a copy of which is attached hereto, finding that one of the strikers, Gerald Smith, was entitled to immediate reinstatement and back pay from the time of his request for reinstatement on June 6, 1950.3 Thereafter, the Respond- ent and the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Supplemental Intermediate Report and supporting briefs. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the supplemental hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con- sidered the Supplemental Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, 188 NLRB 1049. 2 95 NLRB 1023. At the remanded hearing it was demonstrated that, of the 14 strikers for whom rein- statement had been demanded , only Smith evinced any further interest in the proceeding. 102 NLRB No. 102. CROWLEY ' S MILK COMPANY, INC. 997 conclusions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner with the following additions and modifications : 1. The Trial Examiner has found that none of Smith's activity dur- ing the strike justified the Respondent's failure to reinstate him. We agree with this finding. The Respondent contends that on the first or second day of the strike Smith forfeited his right to reinstatement by engaging in unlawful mass picketing at the Respondent's Paterson plant; and that there- after he participated in an unlawful secondary boycott by picketing the premises of the Respondent's customers. As we are convinced on the record before us that none of the Union's picketing was unlawful, it follows that Smith's participation in that picketing could not affect his right to reinstatement. The record reveals, as the Trial Examiner found, that the only evidence of alleged mass picketing was testimony that on the first or second day of the strike Smith was one of a group of 12 men who conducted a picket line in front of the garage door of the Crowley plant in Paterson. Francis Crowley, the Respondent's vice president and general manager, testified that the pickets were orderly, but "it was necessary for me to call the Paterson Police Department to have this circle of strikers broken up enough so that we could pass in and out of the property." The police, according to Crowley, dispersed the picket line within 30 minutes of the time it formed. No evidence was adduced in support of Crowley's statement that it was necessary to break up the picket line to allow ingress to or egress from the plant, nor was it shown that any person or vehicle was impeded in any way from entering or leaving the property. In the circumstances we are compelled to conclude, like the Trial Examiner, that the picketing of the Respondent's plant was lawful primary activity and that there was nothing in Smith's participation therein which would justify the Respondent's failure to reinstate him. With respect to the alleged secondary boycott, Smith admitted at the second hearing that he had picketed two of the Respondent's customers. The only establishment identified was the Guernsey Crest Ice Cream Company of Paterson, where it appears that a picket sign was carried in front of the customers' entrance. The sign read in effect "This establishment sells products of Crowley's Milk Company, which Com- pany is on strike. Please do not buy Crowley's products. Teamsters Local 680, A. F. L." When asked by Respondent's counsel at the sec- ond hearing if he did not picket Crowley's customers to influence the customers' employees to cease handling Crowley's products, Smith answered "we picketed the stores so that the customers would not buy Crowley's products." The foregoing is the only persuasive evidence adduced at either hearing concerning the alleged secondary boycott. 250983-vol. 102-53-64 998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- ... to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, trans- port, or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . where an object thereof is ... forcing or requiring any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person. .. . It is clear from the record that in picketing the premises of the Respondent's customers the Union intended to institute a consumer boycott only. There is no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the Union made any appeal to employees of the Respondent's customers, or ever picketed the employee or delivery entrances of any of the customers. In the circumstances the Union's secondary picket- ing, whether it be viewed as a direct appeal to the Respondent's customers or as an appeal to those doing business with the Respond- ent's customers, was not violative of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act.4 Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in remanding a proceeding to the Board with instructions to test certain picketing against the standards which the Board established in the Moore D'ry Dock case,5 said : If this picketing met the criteria announced in the [Moore Dry Dock case], then it was not unlawful because employees of the secondary employers or employees of other employers, due to their habitual unwillingness to cross picket lines, refuse to do so, for such effects are within the realm of the "incidental." Nor, if otherwise lawful, was the picketing unlawful because it induced or encouraged concerted conduct, not of the neutral employers' employees, but of their customers, since the prohibition of Section 8 (b) (4) does not extend to such solicitation of customers. [Em- phasis supplied.]6 In view of the foregoing we find, as did the Trial Examiner, that none of Smith's conduct during the strike justified the Respondent's failure to reinstate him. 2. The Respondent further contends that its refusal to reemploy Smith was warranted by the fact that his former job was abolished See The Hoover Company, 90 NLRB 1614, enfd. as modified in other respects, 191 F. 2d 380. 92 NLRB 547. e N. L. R. B. v. Service Trades Chauffeurs ( Teamsters ) (Howland Dry Goods Company), 191 F. 2d 65. CROWLEY' S MILK COMPANY, INC. 999 before his application for reinstatement on June 6, 1950, and that on and after that date there was no position in the Respondent's plant which Smith was qualified to fill. Like the Trial Examiner, we reject this contention. At the second hearing it was proved that Smith had not been replaced before the strike at the Respondent's plant became an unfair labor practice strike on May 11, 1948. Further, it was established that, although the Respondent abolished one of its 3 cooler positions on January 13, 1950, it thereafter continued to employ 2 cooler men, only 1 of whom McManus, was employed before the strike became an unfair labor practice strike. It follows, there- fore, that Smith is entitled to reinstatement in the other cooler posi- tion, unless he was not qualified to perform the duties of that job. We do not find this to be the case. The job of a cooler man entails unloading incoming raw products, adding them to an inventory sheet, and placing them in the cooler. When the manufacturing operations are completed the cooler men put the finished products in the cooler and record them on the inven- tory sheet. They also fill customer orders and make appropriate changes on the inventory records as orders are removed from the cooler. The Respondent maintains that Smith was only a cooler helper, and was not capable of performing the inventory work re- quired of a regular cooler man. However, Smith testified without contradiction that from the time of his original employment in 1945 up to the time of the strike in 1948, he did the same sort of physical work as the other cooler men and, like them, kept the running inven- tory. Further, the record establishes that during this period he received regular periodic pay increases and that his hourly pay at the time of the strike was the same as that of the other 2 cooler men. In the absence of any persuasive evidence that Smith's former job was substantially dissimilar from that of the other 2 cooler men, we are compelled to conclude, as did the Trial Examiner, that at all relevant times Smith was qualified to carry out the duties of a cooler man. The Remedy Having found that Gerald Smith was qualified as a cooler man and that none of his conduct during the strike justifies the Respondent's failure to reinstate him, we shall order that the Respondent offer him immediate employment in his former or a substantially equivalent position, dismissing if necessary any replacements hired after May 11, 1948. We shall further order that the Respondent make Smith whole in the manner prescribed in the Intermediate Report for any loss of pay he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him. 1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Order Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Crowley's Milk Company, Inc. (Paterson Division), Paterson, New Jersey, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: (a) Offer to Gerald Smith immediate and full reinstatement to his former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of pay suffered by reason of the discrimination against him in the manner provided in the Supplemental Intermediate Report. (b) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time cards, personnel records, and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Second Region, in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. MEMBER MURDOCK took no part in the consideration of the above Supplemental Decision and Order. Supplementary Intermediate Report PREFATORY STATEMENT In its decision in the above proceeding (88 NLRB 1049), dated March 13, 1950, the National Labor Relations Board, herein referred to as the Board, found, in part, that Respondent had restrained, interfered with, and coerced its em- ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (61 Stat. 136) herein called the Act. In that decision, the Board also found that a strike at Respondent's plant, commenced on April 28, 1948, became an unfair labor practice strike on May 11, 1948. Accordingly, the Board ordered, in part, that Respondent cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found and that it reinstate the strikers upon application, if necessary, dismissing all replacements hired on or after May 11, 1948, and not employees of Respondent on that date. The Board also reserved the right to modify the reinstatement provisions, if necessary. Thereafter, the Board was advised that Respondent had refused to reinstate the strikers upon application on the grounds that they forfeited any right to reinstatement by their actions during the strike, and that in any event, all the strikers were permanently replaced before May 11, 1948. After further reviewing the entire record, and being of the opinion that the question of the reinstatement rights of the strikers may not have been developed fully at the hearing which preceded the Board's order aforementioned, the Board, on August 8, 1951, remanded this proceeding to the Division of Trial Examiners "to afford the parties an opportunity to adduce further relevant testimony concerning the CROWLEY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. 1001 strikers' rights to reinstatement" and the issuance of an appropriate Supple- mentary Intermediate Report 1 Pursuant to said order of remand, and after due notice to all parties, a hearing (referred to herein as the second hearing) was held on June 12, 1952, at New York, New York, before the undersigned duly designated Trial Examiner. The General Counsel and Respondent were represented by counsel who participated therein, and all parties were afforded full opportunity to examine and cross- examine witnesses, and adduce evidence bearing on the issues. After the close of said second hearing, a brief and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were received from Respondent which have been duly considered. At the second hearing, Respondent entered objections to proceeding therewith and moved that the present proceeding be dismissed. Most of said objections and grounds urged for dismissal concerned themselves with issues outside the scope of the remand and were considered and disposed of by the Board in its original decision of March 13, 1950. My role herein being limited to the remand ordered by the Board on August 8, 1951, the only new procedural objections raised by Respondent at the second hearing, which may appropriately be the subject of my ruling, are the following: (1) That the undersigned Trial Examiner is not the same Trial Examiner who conducted the original hearing and (2) "that there is nothing in the record which establishes that the complaining union or its International was in compliance with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act."' The first of these objections was overruled on the authority of N. L. R. B. v. Stocker Manufacturing Company, 185 F. 2d 451 (C. A. 3) and Editorial El Impartial Inc., 99 NLRB 8, and the second on the authority of the Law and Son v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. 2d 236 (C. A. 10) and N. L. R. B. v. Greensboro Coca- Cola Bottling Company, 180 F. 2d 840,844 (C. A. 4). By reason of the foregoing analysis of the present status of this proceeding, the contentions advanced by Respondent both at the hearings and in its brief, the record herein now calls for consideration by me of only the following substantive issues: 1. Did any of the strikers make application to Respondent for reinstatement pursuant to the Board's Order of March 13, 1950, and was such application denied or refused? 2. Had any of the strikers who made application for reinstatement been per- manently replaced prior to May 11, 1948, the date on which the strike was converted into an unfair labor practice strike, by employees newly engaged on or after that date? 3. Assuming that the first of the foregoing questions is answered affirmatively and the second in the negative, did the strikers who might otherwise be entitled to reinstatement forfeit that right by reason of their misconduct during the strike? Upon the entire record of this proceeding, and from my observation of the witnesses at the second hearing, I make the following : SUPPLEMENTARY FINDINGS OF FACT On March 31, 1950, approximately 2% weeks after the Board's original decision herein, 13 employees of Respondent who had been engaged in the aforementioned strike made application through Thomas L. Parsonnet, their attorney , for rein- statement to their former or substantially equivalent position. Respondent 95 NLRB 1023 s These sections of the Act deal with filing by union officials of so-called non-Communist affidavits and specified union records. 1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD made no response to that demand. It not only denied that it received such a demand, but, according to the testimony of Francis E. Crowley, its vice president and general manager, Respondent, on or about April 28, 1948, "fired the men that went on strike and wanted no more part of them." At the second hearing, however, the General Counsel announced that the only striker whose right to reinstatement was being litigated was one Gerald Smith who was not included among those for whom Parsonnet made the demand for reinstatement on March 31, 1950. Smith was employed by Respondent on November 3, 1945, and worked steadily until April 28, 1948, when he, and a substantial majority of the other production and maintenance employees, engaged in the strike that commenced on that day. On April 30, 1948, Smith and all other strikers were allegedly " discharged" because of their participation and activities in that strike. Smith, however, continued the strike activities hereafter described for about 2 months. 1. Smith's demand for reinstatement I find that on or about June 5, 1950, Parsonnet, as attorney for Smith, by letter addressed to Respondent, made a demand for Smith's reinstatement to his former or substantially equivalent position, and that Respondent has ignored and refused to comply with that request. While Respondent denied that it ever received Parsonnet's letter, I credit the latter's testimony that he mailed that letter on June 5, properly addressed with postage prepaid, and that it was never returned to him. I further find that it was received by Respondent on June 6, 1950. It is significant that a copy of that letter, sent by Parsonnet to the Board's Regional Office at New York, was received by that office on June 6 and acknowledged on June 7, 1950. And, though Respondent denied it had received a demand from any of the strikers for reinstatement, there was received in evidence, produced from Respondent's own files pursuant to the General Coun- sel's subpoena , the original of Parsonnet's letter of March 31, 1950, demanding reinstatement of the 13 strikers aforementioned. On the entire record I find that on June 5, 1950, Parsonnet, in Smith's behalf, unconditionally demanded rein- statement for him to his former or substantially equivalent position and that Respondent has failed to so reinstate him. Nor is there any merit to Respondent's contention that Smith's right to rein- statement is "barred by laches." By ordering Respondent, on March 13, 1950, "to reinstate the strikers, upon application," the Board must be presumed to have held that by that time Smith was not estopped from acquiring reinstatement. It certainly cannot be contended that a further lapse of less than 3 months, until June 5, 1950, should effect such an estoppel 8 2. Was Smith permanently replaced prior to May 11, 1948? Smith was employed by Respondent on November 3, 1945, as "a cooler man" and continued at that work until he went on strike and picket duty April 28, 1948, an activity which he continued for about 2 months. As a cooler man it was his duty to stack cans containing Respondent's milk and cream products in the cooler and to bring them in and out of the cooler to the platform for loading on trucks. According to its payroll records for the week ending April 27, 1948, Respondent then had 21 employees engaged in production and maintenance work. During 8 The evidence clearly establishes that an earlier, or indeed, any demand by the strikers would have been futile for, as Crowley testified, Respondent, on or about April 28, 1948, "fired the men that went on strike and wanted no more part of them." CROWLEY'S MILK COMPANY, INC. 1003 the week ending May 4, ]948, and the week ending May 11, 1948, no new employees for work in the cooler department were engaged. According to Respondent's own testimony, it employed 3 cooler men from June 9, 1948, to January 13, 1950, and 2 such cooler men thereafter. On June 9, 1948, these positions were filled by McManus, Wales, and Dipolo. Of these 3, only McManus had been employed prior to May 11, 1948, and he continued in that work to the date of the second hearing. Wales was replaced by Holste on September 8, 1948, and the latter was replaced by Collesano on November 6, 1948. The latter continued in that position until January 13, 1950, when 1 of the 3 cooler jobs was eliminated. Dipolo was replaced by Hennessey on August 2, 1948, who continued as such replacement to March 16, 1949. Chester Walker then took over until March 23, 1949, when he in turn was replaced by Cocker. On March 19, 1950, Cocker started training for an engineer's job and Ralph Holste took his place and continued as a cooler to the date of the second hearing. None of the replacements aforementioned were hired before May 11, 1948. On Respondent's own testimony and records, therefore, I find that in addition to the job filled by McManus, cooler jobs for 2 men until January 13, 1950, and for 1 man thereafter, were filled by employees who were not in Respondent's employ on May 11, 1948.° Accordingly, I find that Respond- ent had not on or before May 11, 1948, permanently replaced Smith, and that since June 9, 1948, at least 1 job as cooler man was filled by an employee hired after May 11, 1948.6 3. Did Smith's strike activities bar his reinstatement? Smith testified that he participated in the picketing at Respondent's plant and at two retail stores selling Respondent's products "so that the customers would not buy Crowley's products." With respect to the picketing at Respondent's plant, the evidence does not establish that Smith indulged in any objectionable conduct other than that he was one of a group of 12 individuals "walking around in a circle in front of the garage door." Two members of this group carried picket signs reading "This plant is on strike, A. F. L., 680." Such primary picket- ing was clearly lawful and I find nothing in Smith's participation in this activity which would justify Respondent's failure to reinstate him. With respect to Smith's picketing elsewhere, Crowley testified that he observed Smith carrying a sign in front of the premises of the Guernsey Crest Ice Cream Company containing the inscription : "Do not buy Crowley's products." By this conduct, Respondent argues that Smith "engaged in a vicious secondary boy- cott in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act and in so doing, ... forfeited all rights under the law. [His] illegal conduct deprived [him] of any right to reinstatement or back pay." Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act declares it to be an "unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . .. to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any . . . commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is" any one of numerous objectives proscribed by the remainder of that section. (Emphasis supplied.) But the prohibition is against induce- • General Counsel's Exhibit 16, Respondent's payroll record for May 27, 1952, shows two men employed in the "cooler department"-McManus and Holste , the latter having been hired on March 199, 1950. 6 By reason of this finding, I find it unnecessary to give consideration to evidence of- fered by the General Counsel that other allegedly substantial equivalent positions, which the General Counsel claimed Smith was qualified to fill, were given to employees hired after May 11, 1948. 1004 THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY ment and encouragement of "employees" of secondary employer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal to handle the goods of the primary employer enmeshed in a labor dispute with the latter's employees. As the Board has repeatedly held, "Section 8 (b) (4) (a) does not prohibit [the inducement of] employers to cease doing business with another employer." (Emphasis in original text.) Con- solidated Frame Company, 91 NLRB 1295, 1299; International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 294, A. F. L. (Conway's Express), 87 NLRB 972; Sealright Pacific Ltd., 82 NLRB 271. Here, according to Crowley's own testimony, all that Smith did by picketing at places other than Respondent's own plant was to induce other employers "not [to] buy Crowley's products." Such inducement directed to customers of Respondent is not proscribed by Section 8 (b) (4) of the Act. Nor is there any merit to the contention urged in Respondent's brief that "employees who go out on strike not caused by unfair labor practices may be discharged" or denied reinstatement. Presumably, what Respondent has in mind in this respect is that because the strike which began on April 28 as an economic strike and was followed by the alleged discharge of the strikers on April 30, while the strike was still of an economic nature, that the discharges of April 30 effectively terminated the employment relationship. Though the Board by its Decision and Order of March 13, 1950, in ordering the reinstatement of the strikers impliedly rejected this contention, a word of explanation in support of such rejection may not be inappropriate. Employees who engage in a strike do not lose their status as employees. The right to strike without loss of employment status is guaranteed by Section 13 of the Act' and is recognized by Section 2 (3) thereof.? N. L. R. B. v. Mackay Radio and Tele- graph Company, 304 U. S. 333, 347; N. L. R. B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Cor- poratzlon, 306 U. S. 240, 255. While it is true that if the strike is of an economic nature, an employer may replace such strikers, that prerogative is not predi- cated on a right to discharge such strikers because they engaged in the strike. Rather, it is based on the relinquishment by the strikers of their right to con- tinue work in exchange for the right to engage in a strike to compel their employer to grant their economic demands. In such a situation an employer is not required to sit idly by, stop or curtail his operations, and weaken his own economic position. If, however, the strike is caused by or converted into an unfair labor practice strike, work has not been voluntarily relinquished by the employees, but rather to protect a right guaranteed by the Act. To permit an employer to discharge or even replace unfair labor practice strikers merely because they engaged in such a strike would be to encourage violations of the Act. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Respondent's proposed findings of fact number 8, reading as follows, is adopted : 8. Said Gerald Smith picketed places of business of Respondent's cus- tomers ; and exposed to the public a placard, requesting the public, and such customers, not to buy Respondent's products, in front of places of business e "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitation or qualifications on that right." 7 "The term 'employee' . . . shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment. . . . THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY 1005 of various customers of Respondent within a 12 mile radius of Respondent's plant. All other proposed findings are rejected . Proposed finding number 1 has been covered by other findings made herein . All other proposed findings are rejected either because they are not material to the issues presently under consideration, or are not supported by the evidence , or are mere conclusions of law and not the subject of findings of fact. All proposed conclusions of law are rejected because they are not the legal conclusions that can properly be drawn from the facts found herein. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] THE WATERBURY TAG COMPANY and WATE, RBURY PRINTING PRESSMEN AND ASSISTANTS' UNION, LOCAL 150, AFL, PETITIONER. Case No. 1-RC-3035. February 4,1953 Decision and Order Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Sidney A. Coven, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Members Houston, Styles, and Peterson]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer 1 is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organization involved claims to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Petitioner seeks a unit described as printing pressmen, com- positors, stonemen, machine setup men, slittermen, and platemaker at the Employer's Waterbury, Connecticut, operations. The Em- ployer contends the proposed unit is inappropriate on the grounds that the employees involved are not craftsmen and that its operations are so integrated as to preclude other than a plantwide unit. There has been no history of collective bargaining with respect to the Employer's employees. The Employer manufacturers paper tags, some printed and some not, at the plant here involved. All operations are performed on 1 The name of the Employer appears in the caption as amended at the hearing. 102 NLRB No. 97.