Republic Aviation Corp.

REPUBLIC AVIATION CORP. 569 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Baird-Ward Printing Co., Inc., is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act., 2. Nashville Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union No. 37, International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union of North America, AFL, at the time of the filing of the charge and complaint herein was a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2 (5) of the Act. 3. The allegation of the complaint that Respondent has engaged in and is engag- ing in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section (a) (1) and (3) of the Act have not been sustained. [Recommendations omitted from publication.] REPUBLIC AVIATION CORP. and LOCAL 1486, BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS, DECORATORS & PAPERHANGERS OF AMERICA, AFL, PETITIONER REPUBLIC AVIATION CORP. and UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL,1 PETITIONER. Cases Nos. 2-RC-6341, 2-RC-6360, and 2-RC-6361. July 29,1954 Decision and Order Upon petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before Samuel Koren- blatt, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds : 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations 2 involved claim to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa- tion of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Employer manufactures completed aircraft at its Long Island, New York, plants. The Petitioners seek to sever units of certain employees from the existing production and maintenance unit at these plants. The Employer and the Intervenor, which currently repre- sents the employees in the production and maintenance unit, urge their 3-year contract, now in its third year, as a bar to the petitions, on the ground that 3 years is a reasonable duration for collective- bargaining agreements in the aircraft industry, especially in the east- ern segment thereof.3 The Petitioners counter that, as the pattern or custom in the industry is for contracts of 2 years or less, the Inter- 1 Herein referred to individually as the Carpenters. Intervenor, Lodge 1987 , International Association of Machinists, AFL, intervened on the basis of its contract with the Employer. 3 The Intervenor further contends that such contracts are a practice in a substantial part of the broader industry which would include the manufacture of aircraft engines and accessories, but it made no serious effort to substantiate this claim 109 NLRB No. 89. 570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD venor's contract with the Employer is of unreasonable duration and therefore no bar. The Intervenor was certified in late 1950 and executed its first con- tract with the Employer for a 1-year term, effective February 19, 1951. The parties then negotiated the existing 3-year contract, which is due to expire February 19, 1955. The Employer is a major aircraft manufacturer. The record shows that, as of late 1951,' of 26 major aircraft manufacturers with collective-bargaining agreements,' em- ploying 136,200 employees (90 percent of the industry total), 10 had contracts for terms of over 2 years, and 16, for terms of 2 years or less. By late 1953,6 total employment in major "organized" aircraft com- panies in the United States had risen to about 412,800 employees and, of these, 42.4 percent were covered by contracts for 3 years or more, and the rest, for 2 years or less. In the eastern segment of the indus- try, which had 98,600 employees, the percentage covered by contracts for 3 years or more was 88.3. It is clear from these record facts that, whether viewed on a national or eastern segment basis, at least since 1951, 3-year contracts have been negotiated in a substantial part of the aircraft industry, and that the instant 3-year contract is therefore of reasonable duration.7 We conclude, therefore, that the contract is a bar to a present deter- mination of representatives, and we shall accordingly dismiss the petitions filed herein.8 [The Board dismissed the petition.] MEMBER BEESON , concurring : I concur in the result reached by Members Murdock and Peterson in this case. CHAIRMAN FARMER AND MEMBER RODGERS , dissenting : We do not agree with this decision. We favor the establishment of a definite and uniform rule which we would apply to all labor contracts in all industries. 4 Derived from a Bureau of Labor Statistics bulletin , entitled "Collective Bargaining in the Aircraft Industry " 8 The total number of manufacturers in the industry was 43. To date , two major com- panies, Gruman and Northrop , are unorganized by a union 8 According to statistics compiled by the Aircraft Industries Association of America, Inc. 7The Carborundum Company, 105 NLRB 192; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, 102 NLRB 1135; General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Transmission Division, 102 NLRB 1140. We reject the position that present contract -bar rules are inapplicable to the aircraft industry . The aircraft industry is a well-established industry , and we see no warrant at this time to except it from the policy enunciated in the General Motors case. Nor is there any merit in the Petitioners' position that the Employer's practice to negotiate its craft unit contracts on an annual basis should be controlling on the contract -bar issue, as the pertinent consideration is the reasonable duration for bar purposes of a contract for a production and maintenance unit. 8 In view of this disposition , we need not pass upon the appropriateness of the Petitioners' unit requests. COURTAULDS (ALABAMA) INC. 571 The present rule, applied by the majority in this case, is that a collective-bargaining contract for more than 2 years is a bar for its full term if it can be shown that "a substantial part of the industry con- cerned is covered by contracts with a similar term." 9 In practical ef- fect, this means that unions and employers have no way of knowing in advance whether a contract for a term longer than 2 years will be held a bar. They know only that a contract for more than 2 years will be a bar if at a time 2 or more years hence, when the question is raised in a representation proceeding, the Board should hold that a substan- tial part of the industry to which the employer belongs has contracts of similar duration. The present formula obviously bristles with un- certainty and the stuff of which litigation is made. How large is "substantial?" How do we define "industry?" Are aircraft frame manufacturers and parts manufacturers part of the same industry? Some companies are engaged in several different industries. Are they limited to 2-year contracts for part of their employees but permitted to make longer term contracts for others, depending upon the plant or operations involved? Is the "industry" test to be applied on a na- tionwide or local basis? In determining what is "substantial," do we look at the entire industry or only the organized segment of an industry? The present rule is fraught with too much uncertainty and lends itself to arbitrary and even discriminatory application. Its inevitable effect is to create confusion and promote litigation in an area in which certainty and predictability should be our goal. Neither labor, em- ployers, the public, nor the Board is well served by it. We would overrule it and replace it with a flat 2-year rule, applicable without exception to all contracts and all industries. 9 General Motors Corporation, 102 NLRB 1140, 1143. COURTAULDS ( ALABAMA ) INC. and TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, CIO ,' PETITIONER COURTAULDS ( ALABAMA) INC. and MOBILE METAL TRADES COUNCIL, AFL,2 PETITIONER. Cases Nos. 15-RC-1114 and 15-RC-1115. duly 29,1954 Decision and Direction of Elections Under separate petitions duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, a consolidated hearing was held before William P. Hutcheson, hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings i Herein called TWUA. $ Herein called MMTC. 109 NLRB No. 94.