Humboldt Lumber Handlers, Inc.

HUMBOLDT LUMBER HANDLERS, INC. 393 and buffers normally advance to the top job rate in a period of 12 months; 1 new employee, however, advanced to the top job rate after only 2 months of employment. Although a maximum 1 year on-the -job training program is maintained for the em- ployees in question , we find that the record in this case reveals that the type of polishing and buffing work performed by them is limited in scope and involves a restricted variety of metals. The Board recognizes that employees in the metal- polishing and buffing classifications sometimes possess true skills and in those situations , as craftsmen are entitled ^o severance on a craft basis . However, the employees sought herein do not, in our opinion , exercise sufficiently the skills generally attribut- able to employees in those craft classifications , and for that reason we are constrained to deny the Petitiotler' s request for severance . As we have found the proposed unit inappropriate, we shall dismiss the petition. [The Board dismissed the petition.] 3George J Mayer Company, 77 NLRB 425 at 427. See also Kwikset Locks, Inc., 107 NLRB 247. The Board announced in American Potash & Chemical Corporation , 107 NLRB 1418, that it would "exercise great care in making certain that in the administration of [the craft severance] rule only groups exercising genuine craft skills will be embraced within the ambit of the rule." HUMBOLDT LUMBER HANDLERS, INC. and JAMES J. KANE, Petitioner WES-CAL MFG.CO. and RICHARD D. GILLESPIE, Petitioner. Cases Nos. 20-RD-93 and 20-RD-94. April 22, 1954 DECISION AND ORDER Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before Milen C. Dempster , hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this proceeding , the Board finds: 1. Humboldt Lumber Handlers, Inc., hereinafter called Handlers , is a California corporation engaged in the business of custom carloading of lumber. Its only plant is located at Arcata, California. During the past year it rendered services worth in excess of $180,000. Four of its principal customers during this period were Diebold Mills , Inc., Paragon Plywood Corporation, Cal Pacific Redwood Company, Inc., and Arcata Lumber Services , Inc. Handlers furnished services valued at approximately $ 82,000 to these 4 companies , each of which annually shipped outside the State goods worth more than 108 NLRB No. 79. 394 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD $25,000. The parties agree , and we find , that Handlers is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act . We find also that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction over Handlers ,.' Wes-Cal Mfg. Co., hereinafter called Wes-Cal, is a Cali- fornia corporation engaged in the operation of a custom mill, where it performs resaw and planing operations on lumber. Its mill is located immediately adjacent to that of Handlers at Arcata , California . During the past year Wes-Cal received in excess of $ 164,000 for its services. However , during that period, none of Wes - Cal's customers shipped products valued at $25,000 outside the State. It is clear therefore that there is no basis for asserting jurisdiction over Wes-Cal , considered alone. Under these circumstances , whether or not we would assert jurisdiction in Case No. 20-RD - 94 would depend on whether Wes-Cal and Handlers are to be treated as a single Employer,' or whether, if they are separate Employers , the appropriate unit he rein is one comprising the employees of both Employers .' Evidence necessary to a determination of either of these questions is lacking in the record .4 However , as we have determined, in any case , to dismiss the petitions herein on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to resolve at this time the jurisdictional issue with regard to Wes-Cal. 2. Lumber and Sawmill Workers, Local 2799 , Redwood District Council , United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America . AFL, hereinafter called the Union , claims to represent certain employees of the Employers.' 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of employees of the Employers within the meaning of Section 916) (1) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Union contends that its contract with the Employers, executed on October 16, 1952 , to expire on April 1, 1954,with ,Hollow Tree Lumber Company. 91 NLRB 635. Chairman Farmer and Member Beeson concur in the assertion of jurisdiction in this case , but are not to be deemed as thereby adopting the Board 's present jurisdictional standards as a permanent policy. 2 Although the record shows that the 5 stockholders who own Handlers also own 90 per- cent of the stock of Wes-Cal, and that employees of both companies have been included in the same bargaining unit since 1952 , the evidence in the record is insufficient to support a fording that these 2 companies consitute a single employer within the meaning of the Act. 3 Where two or more employers have by joint bargaining established the appropriateness of a multiemployer unit, the Board has considered the total operations of all such employers in determining whether to assert jurisdiction . Pacific-Coast Shipbuilders and Ship Repairers, 98 NLRB 196. The record herein shows that the Union was certified on October 13, 1952, after a consent election, for a unit comprising the employees of both Employers , and that the ensuing contract, although signed by Handler 's alone, has been deemed by the parties to this proceeding to apply to the employees of Wes-Cal, as well However, there is no evidence that Wes-Cal participated in the negotiation of this agreement. 4See footnotes 2 and 3, above. 5 The Petitioners assert that the Union, the certified and recognized representative of the employees involved herein, is no longer their exclusive representative as defined in Section 9 (a) of the Act. HUMBOLDT LUMBER HANDLERS, INC. 395 a 60-day automatic renewal clause, constitutes a bar to this proceeding. The petitions herein, filed on February 2, 1954, and February 10, 1954, were both filed after the automatic renewal date of the contract. Under these circumstances, the contract would constitute a bar to this proceeding unless other- wise defective. The Petitioners contend, however, that the contract is nota bar because it contains an illegal union-security provision. Paragraphs C and E of Article I of the agreement read as follows: Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of this contract, or within thirty (30) days from date of em- ployment, whichever is the later, every employee under the jurisdiction of this Agreement shall, as a condition of employment, become and remain a member of the Union in good standing. Whenever any employee required by this Article to become a member of the Union or to maintain his member- ship therein fails to do so or is expelled from the Union and the Union notifies the Company thereof in writing requesting the discharge of such employee, the Employer shall, within seven (7) days from the receipt of such notice, discharge such employee unless the Company is advised by the Union in writing that such employee has been reinstated . . . . ( Emphasis added.) The Petitioners contend that this clause is unlawful because it permits discharge on grounds other than an employee's failure to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership in the Union. We find no merit in this contention. This argu- ment presumes illegality, whereas the proper presumption is one of legality namely, that the obligation to discharge extends only to situations recognized as valid by statute.' Moreover, the record discloses that, although the Union's constitution provides for expulsion on other grounds, the Employer and the Intervenor have interpreted the phrase "is expelled by the Union" to apply only to expulsion for failure to pay the uniformly required initiation fees and periodic dues, and no employee has been discharged for any other cause. We there- fore find that the union-security clause is not unlawful. In view of the foregoing, and upon the entire record in this case, we find that the contract is a bar to an election at this time. We shall, therefore, dismiss the petitions. [The Board dismissed the petitions.] Member Rodgers took no part in the consideration of the above Decision and Order. 6 Spartan Aircraft Company, 98 NLRB 73; RCA Service Company, Inc., 94 NLRB 1122.