Brewery and Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers, and Platform Men

LOCAL UNION NO. 830 405 LOCAL UNION NO. 830, BREWERY AND BEER DISTRIB- UTOR DRIVERS, HELPERS, AND PLATFORM MEN, affiliated with INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM- STERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL and EARL VANN. Case No. 4-CC-37. July 28, 1953 DECISION AND ORDER On April 14, 1953, Trial Examiner C. W. Whittemore issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had not engaged in and was not engaging in unfair labor practices and recommending that the complaint be dismissed , as set forth in the copy of the Inter- mediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a brief in support thereof. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. I The Board has considered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions , the brief, and the entire record in the case , and hereby adopts the find- ings , conclusions , and recommendations of the Trial Examiner insofar as they are consistent with the following. The principal issue in this case is a jurisdictional one. The amended complaint alleges that the Respondent conducted secondary boycotts against Schmidt and Sons, Inc., herein called Schmidt, a brewing company, and Scott and Grauer, a liquor wholesaler , for the purpose of requiring Earl Vann, an employer, to join the Respondent Union , and to force Schmidt and Scott and Grauer to cease doing business with Lincoln Beer Distributors , herein called Lincoln, in violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act. The charging party, Earl Vann, is a partner in the Lincoln firm. Lincoln has a license from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania permitting it to sell beer within the Philadelphia area. Its business is entirely intrastate . In 1951, Lincoln's gross sales approximated $ 50,000. Schmidt, whose brewery is located within the city of Phila- delphia, has annual out-of-State purchases valued at more than $3,000,000, and out-of-State sales valued at more than $2,000,000. In 1951, Lincoln purchased beer valued at approxi- mately $38,000 from Schmidt; in 1952 these purchases in- creased to approximately $44,000. Scott and Grauer has annual imports valued at more than $1,000,000. All its sales are made , however, within the Commonwealth . In 1951, Lincoln purchased from Scott and Grauer beer valued at approximately $ 1,800. Lincoln made no purchases from that firm in 1952. lExcept for a ruling refusing to permit the General Counsel to amend the complaint. This ruling was reversed by the Board on February 20, 1953. 106 NLRB No. 76. 406 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The primary dispute is between Lincoln and the Respondent; Schmidt and Scott and Grauer are only secondarily involved. Assuming arguendo that Lincoln is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, its operations are nevertheless too insubstantial to justify asserting jurisdiction under the Board's present jurisdictional policy.' However, in secondary boycott situations, such as this, the Board has declared that it will take into consideration for jurisdictional purposes not only the operations of the primary employer, but also the operations of any secondary employers to the extent that the latter are affected by the conduct involved. "If, taken together, the business of the primary employer and that portion of the secondary employer's business which is affected by the alleged, boycott meet the minimum standards, jurisdiction ought to be asserted." a (Emphasis supplied.) As set forth above, the operations of the primary employer, Lincoln, considered alone do not justify asserting jurisdiction. The businesses of Schmidt and Scott and Grauer considered in their entirety do meet the Board's jurisdictional tests. However, under the Jamestown Builders Exchange formula, it is not the entire business of the secondary employer which is taken into consideration, but only that Fart of the business which is affected by the alleged unlawful conduct. 'I The Re- 2 Dorn's House of Miracles, Inc., 91 NLRB 632; Hollow Tree Lumber Company, 91 NLRB 635; Stanislaus Implement and Hardware Company, Limited, 91 NLRB 618; Federal Dairy Co., Inc., 91 NLRB 638; The Rutledge Paper Products Company, 91 NLRB 625. 3Truck Drivers Local Union No. 649, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL (Jamestown Builders Exchange, Inc.), 93 NLRB 386, 387. 4Our dissenting colleague misapprehends the scope and purpose of the Jamestown decision The Jamestown case was one of a series issued about the same time in which the Board reexamined its past jurisdictional policy and formulated for the future the standards which would guide it in determining whether or not to assert jurisdiction. (See cases cited in foot- note 2 , supra.) Having laid down the general rule, the Board in the Jamestown case measured the facts of that particular case against the rule and found that these facts did not justify asserting jurisdiction. The Jamestown facts presented one example of the operation of the rule; they did not exhaust its possibilities. In Jamestown, the respondent union picketed a local construction site of the secondary employer. In making its jurisdictional calculations under the Jamestown formula, the Board considered the secondary employer's operations at the picketed site but not elsewhere. The reason is plain. The reasonably anticipated effect of the picketing at the local project was to shut down operations at that site; there was no evidence that it would also result in any kind of work stoppage at the secondary employer's other projects The dissent draws an unwarranted inference from the Jamestown case when it infers that the Jamestown formula is applicable solely "to situations where the secondary employer has separately located plants and not all of its plants are picketed." If the Board had so intended, it could easily have framed its rule in these words. The Jamestown formula speaks in terms of effect and not lp aceofpicketing. The two may coincide as in Jamestown, but not necessarily The inadequacy of the formula suggested by the dissent is readily apparent from the following fact situation. Supposing a manufacturer has a number of widely scattered plants. Plant A manufactures a part which is shipped to plant B which incorporates it in the final product. A secondary boycott at plant A results in a stoppage of work at plant B because of the lack of parts furnished by the former plant. Under the formula proposed by the dissent, the Board would consider only plant A's business in determining whether to assert jurisdiction, whereas under the Jamestown formula, the business ofplantB as well as that of plant A would be taken into consideration, because the effect of the secondary boycott extends to both plants although LOCAL UNION NO. 830 407 spondent Union did not attempt to interfere with the general operations of the secondary employers, Schmidt and Scott and Grauer, but only with Lincoln' s business with these two firms.' The volume of Schmidt's and Scott and Grauer's business with Lincoln, either considered alone or together with Lincoln' s business generally , does not meet the Board's jurisdictional standards. Accordingly, consistent with such standards , the Board has no alternative but to dismiss the complaint, which we shall do.' [The Board dismissed the complaint.] Member Peterson , dissenting: I am unable to agree with the decision of the majority in this case which , in my opinion , is premised upon a mis- interpretation of the Board's jurisdictional policy with respect to secondary boycotts and is contrary to past Board precedents. It is clear that the operations of the primary employer standing alone are insufficent to warrant assertion of juris- diction under the Board' s present policy.' However, as indi- cated by my colleagues, the Board declared in the Jamestown case 8 that in secondary boycott situations it would take into consideration for jurisdictional purposes not only the opera- tions of the primary employer, but also the operations of any secondary employers to the extent that the latter were affected by the conduct involved. The specific point at which my col- leagues and I disagree is with respect to what was intended by the underscored language . They construe this language to mean that, as the Respondent Union limited its interference picketing takes place at only one plant. The Kanawha case, cited by the dissent, is illustrative of the same principle . Although picketing in pursuance of a secondary boycott took place at only 3 of 5 mine entrances , the Board found as a fact that the entire mining operation of the secondary employer was affected by such activities. The Board therefore considered the entire business of the secondary employer in deciding the jurisdictional question. As demonstrated above, the effect of a secondary boycott at one plant may extend well beyond that plant. Conversely, a secondary boycott at a plant may be limited in its effect to a small part of the business of that plant. In the present case, the Respondent Union had the means of shutting down the entire operations of the secondary employers However, it sought only to interfere with the secondary employers' business with Lincoln, the primary employer. Under the facts in the present case, the Respondent Union's activities only affected and were reasonably calculated only to affect this business with Lincoln. Therefore only the value of the secondary employers' business with Lincoln is taken into account in making jurisidictional calculations under the Jamestown formula. 5In point of fact, Vann, the charging party, apparently considered the incident at Schmidt's so insignificant he did not make it the subject of a charge and did not inform the General Counsel of it until shortly before the hearing, more than year after it occurred. The incident was not repeated and Lincoln continued to do business with Schmidt without interference. Although Lincoln voluntarily quit doing business with Scott and Grauer, this business did not exceed $ 1,800 per annum. 6In view of the dismissal of the complaint on jurisdictional grounds, the Board considers it unnecessary to pass upon the other grounds relied upon by the Trial Examiner in recom- mending dismissal of the proceeding. 'Footnote 2. supra. 8 Footnote 3, supra 408 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to the primary employer ' s business with the secondary em- ployers , only the volume of the secondary employers' busi- nesses with the primary employer is added to that of the primary employer ' s business in determining whether to assert jurisdiction. In my view it is necessary to disregard completely the factual context of the Jamestown case in order to arrive at such an interpretation. Thus , that case involved secondary action brought against two employers who were members, with the primary employer , of an association. The union there , as in the instant case , limited its interference to the primary employer ' s business with the secondary employers. However, a majority of the Board in refusing to assert juris- diction computed the entire operations of the secondary employers at the plants involved , but was unwilling to con- sider , as the dissenting member desired, the operations of the whole association. Nowhere in that case was it even suggested that the Board would fragmentize the operations of the secondary employers and look only to the amounts of the business conducted by them with the primary employer at the plants where the interference occurred in deciding whether to take jurisdiction. The majority states that under the Jamestown formula it is not the entire business of the secondary employer which is taken into consideration, but only that part of the business which is affected by the alleged unlawful conduct., I agree with this statement of the principle . However , an exmination of the facts in the Jamestown case makes it manifestly clear that the formula was intended to be applicable to situations where the secondary employer has separately located plants and not all of its plants are picketed. Under these circum- stances , the Board would consider only that part of the Em- ployer ' s business affected by the unlawful conduct, that is, the business of the employer at the plants at which secondary action was actually brought. Of course , if the union's action at one of the secondary employer ' s plants directly affects the operations at another plant or plants of the secondary em- ployer, the business at the latter plant or plants also would be considered . But it would be the total amount of business of the picketed or affected plants and not merely those portions of the business transacted with the primary employer. Moreover, if there was any possible doubt as to the validity of my position, it is dispelled by the Board's decision in the Kanawha case . ' In that case , the secondary employer had 5 mines of which only 3 were picketed . The Board stated that, giving due consideration to mining operations , the secondary employer''-s operations were equatable to a single plant having 5 entrances , with the result that by picketing less than all 9 United Construction Workers, affiliated with United Mine Workers of America, et al, (Kanawha Coal Operators ' Association), 94 NLRB 1731, enforced 198 F. 2d 391 ; cert. denied 344 U.S 876. LOCAL UNION NO. 830 409 the entrances the respondent unions could not be said to have picketed less than the entire business . Having likened this secondary employer's operations to those at 1 plant, the Board took into consideration the entire business of the em- ployer in asserting jurisdiction. A fortiori, it seems to me that where , as here, single plants of the secondary employers are involved making it unnecessary to characterize them in the fashion done in the Kanawha case, the entire businesses of the employers at these plants should be considered for jurisdictional purposes. In view of the foregoing , as the entire business of Schmidt and Scott and Grauer at the plants which were picketed meet the Board ' s jurisdictional tests, I would assert jurisdiction here and proceed to a resolution of the merits of the case. Chairman Farmer took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE On December 28, 1951, Earl Vann, an individual, filed a charge with the Board's Fourth Regional Director alleging violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (A ) of the Labor Management Rela- tions Act, 61 Stat. 136, by Local Union No. 830, the Respondent herein. Despite the mandatory provisions of Section 10 (1) of the Act, it appears that no injunction was sought by General Counsel, t and no complaint arising from the charge was caused by him to be issued, until January 15, 1953, alleging the commission of the aforesaid unfair labor practices . Copies of the charge , the complaint, and notice of hearing thereon , were served upon the Respondent, upon the charging party, and upon Scott and Grauer, a Philadelphia beer distributor. The complaint , as issued , alleges that on December 27, 1951: Respondent Union engaged in a strike and/or induced and encouraged the employees of Scott and Grauer to engage in a strike or concerted refusal in the course of their em- ployment to use, process , transport, or otherwise handle or work on certain goods, articles , and commodities, or to perform certain services ... with the objects of (a) forcing or requiring Earl Vann, an employer and/or self-employed person , to join Respondent Union, and (b) forcing or requiring Scott and Grauer to cease doing business with Lincoln Beer Distributor. Pursuant to notice a hearing was held before the undersigned Trial Examiner on February 2, 1953 , at Philadelphia , Pennsylvania. All parties were represented by counsel, participated in lSection 10 (1) of the Act provides: "Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph ( 4) (A), (B), or (C) of section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board , petition any district court of the United States.... for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter ." At the hearing the General Counsel stated that a petition for an injunction was filed on January 16, 1953, the day after issuance of the complaint According to a statement on the record by counsel for the Respondent Union, however, made on March 5, 1953, not until that day had he been informed that such a petition had been filed The court action, if any, upon the petition is not revealed in the record. 410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the hearing, and were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce relevant evidence, to argue the issues orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings. During the hearing General Counsel moved to amend the complaint, to allege that the same Respondent engaged in similar 8 (b) (4) (A) conduct at another time, at another place, and on the premises of another employer. The Trial Examiner sustained the objection to the motion, on the grounds that the proposed amendment was not onl; ntimely, but contrary to the pro- visions of 10 (b) of the Act. General Counsel appealed the Trial Examiner's ruling, and the hearing was adjourned pending Board action on the appeal. By an order dated February 20, 1953, the Board reversed the Trial Examiner. Pursuant to this order the Trial Examiner thereafter ordered that the hearing be reconvened in Philadelphia on March 5, 1953. On that date, and pursuant to the Board's order, the Trial Examiner granted a motion by General Counsel to amend the complaint to allege conducton the part of the Respondent Union similar to that alleged in the original complaint, but on December 20, and relating to the employees and business of C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc., another Philadelphia beer distributor. While it does not appear from documents in the record that any service of papers was made upon C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc., the first witness called by General Counsel was W. Sims Sharninghausen, secretary of the corporation. Counsel waived oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing. Time for filing of briefs was extended by the Chief Trial Examiner to April 9, 1953. A brief has been received from the Respondent Union. At the conclusion of the hearing ruling was reserved upon a motion by the Respondent Union to dismiss the complaint. Disposition of that motion is made in the following findings, con- clusions, and recommendations. Upon the entire record in the case, and from his observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS Three employers are named in the complaint as amended: (1) Lincoln Beer Distributor, a trade name under which business is done by copartners Earl Vann, Thomas Glenn, and Hastings Friday; (2) Scott and Grauer, the trade name under which business is done by Joseph C. Scott and J. Vernon Grauer; and (3) C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc. Lincoln Beer Distributor wholesales and retails beer to taprooms, private homes, and clubs in the Philadelphia area, and has 2 full-time and 1 part-time employees. Under license it is permitted to purchase and sell beverages only within the State of Pennsylvania. General Counsel does not allege and, indeed, the dearth of evidence will not permit a finding that Lincoln Beer Distributor is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. Scott and Grauer is an importing beer distributor, licensed as such, with place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Beer valued at more than $1,000,000 is annually imported by Scott and Grauer from points outside the State of Pennsylvania. It is clear that Scott and Grauer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc., is engaged in the brewing and sale of beer and ale, with its place of business in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. It annually purchases "raw materials" for the brewing of beer and ale valued at more than $ 3,000,000 from points outside the State of Pennsylvania, and annually sells, for distribution in 10 seaboard States other than Pennsylvania, such beverages valued at more than $ 2,000,000. Although General Counsel makes no allegation on this point, it is clear that C. Schmidt and Sons is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. Scott and Grauer do business annually with about 500 distributors, such as Lincoln, and some 1,200 taprooms. During 1951 Lincoln purchased from Scott and Grauer beverages valued at $ 1,798.06. In 1952 it purchased none. In 1951 Lincoln purchased beer valued at $ 37,875.35 from Schmidt, and in 1952 beer valued at $44,301.31. . II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local Union No. 830, Brewery and Beer Distributor Drivers, Helpers, and Platform Men, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. LOCAL UNION NO. 830 M. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The events at issue 411 Although testimony of various witnesses is in sharp dispute as to some points, the Trial Examiner finds that events placed in issue by the complaint, as amended, occurred in sub- stance as follows: The Respondent Union, for some period of time, has negotiated collective-bargaining agreements with the Philadelphia Beer Distributors Association, a voluntary organization of employers. In December 1951 Lincoln Beer Distributor was not a member of the employer association, although Vann appears to have been a member, in preceding years--at least in 1949. Negotiations for a new contract were completed late in 1951. Since it has been the custom for individual beer distributors to sign individual contracts with the Respondent Union, upon completion of negotiations with the Association, notice was sent out to all beer distributors in the Philadelphia area by the Union in early December, stating in part: Starting as of Monday morning December 17th 8:00 o'clock A.M. the new Distributor Contracts for the Philadelphia area will be ready for signing at the offices of Local Union No. 830, 1112 North Hancock Street. Starting Wednesday morning December 19th only trucks bearing the Local Union No. 830 signed agreement sticker, which will be issued at the signing of your contract for all your trucks will be loaded at the Breweries and I D Distributors platforms. The requirements to be met before signing contracts are as follows: 0 (2) All employees must be members at Local830. Paid up and in good standing. Lincoln Beer Distributor received a. copy of this notice from the Union, although it was not a member of the Association. It appears that many distributors in the area, although not members of the Association, customarily sign the areawide agreements. Lincoln did not sign the agreement. On December 20 its driver, Roland Garrett, went to the premises of C. Schmidt and Sons, Inc. While waiting in line behind other trucks Garrett was approached by Charles E. Fee, an employee of Schmidt and a union steward, who asked him for his union card. Garrett said he had none. Fee then told him to pull his truck out of line because he would get no beer without a card. Garrett called Vann, and Vann came to Schmidt's. Vann asked the shipper why his truck could not be loaded. The shipper denied responsibility. Fee, standing nearby, answered Vann by volunteering, "We won't let your truck get loaded," and said by "we" he meant the Union. Vann thereupon sought company officials. After some delay one of the officials told him that if he went back to the platform his truck would be unloaded. While the truck was being unloaded, Aloysius Bowe, a business representative of the Respondent, walked back and forth in front of the "stall" into which Vane's truck was backed, carrying a sign stating that "Lincoln Distributor is unfair to Local 830." When, a little later, Vann drove into another stall to be loaded with beer. Bowe displayed the same sign in front of that stall. Vann's truck was loaded without delay. 2 In summary, it appears that only on this one occasion did Vann have even brief difficulty in getting his truck unloaded of empties, and no difficulty at all in obtaining a supply of beer. Vann purchased beer from Schmidt throughout 1951 without delay, except on December 20, and continued in 1952 to buy beer without any incident of this nature. On December 27, 1951, Vann was called by his driver to the premises of Scott and Grauer. Upon arrival, and being told by the driver that employees of Scott and Grauer would not un- load the truck, Vann asked two employees, Matkowski and Weaver, why. They asked him if he was a member of the Union, and when he said no, they said they would not unload him because he was not a member of the Union. Van sought the sales manager, Lerch, who said that the Company was "in between" and could donothing about it. Apparently as a result of Vann's complaint, the superintendent of Scott and Grauer, Reynolds, telephoned to union head- quarters and reported the trouble to Louis Lanni, secretary-treasurer of Local 830. Harry Walker, the union steward at Scott and Grauer, was in Lanni's office at the time. Lanni 2 Platform men here were not members of Local No. 830, but of a CIO organization. 412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD agreed to send Walker to the premises at once to order the employees to unload and load Vann.3 Walker came to the plant, gave the instructions , and Vann's truck was unloaded, according to his own testimony, about noon. Vann then drove his truck to the loading platform. After waiting for half an hour without service he went inside and asked employee Francis Gannon if he was going to load his truck. Gannon asked him if he belonged to the Union, and when Vann replied in the negative, declared that he would not load him. Two other employees, standing nearby , also declined , for the same reason, to load Vann's truck. Vann left the premises without obtaining beer, and since then has voluntarily and apparently ceased doing business with Scott and Grauer. B. Conclusions In his brief, counsel for the Respondent urges several reasons why the complaint, as amended, should be dismissed. It is contended that the Board should not exercise jurisdiction. Board policy relative to the assertion of jurisdiction in secondary boycott cases is cited, particularly as expressed in Jamestown Builders Exchange Inc., (93 NLRB 386). In that case the Board said: , in determining whether the Board will assert jurisidiction in cases in which secondary boycotts are alleged, we must consider not only the operations of the primary employer, but also the operations of any second employers , to the extent that the latter are affected by the conduct involved.... Where ... the operations of the primary employer do not satisfy the Board's jurisdiction standards we must, in addition , consider the operations of the secondary employers , but only insofar as such operations are affected by the alleged unlawful boycott. If, taken together, the business of the primary employer and that portion of the secondary employers ' business which is affected by the alleged boycott meet the minimum standards , jurisdiction ought to be asserted. Here Lincoln, the primary employer, is plainly not engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of the Act. Insofar as the alleged secondary boycott actually affected the business of Scott and Grauer, only the value of a few empties and one load of beer or ale was involved , even temporarily, and the precise value is not revealed . Assuming that the boycott had extended throughout the entire year of 1951, which it did not, the operations of the secondary employer would have been af- fected only to the extent of about $ 1,800 , insufficient to assert jurisdiction. Exercising a similar assumption and projection from the single incident at Schmidt's, its operations would have been affected throughout the entireyear of 1952 to a monetary extent of $44,301,31--again insufficient to exercise jurisdiction. On the basis of evidence adduced by General Counsel it would appear to be unreasonable to assert jurisdiction simply because he claims the Union might have engaged in "an exten- sion of this practice," as he said , "to a number of primary employers " and "ultimately bring the total figure" to one warranting jurisdiction . There is no evidence that any primary em- ployer other than Lincoln has been involved in a dispute of this nature with the Union ; the testi- mony of the union secretary is undisputed that the organization has never engaged in a strike in that area. The Trial Examiner finds merit in the Respondent 's contention that the Board should not exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly , it will be recommended that the complaint be dismissed for this reason. History of its decisions, however, permits anticipation that the Board may disagree with this Trial Examiner's understanding of its jurisdictional policies, 4 or that it may, after the issuance of this Intermediate Report, revise such policies. 5 For that reason the merits of the case will be considered. 3 The Trial Examiner does not credit Vann's testimony that during his conversation with Lerch, above described, Walker was called in and that Walker told him he would not be un- loaded because he was not a member of the Union. Vann placed his own arrival at Scott and Grauer as at 11 o'clock, and his conversation with Lerch soon after that time. Walker was not due to report at the plant until 12:30 p.m. Walker flatly denied talking with Vann until he came in pursuant to Vann's instructions , at which time he punched his card and told the employees to give Vann his beer. General Counsel did not ask for production of the timecard. 4 Nicholas Paladmo, et al , 95 NLRB 1480. SCarpenter & Skaer, Inc , et al., 90 NLRB 417 GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 413 At Schmidt's, it is clear that a responsible union agent caused employees to delay for a few minutes the unloading of Vann's truck. It is clear that a responsible Union agent tried to induce employees, but was unsuccessful, not to load his truck. At Scott and Grauer's, only by crediting somewhat dubious evidence, can it be found that Walker, the union steward, induced employees not to unload Vann. 6 Gannon's testimony is to the effect that he declined, of his own volition, to load Vann's truck. Even if the evidence be viewed in a light most favorable to General Counsel's allegation, the incidents were of such short duration and were so trivial and isolated, that the Trial Examiner is of the opinion that that complaint should be dismissed. Particularly, it appears, should dismissal be recommended in view of the fact that considerably more than a year has passed since the material events occurred, and no evidence was brought forward to show that the instructions of Lanni, a high official of the Union, have since then been violated by any steward in the Philadelphia area. On the merits of the case, therefore, the Trial Examiner will recommend that the complaint be dismissed. • CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent Local Union No. 830 , Brewery and Beer Distributor Drivers , Helpers, and Platform men, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America , AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. The Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. I Recommendations omitted from publication.] 6As a witness, called by General Counsel, employee Julian Matkowski said at one point that sometime before December 27, Walker told him to check all union books, and if a man was not a member not to unload him. He later changed his testimony and denied that Walker told him not to unload. GENERAL TELEPHONE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (for- merly ASSOCIATED TELEPHONE COMPANY, LTD.)and COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO. Case No. 21-RM-189. July 28, 1953 DECISION AND ORDER AMENDING CERTIFICATION On July 25, 1951, following a consent election , the Regional Director for the Twenty -first Region certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in the following unit: All employees classified in classifications presently compensated on a daily wage basis, excluding all other employees, guards, professional and supervisory em- ployees [sic ] as defined in the Act. On August 23, 1951, the Union and the Employer entered into a contract ending June 30, 1952, in which the Employer recognized the Union in a unit of "all of its daily wage-earning employees." The contract covered employees who received a supervisory differential as part of their daily wages. At collective-bargaining meetings in May and June of 1952, the 106 NLRB No. 77.