Consolidated Textile Co., Inc.

580 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVI- SION) and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO. Case No . 11-CA-504. August 6, 1953 DECISION AND ORDER On June 8, 1953, Trial Examiner Louis Plost issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act and recommending that it cease and desist there- from and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report. Pursuant to the provision of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel Members Houston, Styles, and Peter- son]. The Board has reviewed the Trial Examiner's rulings made at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was com- mitted. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has con- sidered the Intermediate Report, the exceptions, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the findings,' conclu- sions, and recommendations of the Trial Examiner, with the following additions and modifications: We agree with the Trial Examiner that by unilaterally re- ducing wages on August 11, 1952, and by refusing the Union's request to bargain on September 12, 1952, the Respondent violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. Like the Trial Examiner, we find that the evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption of the Union's continued majority status, on those dates, derived from its certification on January 2, 1951, and fails to establish that the Respondent had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority when it refused to bargain. However, unlike the Trial Examiner, we further rely, as an alternate ground, upon the application of the Poole decision t in the instant case. Here, analogously to that case, the Re- spondent refused to bargain before a reasonable time in which to conclude a contract had elapsed after the execution of the settlement agreement of February 21, 1952. In so doing, whether or not the Respondent had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority, it violated Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act. IAlthough the Trial Examiner found that the record is not clear as to whether the discus- sions between Jones, the president of the Union's local, and the Respondent, concerning the wage cuts, occurred before the mill reopened, we find that the record establishes that the discussions took place before the reopening. This correction does not alter oar concurrence in the Trial Examiner's ultimate conclusions Z Poole Foundry & Machine Company. 95 NLRB 34, enfd 192 F. 2d 270 (C. A. 4), cert den 342 U. S. 954. 106 NLRB No 97. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVISION) 581 ORDER U on the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent , Consoli- dated Textile Company , Inc., (Ella Division), Shelby, North Carolina , its officers , agents, successors , and assigns , shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to recognize or to bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America , CIO, as the exclusive rep- resentative of all its employees in the unit found appropriate in the Intermediate Report , with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment , and other conditions of employment. (b) In any other manner interfering with the efforts of said Union to bargain collectively with the Respondent on behalf of the employees in the aforesaid unit as their exclusive bargain- ing agent. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Upon request , bargain collectively with Textile Workers Union of America , CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit , and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant at Shelby , North Carolina , copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report as an Appendix.' Copies of such notice , to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, shall , after being duly signed by the Respondent ' s representative , be posted by the Respondent im- mediately upon receipt thereof , and maintained by it for a period of sixty ( 60) consecutive days thereafter in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted . Reasonable 'steps shall be taken by the Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for the Eleventh Region, in writing , within ten ( 10) days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 3 This notice, however , shall be amended by substituting for the words, " The Recommenda- tions of a Trial Examiner," in the caption thereof, the words, "A Decision and Order " In the event that this Order is enforced by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals, the notice shall be further amended by substituting for the words "Pursuant to A Decision and Order" the words "Pursuant to A Decree of a United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE Charges having been duly filed and served , a complaint and notice of hearing thereon having been issued and served by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board , and an answer having been filed by the Respondent, Consoli- 582 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD dated Textile Company, Inc., (Ella Division), a hearing involving allegations of unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act, was held in Shelby, North Carolina, on April 30, 1953, before Louis Plost, the undersigned Trial Examiner. In substance the complaint alleges that the Respondent, since September 12, 1952, has re- fused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all its em- ployees in an appropriate unit, and thereby has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act. In substance, the Respondent's answer admits the jurisdiction of the Board, admits that the Union requested bargaining and that it refused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of certain of its em- ployees within a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, appropriately described in the complaint, denies that the Union represents a majority of the employees within said unit, and denies that the Respondent engaged in any of the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. At the hearing all parties were represented, were afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to introduce evidence pertinent to the issues, to argue orally upon the record, and to file briefs and proposed findings and conclusions. The filing of briefs was waived by all parties. The undersigned denied a motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties argued orally on the record. Upon the entire record in the case and from his observation of the witnesses, the under- signed makes the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT The Respondent is a corporation duly organized under and existing by virute of the laws of the State of Delaware, with places of business at North Adams, Massachusetts, Lynchburg, Virginia, and Shelby, North Carolina. The Shelby plant, in which the Respondent is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of textile products is the only one of the Respondent's plants affected by these proceedings. The Respondent in the course and conduct of its business operations at the Shelby plant causes and has continuously caused equipment , supplies , and raw materials , of a value of more than $ 50,000 annually , to be purchased, transported , and delivered in interstate com- merce from and through the States of the United States, other than the State of North Caro- lina, to its Shelby plant, and causes and has continuously caused finished products, valued at more than $50,000 annually, to be sold, transported, and delivered in interstate commerce to and through the States of the United States, other than the State of North Carolina from its Shelby plant. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with theCongress of Industrial Organizations, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act, and admits employees of the Respondent to membership. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The refusal to bargain 1. The appropriate unit and the Union's representation therein There is no dispute that following a hearing upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the Act, and docketed in the office of the Fifth Region of the Board as Case No. 34-RC-216, the Board ordered an election by secret ballot to be held on December 21, 1950, in an appro- priate unit for collective bargaining among certain of the Respondent's employees, in order to determine a collective-bargaining representative, the unit being described as follows: All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Shelby Plant, including watchman but excluding office clerical employees, guards and supervisors, as defined in the Act. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVISION) 583 In the election the employees designated the Union as their bargaining representative. On January 2, 1951, the Union was formally certified as the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining in the above-described appropriate unit. The undersigned therefore finds that at all times material herein a unit for the purposes of collective bargaining among the Respondent's employees, effected by the instant proceeding, consisted of the unit heremabove described, and further finds in accordance with the Board's determination that the said unit of employees designated the Union for the purposes of col- lective bargaining. 2. The refusal to bargain T. W. Hinson, an official of the Respondent, testified credibly and without contradiction that following the Board's certificationi of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit hereinbefore mentioned, the Respondent and the Union entered into formal collective- bargaining negotiations for a contract covering wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The certification was issued January 2, 1951; the first bargaining conference took place "early" in January 1951. Thereafter the parties held "numerous conferences," the Union submitting written proposals and the Respondent written counterproposals; however, no agree- ment was reached, the parties, according to Hinson's undenied testimony, being "at logger- heads." The General Counsel does not contend that the Respondent bargained in bad faith. The undersigned infers that an impasse was reached. Hinson testified that sometime in November 1951 the plant was shut down and did not re- open until sometime in December 1951. After the plant was reopened the Union filed a charge in the Board's Fifth Region alleging 8 (a) (5) violation by the Respondent for the reason "that new work loads were initiated without consulting the Union." On February 21, 1952, the matter was closed by a settlement agreement which called for a 60-day posting of the usual 8 (a) (1) and (5) notice wherein the Respondent notified its employees inter aha that it would bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of those within the appropriate unit. Following the posting of the above-mentioned notice the Respondent and the Union met again on March 11 and March 27, 1952, "in bargaining meetings [which were] a continuation of the proposals which had prior to that been discussed" but at which, according to Hinson's un- denied testimony, "nothing could be accomplished, we had gone so far and could go no fur- ther." A meeting set for April 16, 1952, was postponed and no further meeting was requested by the Union until September 8, 1952. On May 1, 1952, the plant was again shut down. It remained closed until August 11, 1952. Shortly before August 11, every employee was visited by a representative of the Respondent and told the Respondent would reopen the plant with a reduction in wages effective on re- opening. Hinson testified that "two or perhaps more" groups of employees called at the Respond- ent's office and discussed the reopening and wage cut with him. As to the status of these groups Hinson testified; Q. Did they say they were coming as representatives of anybody or just coming to talk themselves? A. I am a little hazy on that. I would not like to say. Hinson testified further: Q. You did not call in the union at that time and advise them of the change in the indi- vidual rates? A. No. However, the Respondent did discuss the wage cut with Earl Jones, the president of the local union, but the record is not clear if the discussion took place before the mill was reopened. Hinson testified that Jones "come to the office on the basis of a rumor prior to that and before we put it in, we called them back in and talked it over with them." Hinson's testimony with respect to any talk with Jones was as follows: i The certification was by the Regional Director of the Fifth Region on behalf of the Board. 584 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Trial Examiner Plost: Now I understand that before you talked to Mr. Jones, the president of the union, about this wage cut, the supervisors had already talked to each and everybody in the mill about it? A. Yes, they talked to Jones and all of them. They were instructed to. Q. And after that you called in Jones as president of the union? A. Yes. Q. What did you tell Jones? A. We just told him the circumstances under which we had to reopen the mill. Q. What did Jones say if you remember? A. Jones said the cost conditions would not warrant them taking a wage cut. On September 8, 1952, approximately 1 month after the reopening of the plant, the Respond- ent received a letter2 from the Union requesting a meeting "for the purpose of negotiating a contract," to which the Respondent replied on September 12, 1952, stating, "it appears that our employees no longer desire to be represented by the Union and we therefore, cannot now recognize you as their bargaining agent."3 2 September 8, 1952 Mr. W H. Hardeman Consolidated Textile Co , Inc. Ella Division Shelby, North Carolina Dear Mr. Hardeman: REGISTERED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED I tried to reach you by phone but have been unable to do so. Therefore, I am requesting that representatives of your Company and the Union sit down next Monday, September 15th, at 2:00 p.m. for the purpose of negotiating a contract Very Truly yours, WLD:b 3 September 12, 1952 Textile Workers Union of America, CIO. 108 1/2 S. Greene Street Greensboro, N. C. ATTN: Mr. Wayne L. Dernoncourt. Wayne L Dernoncourt Acting State Director Gentlemen: We have received your letter of September 8th., asking us to renew bargaining nego- tiations with you. Upon all the circumstances it appears that our employees no longer desire to be represented by your union, and we therefore cannot now recognize you as their bargain- ing agent. Very truly yours, CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE CO., INC. Ella Division /s/ W. H. Hardeman W. H. Hardeman, Mgr. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVISION) 585 On September 18, 1952 (1 year and 9 months after the Union was certified , and 7 months after the date of the settlement agreement hereinbefore referred to), the Union filed the charge in the instant matter.4 W. H. Hardeman, the manager of the Respondent 's plant, testified: Q. Coming down to the time of the shutdown in 1952, did it come to your attention during that shutdown anything to indicate whether or not the union still had any strength among the employees? A. The information that I had was from the overseer . That is where I get most of my information , and they said that a number of people said there is no union any longer, lets start the mill. The Respondent's attorney, apparently to correct what might result in an erroneous im- pression, then examined Hardeman as follows: Q. Well, incidentally , was the shut down of the mill, did the mill shut down because of the union being there? A. No Sir, I never had any trouble with the union. Q. Well now, you say the foremen said to you that many people had said to them that there was no longer any union here9 A. Yes, that is right. Q. And then you said that the foreman said lets start the mill up? A. Yes. Q. What would starting the mill have to do with there no longer being a union there, if anything? A. Well, I don't know if that had any value on it because the union and myself got along all right. Hardeman further testified that the Respondent "did not deal" with the Union "in connec- tion with the shut up " because "I did not think there was any union existing then" ; that he formed this opinion because "quite a number of people" told him so; that he could not recall the names of any of his informants but "it was generally rumored around the mill and different people that I asked ... said there is no union here"; that Willis ,5 one of the Union's committee members , came to him for a "recommendation" and while soliciting the recom- mendation Willis "had not said a word about a union "; that "one other man" whose name he could not recall also said "that he wanted a recommendation, that he could not get a job inasmuch as when we shut down because there was a union here"; that this man did not indi- cate whether the Union "was or was not" in existence but "he led me to believe from his conversation that the Union did not any longer exist "; that he had received no letters from the Union during the shutdown period and that "employees " not otherwise identified volun- teered information." Hardeman testified: Q. So the employees would come out and volunteer the information that there was no longer any union? A. Yes, some of them did, and as far as the union is concerned we got along very aleasantly, we never had any trouble or any words and every time they asked for a meeting I have always granted that very freely, and you know that without me telling you. Earl Willis testified that he had been a union committee member during 1952; that prior to the reopening of the plant in August the union committee did not meet with management re- garding the reopening but after the plant was opened he and one other employee spoke to Hardeman after a meeting at the union hall had instructed him to "ask them to meet with us"; that he told Hardeman the employees "wanted to get together " with the Respondent regarding a contract and Hardeman "said to have them get in touch with them "; that all bar- 40n March 16, 1953, the Union again requested bargaining through a letter, to which the Respondent replied March 20 calling attention to its letter of September 12, 1952. $ Apparently Earl Willis 586 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD gaining was customarily by union officials located at Greensboro , North Carolina , who were promptly notified of Hardeman's statement. Willis' testimony was not denied. Willis impressed the undersigned as an honest and forthright witness . Upon the entire record the undersigned credits Willis ' testimony. Conclusion The Board's certification of a union does not, by its terms, fix the relationship of the parties affected thereby for any particular length of time, but the very nature of the bargaining rela- tionship under the declared purpose of the Act, to encourage collective bargaining and protect the right of employees to a bargaining representative of their choice, makes the certification of the Board rebuttable when the circumstances affecting the rights of the parties become such as to require change. In seeking to encourage stable labor relations the Board under the Wagner Act developed a rule to the effect that absent any unusual circumstances its certification of a bargaining representative was not to be challenged for a period of at least a year. As early as 1944, the United States Supreme Court in the Franks Bros. case6 sustained the Board 's position with respect to the extent (in point of time) of its certifications holding that "a bargaining relationship once rightfully established must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable period in which it can be given a fair chance to succeed." A "fair chance" for a certified union has been held by the Board to be freedom from chal- lenge as to majority status for a period of 1 year absent unusual circumstances.? The amended Act (Taft-Hartley) recognizes the wisdom of the Board's rule by prohibiting the holding of more than 1 election to determine representatives in an appropriate unit in any 1 year .8 The absence of a definite time limit in a Board's certification logically brings as a natural corollary to the 1-year rule the obvious development that the Board's certification will be presumed to continue not only for a year, or a reasonable time ,9 but until actually rebutted. 10 Inasmuch as the Board has the exclusive power to determine representatives, it follows that once a determination has been made by the Board an employer, bound by the determina- tion, may challenge it only at his peril and must rebut the presumed majority flowing from the certification with probative evidence. He must make his challenge in good faith. Until the va- lidity of the presumed majority status established by the certification is rescinded or super- seded by the same authority which first established it, the Board's certification remains valid, otherwise the challenger is being permitted to usurp the Board's function. In Celanese Corporation of America," the Board reiterated the principles governing the conclusiveness to be accorded a union's certification and the circumstances under which it might be challenged after 1 year's duration, as follows: It is appropriate, at the outset, to set forth the legal principles controlling in situations of this type, and particularly to indicate the relationship between the existence of a Board certificate and the right of an employer to question a union's majority in good faith. In the interest of industrial stability, this Board has long held that, absent unusual circumstances, the majority status of a certified union is presumed to continue for 1 year from the date of certification. In practical effect this means two things: (1) That the fact of the union's majority during the certification year is established by the cer- tificate, without more, and can be rebutted only by a showing of unusual circumstances; and (2) that during the certification year an employer cannot, absent unusual circum- stances, lawfq ly predicate a refusal to bargain upon a doubt as to the union's majority, even though that doubt is raised in good faith. However, after the first year of the cer- tificate has elapsed, though the certificate still creates a presumption as to the fact of 6 Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321 U . S. 702. 7Botany Worsted Mills , 41 NLRB218; Prudential insurance Co., 56 NLRB 1859; Lift Trucks, Inc., 75 NLRB 998. 6 Section 9 (c) (3). 9Cf. Worcester Woolen Mills, 170 F. 2d 13 (C. A. 1). 10Arnolt Motor , 173 F . 2d 579- 599 (C . A. 7). For a complete discussion of the Board's rule see N. L. R. B. v. Ray Brooks, 204 F. 2d 899 (C. A. 9). 1195 NLRB 664 at 671-673. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVISION) 587 majority status by the union , the presumption is at that point rebuttable even in the absence of unusual circumstances . Competent evidence may be ntr oTu_ ced to demon- strate that, in fact, the union did not represent a majority of the employees at the time of the alleged refusal to bargain. A direct corollary of this proposition is that after the certificate is a year old , as in cases where there is no certificate, the employer can, without violating the Act, refuse to bargain with a union on the ground that it doubts the union's majority, provided that the doubt is in good faith. [Footnotes omitted.] By its very nature , the issue of whether an employer has questioned a union's ma- jority in good faith cannot be resolved by resort to any simple formula. It can only be answered in the light of the totality of all the circumstances involved in a particular case. But among such circumstances , two factors would seem to be essential prerequisites to any finding that the employer raised the majority issue in good faith in cases in which a union has been certified . There must, first of all, have been some reasonable grounds for believing that the union had lost its majority status since its certification. The facts surrounding the Respondent's challenge of theUnion 's majority status are clearly disclosed by the record. The Respondent, admittedly in good faith, negotiated with the Union for a year following the Union's certification by the Board. The year 's negotiations were fruitless . Following the year of negotiation , the Respondent made certain unilateral changes in workloads ; the Union promptly filed an 8 (a) (5) charge, which was settled by the parties. The settlement agreement called for the posting of the regular 8 (a) (1) and (5) notice, which was duly posted in February 1952. At this time apparently the Respondent did not doubt the Union's majority. Following the settlement the Respondent met in bargaining negotiations with the Union on March 11 and 27, 1952, and a further agreed meeting for April 16 was amicably postponed for the Respondent's convenience. At this stage the Respondent did not question the Union 's majority. On May 1 the plant was closed until August 11 , 1952, at which time it was reopened with unilateral wage changes . Hinson's testimony is amendable to the interpretation that the Re- spondent officially discussed the reopening and wage cut with the Union, through its local president, fore the plant was reopened. However, it is clear that any such discussion was merely a statement of the Respondent 's program and that no claim is made that the local union president was told that the Respondent entertained any doubt as to the Union 's majority status. It has been found that a union committee called on the Respondent after the plant reopened with a request "to get together on a contract" and that they were told by Manager Hardeman to "have them [the Union's officials] get in touch with me. " Hardeman did not tell the com- mittee that the Respondent doubted the Union 's majority. Only after the Union sought bargaining on September 8, did the Respondent on September 12, 1952, write the Union "it appears that our employees no longer desire to be represented by your union." This may be interpreted as a rather poorly expressed good-faith doubt of the Union's majority representation among the Respondent's employees. Manager Hardeman's testimony as to the foundation of the Respondent 's good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status shows it to be based on sheer hearsay , plant rumors, com- pletely unidentified rumormongers , the fact that one employee seeking a "recommendation" for another job at the time the plant was closed did not mention the Union, and that a con- versation with an unidentified employee , who also sought a recommendation , "led me to be- lieve" that the Union was no longer inexistence, plus the fact that undisclosed informants told him the Union's meetings were poorly attended and dues were not being paid while the plant was closed, and the further fact that no mail was received by the Respondent from the Union during the shutdown. Upon this evidence the Respondent contends the undersigned must find that the Respondent entertained a bona fide good -faith doubt of the Union's majority and that the presumptive majority of the Union has been rebutted. The undersigned rejects the Respondent's contention. Upon the entire record, the evidence considered as a whole, and all the circumstances, the undersigned finds that (a) theRespondentdidnot entertain a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority ; and (b) that the Union 's majority, by reason of the Board 's certification presumed 588 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to exist until rebutted, has not been successfully challenged by any of the evidence adduced in this hearing. The undersigned therefore finds that by putting into effect a wage cut on August 11, 1952, without first consulting with the Union and by refusing to bargain with the Union on September 12, 1952, the Respondent refused to bargain with the Union as required by the Act. Further Contentions of the General Counsel The General Counsel contends that inasmuch as the Respondent entered into a settlement agreement with the Union, requiring bargaining, the effectof the settlement agreement is such as to require the Respondent to bargain without question for a period of a year after its date; the settlement agreement being, according to the General Counsel, tantamount to a certifica- tion, valid for a year. In the opinion of the undersigned the General Counsel is in error by contending that a cer- tification is "good for a year. " A certification is not for a definite time, but is valid until rebutted. It must be rebutted by probative evidence after the announcement of a good faith doubt. In support of his position the General Counsel cites the Poole case 12 enforced by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, certiorari denied 342 U. S. 954. In the Poole case the Fourth Circuit holds that a settlement agreement most have definite legal effect and is quite different from a dismissal of charges, and while a settlement agree- ment is not an admission of past liability it does constitute a basis for future liability and the parties recognize a status fixed thereby. Therefore , under a settlement agreement the parties must continue to bargain for a reasonable time. The undersigned believes that the facts of the Poole case are not on all fours with the instant matter ; moreover in the Poole case the Respondent entertained a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority. It has been found herein that the Respondent neither had nor adduced probative evidence to establish a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority, which majority therefore is presumed and found to be valid at all times material to this proceeding. The undersigned does not find it necessary to rely on Poole Foundry and Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B. The undersigned therefore concludes and finds that on August 11 and September 12, 1952, and at all times since, the Respondent has refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the above-described appropriate unit, and that by such refusal the Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its em- ployees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent, set forthinsection III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY It has been found that the Respondent has engaged in the unfair labor practice of refusing to bargain collectively with the duly certified representative of its employees. It will there- fore be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and from like and related conduct. It will further be recommended that the Respondent bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the undersigned makes the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1, Consolidated Textile Company, Inc., (Ella Division) of Shelby, North Carolina, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 12 Poole Foundry and Machine Co., 95 NLRB 34; Poole Foundry and Machine Co. v. N. L. R. B., 192 F. 2d 740, cert. den. 342 U. S. 954. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC., (ELLA DIVISION) 589 2. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Shelby plant, including watchman but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. 4. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, was on August 11 and on September 12, 1952, and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative of all employees in the afore- said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section,9 (a) of the Act. 5. By unilaterally putting into effect a wage cut on August 11, and by refusing on and after September 12 to bargain collectively with the aforesaid Union as the exclusive representa- tive of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 6. By the aforesaid unfair labor practice the Respondent has been and is now interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act, and the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] APPENDIX A NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL bargain collectively, upon request, with Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, as the exclusive representative of allour employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Shelby plant, in- cluding watchman but excluding office clerical employees, guards, and supervisors, as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with the efforts of the above -named union to bargain collectively with said union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit set forth above. CONSOLIDATED TEXTILE COMPANY, INC.. (ELLA DIVISION), Employer. Dated ................ By..................... ............................................... ........................ (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.