Franklin Tanning Co.

192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petitions in Metro R-K, Incorporated, 13-RC-3133; Matagrano ' s, Inc ., 13-RC-3134; and Gerolmo Wholesale Beverage Company, 13-RC-3136, be, and they hereby are, dismissed. [Text of Direction of Elections omitted from publication.] FRANKLIN TANNING COMPANY and INTERNATIONAL FUR AND LEATHER WORKERS UNION OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, Petitioner. Case No. 6-RC-1108. April 17, 1953 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Emil E. Narick, hearing officer., The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Peterson]. Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds: 1. The Employer is engaged incommerce withinthe meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent cer- tain employees of the Employer. The Employer and the Intervenor' move to dismiss contending, inter alia, that District 3 and District Council 3 of the Peti- tioner, both encompassing the same geographical area, consti- tute a single entity, and that District 3 is a labor organization, having an interest in the employees sought, which has not complied with Section 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Act.' The Peti- tioner, in opposing the motion to dismiss , contends that District i The original hearing was held on July 28, 1952. On December 10 and 11 , 1952, a second hearing was held pursuant to an order to reopen to obtain additional evidence on the status and activities of District 3 and Curwensville Organizing Committee as labor organizations, and with regard to the extent of their respective interests in the employees sought by the Petitioner. 2United Leather Workers, Local No. 31, Congress of Industrial Organizations. SIn moving to dismiss , the Employer and the Intervenor further contend that ( 1) the non- complying Curwensville Organizing Committee is a labor organization having an interest in the employees sought and must, therefore , comply; ( 2) the Petitioner 's president, although having filed a non-Communist affidavit, did so fraudulently, and is in fact in accord and sympathy with the aims and purposes of the Communist Party, so that Petitioner is not in full compliance; and (3) that District Director Woolis is an officer of the international and that the Board, pursuant to its Rules and Regulations , should conduct an investigation to determine whether the Petitioner failed to designate the alleged office in its constitution so as to circum- vent the filing requirements of the Act. We find no merit in ( 1) and ( 2) for the reasons assigned in United Tanners, Inc., 103 NLRB 760, where similar contentions were raised with regard to a local organizing committee and to the president of the same petitioner as in the case at bar. We also find that contention (3) is without merit for the reason that the question of whether a union has failed to identify all of its officers is not litigable . Sunbeam Corporation, 93 NLRB 104 NLRB No. 11. FRANKLIN TANNING COMPANY 193 3 and District Council 3 are separate entities, the former simply a geographical subdivision of the complying Inter- national, with its director, Bernard Woolis, negotiating and signing contracts on behalf of the International, and the latter constituting the district executive board,4 which functions in an advisory capacity to the district between sessions of the dis- trict convention, but which has no other function. The Petitioner further contends that there exists no organization or entity in District 3 known as, or functioning as, a "district council" within the definition thereof contained in the Petitioner's con- stitution and the Leather Division's bylaws. The Petitioner's constitution provides for the organization of a "District Council," which, if organized, "shall secure a charter from the International Union"; it further provides that the "International... aid its chartered bodies and their duly authorized representatives are authorized to handle and settle all grievances relating to hours, wages and working conditions for the workers in their respective jurisdictions." A by law of the Leather Division, though entitled "District" provides, in part, that "District Councils may be organized by the local unions in geographical districts designated by the Leather Division Executive Board . . . Such district councils may elect officers and provide for district council revenues...." At the original hearing, the Petitioner did not attempt to differentiate between District 3 and District Council 3, nor did the Petitioner claim, or seek to prove, that no chartered body identifiable as a constitutionally created "district council" existed within the geographical area known as District 3. The Petitioner at that hearing insisted that District 3, or District Council 3, was not a labor organization, and that, even though the demand for recognition was made on District 3 stationery, the request for recognition was on behalf of the Petitioner, and that therefore District 3 was not inthe picture with regard to the employees sought.5 At the reopened hearing, the Petitioner for the first time alleged a distinction between District 3 and District Council 3. To overcome this allegation, the Employer introduced a District Council 3 charter dated 1945, as evidence of the present existence of a constitutionally defined and authorized District Council 3. This charter obviously creates and delineates a district council corresponding in scope and authority in the "district council" defined by the Petitioner's constitution and the Leather Division's bylaws. Although, as contended by the 1205. Moreover, we are administratively satisfied, after careful consideration of the Peti- tioner's constitution and Leather Division's Bylaws , that the Employer's contention does not raise a sufficient question as to whether Woolis is, in fact, an officer of the Petitioner, to warrant further administrative investigation of this facet of the compliance issue . Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc., 103 NLRB 1. 4 This "executive board" comprises the district director , the elected officers of the district, and the "staff." The "staff" consists of several employees of the International who perform organizational work within the district and who serve under the direction of the district director. 5 The petition herein was filed by and in the name of the Petitioner , the international, only, and the authorization cards designate only the International. 194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Petitioner, certain of the individuals named in the charter are no longer associated with the Petitioner and seven of the locals named therein are completely defunct, nevertheless, the charter specifically states that it is given not only to the persons and locals named therein, but also to their successors. Moreover, the Petitioner did not offer any evidence tending to prove that the charter had ever been revoked by the Petitioner or had been handed back to the Petitioner by the members. We conclude that the organization that exists as the District 3 organization at the present time is the same organization that was chartered as District Council 3 in 1945 in that it performs the same functions and is clothed with identical authority. It holds an annual district convention at which local, district, and International activities and plans are discussed and adopted; it collects a per capita tax from each of its member locals; and, although it does not have a constitution or bylaws, it elects a full slate of officers at each convention. The district director and the organizers, although paid employees of the Petitioner, are active at the district conventions either as organizers, planners, or officers of the district.' The Petitioner's official newspaper has carried in several editions stories of the ac- tivities of District 3 in organizing locals and negotiating in- creased wages for the members of various locals. Moreover, at the 1951 and 1952 District 3 conventions resolutions were passed directing continued concerted attempts to organize the Employer's employees. By reason of the foregoing, and because the district director plans to negotiate and sign any contracts that might result from a certification of the Petitioner as the bargaining representative of the Employer's employees, we conclude that (1) District Council 3 is the same organization that Petitioner designates as District 3; (2) District Council 3 is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act; and (3) District Council 3 has sufficient interest in the Employer's employees to compel its compliance with the filing provisions of the Act.' Accordingly, the holding of the election directed herein is conditioned upon the compliance of District Council 3. If District Council 3 fails to achieve compliance within 2 weeks from the date of this Decision, the Board's Regional Director will so advise the Board. No election shall be held unless and until compliance has been achieved.' 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of employees of the Employer within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.9 6 Joseph M. Reinard, a paid organizer of the petitioning International, is also the elected recording secretary of the district. ?United Tanners , Inc., 103 NLRB 760, and cases cited therein. 8 United Tanners , Inc., supra. 9We find without merit the contentionoftheEmployer and the Intervenor that their contract, covering the employees sought , is a bar to this proceeding , as the Employer and the Intervenor mutally agreed to open the contract before the automatic renewal clause could operate to ex- tend the contract for an additional year . The contract, therefore, expired on September 1. 1952, STANDARD OIL COMPANY 195 4. The following employees of the Employer constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of the Act:10 All production and maintenance employees11 at the Em- ployer's Curwensville, Pennsylvania, plant, excluding office clerical employees, guards, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Act. [Text of Direction of Election omitted from publication.] 10 The parties stipulated as to the appropriate unit. 11 Ciprian and Dale, the two students who, depending on financial conditions , may or may not leave the Employer 's employ to return to school, perform the same .work and receive the same pay and benefits as others in the plant and therefore possess sufficient interest to participate in the voting. STANDARD OIL COMPANY and OIL WORKERS INTERNA- TIONAL UNION, CIO, and its LOCAL 348, Petitioner. Case No. 18-RC-1776. April 17, 1953 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION Upon a petition duly filed, a hearing was held before a hear- ing officer of the National Labor Relations Board. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Upon the entire record in this case,' the Board finds: 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce withinthe meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. 2. The labor organization named below claims to represent certain employees of the Employer. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of certain employees of the Employer, within the meaning of Section 9 (c) (1) and Section2 (6) and (7) of the Act. 4. The unit requested herein involves 3 of the 4 product pipe- line terminals on the Employer's western pipeline, the fourth being presently represented in a separate unit by another union. The parties are in agreement as to the classifications of em- ployees to be included in an appropriate unit. The Employer, however, urges that only 3 separate terminal units would be appropriate. In its opposition to the single multiterminal unit sought by the Petitioner, the Employer relies mainly upon: (1) The fact that each of the 3 terminals falls under the jurisdiction of the manager of a separate and distinct sales field division in the Employer's administrative organization; (2) the assertion that employees have no community of interest because of the distance between terminals, the lack of interchange or transfer of employees between the 3 terminals, and because their area 1 The Employer's request for oral argument is denied because in our opinion the record and briefs adequately present the positions of the parties. 104 NLRB No. 12.