Camp & McInnes, Inc.

524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Intervenor, the employees shall be deemed to have indicated-their desire to continue being represented as part of the existing plant- wide unit, and the Regional Director shall then issue a certificate of the results of the election. The voting group consists of all steam licensed employees of the Employer engaged in the Employer's boiler room, including those classified as firemen, but excluding chief firemen,5 and all other super- visors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication in this volume.] 6 The record shows that Robert Simms , the only person classified as chief fireman, possesses power effectively to recommend hire or discharge of firemen. CAMP & MCINNES, INC., ALAMO DIvISION and INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WORKERS UNION7 AFL. Case No. 39-CA-176. August 8,1952 Decision and Order On January 5, 1952, Trial Examiner Stephen S. Bean issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceding, finding that the Respondent and engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in the case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Order 2 Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Camp & McInnes, Inc., 'Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated Its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [ Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. 2 The record shows, as the Trial Examiner found, that the Respondent has discontinued operations in the State of Texas Our order that the Respondent bargain with the Union for its employees is ti erefore conditioned upon the Respondent 's having in its employ employees in the appropriate unit. Walter Holm d Company, 87 NLRB 1169. 100 NLRB No. 85. CAMP & McINNES, INC. 525 Alamo Division, San Antonio, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, as the exclusive representative of all its employees in the appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. (b) Unilaterally instituting changes in wages, hours, or other con- ditions of employment. (c) Discouraging membership in International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, or in any other labor organization of its em- ployees, by discriminatorily refusing to reinstate employees, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire, tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. (d) Threatening and warning its employees to refrain from assist- ing, becoming members of, or remaining members of, a union. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en- gage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condi- tion of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer to Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz, in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy," immediate and full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges. (b) Make whole Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz in the manner set forth in the section of the Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy." (c) Upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of back pay due. (d) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, as the exclusive representative of all the employees in the appropriate unit, and embody any understanding reached in a signed contract. (e) Post immediately, or, if the plant is not in operation, immedi- ately upon the resumption of operations, at its plant in San Antonio; 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Texas, copies of the notice attached to the Intermediate Report and marked "Appendix A." 3 Copies of such notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, shall, after being duly signed by the Respondent's representative, be posted by the Respondent for a period of at least sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. -Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region, in writ- ing, within ten (10) days from the receipt of this Decision and Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 8 This notice shall be amended by substituting the words "A Decision and Order" for the words "The Recommendations of a Trial Examiner" in the caption thereof. If this Order is enforced by a United States Court of Appeals , there shall be substituted for the aforesaid words, "A Decision and Order," the following : "A Decree of the United States Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order." Intermediate Report STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon a charge and a first amended charge, respectively , duly filed on December 19, 1950, and March 5, 1951, by International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, herein called the Union, the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, respectively called herein the General Counsel and the Board, by the Regional Director for the Sixteenth Region ( Fort Worth, Texas ), issued a com- plaint dated October 11 , 1951, against Camp & McInnes, Inc., Alamo Division, herein called the Respondent, alleging that Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and (5 ) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, herein called the Act. With respect to the unfair labor practices , the complaint alleges that: (1) On or about October 17 , 1950, and November 6, 1950 , respectively, Respondent discharged Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz, at times herein called the complainants, and thereafter, on or about November 15, 1950, failed and refused to reinstate them because they joined or assisted the Union or engaged in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro- tection ; (2) in or about July 1950 and at all times thereafter, Respondent re- fused to bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative of an appropriate unit of employees employed in Respondent's plant; and ( 3) on various dates from July 1950 to February 1951 , Respondent committed certain acts variously con- stituting interference with, or restraint or coercion of its employees in the exercise of their statutory rights. Respondent filed an answer in which it denied the com- mission of the specific unfair labor practices ascribed to it and, in additional defense, asserted "by way of explanation " certain allegations. Pursuant to notice , a hearing was held at San Antonio , Texas, on November 6, 7, and 8, 1951, before Stephen S. Bean, the undersigned Trial Examiner, duly' designated by the Chief Trial Examiner . All parties were represented and afforded full opportunity to be heard, to examine and cross -examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing on the issues . On November 7, a motion made by Respondent to strike testimony concerning certain findings and awards made CAMP & McINNES, INC. 527 by Texas Employment Commission was taken under advisement. The motion is now allowed. A motion made by the General Counsel to conform the pleadings to the proof as to names, dates, and other minor variances was granted. The General Counsel and Respondent presented oral argument at the conclusion of the hearing. None of the parties filed a brief. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my observation of the witnesses, 1 make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is, and has been at all times material to the case, a corporation duly organized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the State of Pennsyl- vania, having its principal office and place of business in the city of Reading, Pennsylvania, and operates a knitting mill in San Antonio, Texas, called its Alamo Division, where it is and has been engaged in the manufacture of men's hose which is and has been shipped to its principal office and place of business in Pennsylvania in an unfinished condition. Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business at its Alamo Division, causes and has continually caused approxi- mately $250,000 worth, annually, of its production of uncompleted men's hose to be shipped to its principal office and place of business in Pennsylvania where such hose is completed, finished, packed, boxed, and sold on a national basis through- out the United States. Respondent admits that it is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act, and I so find. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Ladies' Garment Workers Union , AFL, is a labor organization admitting to membership employees of Respondent. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The alleged refusal to bargain 1. The appropriate unit and representation of a majority therein The complaint alleges that all production workers of Respondent employed at its Alamo Division exclusive of office and clerical employees, supervisors, profes- sional employees, guards, and watchmen, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. I find that said unit has, at all times material herein, constituted and does now constitute, an appropriate unit within the mean- ing of the Act and that it insures to Respondent's employees the full benefit of their rights to self-organization and collective bargaining and that it otherwise effectuates the purposes of the Act. The record discloses that on February 23, 1950, a majority of the employees in said unit by secret ballot in a consent election conducted by the Board selected the Union as their exclusive representative for the purposes of col- lective bargaining. The Board certified the Union as such representative on March 3, 1950. 1 find that the Union on and at all times after February 23, 1950, on which day the aforesaid election was held, represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 2. The negotiations and events subsequent to February 23, 1950 After March 3. 1950, the Union and Respondent submitted in writing proposed contracts to one another. 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD In general the two proposals were in accord with respect to the division of work during slack periods, working hours, pay for work on samples, pay for waiting time, and a no-strike provision . Respondent proposed the fixing of piece rates "on a basis which is fair and equitable." The Union proposed such fixing "on a basis that will enable at least sixty percent of the workers . . . to earn a wage above the minimum wage scales." Respondent proposed adjustment of complaints between the shop committee and the Employer with reference of unresolved disputes to a representative of the Union and a representative of the Employer, reserving the right to either party in the event no agreement should be reached to take such action "as may be available to them under the Federal and/or State laws applicable." Respondent 's proposal contained a provision for ultimate final arbitration of complaints and any disputes arising therefrom. Respondent's submitted contract contained no provision for vacations , holidays, contributory medical and health benefits, or the right of reopening the agreement for negotiation or arbitration of wage scales . The Union made proposals rela- tive to all three of these matters. In its written proposal , Respondent offered to renew the existing quota and minimum wage scale. The Union 's written proposal left the questions of quotas and-wages open and contained no quota and wage scale. However, on January 27, 1951, it requested a 10-percent wage increase. No progress was made toward coming to an. agreement during the course of a series of meetings that took place between April 1950 and October 16, 1951, when the Union was informed that the mill was shutting down that day. On January 27, 1951, Respondent asserted it was not in a financial position to grant a wage increase. Thereupon , on that date and again , on September 4, 1951, the Union requested it be granted , for the purpose of determining whether or not Respondent was financially able to pay a wage increase, an opportunity to examine Respondent's books of account by a person selected jointly by the Union and Respondent. Respondent refused to grant this request. Previous to December 20, 1950, Respondent had knitted only nylon and cotton yarn. It started using orlon yarn about this date and fiber V or dacron yarn on March 9, 1951 In December 1950, without consultation with or notification to the Union, Respondent established a per pair piecework rate and weekly quota of production for knitting orlon yarn and on March 9 , 1951, without consultation with or notification to the Union , Respondent established a per pair piecework rate and weekly quota of production for knitting fiber V or dacron yarn. In November 1950, without consultation with or notice to the Union, Respond- ent reduced the lunch period of its employees from 1 hour to 30 minutes and advanced the quitting hour from 5 p. in. to 4: 30 p. in. On September 7,'1951, 4 weeks before the date of the complaint which alleges violations of the Act including but not limited to certain conduct specifically set forth therein, Respondent announced to the Union its previously determined decision to lay off all of its production workers, approximately 36 in number, with the exception of 12 individuals it had decided to retain upon the basis of its conclusions respecting their productivity, skill, length of service and general attitude. Upon protest by the Union, 1 individual's name was added to the list of those to be retained. In response to the Union's request that provision be made to retain all of its personnel on a part-time basis by adopting a method allowing a division' of work whereby each employee should work only 2 or 3 days a week , Respondent stated the matter was closed, not subject to change and a completed decision . On this date a representative of Respondent (which on August 21, 1951, had said it would have to study the Union's original CAMP & McINNES, INC. 529 proposal made more than a year before and had replied, when asked if it was still submitting its original proposal of April 11, 1950, that it would let the Union know "not too soon") when asked if he would attempt to correlate Respondent's proposals with the Union's, stated he would discuss the matter with Respondent's manager but that he did not see that it would be of much use to do so since the plant did not have much work. B. The alleged discharges and refusals to reinstate 1. Minnie Mata a. The General Counsel's version On October 17, 1950, employee Mata, a union member, was called by Respond- ent's shop foreman, Rudy" Lopez, to go into the office of Respondent' s manager, Jack B. Horkheimer. While 'on her way from her place of work to the office, Lopez made a personal remark concerning Mata's husband. Mata told Horkheimer she objected to Lopez saying anything about her husband, that she wanted him kept out of it and not to mention her husband at work or any place and told Horkheimer to tell Lopez not to bother her with her hus- band and not to say things about him in front of her. Horkheimer told her that she had been breaking too many needles. Mata replied that she was having trouble with her'machine, that she had asked Lopez several times to fix it but that nothing had been done and that she did not think she had broken as many needles as Horkheimer claimed she had. Horkheimer replied that she did not understand and ordered her to go out to punch her card. She turned in her work and punched out at 12: 30 p. in. Mata notified the Texas Unemployment Commission that she had been discharged because she talked back to her foreman and informed the Commission's investigator that her machine was giving her trouble, that she had broken two needles, and that Horkheimer got very abusive and fired her. About the middle of November 1950, Mata's husband, Jesse Mata, was called to the plant by Horkheimer and told by the latter that he had not discharged Mata, if she thought she was going to get money for sitting down he did not care if she got 10 lawyers and that she could come back to work the following morning. On or about November 15, 1950, Mata and employee Elvira Cruz informed Miss Rebecca Taylor, international representative for the Union, that they had been notified by the Texas Unemployment Commission that Respondent had stated that they had not been discharged and that the Company had work for them. At Mata's and Cruz' request, Taylor accompanied them to the plant where Horkheimer stated the information the employees had received from the Commission was correct but that there was no need for the Union to intervene. Horkheimer then called in a stenographer to take notes. In response to Taylor's inquiry as to when Mata and Cruz could start working, Horkheimer replied he did not know about that. Horkheimer then telephoned J. B. Kirksey, claims examiner for Texas Unemployment Commission, and after reaching him put Taylor on the phone. Taylor stated to Kirksey she had been told by Mata and Cruz that Kirksey had informed them Horkheimer had stated they had not been discharged and that the Company had work for them. Kirksey said that was correct. Then Taylor again asked Horkheimer when the girls could go to work. Horkheimer replied, "Well, I don't know, maybe tomorrow, maybe next week, maybe six weeks, maybe never ; I don't know." Then ensued a conversation during the course of which Horkheimer stated he had not fired Mata and Cruz, that he had been very good to them, and lent them money, had helped them 530 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD out on personal affairs. He then stated he had fired Mata for breaking too many needles. This assertion, following Horkheimer 's previous statement that he had not fired Mata , led to a somewhat protracted discussion , the bringing in of records and machine trouble and an explanation by a mechanic of the manner of operation of a hand-knitting machine. Horkheimer then went on to say that Mata and Cruz were troublemakers , that they liked to gossip, that he was not going to permit anybody to tell him how to run his plant and that if Mata and Cruz did not know it, they could get the Union to pay them. He denied any opposition to the Union but said in his opinion all the Union wanted was dues and that he was not going to act as a dues-collection agency and that if the`Union was going to tell him how to run his business , it could take over meeting a $3,000 payroll. He then turned to Mata and said, "If you weren't fired, you are fired as of now." Mata left and went immediately to, Texas Unemployment Commission where she was informed Horkheimer had telephoned to Kirksey that neither she nor, Cruz had been hired. b. Respondent's version On October 17, 1950, Horkheimer asked Shop Foreman Lopez to call Mata, not known by Respondent to be a union member, into his office, it having been Horkheimer 's intention to discuss needle breakage with her. Upon her arrival, Mata said, "Keep him [Lopez] away from me. I will take no orders from him." Horkheimer said, "Minnie, do I understand you clearly ?" Mata replied, "Yes, you keep him away from me entirely." Horkheimer replied, "I'll make it easy for you ; either you tell me that you will take instructions from Rudy [Lopez] or punch your card and go home." Thereupon Mata picked up her belongings. went to the time clock , and punched out. About November 15, 1950, at a time Respondent was striving for production, Horkheimer telephoned Texas Unemployment Commission seeking help, and informed Kirksey he would consider reemploying Mata and Cruz provided they would come up with the proper attitude. Shortly thereafter, Mata and Cruz appeared with Taylor who stated the girls were ready to go to work and that Kirksey had said Horkheimer would reinstate them' Horkheimer said "No" and phoned Kirksey requesting him to repeat to Taylor what Horkheimer had said to him. Taylor took the telephone and said to Kirksey that there seemed to be some misunderstanding, that she was over at Horkheimer's with the girls who were ready to go to work . Then Horkheimer said to Taylor that provided the girls would come to work with a proper attitude he would give them machines and put them to work. Horkheimer's wife, Mary Patricia Horkheimer, Re- spondent's then payroll clerk and assistant manager, who was present during a part of the meeting, asked Mata if it were true that she had said she would not work under Lopez' direction. Upon Mata saying it was true, Horkheimer stated that Mata was discharged for cause. 2. Elvira Cruz a. The General Counsel's version At about 3 p in., November 6, 1950„employee Cruz, a union member, was informed that there were no more orders for her and told by Horkheimer that she was "all through ," "fired," because she was "working lunch hours." Cruz i Kirksey , called as a witness by Respondent , testified at one point he "understood" Rorkhelmer would be willing to accept Mata and Cruz back on , the job if they presented themselves in the right manner and were willing to abide by the rules and regulations. CAMP & lt-IcINNES, INC. 531 denied that she had worked during the lunch hours and asserted that she had only put some articles in her box under the machine As appears above, Taylor accompanied Cruz to the plant to procure reinstatement on November 15, 1950. During Horkheimer's talk about the good treatment he had accorded Cruz and Mata he referred to the help he had given Cruz in a matter concerning her daughter. Crnz objected to the reference to her daughter and to Horkheimer reminding her of either that subject or any personal matter and asked lIork- heimer how such things were involved in the question of her being reemployed. There followed Horkheimer's previously adumbrated statements leading up to his informing Mata that she was discharged. Then Horkheimer turned back to Cruz and said, "Do you want to work here?" She said, "Yes, sir." But there is one thing I would like to settle while Mrs. [Miss] Taylor is here. I don't want anybody bothering me any more." Horkheimer asked what she meant by the word "bothering" and Cruz replied "telling me I don't have to work here if I don't want to, and I can quit anytime, and I don't have to work here . . . I would like not to be told things like that." Thereupon he said to Cruz and Mata. "Well, you are fired ; you can all go ; lust get out." This statement terminated the conference. b. Respondent's version Prior to the day of her discharge on November 6, 1950, Cruz, not known by Respondent to be a union member, had been repeatedly warned (two or three times by Lopez and about three times by Horkheimer) not to work before the morning whistle or during the lunch hour and to stop working at quitting time in the afternoon 2 On November 5, 1950, the day before she was discharged, Horkheimer had told Cruz that if he again found her working during her noon hour, she was automatically through. At about 12: 10 p. m. (the lunch period was from 12 to 12:30 p. m.) on November 6, 1950, Horkheimer saw Cruz working on her machine. He walked over to her and said, "Elvira, I have warned you repeatedly. There is nothing to talk about. You are through." During the interview of November 15, 1950, after Horkheimer told Taylor that provided the girls would come to work with a proper attitude and provided that Cruz would desist from working before, between, or after hours, he would give them machines and put them to work, Cruz said, "Well, you don't care any- thing about us; you have no children ; you don't care if we work or not" and asserted that she wished Horkheimer were a woman. At about this point Mrs. Horkheimer walked up and said, "Don't take that attitude. I am a woman. You are taking unfair advantage of Mr. Horkheimer " After this happened, Hork- heimer said to Taylor, "There is nothing further to discuss ; these two women are discharged for cause." C The alleged independent interference, restraint, and coercion Employee Consuelo Delgado, a union member, was discharged about November 3, 1950, by Shop Foreman Rudy Lopez, who possessed the authority of a super- visor, and whom I find to be a supervisory employee within the meaning of the Act. 2 Knitters had been allowed to work during these periods up until an indefinite date before November 6, 1950, when as a result of an inspection by an investigator of the wage and Hour Division of the Department of Commerce, the Company made a rule forbidding such conduct. I find that such rule was promulgated and publicized to employees and that It was in effect on November 6, 1950, and for some time before. 227260-53-vol. 100-35 532 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD She applied to Texas Unemployment Commission for benefits and on November 14, 1950, the day before Mata, Cruz, and Taylor had their previously described interview with Horkheimer, was reemployed by the latter without the Union's intercession after she had been informed by Kirksey that Respondent had work for her. Two days after her return to work she went to the union hall and talked to Taylor. The following day Lopez, whom she had informed she had joined the Union, told her not to be foolish, to stop going to the Union because if 1 orkheimer knew anything about it, he would fire her, that Taylor and Sofie a would not care anything about her if she were fired. Lopez further stated to, Delgado that if she should tell anyone what he had said to her, they would not believe her since there was nobody to witness what he had told her. On the day Mata and Cruz came in with Taylor to interview Horkheimer, Delgado smiled at Mata and Cruz. Lopez asked her why she had smiled at them and told her not to talk to them because if Horkheimer found out she was friendly with them, he would discharge her. On the evening of November 5, 1951, Lopez came up to Delgado where she was seated in a restaurant, told her that she knew Re- spondent had never fired her nor treated her bad, that he knew she was not going to talk against the factory,' and that if they won the case (the instant case), Respondent would give a party. Once when cautioned by Horkheimer about going into the rest room before quitting time, Delgado told Horkheimer that other girls were doing the same thing. Horkheimer replied that he did not care about the other girls and that she could tell that to Taylor, Gonzales, and Mata, and that if one of these days she did not like her job, she could just punch out and go home and could tell that to Taylor, Gonzales. or Mata. Within a few weeks of this conversation, Delgado was again discharged, the assigned reasons being that she talked too much and could not knit the minimum required quota of iii pairs of socks per day or 86 pairs per week. , Discussion and Conclusions A. The alleged refusal to bargain The record shows a clear refusal to bargain by Respondent on and after November 1950 by: (1) in November 1950, unilaterally reducing the lunch period of its employees from 1 hour to 30 minutes and advancing the closing hour from 5 p. m. to 4: 30 p. m.; (2) in December 1950, unilaterally establishing a quota of production for the knitting of orlon yarn; (3) on January 27, 1951, and September 4, 1951, refusing the Union access to its books of account for the purpose of ascertaining the existence or otherwise of data substantiating Respondent's con- tention it was financially unable to grant an increase in wages; (4) on'-March 9, 1951, unilaterally establishing a quota of production for the knitting of fiber V or dacron yarn,' and (5) on September 7, 1951, unilaterally arriving at com- pleted decision relative to the constituency of a group of employees to be retained ,and a group of employees to be laid off due to lack of production.' a Sofie Gonzales, a former employee of Horkheimer, who had attended, as a union repre- sentative, bargaining conferences between Taylor and Horkheimer. 4 Lopez testified Delgado mentioned the fact she was coming to this hearing the follow- ing day. 6 N. L R B. V. Crompton-Highland Mills, Ino., 337 U. S. 217 ; Tomlinson of High Point, Incorporated, 74 NLRB 681; Southern Saddlery Company, 90 NLRB 1205. ° This violation occurring 34 days before the date of the complaint was not alleged therein. However, there was a general allegation of a continued refusal to bargain and since this particular issue was fully litigated, I consider that any variance that may be regarded as existing between the allegations of the complaint and the ultimate findings are immaterial. See N. L. R B. v. Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company, 304 U. S. 333; N. L. R. B. v. Express Publishinq Company, 312 U. S. 426. CAMP & Mc1_NNES, INC. 533 Bargaining in good faith involves more than just meeting with the collective bargaining representative, going through the surface motions of discussing an agreement, and making a last minute assertion that It would not be of much use to attempt to correlate proposals submitted well over a year earlier by each party to the other, after such a lengthy course of conduct in disparagement of the collective bargaining process as the above.' In view of the foregoing and upon consideration of the totality of Respond- ent's conduct and of the record as a whole, I find that from November 1950 and at all times thereafter, Respondent evidenced an intention to avoid its duty to bargain in good faith and thereby refused to bargain collectively with the Union and interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act 8 B. The alleged discharges and refusals to reinstate The record fails to show that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices by the act of discharging Mata on or about October 17, 1950, and Cruz on or about November 6, 1950. I find that this allegation of the complaint has not been proven. The record does show that employees Mata and Cruz were denied reinstate- ment when they applied for work on or about November 15, 1950. There seems to be no contention on the part of the General Counsel that the'complainants were refused reinstatement because of any recognized conspicuity in the affairs, of the Union. I cannot regard Taylor's conclusionary and uncorroborated testimony that they were both "very active members" as substantial evidence either that they stood apart from other employees in the measure of their assistance to or prominence in the Union or that Respondent was aware of their union membership and activities. However, although Respondent denied know- ing whether or not Mata and Cruz were union members , I find that in such a small plant as this, employing only approximately 36 weavers, Respondent at least entertained a suspicion by November 15, 1951, about 20 months after the consent election, which was confirmed, when they appeared at the plant with the Union's representative, that these employees were members of the Union. But this matter of Respondent's knowledge or lack of knowledge is of relatively slight importance in view of the contention of General Counsel that the com- plainants failed of reinstatement because they sought reemployment through the medium of the Union's international representative, rather than by pre- senting themselves alone, as did employee Delgado who was rehired the day before they were refused reemployment. The General Counsel has argued that Delgado, who applied for work alone, on the one hand„ and Mata and Cruz, who applied for work in company with their union representative, on the other hand, were the recipients of a difference and variance in treatment and that this disparity of treatment, when accompanied by Horkheimer's statement to the effect that there was no need of a union representative coming up, that he was not going to have a union tell him what to do nor how to run his plant, that ilMata and Cruz might as well know that and that if they did not they could get the Union 7 N. L. R. B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc, supra, 337-17. S. 217 ; Tomlinson of High Point, Incorporated, supra, 74 NLRB 681. 8In arriving at this conclusion , I have not relied on the evidence dealing with Respond- ent's unilateral reinstitution of 10-minute recess periods in January 1950 . This occurred before the consent election was held on February 23, 1950 , and more than 6 months prior to the date of the filing of the first charge on December 19, 1950. 534 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to pay them, that all the Union wanted was dues and he was not acting as a col- lection agency for the Union and that if the Union was going to tell him how to run his business it could take over the $3,000 payroll, clearly establishes the fact that the complainants were denied reinstatement for the reason that they engaged in concerted *and union activities for the purposes of mutual aid or protection in violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act. Respondent's contention is that it denied reemployment to Mata and Cruz, not because of any union involvement whatsoever, but because they did not present themselves for work with the "proper attitude." More specifically, Respondent insists that Mata was not rehired because she said she would not take instructions from her foreman and Cruz failed of reemployment because she belligerently stated that Horkheimer did not care, had no children, and she wished he were a woman. What are the facts and what are the inferences that tend to sustain or disprove the conflicting contentions? There is no doubt that Respondent required help about November 15, 1950, and that as a result of a conversation between Kirksey and Horkheimer, Delgado, Mata, and Cruz applied for jobs. All three possessed the knitting experience Respondent required. I find on the testimony of Jesse Mata which is confirmed by the statement taken from Minnie Mata by the investigator of Texas Unemployment Commission, that on the day prior to Mata presenting herself for work with Taylor, Horkheimer had called Mata's husband to his office and told him Mata could go to work the following morning. At this time there was no mention made of her adopting a "proper attitude." This question was not raised until Mata reported to Horkheimer with Taylor, after having learned from both her husband and the Texas Unem- ployment Commission that Respondent was hiring help and had work for her. Kirksey testified that Horkheimer told them in effect that he would rehire the complainants.' Admittedly, Kirksey's memory of conversations relating to reemploying Mata and Cruz was poor. He did recall that after Horkheimer had denied reinstate- ment to these two people, Horkheimer telephoned him to the effect that they had not presented themselves in the manner he thought they should have and he had not rehired them. If, as Horkheimer claims, he had informed Kirksey before the employees were sent to him, that he would hire them only on condition that they displayed "a proper attitude," there would scarcely appear to have been occasion for Horkheimer to later telephone Kirksey, stating, or apologizing for'the fact, that he had not hired them. It seems more likely that Horkheimer would have felt it necessary to explain his conduct if he had not kept an uncon- ditional agreement to reemploy, than if he had forewarned the agency that the hiring of these employees was contingent upon the factor of attitude. Kirksey testified that he told the girls in effect that Horkheimer would probably rehire them if they went and saw him about a job. Under these circumstances, and because of Kirksey's admitted imperfect recollection of the conversations, I believe and find, that at the time Horkheimer first talked to Kirksey, he did not condition his willingness to rehire upon the applicant's manifestation of an acceptable "attitude," and that it was not until after the Union appeared on the scene in the presence of Taylor and during the course of the rather acrimonious ° Q Now let me ask you Mr. Kirksey, if Mr. Horkheimer did not tell you that all three of those girls, Minnie Mata, Consuelo Delgado, and Elvira Cruz, that he would rehire all three of them? A. It was words to that effect. I believe I talked to Mr. Horkheimer at different times about different people concerned. CAMP & McINNES, INC. 535 session between himself and Mata and Cruz, that he developed an aversion to engaging their services" Was Horkheimer's disapproval of Mata's and Cruz' attitudes the genuine reason for his refusing to reinstate them, or merely a pretext conceived to conceal an antiunion motivation? Does this case come within the principle that an employer may, without violating the Act, discharge or fail to reinstate an employee for any reason it chooses or for no reason at all, provided the reason is not one proscribed by the Act? The answer to these questions requires a further analysis and sifting of the evidence. It was admitted by Foreman Lopez that Mata resented some remarks he had made to her about her husband. However trivial this incident may possibly seem to a disinterested and impartial trier of fact or reader of a cold record, I have no doubt, after observing both Lopez and Mate, that the latter was profoundly distressed by whatever Lopez said to her while she was walking from her work station on the way to the office with him on October 17, 1950. I find, on the testimony of both Lopez and illata, that on arriving at the office, Mata said to Horkheimer that Lopez had talked to her about her husband, that she did not like Lopez' talking about her husband and her private affairs, asked Horkheimer to instruct Lopez not to say anything about her husband in front of her at work or any place, and stated to Horkheimer she wanted Lopez kept out of it. It is upon this statement, I believe, that Horkheimer later seized and placed a distorted construction projected into the November 15 meeting, when Mata returned with Taylor looking for work 29 days later. I agree with the General Counsel that it is highly unlikely that Mata, who-had been unemployed for over 4 weeks and who wanted and needed work, and went to the shop with the under- standing that she was to be rehired and for the purpose of procuring employment, should then and there upon interviewing her employer, announce that she would not work under or accept the instructions of her foreman. Unquestionably con- siderable ill-feeling existed between Mata and Lopez She had made her atti- tude entirely clear on October 17 by in effect demanding that Lopez be "kept out" of her personal affairs. But this expression of offense over what she considered was an unwarranted intrusion by her foreman into matters which were not his concern (an expression which indeed she perhaps would not have had the temerity to reiterate to her employer when she was no longer so immediately upset as she had been on October 17, had it not been for the protective presence of Miss Taylor) falls far short of an assertion that she insisted on her foreman being "kept out" of the work she hoped to procure to the extent that she would take no orders from him. It seems quite apparent that both Horkheimer and Taylor were emphatic in their statements of their relative positiohs during the interview and that as the meeting progressed, if riot at its start when to his annoyance Taylor appeared, Horkheimer allowed himself to become irked into the position of not hiring two needed employees whom he had the fairly definite intention of gmploying before they appeared on the scene with the union representative. In the face of the testimony of both Mata and Taylor, whom I believe, that Mata did not make a statement in the intendment ascribed to her by Respondent, and in view of the extreme improbability that a work applicant to whom unemployment benefits had been denied, and who was desirous of a job, would, for no apparent reason, announce IU From my observation of Foreman Lopez, a consideration of his interest in the case, and the fact of his continued parrotting of the phrase "proper attitude," I am satisfied his testimony lends no support to the claim that Mats, and Cruz were asked to come to the plant merely for the purpose of a preliminary discussion concerning their willingness to abide by the Company's rules and regulations. 536 - DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD or confirm an alleged previous assertion that she would take no orders or instructions, I find that Mata did not refuse or say that she would refuse to accept such orders. Some things may well have been said during this heated dis- cussion that better would have been left unsaid, but I am satisfied Respondent has at least indulged in wishful thinking in straining the meaning of Mata's earnest demand that Lopez be kept out of her private affairs " into a defiant refusal to work under the orders of her boss. Respondent seeks to support its claim that Cruz was denied reinstatement because of the antagonism and belligerence she displayed at the interview, by testimony that when Horkheimer was attempting to explain that she and Mata would be reinstated provided they would come to work with a proper attitude, Cruz told him, "Well, you don't care anything about us, you have no children, you don't care if we work or not," and that she wished IIorkheinler were a woman. Witnesses called by Respondent were uncertain as to whether Cruz made reference to Horkheimer not caring about Mata and herself, whether or not they worked and Forkheimer having no children, before or after Horkheimer had stated she would not be reemployed. Of course if this alleged statement were made and the asserted belligerency and antagonism were manifested after Cruz was denied reinstatement, it could have no bearing on the reason impelling Horkheimer's decision not to reinstate her. That a reference was made at some- time during the interview to Mrs. Cruz' daughter or to the subject of children is clear. Horkheimer, in an apparent effort to satisfy Taylor or Mata and Cruz, or all three of them, that satisfactory management-labor relations prevailed and that Respondent treated its employees with friendly consideration, expatiated upon the kindly deeds he had performed for employees, including his assistance to Mrs. Cruz in connection with some undisclosed situation concerning her daugh- ter and herself Cruz expressed her belief that such considerations had no bearing on the question of her reemployment and objected to Horkheimer bring- ing up the subject of her slaughter or any personal matters. It appears from Taylor's testimony, and I find, that after Horkheimer had told Mata that she was "fired as of now," he turned to Cruz and asked her if she wanted to work at the plant Cruz responded in the affirmative and added that while Taylor was present she wanted to be assured that she would not be bothered by people telling her, and she would not like W he told, that she did not have to work at the plant if she did not want to and that she could quit at any time.' Thereupon Hork- heimer told Cruz that she too was discharged. I have no great doubt but that Cruz expressed her resentment at what she considered Horkheimer's self-right- eousness and impropriety in projecting a possibly atrabilious family affair into the discussion, but in view of the implausibility of Horkheimer's testimony that she brought up the matter of children "out of the blue sky" and the divergent and contradictory testimony of the witnesses called by the Respondent, I find that her remarks anent children were less "belligerent" and "antagonistic" than contended, and as testified by Taylor were to the effect that she did not see what bearing Horkheimer's help in her daughter's situation had upon the question of her own unemployment.13 13 Significantly, Horkheimer testified in part that Mata said, "You keep him [Lopez] away from me." 13 As appears from the testimony of Delgado , Lopez employed much the same language In talking to her. 13 It is noteworthy that Horkheimer did not testify, as claimed by Mrs. Horkheimer, that Cruz said she would "whip" him. In direct examination by the General Counsel, he con- fined his testimony as to the latter part of Cruz' alleged outburst to "You have no children." Later, while under examination by counsel for Respondent , Horkhelmer added that at about the same time she made the remark about his having no children , she also stated that she wished he were a woman. CAMP & McINNES, INC. 537 I do not deem it necessary, and indeed feel that without guesswork it would be impossible, to find, lacking a reliable stenographic transcript, what were Cruz' precise words when Horkheimer interjected his reference to her daughter. Suffice it to say that I believe that she was not fully correctly quoted by Respondent's witnesses, that what she did say was induced by Horkheimer's statement and did not amount to such an unprovoked display of antagonism and belligerence as Respondent would have one believe. In any event, the real issue to be decided is not what Cruz said but whether Respondent's refusal to reinstate her was because of what she said and bow she said it or for some other reason. Having thus attempted to winnow the wheat of truth and pertinence from the chaff of fiction and irrelevance, we face the question: Were Mata and Cruz denied reinstatement because one "stated she would not work under the instruc- tions and direction of the shop foreman" and the other "without just cause or provocation, in an angry and extremely belligerent manner, shook her finger at Jack B. Horkheimer, the Manager, and said, you don't care, you have no children ; I wish you were a woman"? 14 or were they denied reinstatement because "They joined or assisted the Union or engaged in other concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection"? 16 More simply the question for determination is : Was Respondent's act moti- vated by the complainants' union or concerted activities? Arrival at an answer to this question, in view of certain further facts and circumstances surrounding and shedding light on the motives of Respondent, should not be difficult, for one who has dwelt with the case and come to know, however slightly, its cast of characters. The attendance at a conference with an employer, in company with a union representative, of two employees for the purpose of procuring reinstatement unquestionably is a protected concerted activity. If, in the course of such activity, employees should employ forceful argument and language and display manners indicative of belligerence and anger such as are not uncommon to standards of conversation in industrial plants, such conduct does not lose its protected character. The events occurring at Respondent's office on November 15, 1950, were a part and parcel of the protected concerted activity in which Mata and Cruz were engaging. Immediately upon their arrival, Horkheimer expressed his disapprobation of the fact that they were accompanied by their union representative and indulged in a gratuitous diatribe clearly expressing his resentment concerning what he claimed was the Union's attempt to run his business and what he called Mata's and Cruz' troublesomeness. Respondent's disapproval of the concerted efforts of Mata and Cruz is further emphasized by Horkheimer's statement to Delgado that if she did not like her job she could just punch out and tell that to Taylor Gonzales and Mata, as well as by Lopez' :antiunion statements to Delgado that Taylor and Gonzales would not care if she %, ere fired, and that she should not talk to Mata and Cruz and that if Horkheimer .yarned she talked to them or had been at the union hall, he would fire her. V he reinstatement of employees is very much of a routine procedure. On the !,y before Mata's and Cruz' appearance, Delgado, patently not an obsequious - person (whose status was not materially different from theirs, and who indeed, according to Respondent, had not been a satisfactory employee and had been discharged only about 11 days earlier because of frequent absences ), came to the plant alone, and was rehired by Horkheimer after only a brief discussion concerning a claim for unemployment compensation. In marked contrast was the procedure adopted by Horkheimer when Mata and Cruz appeared, not alone " The quoted portions appear in paragraph 6 of answer of Respondent. 25 The quoted portion appears in paragraph 8 of the complaint. 538 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD as did Delgado, but in the company of Taylor. After Horkheimer made his reference to the fact that there was no occasion for the presence of a union representative, the business at hand, so simply dispatched in the case of Delgado, took on such importance as to involve the calling in of a stenographer 6 to take notes, the summoning of Alvarado, the mechanic, and the invasion of Lopez, the foreman, York, the timekeeper, and Mrs. Horkheimer, the payroll clerk. Amidst this assorted assemblage, Horkheimer moved forth to debate. The complaints he proceeded to voice, rather than directed against Mata and Cruz as individuals or toward a thrashing out of disciplinary or operational problems, as Respond- ent would seem to desire to have one believe they were, were fundamentally addressed to a criticism of the Union and the concerted activities of Mata and Cruz in utilizing the services of their union representative in seeking reinstate- ment. Finally, Horkheimer not only refused to reinstate either Mata or Cruz but announced that they were through, thus placing them forever beyond the peradventure of reinstatement. A direct result of this conduct was, in the minds of employees who had received assurances before they called upon the Union for assistance that they probably would be employed upon applying for work, and who were denied reinstatement either despite or because of the Union's participation in the interview, to discredit the Union and undermine its effec- tiveness as their bargaining representative. I am satisfied that Mata was not denied reinstatement on November 15 for having objected on October 17 to Lopez talking about her husband and asking Horkheimer to keep him away from her or for admitting to Mrs. Horkheimer on November 15 that she had so objected, and that Cruz was not denied reinstatement because she excepted to Horkheimer's reference to her daughter. These incidents were, in my opinion, advanced as pretexts and I believe the real reason for Respondent's denial of reinstatement to the complainants, whom Horkheimer characterized as trouble- makers, lies elsewhere. Mrs. Horkheimer at first testified that Cruz made the remark about children after Horkheimer announced : he and Mata would not be reemployed Then she testified Cruz made the remark before the announcement. She ended up by testi- fying she did not know which came first. Lopez testified that Horkheimer said he would not reinstate "them" and that was when Cruz said Horkheimer did not care if she had her job or not, he did not have any children. York testified that at the meeting on November 15, 1950, "after the statements came up" Cruz stated Horkheimer did not care whether she had a job or not due to the fact that he did not have any children and that "I don't recall anything else" or anything said by Minnie Mata. Evidence of this character I can but regard as altogether too insubstantial to lend support to the burden resting upon Respond- ent of going forward with evidence controlling, negating, or seeking to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination which I find was made out by the General Counsel. Indeed, if any weight were to be given this testimony, it would tend to prove that Cruz' alleged offensive remarks and behavior were the result of, rather than the cause of, the refusal to reinstate and to confirm Mata's testi- mony, corroborated by Taylor that she did not say on November 15 that she would not work under Lopez' orders or instructions. On all the evidence and the record considered as a whole, I am convinced and find that. Respondent's refusal to reinstate Mata and Cruz, whom Hork- heimer said he had taken off the street and taught to knit, was prompted by Horkheimer's opposition to their concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection ; that the refusal was made under circumstances which dis- 1e Respondent did not undertake to account for the fact that the stenographer was not called as a witness. CAMP & McINNES, INC. close a clear motivation of hostility to the Union, which Horkheimer told Taylor be disliked ; it operated as a warning to all employees of the danger attached to reliance upon and affiliation with a union ; and hence the refusal to rein- state generally discouraged union membership and consequently constituted a discrimination in regard to the hire, tenure , and conditions of employment of Respondent's employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act. C. The alleged independent interfei ence, restraint, and coercion Delgado impressed me as a sincere, forthright, and reliable witness As apparent from findings made in that portion of this report which appears as section III, C, she was told on November 15, 1950, by Foreman Lopez not to talk to Mata and Cruz because if Horkheimer found out she was friendly with them he would discharge her, was told on November 17, 1950, by Lopez not to be foolish, to stop going to the Union, that if Horkheimer knew anything about it he would fire her, and was told on November 5, 1951, by Lopez that she knew Respondent had never fired her 17 nor treated her bad, that he knew she was not going to talk against the factory and that if Respondent won the case, it would give a party. I reject as unreliable the testimony of Lopez insofar as it denies that of Delgado, for the reason that upon my observation of Lopez, much of his testimony imparted the very definite impression of having been learned and repeated by rote, lack- ing in candor, and inspired by a desire to support and protect himself with his employer rather than to relate the truth. I find that these statements constituted threats and warnings to refrain from assisting, and remaining members of, the Union, as alleged, that they tended to inhibit and interfere with the rights guar- anteed to employees by the Act, and are, consequently, violative of Section 8 (a) (1). IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent set forth in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and com- merce among the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V TILE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I will recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action which will effectuate the purposes of the Act. It has been found that Respondent by its course and conduct on and after November 1950, refused to bargain col- lectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly, I shall recommend that Respondent, upon request, resume negotiations with the Union as the exclusive representative of its employees in the appropriate unit, for the purpose of executing a bargaining contract and continue said negotiations with due dispatch , and if an understanding is reached , embody such understanding in a signed agreement. It has been found that Respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz . Respondent cur- tailed its operations on September 7, 1951, and completely ceased its operations "The record shows Delgado was discharged on November 3, 1950, and again in December 1950 540 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD on October r6, 1951. There is no contention and there is no evidence that such curtailment and cessation of operations were for other than legitimate busi- ness reasons. It is possible that Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz might have been affected in the reduction of operations on September 7, 1951, even absent Respond- ent's unfair labor practices, and it is apparent that they would have been laid off at the time of cessation of all operations on October 16, 1951, but the record furnishes no basis for determining the order in which they might have been laid off or discharged. Under these circumstances, I shall recommend that in the event Respondent has resumed or hereafter shall resume operations, Respond- ent offer to Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz, in the order in which they would be reinstated in accordance with the system of seniority or other nondiscriminatory practice heretofore applied by Respondent, full reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights, and privileges. I shall further recommend that Respondent make whole Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz for any loss of pay they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimination against them, by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to the amount which each would have earned as wages from November 15, 1950, the date of the discrimination against them, to either September 7, 1951, or October 16, 1951, on whichever date they would have been laid off in accordance with the system of seniority or other nondis- criminatory practice heretofore applied by Respondent in the conduct of its business, and from the date of Respondent's resumption of operations, if any, to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less the net earnings of each during the said period, the back pay to be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289; and that Respondent make available to the Board, upon request, payroll and other records to facilitate the checking of the amount of back pay due. It has also been found that Foreman Lopez' statements to employee Delgado on or about November 15 and 17, 1950, and November 5, 1951, constituted inter- ference with the rights guaranteed to employees by the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that Respondent cease and desist therefrom. Because of the Respondent's unlawful conduct and its underlying purpose and tendency, I am of the opinion that the unfair labor practices found are per- suasively related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act and that danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless the order is coextensive with the threat. In order, therefore, to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7, to prevent a recurrence of unfair labor practices, and thefeby to minimize industrial strife which burdens and obstructs commerce, and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, I will recommend that the Respondent cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, AFL, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. All production workers of Respondent employed at its Alamo Division, exclusive of office and clerical employees, supervisors, professional employees, guards, and watchmen, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col- lective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act. CAMP & MCINNES, INC. 541 3. The Union was on February 23, 1950, and at all times since has been, the exclusive representative, within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act, of all employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. 4. By refusing to bargain collectively with the aforesaid Union, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act. 5. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of Minnie Mata and Elvira Cruz, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. 6. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.] Appendix A NOTICE TO. ALL EMPLOYEES Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that: WE WILL NOT threaten and warn our employees to refrain from assisting and remaining members Of INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GAR1nENT WORKERS UNION. AFL, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our em- ldoyees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist INTERNATIONAL LADIES' GARMENT WoRI:ERs UNION, AFL, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection or to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. WE WiTL OFFER to Minnie Mate and Elvira Cruz immediate and full rein- statement to their former or substantially equivalent positions without prejudice to any seniority or other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of the discrimination. WE WILL BARGAIN collectively upon request with the above-named union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below with respect to rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, and if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is : All production workers employed in our Alamo Division, exclusive of office and clerical employees, supervisors, guards, and watchmen. All our employees are free to become or remain members of the above-named union or any other labor organization. We will not discriminate in regard 542 DECISIONS OF -- ATIONA1i LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment against any employee because of his membership in or activity on behalf of any such labor organization. CAMP AND MCINNES , INC., ALAMO DIVISION, DnvployeT . Dated-------------------- By--------------------------------------------- (Representative) (Title) This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. POLYNESIAN ARTS, INC. and UNITED PACKINOIIOUSE WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO and NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF OPERATIVE POTTERS, LOCAL UNION No. 227, AFL, PARTY TO THE CONTRACT. Case NO. 9-CA-434. August 8, 1950 Decision and Order On January 5, 1952, Trial Examiner Albert P. Wheatley issued his Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act, and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Re- port and a supporting brief. The Board 1 has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Inter- mediate Report, the exceptions and brief, and the entire record in this case, and hereby adopts the Trial Examiner's findings, conclusions, and recommendations.2 Order Upon the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondent, Polynesian Arts, Inc., May- field, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall : 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Dominating or interfering with the formation or administra- tion of, or contributing support or assistance to, National Brotherhood of Operative Potters, Local Union No. 227, AFL, or any other labor organization. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated Its powers in connection with this case to a three -member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. 7 With respect to the 8 (a) (2) issue, see Jack Smith Beverages. Inc., 94 NLRB 1401. 100 NLRB No. 86.