Southeastern Pipe Line Co.

SOUTHEASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY 575 SOUTHEASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY and OIL WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, CIO. Case No. 10-CA-1360. April 30, 1953 SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER On March 6, 1953, the Board issued a Decision and Order in the above-entitled proceeding.' Thereafter, on March 30, 1953, the Respondent moved to reconsider the order and to limit the scope thereof. The Board,' having duly considered the matter, decides as follows: The Respondent requests reconsideration of the finding that the transfer of T. E. Barcroft was discriminatory, upon the alleged authority of the Greeneville Cabinet case.' The two cases do not present analagous situations. In Greeneville, the Trial Examiner found, and the Board adopted his finding, that the transfer of Waddell was not a "punishment intended to have been visited upon him because of his known union activities. Consequently, no constructive discharge has been shown." In the present case, the Trial Examiner found, with Board approval, that Barcroft's transfer was due to "Barcroft's union membership and activity and Respondent' s desire to remove him from proximity to employees interested in the Union and to Respondent's desire to break up the Union." In other words, the transfer of Waddell in the Greeneville case was lawfully motivated, whereas that of Barcroftinthe present case was made for unlawful reasons . The different motives dictate different results. The Respondent also moves to limit the scope of the Board's order as follows: (a) By eliminating the words "any other labor organization" in paragraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of the order, which require the Respondent to cease and desist from discouraging membership in, threatening employees with reprisals because of member- ship or activities in behalf of, and soliciting employees to withdraw from, Oil Workers International Union, CIO, or "any other labor organization." We believe that the evidence justifies the inference that the Respondent's unlawful conduct was moti- vated by hostility to labor organizations in general and not merely to the Oil Workers Union. In these circumstances, the prohibition against unlawful conduct directed at membership in the Oil Workers Union or "any other labor organization" is deemed necessary to reach the threat implicit in the Re- spondent's unlawful conduct 4 1 103 NLRB 341. Z Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and Murdock]. 3 Greeneville Cabinet Co., Incorporated , 102 NLRB 1677. 4Associated Press v. N. L. R. B., 301 U.S. 103; Stokely Foods, Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 193 F. 2d 736 (C.A. 5); N. L. R. B. v. Tappan Stove Company, 174 F. 2d 1007 (C.A. 6); The Canyon Corporation v. N. L. R. B.. 128 F . 2d 953 (C.A. 8). 104 NLRB No. 82. 576 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) By adding the word "discriminatorily" betweenthe words "by" and "transferring" in the second line of paragraph 1 (a) of the order. The Respondent contends that the order as written is invalid in that it would prohibit all transfers of personnel. We disagree with this interpretation. The paragraph prohibits only discriminatory transfer of personnel. The Respondent's proposed amendment is unnecessary. (c) By adding the word "coercively" to paragraphs 1 (c) and (d) which require the Respondent to cease and desist from soliciting employees to withdraw from the Union and from interrogating employees concerning union activities. We reject this proposed amendment as unduly restrictive and misleading. (d) By eliminating from paragraph 1 (a) the provision which reads "or in any other manner discriminating against them in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment." The clause to which the Respondent objects is practically a verbatim copy of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, which is the section violated by a discrimination against an employee. The Board regularly includes this language in its cease-and-desist orders when it finds discrimination, because discrimination as to some terms and conditions of employment is likely to lead to discrimination as to others. The courts have, in innumerable cases, enforced orders worded in the manner which the Respondent considers objectionable. (e) By eliminating the broad cease-and-desist order con- tained in paragraph 1 (e). The Respondent's unlawful activities, including the discriminatory transfer of Barcroft, go to the very heart of the Act and indicate a purpose to defeat self- organization of its employees. We are convinced that the unfair labor practices committed by the Respondent are potentially related to other unfair labor practices proscribed by the Act, and that the danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the Respondent's conduct in the past. The preventive purpose of the Act will be thwarted unless the Board's order is coextensive with the threat. Accordingly, in order to make effective the interdependent guarantees of Section 7 and thus effectuate the policies of the Act, an order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from in any manner infringing upon the rights of employees guaranteed in the Act is deemed necessary.5 (f) By limiting the order to those pumping stations and ware- houses where the unfair labor practices were found to have been committed. The Respondent operates pipelines from Point St. Joe, Florida, to various points within the State of Georgia. In 1951, the Board found appropriate a unit of oper- ating and maintenance employees employed by the Respondent throughout its pipeline system.' The Union won the election directed and was certified as bargaining representative of employees in the appropriate unit. The unfair labor practices SN. L. R . B. v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F. 2d 748 (C.A. 9); Stokely Foods, Inc., 91 NLRB 1267, enfd. 193 F . 2d 736 (C.A. 5); Standard Dry Wall Products , Inc., 91 NLRB 544, enfd. 188 F . 2d 362 (C.A. 3); N. L. R. B. v. Entwistle Manufacturing Co., 120 F. 2d 532 (C.A. 4). ® Southeastern Pipe Line Company, 94 NLRB 1177. MISSION APPLIANCE CORPORATION 577 committed by the Respondent were aimed at undermining the Union and destroying its majority status throughout the unit. There is little doubt but that the impact of the unfair labor practices was systemwide. The danger of future unfair labor practices is as great in one part of the system as in another. The Board therefore reaffirms the need for extending its order to all parts of the Respondent ' s pipeline system.' As the Respondent's motion is without merit, we shall deny it. ORDER IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent' s motion to reconsider the Board ' s order of March 6, 1953, and to limit the scope thereof, -be, and it hereby is, denied. TN. L. R. B. v. United Mine Workers of America, 195 F. 2d 961 (C. A. 6); N. L. R. B. v. T. W. Phillips Gas & Oil Company, 141 F. 2d 304 (C.A. 3). MISSION APPLIANCE CORPORATION and SHEET METAL WORKERS' INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION , LOCAL 371, AFL, Petitioner. Case No . 21-RC-2886 . April 30, 1953 DECISION AND ORDER Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before George H. O'Brien, hearing officer . The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-member panel [ Members Houston , Styles, and Peter- son]. Upon the entire record in this case , the Board finds: 1. The Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. 2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent employees of the Employer. 3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representation of em loyees of the Employer within the mean- ing of Section 9 (c) (1 ) and Section 2 (6) and ( 7) of the Act, for the following reasons: The Intervenor (Association of Gas Appliance Workers) contends that its current contract , which covers the produc- tion , maintenance , and office clerical employees at the Em- ployer ' s Los Angeles and Hawthorne, California, plants, constitutes a bar to this proceeding . The Petitioner, which seeks a unit of only production and maintenance employees at these plants of the Employer , contends that the current contract is not a bar because a schism has occurred within