Bar-Brook Manufacturing Co., Inc.

610 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. and LOCAL #79, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILER- MAKERS, IRON SHIP BUILDERS AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL. Case No. 15-CA-486. June 17, 1953 DECISION AND ORDER On April 21, 1953, Trial Examiner Arthur Leff issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board' has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions, the briefs, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions , and recommendation of the Trial Examiner with the following addition. Respondent in the instant case renews its contention, re- jected by the Board in its Supplemental Decision and Certifica- tion of Representatives (101 NLRB No. 43), that the election conducted among its employees pursuant to a Board Decision and Direction of Election (issued July 14, 1952), should be set aside because of allegedly unlawful conduct on the part of the Union. The Board has reconsidered this contention and finds, in addition to its previous findings, that assuming the conduct occurred as alleged by Respondent in its objections to the election and reiterated in its brief in support of its exceptions in this case , it was nonetheless too remote in time to have interfered with the employees' free choice in the election.' Ac- cordingly we reaffirm the Board's Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representatives. ORDER Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that Bar-Brook Manufacturing Company, Inc., of Shreveport, Louisiana, its officers , agents, successors, and assigns shall: 1. Cease and desist from: 'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Mem- bers Murdock, Styles, and Peterson]. 2 NAPA New York Warehouse, Inc., 75 NLRB 1269, 1271; Krambo Food Stores, Inc., 101 NLRB 742. 105 NLRB No. 89. BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 611 (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local #79, Inter- national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, AFL, in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Shreveport, Louisiana, attic and window fan manufacturing plant, including the shipping clerk, inventory clerk, and so- called "seasonal employees," but excluding the office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors. (b) By threats of reprisal for union activity, or in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations , to join or assist Local #79, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities, except to the extent such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local #79, Inter- national Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, AFL, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit described above, and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant and office in Shreveport, Louisiana, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report as Appendix A.3 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Di- rector for the Fifteenth Region, after having been duly signed by an authorized representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon the receipt thereof and maintained by it for sixty (60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. 3 This notice shall be amended by substituting for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" in the caption the words "A Decision and order." In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice shall be further amended by substituting for the words "A Decision and Order," the words "A Decree of the United Stares Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." 61 2 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE A charge having been filed by Local #79, international Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America , AFL, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region (New Orleans , Louisiana), issued his complaint dated February 26, 1953, against Bar-Brook Manufacturing Company, herein called the Respondent, alleging in substance that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean ing of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, in that the Respondent (1) since on or about February 16, 1953, has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in an appropriate unit, and (2) since on or about April 15, 1952, engaged in acts of interference, restraint, and coercion by (a) interrogating employees concerning union activities, (b) threatening employees with reprisal if they supported the Union and established it as col- lective -bargaining representative , (c) promising them benefits if they did not, and (d) so- liciting employee help in antiunion activity. The Respondent in its answer denied the com- mission of unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held on March 23, 1953, at Shreveport, Louisiana, before Arthur Leff, the undersigned Trial Examiner duly designated by the Chief Trial Examiner. All parties were represented at the hearing . Full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross -examine witnesses , and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues was afforded all parties. At the close of the General Counsel's case, the Respondent moved to dismiss the independent 8 (a) (1) allegations of the complaint. The motion was denied. A motion made by the General Counsel at the end of the entire case, to conform the pleadings to the proof with regard to minor variances, was granted. Opportunity was afforded all parties to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings and con- clusions. After the hearing a brief was received from the Respondent. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent, Bar-Brook Manufacturing Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its office and principal place of business in Shreveport, Louisiana, is engaged in the business of manufacturing attic and window fans. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint, the Company received raw materials valued in excess of $100,000, of which over 25 percent came from points outside the State of Louisiana. During the same period the Respondent manufactured and sold finished products valued in excess of $200,000, of which more than 50 percent was shipped to points outside the State of Louisiana. The Respondent does not dispute that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local #79, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, is a labor organization ad- mining to membership employees of the Respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Introduction Organization of the Respondent's employees into the Union began about the beginning of May 1952, after a group of employees , led by Claude Blundell who had been a member of the Union at a prior place of employment, called at the Union's office to obtain designation cards. On May 16, 1952, Charles Trepagnier, the Union's international representative, made a bargaining demand upon the Company . The Company insisted upon a Board certifi- cation. On May 19, 1952, the Union filed with the Board a petition for certification, thus initiating the representation proceeding in Case No. 15-RC-744, the history of which is BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 613 set forth in a subsequent section of this report. On the morning of May 21, 1952, employees of the Respondent went out on strike, apparently for recognition . The strike lasted until June 3, 1952, ending with the return of all employees to work. During the strike, unfair labor practice charges were filed by the Union and the Respondent, each against the other. The Union 's charge, filed May 23, 1952, alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (1) since on or about May 20, 1952. That charge, which was subsequently amended on February 19 , 1953, to add a refusal-to-bargain allegation , forms the basis of the complaint in this proceeding. The Respondent's charge, filed May 27, 1952, and docketed as Case No, 15-CB-92, alleged that "since on or about May 21, 1952," the Union had "intimidated and coerced employees of the Company to compel them to support ithe] Union in its actions against the Company, particularly in its strike against the Company." On June 13, 1952, the Regional Director administratively dismissed the Respondent's charge for insufficient evidence of violations and, on appeal to the General Counsel, his action was sustained. Because the Company, unlike the Union, did not waive its charge as a basis for objecting to the results of an election , the representation proceeding was held in abeyance while the charge was still pending , in accordance with the Board's usual procedures. Following the dismissal of the Respondent 's charge, the representation proceeding was processed to a conclusion , resulting in the Union's certification. The Company, however, has since refused to bargain with the Union , upon grounds to be stated below. B. Interference, restraint, and coercion , Apart from the refusal-to-bargain aspect of the case, later to be considered, the General Counsel's evidence was confined to the following four incidents of alleged interference, re- straint, and coercion: (a) James Draper, an employee of the Respondent in May 1952 but now no longer employed by it, testified: In May 1952, on the Monday after the Friday that Charles Trepagnier called on the Respondent to make the Union's bargaining demand, Draper was approached at his place of work by M. H. Swor, the Respondent's plant superintendent and now also its vice president. Swor asked Draper if he were open for some fatherly advice. Draper stated that he was. After hesitating a moment. Swor said, "Well, you know there is being a little move made in the shop. We don't want it to materialize." Swor then went on to refer to a man in town named Brown who, Swor stated, had got "mixed up in a little move like that" and as a result had been unable to get work anywhere in town, being obliged finally to go to another town where he went into business for himself. Swor denied ever having had a conversation with Draper such as Swor testified to, and further denied ever talking to Draper about the Union in any respect. He also testified that he knew no one named Brown, nor any one else who had been unable to get work in town because of his connection with a union. Despite Swor's denial, I credit Draper's testimony. Draper, who appears to have left the Respondent's employ on friendly terms and who has no apparent interest in the outcome of the case, impressed me as a witness careful of the truth and meticulous in not enlarging his testimony beyond his actual memory of what occurred. From my observation of him, I do not believe him one who might have fabricated a story of this kind, and certainly he had no interest in doing so. Swor, on the other hand, because of his position with the Respondent had an interest to protect, and certain other aspects of his testimony reflect a tendency on his part to attempt to conform his statements to what he considered the Respondent 's best defense. On the basis of my consideration of the full testimony of both witnesses, and from my observation of their demeanor while testifying, I am convinced, and I find, that Swor made the statements substantially as attributed to him by Draper. I am persuaded that Swor intended, and Draper understood, the reference to the "move" to relate to the Union's organizational efforts, and the reference to Brown to embody a veiled threat that economic reprisals might be visited upon employees who supported the union movement. I so find, and further find that the statements, in the context in which they were made, constituted a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. (b) Claude V. Blundell, no longer employed by the Respondent but an employee in May 1952, testified: At the beginning of the workday on May 21, 1952, about 2 hours before the strike began, Swor approached him and the following conversation ensued: Swor: Don't weld on that. I want to talk to you a minute. Blundell: What is it? Swor: This little move you got in here. Do you want to work here? If you want to work here. I want you to get busy and help me combat and knock this move out. There is one 614 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fellow here (Davis) that went in for a little labor union and he had to leave town and go to work. If you want to work, now, jump in and help me combat this and knock it out. Blundell: I don't know what I have got to do with that. There is other fellows here, too. Swor: I am telling you, you better jump in and help me knock it out. Blundell: I can't do that. Wait a minute. Let me talk to you. Swor: (walking off): That is all right then. Swor denied that any such conversation had occurred . Swor testified that he spoke to Blundell with reference to the Union on only 1 occasion , about 1 or 2 days before the strike. Swor had heard , he testified , that threats were being made by union members against em- ployees to compel them to join, and that Blundell was the leader of the union movement. Consequently, according to his version, he went to Blundell and asked him "to see if he couldn't keep the fellows from making threats," as he "didn 't want to see any violence, didn't want to see anyone getting hurt." Blundell replied, according to Swor, that he knew those who had been making the threats and that he would speak to them and see to it that such threats were discontinued , agreeing that the men had "to realize that they had to keep the Company's interest at heart as well as that of the Union." Blundell, on the other hand, denied that on the occasion in question , Swor had made any mention of employees being threatened and intimidated. Much of Swor's testimony left me unimpressed. His testimony as to bow he knew Blundell to be a leader among union adherents was vague and evasive . So, too, was his testimony concerning the threats and intimidation about which he says he heard. The record would indicate that the Respondent 's concern over alleged threats, intunidation , and violence arose after the strike began.,' As Blundell was apparently a leader in the strike activity, I think it not unlikely that Swor may have spoken to Blundell about intimidation at that time. But I am not convinced that he did so at the time he fixed in his testimony. But while Swor's testimony left me skeptical, so did that of Blundell. Blundell was not a completely forthright witness, as his denial of leadership in the Union, directly contradicted by other witnesses for the General Counsel, plainly indicates. Part of his testimony, such as his reference to "one fellow here that went in for a little labor union and he had to leave town and go to work," seemed to me an added embellishment of his own, perhaps suggested by what he had heard from Draper. If Swor had made the direct threat Blundell attributed to him. I do not think he would have bothered to add a covert one. Moreover , if Swor knew Blundell to be a leader of the Union, I do not think he would have come to Blundell to ask him "to knock this move out." And if he did not, little reason appears why he should have asked Blundell, a comparatively new employee, to assume the leadership in an antiunion drive. Though I believe some conversation may have occurred between Blundell and Swor on the morning of the strike, S am not persuaded that Blundell gave a fully truthful account of what occurred, and since I have no means of separating what is true from what is not, I reject all of it. (c) Robert B. Reynolds, also a former employee of the Respondent, testified as follows: During the first week of June 1952, Steiner, the Respondent 's foreman In charge of the machine shop, called him in to discuss the Union with him. Sterner told Reynolds --aged 19 and on his first job--that he probably didn't have the experience that older people had, mentioned to Reynolds that he (Steiner) had been "messed up in a union before," and sug- gested to him that he talk to his father about the Union before deciding what to do. Steiner went on to tell Reynolds in substance that Mr. Barnes, the Respondent's president, was not going to let anybody else tell him how to run the shop, and that before he let the Union come in and run his business for him he would close down the shop. Reynolds' testimony was undenied and is credited. I am unable to agree with the Respon- dent's contention that Steiner 's otherwise unexplicated statement as to what Barnes would do constituted the expression of an opinion privileged by Section 8 (c) of the Act. I find that the intent and effect of the statement was to hold out the threat of a plant shutdown if the Union were established as bargaining representative. This threat, made by a management representative for whose conduct the Respondent is responsible, constituted , it is found, an act of illegal restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1). (d) Employee Raymond Moss testified that somewhere along about the first part of June 1952, Superintendent Swor asked him "if anyone had approached [him] any more about joining the iFor example, the 8 (b) (1) (A) charge filed by the Company alleges that "since on or about May 21, 1952 [the date the strike began] said Union has intimidated and coerced employees of the Company to support said Union in its actions against the company. par- ticularly in its strike against the Company." BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 615 Union or something to that effect," and had elicited from him a negative reply. On cross- examination, Moss admitted that he had probably told Swor at one time that he was not in favor of the Union. He also recalled that Swor told him at one time that he was free to Jour the Union or not as be wished. And while he could not remember exactly when Moss told him this, he conceded that it could have been during the same conversation in which Swor asked him the question he testified to on direct examination. Swor did not deny asking that question of Moss, but fixed the time as being on the first day of the strike. According to Swor, Moss asked Swor on that occasion if he could continue working despite the strike , indicating that he had a family to support and was opposed to the Union. Swor further testified that it was only after Moss indicated to him that he was against the Union that he asked Moss if he had been approached to join. Swor also testified that he told Moss in the course of that same conver- sation that he was within his rights to join the Union if he wanted to. Moss was not recalled by the General Counsel as a witness to rebut Swor's testimony'as to how he came to ask the question and as to the additional matter mentioned in the same conversation. Since what Swor added is not necessarily inconsistent with Moss ' testimony, and stands undenied, I accept Swor's testimony in that respect. Bearing in mind the context in which the question was asked, the accompanying remarks , Moss' earlier disclosure of his position with regard to the Union, and the fact that the questioning as far as it went did not seek information as to who was doing the soliciting for the Union, I am not persuaded that Swor 's questioning of Moss, standing as it does isolated in the record , is enough upon which to predicate a finding of Illegal interrogation violative of Section 8 (a) (1). Accordingly, I find that the allegation of the complaint, that the Respondent interrogated employees as to their own union activities and as to the union activities of other employees , has not been sustained. C. The refusal to bargain On July 14, 1962, the Board issued aDecision and Direction of Election in Case No. 15-RC- 744, finding, among other things, that all production and maintenance employees at the Re- spondent's Shreveport, Louisiana, attic and window fan manufacturing plant, including the ship- ping clerk, inventory clerk, and so-called "seasonal" employees, but excluding office clerical employees , professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. In Its decision, the Board considered, and rejected , the Respondent's contention that certain extra employees hired to meet added production requirements and called by the Respondent "seasonal employees " should be excluded from the appropriate unit. On July 30. 1952, pursuant to the direction of election , an election by secret ballot was conducted under the supervision of the Regional Director for the Fifteenth Region. Upon the conclusion of the election, a tally of ballots was furnished to and certified by the observers for the Union and the Respondent. The tally showed that of the approximately 41 eligible voters in the appropriate unit, 40 voted and of these, 23 voted in favor of representation by the Union and' 17 against. On August 5, 1952, the Respondent filed timely objections to conduct affecting the results of the election. and at the same time also objected to the Board 's decision enabling "temporary" employees to participate in the election. In substance, the objections to the conduct affecting the results of the election were that "employees were intiiriidated and coerced by threats of violence uttered by picketing strikers , and that employees were coerced by mass picketing" during a strike that the record here shows was conducted between May 21 and June 3. 1952. The Regional Director, acting pursuant to Section 102.61 of the Board's Rules and Reg- ulations, investigated the objections, and on September 15, 1952, issued his report on objec- tions. With regard to the objections to conduct affecting the results of the election, the Regional Director reported as follows: On or about May 21, 1952, following a demand for bargaining by the Petitioner and the filing of the petition herein, the employees of the Employer went on strike. On May 23, 1952, the Petitioner [Union] filed 8 (a) (1) charges which it waived for the purposes of the instant proceeding. Thereafter, on May 27, 1952, the Employer filed 8 (b) (1) charges, docketed as Case No. 15-CB-92, which it refused to waive. On or about June 3, 1952. the strike was abandoned and all employees so desiring returned to work. The Employer's charges were investigated and dismissed for lack of merit by the undersigned on June 13, 1952. The Employer appealed this dismissal, and on September 11, 1952. the General Counsel sustained the dismissal. The Regional Director declared it to be his opinion that: 291555 0 - 54 - 40 616 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD this objection, based as it is on activities upon which the General Counsel has refused to issue a complaint and in any event which occurred at least two months before the election does not raise material issues with respect to conduct affecting the results of the election. As to the Respondent 's additional objection relating to the alleged temporary employees, the Regional Director reported: ... The Employer's position as to eligibility was fully litigated in the representation hearing upon which the Board's Decision and Direction of Election was predicated. On the basis of the foregoing, the Regional Director found that the Respondent 's objections did not raise substantial or material issues with respect to conduct affecting the results of the election. He recommended that the objections be overruled and that the Union be certified. On September 22, 1952, the Respondent filed with the Board exceptions to the Regional Director's report. Thereafter, on October 30, 1952, the Board issued a Supplemental Decision and Certification of Representatives. On the basis of its review of the Respondent's objections, the Regional Director's report, and the exceptions thereto, the Board ruled: Allegation (1) [relating to the alleged union coercion] was the subject matter in a charge in Case No. 15-CB-92 filed by the Employer. The Regional Director investigated the charge and found no merit in the charge and refused to issue a complaint. The General Counsel sustained the dismissal of the charge on appeal. The Board is not empowered to review the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint. (Association of Motion Picture Producers Inc., 88 NLRB 1155, and cases cited therein.) As noted by the Regional Director, the matter of eligibility of the alleged "temporary" employees was fully litigated at the hearing. We see no reason to change our decision in this matter. The Board accepts the Regional Director's findings and concludes that the objections raise no substantial and material issues with respect to the conduct of the election and they are hereby overruled. The Board certified that the Union had been designated and selected by a majority of the employees in the unit theretofore found by it to be appropriate as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining, and that, pursuant to Section 9 (a) of the Act, the Union was the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages , hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. On February 16, 1953, the Union requested the Respondent to bargain collectively with it as the exclusive representative of the Respondent's employees in the unit found appropriate above. The Respondent refused, asserting that the Board's certification was invalid because alleged temporary employees were included by the Board in the appropriate unit and allowed to participate in the election, and further because of the matters set forth in its charge in Case No. 15-CB-92. That is still the position of the Respondent. The Respondent has made no additional contentions in this complaint proceeding, but has declared its purpose, as is Its right, to test the validity of the Board's earlier determinations in the circuit court of ap- peals. z On the record as a whole, it is concluded and found that on February 16, 1953, and at all times thereafter, the Union was, and now is, by virtue of Section 9 (a) of the Act, the exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purpose of collective bargaining 2 At the hearing, the Respondent made an offer to prove in this proceeding the allegations of the 8 (b) (i) (A) charge in Case No. 15-CB-92 which had previously been dismissed by the General Counsel, and in that connection submitted certain letters and documents re- lating to the processing of that charge. The offer of proof was rejected on the ground that it was outside the issues of this proceeding and, moreover, concerned objections to the election that had already been considered by the Board in the representation proceeding and ruled upon by it adversely to the Respondent's position. The Respondent also offered to prove that some 19 employees who were eligible to vote in the election had left the Re- spondent's employ on various dates between July 30, 1952, and December 23, 1952. The purpose of the offer, according to the Respondent, was to supply confirmation of the cor- rectness of its contention before the Board in the representation proceeding with regard to the alleged temporary employees the Board included in the unit. The Respondent con- ceded, however, that the offer of proof related to an issue that had already been litigated before the Board and finally disposed of by it in the representation proceeding. For that reason, the offer of proof was rejected. BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC. 617 with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employ- ment. It is further found that by refusing to bargain with the Union as such exclusive bargain- mg representative on February 16, 1953, and thereafter, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. By such conduct, the Respondent also interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. W. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above, to the extent they have been found to constitute unfair labor practices, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent, described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in certain unfair labor practices , it will be recommended that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union, the statutory representative of employees in the appropriate unit, it will be recommended that the Respondent be ordered to bargain collectively with the Union and embody any under- standing reached in a signed agreement. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local # 79, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. 2. All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Shreveport, Louisiana, attic and window fan manufacturing plant, including the shipping clerk, inventory clerk, and so-called "seasonal" employees, but excluding the office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 3. On October 30, 1952, the above Union was, and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargain- ing within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 4. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit on February 16, 1953, and thereafter, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act, 5. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 7. The Respondent has not, as alleged in the complaint, engaged in unfair labor practices by interrogating employees as to their union activities and as to the union activities of others; by promising financial benefits to employees should the Union be brought in; and by soliciting help in antiunion activity. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: 6 18 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization , to form labor organizations , to join Local #79, International Brotherhood of Boilermakers , Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through repre- sentatives of their own choosing , and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection , or to refrain from any and all such activities , except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition or employment as authorized in Section 8(a) (3) of the Act. WE WILL bargain collectively upon request with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described herein with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment , or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees at our plant, including the shipping clerk, inventory clerk, and so-called seasonal employees, but excluding the office clerical employees, professional employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. All our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming members of the above-named union, or any other labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be affected by an agreement in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. BAR-BROOK MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC., Employer. Dated .............. By .......................................................... :.................................... (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. TEXTILE MACHINE WORKS, INC. and PAUL J. GASSERT, ET AL. TEXTILE MACHINE WORKS, INC. and WILLIAM G. BAUER TEXTILE MACHINE WORKS, INC. and UNITED STEELWORK- ERS OF AMERICA C. I.O. Cases Nos . 4-CA-118,4-CA-277, and 4 -CA-343 . June 17, 1953 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER On November 5, 1951 , the Board issued its Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding,' finding that the Re- spondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom , and take certain affirmative action. Among the unfair labor practices found to have been committed by the Respondent was its discriminatory refusal to employ 85 former employees , herein called discriminatees , in vion of Sec- tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act. As a defense to the allegations of the complaint that the refusal to employ the discriminatees violated 196 NLRB 1333. 105 NLRB No. 77.